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(15883)

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

TURKEY

PART XXXVII

JANUARY TO JUNE 1939

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Further Correspondence respecting Turkey.

PART XXXVII.—JANUARY TO JUNE 1939.

[E 132/132/44] No. 1.

Sir P. Loraine to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received January* 5, 1939.)

(No. 666.)

My Lord, *Angora, December* 27, 1938.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the fourth quadrennial grand congress of the People's party met, in extraordinary session, at Angora on the 26th December to elect a new supreme chief in the place of Atatürk, who, in accordance with article 2 of the party statutes, was "permanent supreme chief." The congress, by a unanimous vote, modified article 2 in the sense that Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, is declared to be the "founder and eternal chief" of the party and M. Ismet Inönü "permanent supreme chief," this post being one whose holder is irremovable and which can only be rendered vacant by death, serious illness, or resignation. This decision appears to pledge the People's party to re-elect M. Ismet Inönü at each succeeding presidential election, and thus to render his tenure of the presidency of the republic *in practice* permanent. Should this prove to be the case, an important precedent will probably be created, almost equivalent to an agreed interpretation of the Constitution.

2. After his election, M. Inönü appointed the Prime Minister, M. Celal Bayar, vice-president of the party, and the Minister of the Interior, Dr. Refik Saydam, secretary-general, and delivered a speech in which he reaffirmed the principles on which the party is based, paid a tribute to its achievement, stressed the fact that the loyalty of the people to the Republican régime was more marked than ever, and expressed his conviction that, under the wise guidance of the Grand National Assembly in which all powers were vested, the progress of Turkey would be maintained. A short summary of the speech is enclosed.(1)

I have, &c.
PERCY LORAINE.

(1) Not printed.

[R 318/1/22] No. 2.

Sir P. Loraine (*No.* 1) *to the Earl of Perth* (*Rome*).—(*Repeated to Foreign Office; Received January* 11.)

(No. 5. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, January* 11, 1939.

FOLLOWING for Secretary of State:—

"From certain remarks which Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has let drop, I sense that recent allusions in the press messages, &c., to the possibility that Italy may obtain credits from the United Kingdom in return for concessions to British point of view about Spain, have created some uneasiness in the mind of Turkish Government.

"It is not in the least that they doubt goodwill or good sense of His Majesty's Government; but, if I may interpret their mind, it would be that they fear Italian guile in securing a bargain which will rescue Italy from her serious economic dilemma and leave her hands free in Eastern Mediterranean in return for renunciations in the west, which circumstances are bound sooner or later to impose. Minister for Foreign Affairs, rightly or wrongly, is much impressed with the gravity of Italy's economic difficulties.

"Foregoing is merely intended for your information. May I, however, suggest that if during conversations which Prime Minister and yourself are about to take in Rome you felt able to give me any message for the Turkish Government from which they will understand (1) that at such an important juncture you are maintaining the close and friendly contact with them which you had offered to Dr. Aras; (2) that you are mindful of their point of view and careful for their interests, I am certain that a very good impression will be made."

[E 353/138/44] No. 3.

Sir G. Ogilvie-Forbes to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 38.)
My Lord, *Berlin, January 11, 1939.*

WITH reference to Sir P. Loraine's despatch No. 522 of the 19th October, 1938, I have the honour to report that M. Numan, the Turkish Under-Secretary of State, is at present in Berlin with a view to concluding agreements with the German Government (1) on the subject of the Montreux Straits Convention; and (2) on the allocation of the credit of 150 million reichsmarks recently granted by Germany to Turkey. His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora, in a private letter, suggested that I should show some attention to M. Numan. I accordingly communicated with the Turkish Ambassador with a view to paying a call on him. M. Numan did not at the time happen to be in Berlin, but left word that he would call on me as soon as he returned. He accordingly came to see me on the 6th January and informed me that he had suggested to the State Secretary an exchange of notes, the draft of which he read to me, to the effect that the Turkish Government regarded the German Government as having the same rights and obligations with regard to the Straits as were enjoyed by the other signatories of the Montreux Convention. M. Numan informed me that Freiherr von Weizsäcker appeared at first sight to concur with this draft, but gave him to understand that the German reply would contain an additional paragraph setting out the so-called Italo-Japanese reservation in the sense of the enclosure to Rome despatch No. 746 of the 10th August. This, M. Numan informed me, the Turkish Government would be prepared tacitly to accept. He added that no decision could be reached until Herr von Ribbentrop returned to Berlin, and that he expected to be detained here for at least another fortnight. He kindly said he would furnish me with a copy of the final text if and when approved.

2. I asked him about the German credit to Turkey. He said he did not anticipate any difficulty in coming to an agreement as to its allocation. He added that the Germans were jealous of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement and wanted certain concessions which the Turks had accorded to us, but which M. Numan said the Germans were not going to receive. I gathered from him that the commodities concerned on the Turkish side were principally food-stuffs, such as fruit, nuts, olives and olive-oil, and he said that they represented about 40 per cent. of the Turkish exports, adding somewhat regretfully that our commitments to the Dominions and Colonial Empire excluded these products from the Anglo-Turkish Credit Agreement.

3. I found M. Numan extremely friendly, and he made some very complimentary allusions to His Majesty's Ambassador in Angora and commented regretfully on his Excellency's impending departure.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representative at Angora.

I have, &c.
GEORGE OGILVIE-FORBES.

[E 520/9/44] No. 4.

Sir G. Ogilvie-Forbes to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 19).

(No. 63 E.)
My Lord, *Berlin, January 7, 1939.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1412 E. of the 28th December, 1938, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that, according to the press, the negotiations in connexion with the Turco-German Credit Agreement which was arranged in principle at Angora on the 6th October, 1938, have been terminated. The agreement was signed in Berlin on the 16th January, 1939.

2. As already reported in my despatch No. 1038 E. of the 11th October, 1938, the agreement provides for the granting of a 150 million reichsmarks credit by Germany to be used for the payment of Turkish industrial, military, naval and Public Works orders in Germany. It is stated that the credit will be granted at a low rate of interest and that it will be repaid by deliveries of Turkish domestic produce.

3. Copies of this despatch have been sent to His Majesty's representative at Angora, the Department of Overseas Trade and the Export Credit Guarantees Department.

I have, &c.
GEORGE OGILVIE-FORBES.

[E 555/9/44] No. 5.

Sir P. Loraine to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 14. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, January 20, 1939.*

IN speaking about recent signature of Turco-German Credits Agreement in Berlin, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs told me, in confidence, that German negotiators had been astonishingly yielding as regards all main Turkish desiderata. The Turks had, moreover, rejected successively German requests (1) that credits should be calculated and should be repayable on a gold basis; (2) on a sterling basis; (3) that Germany should be guaranteed against a depreciation of the mark. In each case Turkish refusal was accepted, and Turkish obligations are therefore solely in marks. Lastly, Germans asked for the right to resell Turkish produce outside Germany in the event of Turkish repayments being in arrears, and Minister for Foreign Affairs had the impression that their other requests having been rejected, Germans were making this one a *sine qua non* condition of signature. He nevertheless again said no, and was astonished at hearing, in less than twenty-four hours, that Germans had again given in and that agreement had been signed.

I also learn that, of 100 million marks, 50 million are for armaments, including aircraft. You will observe that share allotted to armaments goes far beyond what Dr. Aras had led me to anticipate.

Please see my immediately following telegram.

(Repeated to Berlin.)

[E 562/9/44] No. 6.

Sir P. Loraine to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 15. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, January 20, 1939.*

MY immediately preceeding telegram.

It seems perfectly clear that German negotiators have accepted very great and entirely unbusinesslike risks, and I think by that must be measured the

political importance, which they evidently attach to provision of these credits to Turkey.

But I do not see any sign at all that Turkish suspiciousness of German political motives and German ambitions have been in any way allayed thereby.

(Repeated to Berlin.)

[E 809/297/44] No. 7.

Viscount Halifax to Sir P. Loraine (Angora).

(No. 49.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 31, 1939.

THE Turkish Ambassador called on me this afternoon on arrival and, after the usual courtesies in which he spoke very warmly of his relations with your Excellency, he gave expression to the cordiality of feeling that so happily existed between Turkey and Great Britain. This had been manifested in several directions of late and was of the greatest importance for the future Mediterranean peace. I assured the Ambassador of the pleasure with which I had listened to what had fallen from him, with which I need hardly say I found myself in the most complete agreement. In particular, I told his Excellency how pleased we had been to note the growing intimacy of relationship between Turkey and Greece. The Ambassador confirmed what I had said in this respect and added that, in his view, it was also of very great importance that the solidarity of the Balkan *Entente* should be fully maintained. He said that, after he had had time to settle down in London, he would very much value the opportunity of a frank discussion with me on all the issues with which we were mutually concerned.

2. In a little general conversation before he left, M. Aras expressed the view that, according to the information of the Turkish Government, war in the immediate future was not to be expected. It was impossible, no doubt, to avoid a measure of anxiety over the manner in which Italy was pressing her several claims upon France, but he did not believe that Italy would wish to risk war in which she would find herself opposed to Great Britain, Turkey and possibly other countries in the Balkan *Entente*, for this could only have the ultimate effect of throwing her more into the arms of Germany. I said that it was, no doubt, greatly to be hoped that the Italian Government would be ready to give adequate weight in their consideration of these issues to the arguments that he had just developed, but there was always the possibility that, in the advancement of their claims, the Italian Government, through faulty appraisement of the situation, might go too far and be unable to avoid becoming the creature of events which they could no longer direct.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[E 1092/138/44] No. 8.

Sir P. Loraine to Viscount Halifax.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 37. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, February* 11, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 165 of 1938.

Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has been so good as to inform me that discussions with the German Government about Straits Convention have altogether lapsed. It was found that during Numan's visit to Berlin that no formula safeguarding the principles defended by the Turkish Government was acceptable to the German Government. Turkish last offer was an arrangement similar to that which, his Excellency informs me, was made with the Polish Government, I gather by an exchange of letters (Foreign Office despatch No. 44 of 1937). This was refused by Berlin as inconsistent with German dignity.

Thus, so far as Turkish Government are concerned, question is completely in abeyance.

(Repeated to Berlin.)

[E 1378/168/44] No. 9.

Sir P. Loraine to Viscount Halifax.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 86 E.)

My Lord, *Angora, February* 13, 1939.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to Mr. Morgan's despatch No. 595 E. of the 8th October, 1937, to report that the First Village and Agricultural Reconstruction Congress was held in Angora from the 27th to the 30th December, 1938. It was opened by the then Prime Minister, M. Celal Bayar, and was closed by the then Minister of Agriculture, M. Faik Kurtozlu, in the presence of the President of the Republic. The full session of the congress, which was held on the morning of the 30th December, was presided over by a peasant from Eskişehir. After the closing ceremony the President of the Republic received all the participants, and in the evening a banquet was given in their honour. The local press reported that many peasants had come to Angora from distant parts of Anatolia at their own expense in order to present their case to the congress. It appears that the congress is the outcome of some two years' preparatory investigations carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture.

2. In his speech delivered at the opening ceremony, M. Celal Bayar made a brief sketch of the conditions of agriculture under the Sultans, and traced its gradual recovery under the care of the Kemalist régime. Among other things, he claimed that the present régime had made Turkey a producer, and in some cases an exporter, of many things which she was formerly obliged to import, and that her agricultural exports had increased by 96 per cent. in 1937 as compared with 1923. But mere increase of exports was not enough. Peasant cultivators represented 72·5 per cent. of the whole population; landworkers accounted for 81 per cent. of the labouring population; 90 per cent. of exports consisted of agricultural produce; but only 7 per cent. of the value of the farmer's property was represented by his machines. Turkey had the lowest production per hectare of any country, of wheat, rice, barley, potatoes and sugar beet; it was the Government's business to educate the peasants so that scientific and intensive cultivation became possible. The resolutions of the congress would be carefully studied, and would possess a consultative character.

3. The principal resolutions adopted by the congress, after discussion in a number of committees, were the following:—

(1) That a plan of land settlement, to be enforced by law, should be drawn up; this plan should provide also for afforestation of denuded areas.
(2) That the use of the horse should be encouraged in agriculture.
(3) That peasant cultivators should be enabled to obtain such machines as they needed at small cost, and that those having extensive farms should be supplied with tractors and reaping machines.
(4) That the State should decide which type of plough and other machines were most fitted to the different regions and take steps to ensure that the vendors of these machines kept repair shops where repairs and adjustments could be made and spare parts obtained.
(5) That the prices of motor fuels, and the customs duties payable on them, should be reduced.
(6) That a programme of technical education for the peasant should be drawn up and that to further this cheap wireless sets be supplied and the publication of a weekly paper, which should be distributed gratis, be arranged.

4. A commission was subsequently formed in the Ministry of Agriculture to examine the recommendations of the congress. At the same time it was announced that local congresses would be summoned by the Ministry, and that the first of these would be congresses of cotton and of flax growers.

5. The *Cumhuriyet* of the 4th January published an account of the recommendations of the Ministerial Commission, which appears to have concentrated on the broad lines of an agricultural plan. According to this account the country is to be divided into ten zones, which are to be dealt with successively; the first to receive attention will be that of which Angora is the

centre and will comprise the plateau extending from the vilayet of Eskişehir in the west to Sives in the east, as far north as Çankiri and Çorum, and as far south as Afyon at its western, and Niğde at its eastern, extremity, and including Konya. This is regarded as the most difficult zone on account of the nature of the terrain. Its population is nearly 4 million. It is estimated that £T. 4,500,000 will be required for the execution of the plan in this zone, but since this capital includes seed already sown and stores which are already in existence, an initial capital of £T. 1,500,000 will suffice. In addition to this 70 per cent. of village revenues and a portion of certain departmental revenues will be allocated to carrying out the plan.

6. The framework of the organisation required for the execution of these proposals will be as follows: Each zone will be under the control of a chief adviser, assisted by a publicity adviser and a technical adviser. The publicity adviser will have a staff of inspectors who will be "directors of agriculture" and 300 agriculture agents who will get into touch with the peasants and endeavour to educate them, making use of the services of the technical side in order to convince them. The technical adviser will control the agricultural schools, experimental and selection stations, breeding stations, stud farms and the like.

7. Finally, a new organisation called the Ak-Bank will be called into being, which will create central machine sheds where all necessary machines will be housed, will lend out these machines to the peasants and farmers and will at the same time give financial assistance where necessary.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.
PERCY LORAINE.

[R 1541/1541/67] No. 10.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, March 6, 1939.*

I CALLED on Minister for Foreign Affairs on 6th March on his return to Angora.

He expresses satisfaction with results of Bucharest meeting and of his other visits. He regarded Balkan *Entente* as thoroughly sound, and expressed himself as generally satisfied with the situation in this part of Europe, including Albania.

I asked him about M. Gafencu's visit to Warsaw. He said that M. Gafencu had told him that he had received an invitation to Warsaw, but that he had no special subjects to discuss there. Minister for Foreign Affairs did not look for any concrete result from the visit. He stated that Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs would probably be visiting Angora later. Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs is expected next week.

(Repeated to Athens, Belgrade, Sofia and Bucharest, Saving.)

[E 1749/493/44] No. 11.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 109 E.)
My Lord, *Angora, March 1, 1939.*

I HAVE the honour, with reference to Sir Percy Loraine's despatch No. 628 E. of the 3rd December, 1938, regarding Turkish foreign trade during the third quarter of 1938, to transmit to your Lordship herewith tables showing the movement of trade during the quarter ended the 31st December.

2. Tables I and II cover imports and exports by principal countries, while Tables III and IV show imports and exports by principal commodities. The total foreign trade of Turkey during the final quarter and twelve months ended the 31st December compare as follows with that of the corresponding period of 1937 :—

	Imports.		*Exports.*	
	Tons metric.	*£T. '000s.*	*Tons metric.*	*£T. '000s.*
Fourth quarter—				
1938 ...	208,409	37,617	334,100	65,912
1937 ...	138,658	35,111	338,792	60,872
Twelve months—				
1938 ...	757,558	149,386	1,104,894	144,946
1937 ...	574,083	114,379	1,068,454	137,963

The balance of trade over the quarter under review and the twelve months are as follows :—

	1938.	*1937.*
	£T.	*£T.*
Final quarter	+28,295,000	+25,761,000
Twelve months	− 4,890,000	+23,604,000

Thus a favourable trade balance of £T. 23·6 million during 1937 was transformed into a debit balance of £T. 4·9 million during 1938. The above figures also show the markedly seasonal character of Turkish exports. No less than 45 per cent. of the total exports of the country occurred during the final quarter of 1938, and 44 per cent. during the final quarter of the preceding year. Imports, on the other hand, are spread over the whole year more or less evenly.

3. The average cost of Turkey's imports per metric ton during the quarter under review amounted to £T. 180·8 against £T. 222·2 during the corresponding period of 1937, and of her exports during the same quarters to £T.194·3 against £T. 179·6. For the twelve months the corresponding figures are: imports £T. 197·9 against £T. 199·2 and exports £T. 131·1 against £T. 129·2.

4. United Kingdom exports to Turkey continue to show the accelerated rhythm noticeable during the preceding quarters of 1938, and the figures for the whole year show that exports to Turkey were more than doubled during 1938. United Kingdom imports from Turkey, however, present the reverse side of the picture, as the value of United Kingdom imports during 1938 was almost exactly half of what it was during the preceding year. During 1938 the United Kingdom enjoyed a favourable balance of trade in her commercial relations with Turkey of £T. 11·6 million, against an unfavourable balance of trade of £T. 2·6 million in 1937. This satisfactory trading position (which is, nevertheless, extremely unsatisfactory *vis-à-vis* the Anglo-Turkish clearing position) has been brought about chiefly by the credits granted in respect of the steel works at Karabuk.

5. The totalitarian States, Germany and Italy, continue to increase their hold on Turkish foreign trade. During the final quarter and full year under review both countries have strengthened rather than merely maintained their position. For instance, Germany's purchases of Turkish exports increased from £T. 50·4 million in 1937 to £T. 62·2 million in 1938, and her sales to Turkey from £T. 48·1 million to £T. 70·4 million. The corresponding position of Italy is as follows: 1937 imports of Turkish products £T. 7·2 million against £T.14·5 in 1938 and exports to Turkey £T. 6 million against £T. 7·1 million in 1938.

6. The trade of the U.S.S.R. with Turkey shows some decline, her exports to Turkey being only some £T. 5·9 million against £T. 7 million in the preceding year, and imports from Turkey £T. 5·1 million against £T.6·5 million in 1937.

7. Turkish imports showing the largest increase over 1937 were woollen piece-goods (£T. 2·6 million against £T. 1·8 million), sugar (£T. 4·1 million against £T. ·8 million), steel rails (£T. 2·0 million against £T. 1·2 million), iron and steel pipes and parts (£T. 2·7 million against £T. 1·4 million), iron, worked, heavy (£T. 6·2 million against £T. 1·7 million), locomotives (£T. 3·5 million against £T. 1 million), machinery, other than textile and agricultural (£T. 6·7 million against £T. 4·2 million), and railway wagons (£T. 2·5 million against

£T. ·5 million). The only decrease of any importance was in yarns of wools and hair, which fell from £T. 4·3 million in 1937 to £T. 1·2 million in 1938.

8. The largest export increases were recorded in sultanas (£T. 14·3 million against £T. 5·9 million), hazel nuts (£T. 12·4 million against £T. 10·6 million), cotton, raw (£T. 10·2 million against £T. 5·5 million), and chrome ore (£T. 5·1 million against £T. 3·9 million). The only decreases of any importance were recorded in wool (£T. 3·3 million against £T. 6·5 million), mohair (£T. 3·5 million against £T. 5·7 million), wheat (£T. 5·6 million against £T. 7·8 million), and tobacco (£T. 39·3 million against £T. 43·9 million).

9. Production throughout Turkey during 1938 was exceptionally good, and the decreases recorded above are more largely due to purchasing factors than to scarcity of production, except in the case of hazel nuts, where diseases spoilt a promising crop.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.
H. M. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

Enclosure in No. 11.

Table I.—*Turkish Imports by Principal Countries.*

(In £T. '000's.)

Country.	*1938. Final quarter.*	*1938. Twelve months.*	*1937. Final quarter.*	*1937. Twelve months.*
United Kingdom	3,934	16,794	2,530	7,128
Germany	19,260	70,410	16,645	48,132
United States	2,189	15,680	4,781	17,294
Italy	2,597	7,120	880	6,084
Czecho-Slovakia	874	5,776	1,327	3,006
U.S.S.R.	556	5,890	2,015	7,092
Belgium	458	2,424	535	1,307
Sweden	428	2,300	549	2,147
Poland	817	2,659	101	361
British India	356	2,232	1,066	2,039

Table II.—*Turkish Exports by Principal Countries.*

(In £T. '000's.)

Country.	*1938. Final quarter.*	*1938. Twelve months.*	*1937. Final quarter.*	*1937. Twelve months.*
United Kingdom	1,419	4,942	3,854	9,768
Germany	32,797	62,209	23,020	50,411
United States	12,310	17,769	12,116	19,203
Italy	2,564	14,563	2,907	7,266
Czecho-Slovakia	441	4,998	1,544	6,093
U.S.S.R.	2,863	5,140	2,205	6,508
Belgium	954	2,597	1,420	6,633
Sweden	856	1,776	1,046	1,920
Poland	1,430	2,202	1,968	2,260
British India	13	176	215	820
France	1,331	4,758	1,635	5,264
Roumania	1,970	3,293	758	1,025

Table III.—*Turkish Imports by Principal Commodities.*

(In £T. '000's.)

Commodity.	*1938. Final quarter.*	*1938. Twelve months.*	*1937. Final quarter.*	*1937. Twelve months.*
Yarns of wool and hair ...	406	2,220	1,322	4,288
Woollen piece-goods ...	231	2,585	981	1,832
Sugar	491	4,138	214	875
Yarns, cotton	1,079	5,204	1,966	5,476
Cotton piece-goods	4,440	15,840	5,453	15,944
Iron and steel	1,927	5,614	1,060	4,186
Rails, &c.	275	2,028	292	1,201
Iron and steel sheets ...	799	2,039	781	1,559
Iron and steel pipes and parts	700	2,703	519	1,438
Iron, worked, heavy ...	1,703	6,226	588	1,739
Locomotives	287	3,546	64	1,095
Motors, electric	936	2,534	243	1,540
Machinery, textile	422	2,367	412	2,168
Machinery, agricultural ...	158	1,536	369	1,787
Machinery, other	2,097	6,730	1,251	4,238
Wagons, railway	262	2,526	83	592
Medicinal preparations ...	475	1,468	351	1,135

Table IV.—*Turkish Exports by Principal Commodities.*

(In £T. '000's.)

Commodity.	*1938. Final quarter.*	*1938. Twelve months.*	*1937. Final quarter.*	*1937. Twelve months.*
Hides and skins, wet ...	722	2,847	508	2,832
Wool, &c.	1,838	3,382	1,452	6,531
Mohair	1,671	3,575	2,041	5,725
Wheat	1,055	3,631	222	7,883
Rye	514	3,128	835	4,409
Barley	806	5,164	2,381	5,088
Pulse	1,168	2,709	1,192	2,502
Sultanas	8,639	14,329	2,862	5,942
Figs	4,129	5,553	2,493	3,245
Hazelnuts	5,543	12,445	5,088	10,693
Olive oil	260	1,383	55	1,553
Tobacco	22,383	39,280	30,047	43,894
Cotton	4,069	10,227	974	5,481
Chrome	1,208	5,138	1,179	3,995
Coal	317	2,033	238	1,554

[E 1998/297/44] No. 12.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received March* 17.)

(No. 111.) *Angora, February* 28, 1939.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I to-day presented my letters of credence to the President of the Turkish Republic.

2. In a short conversation that ensued M. Ismet Inönü referred in general terms to the European situation. He first stated that, according to his information, the position in Albania was entirely normal. His impression was that recent reports had been exaggerated, and he expressed the view that Italy would be unlikely to undertake any adventure in Albania owing to the effect on Yugoslavia.

Germany and Italy were now occupied in cultivating good relations with Yugoslavia, and any move against Albania would not harmonise with this policy. He recalled that some years ago there had been a suspicion of collusion between Italy and the Yugoslav Government on the subject of action in Albania which had adversely affected the position of the Yugoslav Government of the day. (I am uncertain as to the facts of the occasion to which his Excellency referred, but his allusion seems worth mentioning.)

3. His Excellency then remarked that it had appeared that, "until two or three days ago," there had been signs of improvement in the general European situation. I said that I myself had no information to show that this improvement had been reversed during the last two or three days, though, of course, great difficulties existed. He replied by alluding to the anti-German demonstrations in Poland and to the situation in Spain. As regards Poland, he observed that public opinion was expressing itself as hostile to Germany while the Polish Government were pursuing a policy friendly to that country. As regards Spain, he expressed some anxiety that the resistance of the Republicans might result in further fighting.

4. He then passed on to the subject of the Balkan *Entente*, and I remarked that the reports I had seen in the newspapers of the result of the meeting at Bucharest appeared altogether favourable. He agreed, but expressed some apprehension as regards Bulgarian intentions. Bulgaria's claims remained a live issue. I said that, in my opinion, it would be most unwise of Bulgaria to press these claims at the present moment, first, because the general European situation was such that any forward policy of this nature might produce wider trouble and, secondly, because, if matters came to a head, Bulgaria herself would be the first to suffer. The strength and continuance of the Balkan *Entente* seemed to me to be a matter of great importance. I had, however, formed the impression from what I had seen of recent press reports that the Bulgarian Government were at all events slowing down the *tempo* of their policy in regard to their territorial claims. I trusted that this would prove to be the case. M. Ismet Inönü replied that this might be the case, but that the claims remained in existence; however, M. Kiosseivanoff would shortly be visiting Angora, when more light might be thrown on the situation.

5. His Excellency then remarked with pleasure upon the excellent relations existing between our two Governments, and paid a tribute to the admirable work performed by Sir Percy Loraine in the cause of friendship between our two countries. I took the opportunity to state that I regarded these good relations as fundamental and should do my best to maintain and further them.

I have, &c.
H. M. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

[C 3429/3356/18] No. 13.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, March 18, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 48.

I read your telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon. He took notes and said that he would at once consult his colleague and hoped to give me an answer this evening.

He stated that it would be much easier for the Turkish Government to reach a decision if they knew what attitude His Majesty's Government would adopt. I replied that it would be very serious if each Government concerned waited for answer from the other, and that it would be difficult for His Majesty's Government to make decision without having the answer for the questions put in your telegram.

Pending his definite answer, the following may be of use as a guide:—

Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that he had already received somewhat similar information from Bucharest, though it had not been established whether it was quite urgent as is represented in your telegram. He also stated that the

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Bulgarian President of the Council, who is here, is apprehensive of a German attack on Roumania, and had enquired what would be the attitude of the Balkan *Entente* in such a case. He had received the reply that the Balkan *Entente* would fulfil its mutual obligations.

(Repeated to Warsaw, Athens, Belgrade and Paris.)

[C 3604/3356/18] No. 14.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 115.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 21, 1939.*

I ASKED the Turkish Ambassador to call upon me this afternoon in order to keep him generally informed of the action which we are taking with a view to concerting resistance to any further German aggression.

2. I explained to his Excellency that there were still two doubtful points of very great importance, namely, the attitude of the Polish Government and that of the Soviet. We had accordingly addressed an enquiry to Warsaw and to Moscow asking those Governments whether they would be prepared to make any declaration of solidarity with us, and of course the French Government, with a view to discussing possible action.

3. I said that, assuming that we should achieve this, our next step would be to approach other Governments, foremost amongst which would be the Turkish Government, and I should therefore be very glad if M. Aras could give me any idea of the attitude of his Government in these circumstances.

4. M. Aras replied that what he was about to say to me in regard to the position of his Government did not represent a decision taken by them in the light of the happenings of the last few days, but was a fixed policy which they had decided on before he left Turkey, and which he had discussed with the President of the Turkish Republic. The situation was that the Turkish Government were quite satisfied with all their existing treaty arrangements, and quite determined to fulfil all their obligations under them. But before accepting any further commitment, and before departing from neutrality, the Turkish Government would wish to be reassured on two points. The first was, generally, would they have Great Britain with them? And the second was, more particularly, if they were attacked in the Mediterranean, would they have the benefit of direct British assistance? M. Aras explained that, once satisfied on these two points, there was no other question that would present any difficulty, and they would be prepared to go to all lengths with Great Britain. At present, in certain eventualities, they would, under their treaty arrangements, be neutral. If they made any departure from neutrality, the result in the end might be that they would be involved in hostilities up to the hilt. If they were assured of British co-operation they would be prepared to go the whole length. In any event, they would only depart from neutrality if they were on the same side as Great Britain. He added that what he had said was unconditional, and would not be affected by the replies which might be returned by the Polish and Soviet Governments.

5. I asked him whether it was to be understood that Anglo-Turkish co-operation would come into effect even though a war might be begun by a German attack in non-Balkan regions, for example, an attack on Poland or an attack against the West. To this Dr. Aras replied that that was certainly the case: if assured of Anglo-Turkish co-operation, if England went to war Turkey would do the same, though her activity would evidently have to be confined to that particular part of Europe where she could operate.

6. I thanked Dr. Aras and promised to keep him informed as promptly as possible of any developments.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX

[C 4141/3356/18] No. 15.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 86.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, March 26, 1939.*

MY telegrams Nos. 83 and 84.

In view of what my French colleague told me and of Sir R. Hoare's telegram No. 75, I did not like to defer calling on Minister for Foreign Affairs any longer. I saw him on 26th March, explaining that I was anxious to obtain his impressions on last week's events.

2. I said I had [? nothing] fresh to tell him, and that now that ultimatum story had been contradicted and German-Roumanian Agreement signed, I thought it probable you considered that dangers were somewhat less urgent and should be dealt with with greater deliberation. I disbelieved reports which had appeared here that democratic Powers regarded the situation as having calmed, and had therefore abandoned their attempts to guard against further threat. He must be aware from his ambassador in London as well as from speeches and London newspapers how seriously we regarded the position

3. I then asked if his Excellency could tell me something about reported mobilisations in the Balkan States. A week ago he had been thoroughly satisfied with results of M. Kiosseivanoff's visit, but much seemed to have happened since, and I should like him impressions.

4. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that he was convinced that there had been an ultimatum to Roumania or some sort of threat. No country could have accepted such terms except under compulsion. Nevertheless, Roumanians had made no appeal for help and had of their own accord accepted German terms. It was impossible to help a country which neither helped itself nor asked its friends to do so.

5. He took most gloomy view of German-Roumanian Agreement (of which he had the text). Roumania was now entirely in German orbit, and German right to establish free zones gave her unlimited powers of mercantile and even naval expansion.

6. As regards mobilisation in the Balkan States, see my telegram No. 87. In reply to my enquiry, he assured me that in spite of last week's developments, he remained as satisfied as previously with result of Kiosseivanoff's visit. I am inclined to think, in connexion with these measures of mobilisation, there has, in fact, been some maintenance of contact with Kiosseivanoff on lines indicated in paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 76. His Excellency stated that since German-Roumanian Agreement, Dobruja question has fallen into the background.

7. Beyond complaining that democratic Powers moved too slowly to keep pace with developments, his Excellency did not renew his appeal for a lead from Western Powers (this does not, however, lead me to modify the views expressed in my telegram No. 84). It was quite evident from the way he spoke that he was determined to resist any German threat to Turkey. "Even if England and France did nothing in such circumstances," he said, "Germany would get her answer." His Excellency spoke throughout as if it was an axiom that Turkish interests coincided with those of the democratic Powers.

Please send to Paris.

[C 4114/3356/18] No. 16.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 88.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, March 26, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 83, last paragraph.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me on 26th March that German Chargé d'Affaires had put to him exactly the same question regarding Turkish attitude in the event of an attack on a member of the Balkan *Entente*, as had been put by M. Kiosseivanoff (see my telegram No. 76). He had given exactly

the same reply. I think this explains my French colleague's statement. I asked Minister for Foreign Affairs if there had been any signs of a change in the German attitude here during the last week. He replied in the negative; on the contrary, Germans were being most considerate and amenable.

Please send to Paris.

[E 2312/294/44] No. 17.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 28.)

(No. 89. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, March 28, 1939.*

THE Yugoslav Minister called 28th March before leaving for Belgrade, whither he has been summoned to report.

His object was to ascertain whether I had any information as to the attitude of Turkey in the event of general war. He said "certain rumours" were going about that the Turkish Government had informed someone that they would remain neutral.

I said that I knew nothing of such rumours, and that my views of Turkey's attitude were as follows:

(*a*) In the event of any menace to Turkey's individual interests, Turkey would fight to defend them.

(*b*) In the event of any attack on a member of the Balkan *Entente*, Turkey would fulfil the obligations of the pact as recently defined to Kiosseivanoff.

(*c*) With regard to any threat of a European war, Turkey, like His Majesty's Government, would be reluctant to define their attitude in a hypothetical case, though Turkey's general tendencies seemed to me to be clear enough.

In reply to my enquiry, he told me confidentially that the rumours emanated from Rome.

(Repeated to Belgrade.)

[E 2378/5/89] No. 18.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (Received March 31.)

(No. 141.)
My Lord, *Angora, March 18, 1939.*

WITH reference to telegrams Nos. 11 of the 8th March and 1, Saving, of the 10th March from His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the French Ambassador called this morning and expressed anxiety in regard to the Turkish attitude in the disturbances reported in Mr. Davis's telegrams.

2. M. Massigli stated that a document had been seized by the French authorities operating in the area between Aleppo and Kilis which, according to him, supplied definite evidence that the Kaïmakam of Kilis and Turkish officers were engaged in intrigues with the Muruds. M. Massigli had shown this document to M. Saracoğlu, who had appeared "extremely discountenanced" on seeing it. M. Saracoğlu has explained that no doubt what had occurred was that the local Turkish authorities had acted against their instructions or had distorted such instructions as they had received, but, in M. Massigli's opinion, M. Saracoğlu's replies were not convincing.

3. I find it difficult to believe that the Turkish Government at the present moment could be engaged in any intrigue likely to bring them into difficulties with the French Government, and it seems to me that M. Saracoğlu's confusion could be equally explained by annoyance at the activities of the local Turkish authorities on account of the trouble which they might cause between the Turkish and French Governments.

4. M. Massigli mentioned also the situation with regard to the Hatay, saying that he was worried as to what would be the result. The local assembly had already adopted Turkish laws, currency and other administrative measures, and the Hatay was thus becoming a vanishing asset. Otherwise, it might have been possible for some bargain to be struck, but unless it was done soon the moment would have passed.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

I have, &c.
H. M. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

[C 4535/3356/18] No. 19.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April* 1, 1939.

I OUTLINED briefly to the Turkish Ambassador on 31st March the arrangement which we were endeavouring to conclude with the Polish and Roumanian Governments. He agreed that Poland was the key to the situation. I explained the difficulties encountered in Warsaw as regards close association with the Soviet Government, but we hoped to have the latter's sympathy and general support. I wished to keep in close touch with his Excellency, as we attached the greatest value to our friendship with Turkey.

2. The ambassador then developed two ideas which he said were his own.

3. He first suggested that other countries might accede to the Anglo-Italian Agreement. He mentioned Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, as likely to accede. He realised there would be difficulty about France's accession, but this might be overcome later if Franco-Italian relations improved. The object would be to form a Mediterranean block which might eventually form a counterpoise to Germany in a form Signor Mussolini might not find inacceptable.

4. The second proposal seemed to be for a mutual treaty of non-aggression between the Soviet Union, Poland, Roumania and Turkey. The signatories would agree to combine against any party contravening the arrangement, which would be backed by a British guarantee.

5. I said I would examine these proposals, the first of which seemed more practical than the second.

6. M. Aras has also drawn attention to the fact that under the Turkish-Soviet Treaty neither party is at liberty to make an arrangement with any immediate neighbour of the other party without the latter's consent. Consequently, the inclusion of Turkey in any international arrangement involving a treaty relationship between Turkey and Poland could only be brought about with the consent of the Soviet Union. It was therefore important that Polish-Soviet relations should be on the best possible footing.

(Repeated to Moscow, No. 4, Saving; Paris, No. 101, Saving (by bag); Warsaw, No. 11, Saving; Bucharest, No. 17, Saving; Athens, No. 13, Saving; Rome, No. 37, Saving; Belgrade, No. 11, Saving; Sofia, No. 12, Saving; and Berlin, No. 25, Saving.)

[E 2627/297/44] No. 20.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 114.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Angora, April* 11, 1939.

FOLLOWING return to office after recent parliamentary elections, Turkish Prime Minister made declaration of policy on the 10th April to Grand National Assembly and obtained unanimous vote of confidence. Dealing with foreign affairs, Prime Minister said :—

"Recent developments of world situation call for greatest vigilance in our foreign policy. World crisis, which sets up nation against nation and is responsible for suppression of States in few days, closely affects our

Government, which has always proclaimed and proved strong attachment to peace. Nevertheless, in midst of all these developments Turkish foreign policy has not changed. Faithful to her friendships and alliances, her word and her signature, Turkey's love for peace and resolve to serve cause of peace continues. In this troubled time our Government maintains with all Powers, great and small, cordial, loyal and friendly relations and will strive to maintain them in the future. This straightforward policy is our Government's contribution to cause of peace. In midst of violent clash of ideas and interests neither ideology not interested ambition will make Turkey deviate from the path of peace. Our Government will not initiate any act that may imperil life and welfare of the national unless our goodwill and our sincere and friendly neutrality towards all States are directly or indirectly object of an attempt or violation. These are main lines of our foreign policy. Any new situation will be carefully watched and examined with due regard to interests of general peace and higher interests of Turkey. We shall be careful to ensure that Grand National Assembly duly exercises its right of control and decision. Government is vigilant in taking timely measures for all eventualities that may confront the fatherland and the nation. I am proud to declare to you that, relying on great Turkish army, sublime source of courage and unshakable patriotism, we are convinced that we shall ward off all dangers and aggression."

[C 5052/54/18] No. 21.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 155.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 11, 1939.

THE Turkish Ambassador called upon Sir Alexander Cadogan on the 7th April, at the latter's request, and was informed of what had passed with Colonel Beck in London.

2. Sir Alexander Cadogan said that M. Aras would already have seen from the Prime Minister's declaration that M. Beck had given a reciprocal provisional guarantee corresponding with that which we had already given to the Polish Government. Further, we had agreed in principle to the negotiation of a more permanent arrangement, and we were ageed generally on the principles on which it should be based. There were certain matters which still remained to be discussed, and incidentally it would be necessary to get in touch with the French Government, as if the agreement was to be on the lines that we contemplated it would probably involve some extension of France's existing obligations to Poland, and *vice versâ*. But Sir Alexander Cadogan hoped that this would not take very long.

3. We had, of course, discussed with M. Beck the position of Roumania, but M. Beck had explained that, Poland being an ally of Roumania and being in certain treaty relations with her, he felt it was necessary that this matter should be discussed in the first instance direct between Warsaw and Bucharest, and to this we had agreed.

4. Sir Alexander Cadogan said that it would be important for our two Governments to keep in touch and he very much hoped that if and when the arrangements with Poland and Roumania were complete we should be able to discuss with the Turkish and Greek Governments the manner in which they might be disposed to co-operate.

5. M. Aras thanked Sir Alexander Cadogan for the information which had been given him. He said that the Roumanian Ambassador in Angora had already informed the Turkish Government of the proposals put forward in Bucharest by the French Government and His Majesty's Government. The Roumanian Ambassador had said that it would greatly strengthen the position of Roumania if she could be assured of Turkish and Greek assistance. The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had replied that he would study this suggestion with all the sympathy that was warranted by the relations between Turkey and Roumania and the friendship between Turkey and Great Britain. He added that in any event the Turkish Government were determined to carry out their obligations as a member of the Balkan *Entente*

6. In conclusion M. Aras said that he thought it was important that your Excellency should be fully informed of the policy of His Majesty's Government in order that you might be in a position to discuss matters with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir Alexander Cadogan assured M. Aras that we were doing this, and that you would be able to have a frank exchange of views with the Minister.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[R 2688/G] No. 22.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 98.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 12, 1939.*

IN my telegram No. 92 [of 11th April] I have set forth the lines of the approach to be made to the Turkish Government in order to deal with the immediate menace to Greece arising out of the Italian action in Albania.

2. We must, however, fear that the present Italian action in Albania may only be one step in a wider movement for the achievement of the expansionist aims of the Axis Powers, who, it is presumed, are acting in collusion. We cannot foresee where the next point of attack will be; but whenever and wherever it is made (Greece or Roumania or Poland or Western Europe) the ultimate aim will be joint domination of Europe by Germany and Italy. Whichever of these two Powers it is that launches the attack, it is almost certain that the other will be involved. This means that the next act of aggression by either of the Axis Powers, whatever may be the point of attack, is likely to involve directly or indirectly all the Powers bordering on the Mediterranean.

3. It must be evident that, if in such a war, however it arises, the Western Powers did not emerge completely victorious, the result must be complete domination of the remaining States of Europe by Germany and Italy. If this result is to be averted, it is essential in the interests of all that the strongest possible barrier by the greatest number of States should be jointly opposed to aggressive action on their part.

4. With this object in view, His Majesty's Government are prepared in principle to come to the help of Turkey in the event of any threat by Italy, direct or indirect, to the independence of Turkey in the Mediterranean area which is actively resisted by the Turkish Government, provided that the Turkish Government are prepared for their part to come to the help of His Majesty's Government in the event of His Majesty's Government being involved in a war with Italy. The precise circumstances in which the proposed reciprocal obligation would operate would, of course, have to be worked out in consultation.

5. You will be aware from my telegram Intel No. 3 [of 30th March] of the nature of the approach which His Majesty's Government and the French Government have recently made to the Polish and Roumanian Governments with a view to meeting the German menace. Among the suggestions made to the Polish Government was a proposal for common action by Poland with Great Britain and France in defence of Roumania in the event of any threat by Germany, direct or indirect, to the independence of Roumania which was actively resisted by the Roumanian Government. You will also have seen from my telegrams Nos. 70 and 71 [of 7th April] the conclusions which were reached on this matter during the recent conversations with the Polish Foreign Minister. The Polish Government are now, we believe, in communication with the Roumanian Government on this subject and we await their reply. We have kept the Turkish Ambassador informed in general terms of the above; but in case the situation should not be clearly understood by the Turkish Government, you are authorised to explain the situation to them in strict confidence in the light of the telegrams referred to above. This situation may develop in one of two ways:—

(*a*) That Poland will not be prepared in conjunction with the United Kingdom and France to guarantee Roumania against German aggression

(*b*) That Poland will be prepared to give such a guarantee

6. His Majesty's Government consider it of the first importance that the Turkish Government should collaborate in any project of common defence, and in determining what attitude they will adopt towards either of the foregoing alternatives they will be influenced by any indication which the Turkish Government can give them as to what their (the Turkish) attitude would be towards either of the two developments enumerated above.

7. It further appears to His Majesty's Government that in the present situation it is most desirable to achieve the greatest possible degree of co-operation between the Balkan States, and from this point of view the position and attitude of Bulgaria has a special importance. I shall be glad to learn from the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs his estimate of the probable attitude of Bulgaria in the situation which we are envisaging, and whether, in his view, there are any steps which could now be taken to secure her co-operation or, if this is impossible, at least to neutralise her opposition.

8. You should lose no time in laying the foregoing considerations before the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. He will doubtless wish to consider them in connexion with the enquiry which you will have made as a result of the instructions in my telegram No. 92. I have no desire to rush his Excellency where decisions of such moment are involved. You may therefore indicate to him that, while, of course, His Majesty's Government would be grateful to have an early expression of his views on the proposals contained in the present telegram, I should not wish the consideration of these matters to delay the Turkish Government's reply to the more urgent question dealt with in my telegram No. 92.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 147; Warsaw, No. 94; Bucharest, No. 109; Athens, No. 111; Sofia, No. 58; Belgrade, No. 91; Rome, No. 189; and Moscow, No. 62.)

[E 2715/132/44] No. 23.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (Received April 13.)

(No. 178.)
My Lord, *Angora, April 5, 1939.*

WITH reference to my predecessor's telegram No. 24 of the 28th January announcing the dissolution of the Grand National Assembly, and the decision to hold elections for a new Assembly, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the elections took place on the 21st and 26th March. On the former date, the country as a whole went to the polls, and selected the so-called "electors of the second degree," and these, on the 26th March, elected the Deputies who form the new Grand National Assembly. The new Parliament, which, according to the Constitution, is to sit for four years, numbers 424 Deputies, as compared with 399 in the previous Parliament. Of these, 420 were put forward by the People's party and four are "independents" approved and provided with constituences by the People's party. There were no Opposition candidates, but this fact did not dispense the people from being urged to record their votes at the primary elections and some 80 per cent. of them did so.

2. In presenting to the nation the list of the party's candidates M. Ismet Inönü, President of the Republic, and president for life of the party, issued a manifesto. In this he emphasised that, in drawing up the list, care had been taken to ascertain the wishes of every class of the population. He made a reference to the seriousness of the international situation, and declared in this connexion that he could not yet define with certainty the duties which might confront Turkey. In any case, Turkey must be strong and united. The People's party would continue its constructive programme, with particular regard to improving the lot of the peasants. He concluded by asking for the support of his fellow citizens for himself and the party.

3. There are 130 new Deputies in the new Assembly. One of these is Dr. Abdurrahman Melek, who is Prime Minister of Hatay. He will find in the Assembly Tayfur Sokmen, President of Hatay, who was Deputy for Adalia in the last Assembly and has been re-elected for the same constituency. In common with other Deputies they must swear, at the opening of the Assembly, not to work against the welfare of the "fatherland" nor against the sovereignty of the

people and to be faithful to the principles of the republic. Notable among those not re-elected are Şükrü Kaya, ex-Minister of the Interior; Hasan Riza Soyak, Secretary-General of Atatürk; Ali Kılıç, boon companion of Atatürk; Şakir Kesebir, ex-Minister of National Economy; Sadri Maksudi Arsal and Mme. Esma Nayman. Of these, Şükrü Kaya is personally disliked by the new President of the Republic, and Ali Kılıç was unpopular with everyone outside Atatürk's immediate circle. Şakir Kesebir's retirement from public life is due to ill-health. Sadri Maksudi Arsal had to choose between being a Deputy and continuing his work as professor at the law faculty, and chose the latter.

4. The Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs told the counsellor of this embassy that the recently concluded elections were distinguished from previous ones in that, throughout the country, primary and secondary electors insisted strongly on the choice of local men for each constituency. The leaders of the People's party had fallen in with this general demand, with the result that at least 80 per cent. of those Deputies who were making their first appearance in the Assembly were residents in the constituencies for which they sat.

5. As reported in my telegram No. 96 of the 3rd April the new Assembly was opened on the 3rd April, and during its opening session re-elected M. Ismet Inönü as President of the Republic.

I have, &c.
H. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

[R 2746/661/67] No. 24.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received April* 13.)

(No. 122.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, April* 13, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 98.

I have had a preliminary conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs. With regard to paragraph 4 of your telegram he asked why guarantee offered by His Majesty's Government only covered threat by Italy and did not mention Germany? I replied the whole sense of your telegram showed that we connected Germany and Italy together, and that a threat from one was regarded as a threat from both.

But I should be grateful for instructions as to whether threat to Turkey from Germany is definitely covered.

[R 2746/G] No. 25.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora)

(No. 103.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April* 13, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 122 [of 13th April: Guarantee of Turkey].

1. You correctly interpreted our reasoning.

2. The situation has again been altered by decision of His Majesty's Government to guarantee Roumania (see my telegram No. 101). You may therefore inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs that a direct guarantee to Turkey against Germany would naturally follow if, as we hope, Turkey agrees for her part to guarantee Roumania, since we realise that Turkey by doing so might risk coming into direct conflict with Germany.

3. If we were to guarantee Turkey against Germany, we should expect Turkey to reciprocate by guaranteeing the United Kingdom against Germany. Your own reply to Minister for Foreign Affairs exactly represents thought of His Majesty's Government.

[E 2737/9/44] No. 26.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received April* 14.)

(No. 125. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, April* 13, 1939.

SIR P. LORAINE'S letter of 5th May, 1938.

Turkish Government have agreed to appointment of Herr von Papen as German Ambassador, but without enthusiasm.

(Repeated to Berlin.)

[R 2687/661/67] No. 27.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (*Received April* 16.)

(No. 133.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, April* 15, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 98, your telegram No. 101 and your telegram No. 106.

(Secret.)

Following is translation of oral communication handed to me on 15th April by Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

"Domination of Europe by Axis Powers and endangering of existence of small States constitute eventualities which [? are] opposed to interests of general peace and to particular and predominant interests of Turkey, even if Turkey were not the direct object of some menace or some aggression. This is still more the case because eventuality of Italian domination in Mediterranean constitutes as evident a danger for Turkey as for England.

"This point of view, [? which is] fundamental for Turkey, clearly shows coincidentism [*sic*] existing in present conjuncture between interests of Turkey and those of Great Britain.

"Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks it necessary to state following considerations in order to determine with no possible doubt the line of conduct which Turkish Government propose to follow in practical sphere in face of situation defined above.

"If Turkey from now openly takes up [? position] against Axis Powers there would follow, in the event of the latter being determined to start a new general war, the concentration in a very short time of all opposing forces on [? Straits]. This probability induces Turkey, who from that moment would have to bear all pressure of Axis, to desire to be certain beforehand as to assistance which England, and eventually France and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, could effectively afford her. This is an indispensable element for preparations to be made by Turkish Government.

"It is certain that in order to be able to reach a decision concerning requirements of present situation Government of the Republic must know very precisely the line of conduct which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics propose to follow in this event. Representations made in this respect to Government of Moscow have not so far yielded results capable of giving light to Turkish Government.

"It must be remarked, on the other hand, that responsibility [? being made] to weigh on Turkey for defence of Straits is so heavy and grave that it would be neither possible nor in conformity with common interest to divert Turkish forces from such an object in order to send them to help Roumania.

"It is also to be feared that an immediate taking up of position by Turkey against Axis Powers may assign a greater importance to Bulgaria and may thus increase her intransigence.

"Now maintenance of Balkan solidarity and obstacles opposed to penetration in this area of influence of Axis are the most efficacious contribution on Turkey's part to cause of general peace, and it would be useful to let Government of Republic continue to fulfil this predominant rôle as it has up to the present.

"[? Above] point of view can for the moment be summarised as follows:—

"1. In order to prepare proposed action in accordance with development of events, to give the clear impression that Turkey is following a policy parallel with that of England or in any case in sympathy with that policy in general interest of peace, and to declare at the same time that, unless Axis Powers commit an aggression in Mediterranean or against Balkans, Turkey will preserve her neutrality.

"2. Come to agreement as to British assistance in preparations foreseen for defence of Straits against aggression by land of Axis Powers—preparations which Turkey is obliged to undertake.

"3. Endeavour to assure collaboration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"4. British support to efforts made by Turkey to settle differences between Bulgaria and Roumania.

"5. Common action of Turkey and Great Britain being assured in eventuality of mutual assistance, to communicate to Turkish Government the scheme mentioned in British aide-mémoire.

"6. Keep absolutely secret the preceding arrangements as well as the [? conversations] the same connexion."

(Repeated to Paris, Warsaw, Bucharest, Athens, Sofia, Belgrade, Rome and Moscow.)

[R 2888/661/67] No. 28.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 134. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, April 15, 1939.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I would offer following observations on Turkish reply:

(*a*) Point 1 in summary at end. Minister for Foreign Affairs explained that by "give the clear impression," &c., he meant impression to public opinion.

(*b*) Points 2 and 5. These clearly show the necessity for informing the Turkish Government of plan for co-operation in war; reference to point 5 to "scheme mentioned in British aide-mémoire" is to last sentence of paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 98. See also my telegrams Nos. 112 and 131.

(*c*) Point 3. At the same interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs I acted on your telegram No. 118.

Point 4. I informed his Excellency of your telegram No. 111 and of substance of your telegram No. 119.

Point 6. I would draw attention to the Turkish requirement of secrecy.

I have shown Turkish reply to my French colleague, who will receive copy forthwith.

At close of my conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs, in reply to my enquiry, he renewed general assurance of Turkish co-operation in the event of war in the Balkans, or the Mediterranean or of a general war.

(Repeated to Paris, Warsaw, Bucharest, Athens, Sofia, Belgrade, Rome and Moscow.)

[R 2887/G] No. 29.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 126.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 19, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 133 [of 15th April: Guarantee of Turkey].

1. I am most grateful for manner in which you are handling this delicate negotiation and for explanations contained in your telegrams Nos. 134 and 135.

2. You may tell Minister for Foreign Affairs that it has been a source of the greatest satisfaction to me to see that his general appreciation of the situation coincides with our own, and that he realises that the interests of our two countries in the face of the common danger are identical. I note from paragraph 8 of Turkish communication quoted in your telegram No. 133 the definition of the role which the Turkish Government considers itself as best qualified to play, particularly with regard to the maintenance of Balkan solidarity as defined in paragraphs 2 and 3 of your telegram No. 121 and paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 126; I presume, of course, that by Balkan solidarity his Excellency means the solidarity of the four States members of the Balkan *Entente* and Bulgaria. I cordially concur that the Turkish Government should continue along the path thus defined.

3. I also note from point 1 of the summary of the Turkish attitude set forth in the final paragraph of the same telegram that Turkey proposes declaring *publicly* that, unless the Axis Powers commit an aggression in the Mediterranean or against the Balkans, Turkey will preserve her neutrality. I also gather from the last paragraph of your telegram No. 134, if I understand it aright, that the Turkish Government is prepared to give *secretly* His Majesty's Government a valuable and far-reaching assurance of its co-operation in the event of war in the Balkans or the Mediterranean, even though that war resulted from an act of aggression committed elsewhere, or in the event of a general war.

4. While appreciating the value of the public declaration, I cannot help feeling that that value would be enhanced if it were possible that the declaration could be worded in a positive rather than in its present negative form, namely, that, if the Axis Powers committed an act of aggression in the Mediterranean or against the Balkans, Turkey would be unable to preserve her neutrality. But there is an even more important point. The literal effect of the words "if the Axis Powers committed an act of aggression in the Mediterranean or against the Balkans" might be to enable Turkey to preserve her neutrality if, for example, German aggression against Belgium had led to a war in which Italy joined and which accordingly included the Mediterranean. In these circumstances Italy might not be technically regarded as an aggressor, and accordingly the Turkish condition for the abandonment of neutrality would not technically be fulfilled. We are, of course, confident that this is not the Turkish intention, but the public declaration would be closely scrutinised and this obvious possibility pointed out. The Turkish Government may argue that this point would be covered by the proposed secret understanding, but I frankly do not like the idea of a secret understanding as well as a public declaration. Moreover, the Turkish Government may prefer to avoid the inconsistency which would arise from making a public declaration committing Turkey to preserving her neutrality unless the Axis Powers commit an aggression in the Mediterranean or against the Balkans, while at the same time entering into a secret understanding which commits her to co-operation with His Majesty's Government in certain other eventualities. In any case the procedure for a public declaration which does not really show the nature of the agreement reached and has to be completed by a secret understanding is difficult to reconcile with our parliamentary system. I recognise, however, Turkey's desire to maintain a form of words which would confine her abandonment of her neutrality to the event of war in the Balkans or in the Mediterranean. It occurs to me, therefore, that a possible reconciliation of the two points of view could be reached by substituting for the words: "an act of aggression in the Mediterranean or against the Balkans" the following: "an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean or in the Balkans."

5. His Majesty's Government attach great importance to the position being made clear to their own public, and it would greatly help them if the Turkish Government could see its way to adopt this phraseology in its declaration. In return for such a public declaration His Majesty's Government would be prepared to lend Turkey all the support in their power.

6. If this were agreed, the forms of agreement would have to be worked out on the lines of the two preceding paragraphs.

7. I will now deal with the method of procedure outlined in the six points at the end of your telegram No. 133:

Point 1.—The question of eventual declarations on the part of both Governments has been covered in paragraphs 4 and 5 above. If in the meantime it

becomes necessary to say anything in public, I would suggest that both Governments should confine themselves to statements that they are in close consultation with each other and that the discussions proceeding between them reveal the accustomed identity of views.

Point 2.—Will involve Staff conversations. His Majesty's Government will be prepared to start these at an early date, provided agreement is reached in principle on paragraphs 4 and 5 above. At the moment Staff conversations are proceeding with French experts in London, and I suggest that we should begin parallel conversations here as soon as possible with Turkish service attachés. Without associating the French with the conversations with the Turkish experts, it should be possible thus for His Majesty's Government to discuss without undue delay with the French experts, independently if thought desirable, any points arising from the Anglo-Turkish discussions which might depend on French co-operation.

Point 3.—Since you have already acted on my telegram No. 118, Turkish Government is now aware of approach made to Moscow. Active exchange of views is proceeding as to best way in which Soviet assistance could be enlisted. You will also have seen Moscow telegram No. 69.

Point 4.—Turkish Government will already know from your communication to it of my telegram No. 111 how ready I am to second its efforts and you may stress the importance which His Majesty's Government attach to securing Bulgarian co-operation. I look to Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to indicate how and when my intervention can be most useful. Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs will be in London from 22nd to 25th April, as at present arranged.

Point 5 is covered by my suggestions on point 2.

Point 6.—Every possible effort will be made to ensure secrecy. It will, however, be essential to take French Government into our confidence.

8. You should communicate without delay the proposals and considerations advanced in the preceding paragraphs to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Sofia, No. 73; Rome, No. 210; Athens, No. 135; Belgrade, No. 108; Bucharest, No. 138; Warsaw, No. 112; and Moscow, No. 78.)

[T 5857/436/384] No. 30.

Viscount Halifax to His Majesty's Representatives at Berlin, Brussels, Budapest, Lisbon, Tokyo, Washington and Cairo.

(Intel No. 22. Personal.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April* 20, 1939.

MY Intel No. 17.

1. In replying to Turkish Government's communication, His Majesty's Government have, while expressing appreciation of helpful Turkish attitude, laid stress upon the importance they attach to removing the inconsistency between apparent Turkish desire—

(*a*) To declare *publicly* that Turkey will preserve her neutrality unless the Axis Powers commit "an act of aggression in the Mediterranean or against the Balkans";

(*b*) To give His Majesty's Government a *secret* assurance of co-operation in the event of a general war or one in these areas resulting from aggression elsewhere.

2. His Majesty's Government therefore propose that Turkish Government should substitute for words quoted in (*a*) above "an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean or in the Balkans." This would cover all possible contingencies from the point of view of the United Kingdom.

3. In return for this public declaration they would be prepared to lend Turkey all the support in their power.

4. Further replies given to points in Turkish statement under reference are as follows:—

Point 1.—Both Governments might meanwhile confine themselves merely to statement that they are in close consultation and that discussions are revealing customary identity of views.

Points 2 and 5.—Involve staff conversations, which His Majesty's Government are ready to begin in London as soon as Governments agree in principle as to paragraphs 1 and 2 above. Simultaneous presence of French experts now in London will be useful if any questions arise which might depend on French co-operation.

Point 3.—His Majesty's Government is, as Turkish Government now knows, actively pursuing discussions with Moscow.

Point 4.—His Majesty's Government appreciate importance of Bulgaria and would welcome Turkish indication of how and when most usefully to intervene. Roumanian Minister will be in London from 22nd to 28th April.

Point 6.—All possible secrecy will be observed; but France must know.

5. Turkish Government is reported from Angora to be very pessimistic as regards likelihood of early outbreak of war.

[R 3073/661/67] No. 31.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received April* 21.)

(No. 147.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, April* 20, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 126.

I handed to Minister for Foreign Affairs on 20th April a personal letter containing full substance of your telegram. He promised immediate consideration.

He raised following points:—

1. He agreed, of course, as to necessity of keeping French Government informed, and said it was equally necessary for [group omitted] should take Soviet Government into his confidence. He had already done so to a certain extent, and Soviet Government had equally informed him of their conversations with us. He added that Soviet Government have suggested an early meeting with Turkish Government to discuss international situation, and that such a meeting will definitely take place at Batum within next ten days. I said I must at once obtain your instructions as to whether you agreed to Soviet Government being informed.

2. He suggested that your telegram did not answer Turkish point about Straits. I said this was evidently covered by suggestion for staff conversations. He admitted this, but urged on me the importance which Turkey attached to certainty of material assistance from His Majesty's Government in regard to defence of Straits, particularly on land. He said it was essential that we should afford this assistance, and I understood him to refer to supply of necessary guns, &c.

(Repeated to Paris, Warsaw, Bucharest, Athens, Sofia, Belgrade, Rome and Moscow.)

[R 3073/2613/67] No. 32.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 131.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April* 22, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 147 [of 20th April: Guarantee of Turkey].

1. *Point* 1.—I could not object to the communication by the Turkish Government to the Soviet Government of the purport of the former's present political conversations with His Majesty's Government: it must be made quite clear,

however, that what is said in any staff conversations which may take place between His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government is for Turkish ears only.

2. *Point* 2.—I will communicate with you further on this point in due course.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 181; Warsaw, No. 121; Bucharest, No. 150; Athens, No. 142; Sofia, No. 78; Belgrade, No. 113; Moscow, No. 84; and Rome, No. 216.)

[R 3301/661/67] No. 33.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (*Received April* 26.)

(No. 163.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, April* 26, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 126.

Turkish reply was handed to me by Minister for Foreign Affairs last night. After acknowledging receipt of letter by which contents of your telegram under reference were communicated to him, Minister for Foreign Affairs redefines standpoint of His Majesty's Government as understood by him and explained by him to Cabinet, viz., His Majesty's Government would contemplate Anglo-Turkish mutual assistance in following manner :—

(1) Any war which broke out as a result of an aggression by Axis Powers and involved Italian participation in such a way as to bring England or Turkey into the war against last-named Power would necessarily be regarded as a Mediterranean war and would, *ipso facto*, bring Anglo-Turkish assistance into play. More precisely, any Turco-Italian or Anglo-Italian war would involve Anglo-Turkish collaboration.

(2) Any war resulting from an aggression by Axis Powers and spreading to the Balkans would bring mutual assistance between Turkey and Great Britain into operation.

(3) Parallel with Anglo-Turkish Agreement an agreement for Anglo-Soviet assistance would be concluded together with a Turco-Soviet Agreement conceived in same spirit as that proposed between Turkey and Great Britain.

(4) Turkey and England would continue their parallel attempts to settle Bulgaro-Roumanian dispute and to ensure, if possible, the participation or at least the neutrality of Bulgaria.

(5) Turkey having, on the one hand, vital interests from point of view of her economy and of her armaments to safeguard in Germany, and, on the other hand, the defence of the Straits being of the greatest importance from point of view of efficacy of Anglo-Turkish mutual assistance, conversations would immediately be opened in London to determine British assistance to Turkey in economic and financial spheres and as regards provision of various kinds of military supplies, and to lay down methods of effective assistance in light of various probabilities.

(6) Above conditions having been fulfilled, a treaty of mutual assistance of a lasting character would be concluded between Turkey and England, ratified by the two Parliaments, and thus made public with no secret clause except staff agreements.

2. Letter then continues as follows :—

"Such are conclusions which I have drawn both from our various conversations and from the written papers which we have exchanged on the subject. However, as regards paragraph (2), I would like to give greater precision to proposal contained in your letter. I would propose to word paragraph (2) as follows :—

"'(2) Any war resulting from an aggression by Axis Powers and spreading to the Balkans in such a way as to threaten security of Turkey would bring mutual assistance between Turkey and Great Britain into operation.

"3. I hope views of our two Governments on our understanding of the question are identical and that His Majesty's Government will agree as to necessity of the greater precision given to paragraph (2). In this event, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that Government of the Republic expresses its agreement in principle to this effect, and that it will delegate experts with power to treat on all questions mentioned in paragraph (5) with British experts.

"4. It will, on the other hand, await the result of Anglo-Soviet conversations, being itself in touch with Government of U.S.S.R. on this same question in connexion with its Turco-Soviet aspect.

"5. Turkish Government agree to declare at any time, if it is felt to be necessary, that Turkish and English Governments are in close consultation and that discussions which are taking place between them reveal their customary identity of views."

See also my immediately following telegram.

(Repeated to Paris, Rome, Bucharest, Warsaw, Athens, Sofia, Belgrade and Moscow.)

[R 3345/661/67] No. 34.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received April* 27.)

(No. 164.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, April* 26, 1939.

MY telegram No. 163.

Minister for Foreign Affairs amplified the written communication by the following statement of attitude of Turkish Government in negotiations with the Soviet Government :—

2. They desire to conclude an agreement with Soviet Government on the same lines, but not a treaty in general terms or covering as much ground as their agreement with His Majesty's Government. They intend agreement with U.S.S.R. to cover any areas in which Turkey and the Soviets are jointly interested, viz., Balkans and Black Sea, but not other neighbours of the U.S.S.R. such as Poland and the Baltic States.

3. They [group undecypherable] offer no views as to extent or character of any agreement His Majesty's Government propose to make with the Soviets.

4. I read to Minister for Foreign Affairs, in French, draft of this telegram and he has concurred orally.

5. My telegram No. 167 reports further conversation with him on 26th April.

(Repeated to Paris, Rome, Bucharest, Warsaw, Athens, Sofia, Belgrade and Moscow.)

[R 3326/661/67] No. 35.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received April* 27.)

(No. 167.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, April* 26, 1939.

MY telegrams Nos. 163 and 164.

You will notice that, whereas original intention had been to cover Mediterranean and Balkans in one clause (see, for instance, paragraphs 3 and 4 of your telegram No. 126), Turkish Government have now placed them in two separate clauses.

2. Explanation is partly provided in my telegram No. 164, but Minister for Foreign Affairs has explained further as follows :—

(*a*) As regards Mediterranean, he considers Turkey as absolutely committed to mutual assistance with us. If either were at war with Italy, the other would come in at once.

(*b*) As regards Balkans, he does not like to go quite so far owing to considerations regarding Soviets. Inclusion of words "in such a way as to threaten security of Turkey" in paragraph 2 (2) as shown in my telegram No. 163 is proposed, firstly, for reasons given in my telegram No. 164; secondly, because Turkish Government do not want to bind themselves to us beyond a certain point before they have come to an understanding with Soviets; and, thirdly, because they want to retain some latitude for negotiations with Soviets. Minister for Foreign Affairs considers that in actual fact wording which he proposes would cover a threat by the Axis Powers to Balkans. He feels, however, that he cannot undertake so general an obligation to Soviets as to His Majesty's Government. Among other things, such an agreement would cover outside eventualities even as far as a Russo-Japanese war, in which Turkey would have no interest. His present idea is to give Soviets the same undertakings as regards Black Sea as he has to us as regards Mediterranean. He is anxious to see how attitude of Soviet Government develops, and I think he does not exclude possibility of enlarging his obligations in the Balkans if committed in return for getting more out of Soviets.

3. I asked him whether, in general, his reply meant that, subject to text of paragraph 2 (2), he was in agreement with our proposals as defined by him in my telegram No. 163. He replied in the affirmative.

4. I pointed out that he had not answered your question as to whether he understood "Balkan solidarity" to include Bulgaria as well as Balkan *Entente* Powers (your telegram No. 126, paragraph 2). He said he did.

5. I asked whether by "parallel with" in clause (3) of paragraph 1 of my telegram No. 163 and by "above conditions having been fulfilled" in clause (6) he meant he was unwilling to conclude final agreement with us until agreements with Soviet Government had been concluded. While evidently anxious to avoid binding himself finally to us in so far as Balkans (as distinct from Mediterranean) are concerned until more certain of Soviet Government, he did not appear to wish all these negotiations to proceed *pari passu*. He seemed to think Soviet attitude is developing in the right direction.

6. Finally, I said I thought we were approaching a point when main lines of our agreement could be drafted. I said that, subject to your views as to proposals in my telegram No. 163 and without in the slightest degree committing you, it seemed to me personally that agreement would contain three clauses: first, would express general identity of interests and policy based generally on paragraphs 1 and 2 of my telegram No. 133 and of first sentence of paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 126; and, second and third, would deal with Mediterranean and Balkans respectively on lines indicated in my telegram No. 163. I said I could not possibly say whether you would agree to this suggestion, which showed purely how the matter presented itself to me. Minister for Foreign Affairs concurred in this, and expressed desire that political agreement should be negotiated here and agreement resulting from staff conversations be concluded in London. I said I had no idea how you would view this and that it was possible that you would prefer to conclude political agreement also in London, which was the centre of so many other similar negotiations. His Excellency seemed to prefer his own suggestion. I said I would submit the matter to you.

(Repeated to Paris, Rome, Bucharest, Warsaw, Athens, Sofia, Belgrade and Moscow.)

[E 3113/2731/44] No. 36

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received April* 28.)

(No. 185 E.)

My Lord, *Angora, April* 7, 1939.

WITH reference to Sir Percy Loraine's despatch No. 660 E. of the 23rd December, 1938, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the trade agreement between Turkey and the United States of America was signed at

Angora on the 1st April. A copy of the text of the agreement, which has been furnished by the United States Embassy, is enclosed herein.(1)

2. My commercial secretary observes that the agreement appears to be very straightforward. Turkey undertakes to supply free exchange for the United States of America imports up to a total of 10·91 per cent. of the value of her (Turkey's) total imports, excluding from this figure extraordinary imports arising from the United Kingdom and German credits. The United States of America also benefit by large customs reductions on, principally, prunes, dried or tinned, 75 per cent.; asparagus, tinned, 75 per cent.; radios, assembled, 75 per cent.; non-assembled radio parts, 88 per cent.; automotive vehicles, chassis and parts, 60 per cent.; and toothpaste, 50 per cent. Reductions in respect of other articles mentioned in the first schedule vary between 5 per cent. and 40 per cent.

3. Turkey receives specified reductions in rates of duty on a number of her agricultural products, valonia, liquorice, leaf-tobacco, figs, raisins, hazel-nuts, pistachios and on rugs, borax (produced by a British company), chromite and chrome ore and emery. The United States of America do not undertake to purchase any specified amount of Turkish produce.

4. The most important clauses of the agreement are article 9, which deals with the provision of free exchange by Turkey and of which the effect is stated above; article 13, which enables the agreement to be terminated at sixty days' notice if the parties have failed in a given period to agree as regards measures adopted by one party which are considered by the other "to impair the effectiveness of the agreement"; and article 14, which provides similar facilities if one party considers that existing exchange rates have altered so as to prejudice its industry and commerce and negotiations for a modification of the agreement for this reason have failed.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington and to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

H. M. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

(1) Not printed.

[E 3114/182/44] No. 37.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received April* 28.)

(No. 192.)

My Lord, *Angora, April* 11, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that an interview given by General Kâzim Karabekir to the *Tan* newspaper of Istanbul, and reported in the *Tan* of the 3rd April, was considered by the youth of Istanbul and Angora to be offensive to the memory of the late President of the Republic, with the result that student manifestations—on a small scale—took place in these two towns, to express the loyalty of the youth of Turkey to Atatürk, and their displeasure with General Kâzim Karabekir.

2. The general, who in the early days of the national struggle had played a leading rôle in the Erzerum district, but whose fame was later eclipsed by that of Mustafa Kemal, was never regarded with favour by Atatürk and was relegated to the provincial obscurity of Istanbul during Atatürk's lifetime. The general emerged, on one occasion, from his obscurity to claim that he had played an important part in the formation of the new Turkey (see Sir George Clerk's despatch No. 180 of the 13th May, 1933), but on Atatürk expressing the opinion that such a claim only proved its holder to be fit for a lunatic asylum, the general retired again to the outer darkness.

3. After Atatürk's death the general was allowed to return to public life and was elected Deputy for Istanbul. He has apparently thought that the time was propitious for again airing his view, in the interview referred to above, that he played a most important, if not the most important, part in the formation of the new Turkey. It seems, however, that the time is not yet ripe for criticism of Atatürk and his régime, and the student demonstrations have led the general to declare his respect and devotion to the "Eternal Chief."

4. The incident serves to show that Atatürk's memory is still green. There had been a tendency towards oblivion of the late President. Many of his close companions were no longer in official favour; many of those whom Atatürk disliked had returned from abroad, or from self-imposed provincial exile, to be officially received by the new President of the Republic. This, combined with the fact that, on the occasion of a recent simple ceremony in connexion with the removal of the remains of Atatürk from one part of the Museum in which they temporarily repose to another, M. Ismet Inönü did not attend, gave rise to a widespread belief that the memory of Atatürk would be considered as interred with him. The student demonstrations, together with the discovery that M. Ismet Inönü's abstention from the ceremony has aroused a great deal of displeasure among the people, should prevent any movement, in high quarters, towards a diminution of the outward marks of respect to the dead leader.

I have, &c.

H. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

[E 3450/9/44] No. 38.

Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 174.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, April 28, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 125.

Herr von Papen arrived on 27th April and had a conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, of which the latter gave me the following account the same evening:—

2. The German Ambassador began by stating that the German Government were partisans of peace. They would make the necessary settlement in Central Europe, but they did not desire to control an inch of territory. They wanted peace and nothing but peace.

3. Relations with Poland had been very good until Poland received British support. Poland must be friendly either with Germany or with the Soviets. On account of communism, friendship with Soviets was impossible for her and she must live on good terms with Germany. Germany asked nothing of Poland except Danzig (with every condition to amplify Poland's needs) and an *Autostrade*.

4. As regards Czecho-Slovakia, Herr Hitler had already made it clear at Munich that he could not tolerate the military threat in the heart of Germany which Czecho-Slovakia constituted.

5. As regards France, Herr Hitler had said that for centuries Franco-German hostility had greatly harmed Germany. Germany wished at all costs sincerely to reconcile herself with France. Not only did Germany wish to make no further moves, but she did not wish to encourage others to do so; for instance, Hungary and Bulgaria. On the contrary, Germany was restraining them.

6. The Axis was solid, but it was Germany who "called the tune and time." Italy had seen that Germany had done everything and Italy nothing. Italy had occupied Albania because she wanted something to show. Germany liked Turks, and so long as Turkey was Germany's friend no one, especially Italy, could do anything against Turkey.

7. The Minister for Foreign Affairs interrupted Herr von Papen at this point to say that Turkey did not appreciate dependence on the friendship of others, and enquired whether the German Ambassador meant that, if Turkey was not on friendly terms with Germany, Italy would attack her? Herr von Papen excused himself and said he had expressed himself badly and had meant no such thing.

8. The Minister for Foreign Affairs went on to say the German Ambassador could be sure of one thing—Turkey was not afraid of the Italians. If they came along, Turkey was certain of a happy conclusion. The Italians might be more numerous and stronger, but against this Turkey had two advantages: (1) The Italians would be far from their base; and (2) "they have their Italians and we have our Turks."

9. Herr von Papen then gave further pacific assurances and added that Germany desires nothing from Turkey [illegible]

what was the truth of press reports regarding negotiations for a non-aggression pact. He could not conceal that British policy of assurances and counter-assurances, in one word of encirclement, "irritated" Germany, and if ever this encirclement became a *fait accompli* through an agreement between Turkey, Soviet Government and His Majesty's Government, he greatly feared that their ardent partisan of peace, Herr Hitler, would find himself in an extraordinary state of exasperation.

10. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that the ardent desire of the Turkish Government was equally to preserve peace. But Turkish Government had been worried by two recent events: (1) Ultimatum to Roumania—this had vanished within forty-eight hours, which had consoled them; (2) the occupation of Albania. Albania was a very poor country and Italian occupation would only prove expensive. Turkish Government had, therefore, been inclined to regard Albanian move as part of a concerted plan by the Axis Powers and to consider that the time had come for Turkey to protect herself against surprises. Since then Turkey had been in contact with friendly countries and exchanges of views were in progress. At present there was no signed or initialled agreement, and it could not be said that there were official conversations. But these countries were concerting together and close contact continued.

11. Herr von Papen enquired what Germany could do to reassure Turkey. The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that the period of words was already over. German Ambassador then suggested that Signor Mussolini might make a declaration of friendship with Turkey. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that such a thing would "displease Turkey enormously." German Ambassador there upon gave every assurance of German and Italian good intentions. Minister for Foreign Affairs then asked three questions:—

(1) Does Germany approve existence and strengthening of the Balkan *Entente*? Herr von Papen replied that Germany approved entirely.

(2) Did Germany and Italy intend to proceed further in the Balkans? Herr von Papen replied: "Jamais de la vie."

(3) Did Germany intend to start a war in the Mediterranean? German Ambassador replied: "Never."

12. Minister for Foreign Affairs then said that Germans could sleep quietly in their beds because Germans had no intention of seeking adventures elsewhere. German Ambassador tried to convince him of Italian good intentions. Minister for Foreign Affairs observed that so long as Italy went on fortifying and reinforcing islands, and since Italy had occupied Albania which was a vital point for Turkey, no verbal assurances would satisfy Turkey.

13. I am impressed with the manner in which the German Ambassador seems to have acted as spokesman for the Italian Government. My Italian colleague went on leave a few days ago, remarking that there was nothing for him to do here.

Please repeat to Paris.
(Repeated to Rome, Saving, Warsaw, Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia.)

[T 3857/436/384] No. 39.

Viscount Halifax to His Majesty's Representatives at Berlin, Brussels, Budapest, Lisbon, Tokyo, Washington and Cairo.

(Intel No. 20. Personal.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 28, 1939.*

MY Intel No. 22.

1. Turkish reply of 25th April interprets British proposals for Anglo-Turkish mutual assistance as follows:—

(a) Any Turco-Italian or Anglo-Italian war in the Mediterranean would involve Anglo-Turkish collaboration.

(b) Axis aggression which spread to the Balkans would bring mutual assistance between Turkey and Great Britain into operation.

(c) An Anglo-Soviet assistance pact and one between Turkey and Soviet Russia in the same spirit as the proposed Turco-British pact

(*d*) Continued parallel attempts by Turkey and Great Britain to settle Bulgaro-Roumanian dispute and ensure co-operation or at least neutrality of Bulgaria.

(*e*) Immediate conversations in London to square the safeguarding of vital Turkish economic and armament interests in Germany with an efficient defence of the Straits, from the standpoint of the Anglo-Turkish mutual assistance, by providing military supplies and laying down effective method of assistance in the light of various probabilities.

(*f*) Once these conditions have been fulfilled, a treaty of mutual assistance to be ratified by both Parliaments and made public, with no secret clauses except staff agreements.

2. For (*b*) above, the Turkish Government wishes to substitute some such wording as: "Any war resulting from an aggression by Axis Powers and spreading to the Balkans in such a way as to threaten the security of Turkey would bring mutual assistance between Turkey and Great Britain into operation." Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has explained that in the Mediterranean the Turkish Government considers itself committed absolutely to mutual assistance with Great Britain. As regards the Balkans, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has explained his desire, first, to bargain with the Soviet Government, to whom he does not wish to incur an obligation, for instance, in the event of a Russo-Japanese war, in which Turkey would have no interest. Nor was he anxious to bind himself finally to Great Britain as regards the Balkans (as distinct from the Mediterranean) until more certain of the Soviet Government.

3. The Turkish Government has, therefore, stated that, as regards the Turco-Soviet aspect of the British proposals, it will, while maintaining contact with Soviet Russia, await the result of Anglo-Soviet conversations. Privately, the Minister for Foreign Affairs added that the Turkish Government intended its agreement with the U.S.S.R. to cover any areas in which Turkey and the Soviet were jointly interested, such as the Balkans and the Black Sea, but not other neighbours of Russia, such as Poland and the Baltic States.

4. The Turkish Government is further prepared at any time to make known, if necessary, our close consultation and identity of views as revealed by discussions.

[R 3325/661/67] No. 40.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 144.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 20, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 163 [of 20th April: Guarantee to Turkey].

Please inform Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs that I am most grateful for communication made to you on 25th April as set forth in your telegram under reference and further explained in your telegrams Nos. 164 and 167 of 26th April. It is gratifying to find that there is so large a measure of agreement between us.

2. As regards point (1) of paragraph 1 of your telegram No. 163, His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government are clearly in agreement, if it can be assumed that the words "last-named Power" refer to Italy. I gather, however, from the fact that no mention is made of it in your telegram No. 163 and subsequent telegrams that the Turkish Government regards an immediate public declaration as no longer necessary. His Majesty's Government, however, consider that the general situation remains such as to make it desirable to strengthen the peace front against aggression. They submit, therefore, for the consideration of the Turkish Government, a form of declaration the text of which is contained in my immediately following telegram, and which, in their opinion, it might, if the Turkish Government agree, be desirable to make public by both Governments simultaneously in the near future. His Majesty's Government are, however, sensible of what may be an important objection to this procedure, *i.e.*, that the reference in such a declaration to the Mediterranean only might be thought to take no account of the dangers inherent in the Balkan situation and thus to lead to undesirable reactions not only in the Balkans but elsewhere.

3. It will be observed that this text, which is modelled on the text of the statement issued at the conclusion of the recent conversations with the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, refers only to the Mediterranean, and would thus leave the way clear for the development of Turkey's negotiations with the Soviet Government on the one hand and her Balkan allies and Bulgaria on the other. Paragraph 3 of this declaration is intended to cover point (1) of paragraph 1 of your telegram under reference and to have the same meaning and effect.

4. I notice from paragraph (2) of your telegram No. 163 that to the definition given in point (2) of paragraph 1 of that telegram of the circumstances entailing mutual assistance which, at present runs as follows: —

> "Any war resulting from an aggression by Axis Powers and spreading to the Balkans would bring mutual assistance between Turkey and Great Britain into operation."

Turkish Government wish to insert after "Balkans" the qualifying words "in such way as to threaten the security of Turkey." This, in effect, would seem to confine Turkish intervention only to an eventuality when she considered her security threatened. His Majesty's Government have, of course, as announced on 13th April in Parliament, given an unilateral guarantee to Greece and Roumania to the effect that, "in the event of any action being taken which clearly threatened the independence of Greece or Roumania and which the Greek or Roumanian Government respectively considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Greek or Roumanian Government all the support in their power." This guarantee would, in fact, be brought into operation by just such a set of circumstances as is precisely covered by the unamended wording of point (2) of paragraph 1 of your telegram No. 163, and would thus entail "mutual assistance between Turkey and Great Britain." Such mutual assistance, however, would not necessarily be obligatory if the above-mentioned Turkish addition were adopted. His Majesty's Government would, therefore, much prefer the unamended wording and trust that the Turkish Government will not insist on their suggested addition.

5. As regards point (3) of paragraph 1, the Turkish Government seem to be under some misapprehension. His Majesty's Government have no intention of concluding a bilateral agreement of mutual assistance with the Soviet Government. The present state of their conversations with the Soviet Government and the considerations which underlie our policy have been conveniently outlined in my telegram to Warsaw, No. 128 [of 28th April], which has been repeated to you. You may inform the Turkish Foreign Minister, in strict confidence, of the contents of that telegram. We have, as he will see, in dealing with the Soviet Government, thought it essential to take careful account of the susceptibilities of the Polish and Roumanian Governments, and no doubt the Turkish Government will bear in mind the possible reactions of the Roumanian Government when they discuss matters with the Soviet Government.

6. There is clearly complete agreement between our two Governments as to points (4) and (5), *i.e.*, joint endeavours to ensure, if possible, the participation or at least the neutrality of Bulgaria on the one hand and staff conversations on the other. With regard to British assistance in the economic and financial spheres, however, the Turkish Government will be only too well aware from the recent budget statement in the House of Commons that His Majesty's Government have their own financial difficulties.

7. With regard to point (6), I am not quite certain as to the implication of the words "above conditions having been fulfilled." At first sight they would seem to postpone the conclusion of the prospective treaty to such time, for example, as Turkey had completed her negotiations with the Soviet Government or until Bulgarian participation and neutrality had been ensured or Turkey felt satisfied that all her requirements under point (5) of your telegram No. 163 had been met. I cannot but feel that, if this interpretation is correct, undue delays might hinder the completion of the treaty which I am sure it is as much the desire as it is to the interests of both Governments to conclude as soon as possible.

8. The course, therefore, that His Majesty's Government would favour is a procedure by the following stages:—

Stage I. The issue of a joint declaration in the sense of my immediately following telegram, should the two Governments on closer examination of the difficulties alluded to in paragraph 2 above consider this desirable

Stage 2.—The negotiation in Angora of an interim understanding as soon as possible after the issue of such a declaration. The eventual publication of all or any of the contents of the interim understanding is a question which might be left for discussion at a later date. In the event of stage 1 being adopted, this understanding would be principally directed to cover points (2) to (5) of paragraph 1 of your telegram No. 163 and might be drafted in the light of paragraph 6 of your telegram No. 167. If, on the other hand, our two Governments come to the conclusion that no joint declaration of the nature suggested is desirable, the interim agreement would then have to cover point (1) of paragraph 1 of your telegram No. 163. In this connexion I would lay particular stress on our wish that the wording of point (2) in paragraph 1 of your telegram No. 163 should not be weakened by the additional phrase suggested in paragraph 2 of the same telegram.

Stage 3.—Concurrently, if desired, with stage 2 the meeting of experts in London to deal with all questions in point (5) of paragraph 1 of your telegram No. 163, always bearing in mind the difficulties alluded to in paragraph 6 above.

Stage 4. The negotiation in Angora of the treaty foreshadowed in paragraph 2 of the proposed declaration.

9. I will send you as soon as possible the draft of an interim understanding for stage 2 on the lines suggested under that heading in the preceding paragraph.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 158, Saving; Rome, No. 54, Saving; Bucharest, No. 168; Warsaw, No. 129; Athens, No. 153; Sofia, No. 86; Belgrade, No. 123; and Moscow, No. 92.)

[R 3325/661/67] No. 41

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 145.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 29, 1939.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.
Following is text of proposed declaration :—

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Turkish Government have been in close consultation, and the discussions which have taken place between them, and are continuing, have revealed their customary identity of views.

"2. It is agreed that the two countries will enter into an agreement of a permanent and reciprocal character in the interests of their security.

"3. Pending the completion of the permanent agreement, His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government declare that they are prepared to lend each other all the support in their power in the event of an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean.

"4. This declaration, like the proposed agreement, would not be directed against any other country, but would be designed to assure Great Britain and Turkey of mutual assistance should the necessity arise.

"5. It is recognised by the two Governments that certain matters, including a more precise definition of the various ways in which the necessity for such assistance might arise, will require further examination before the permanent agreement can be completed. This examination is proceeding.

"6. It is understood that the arrangements above mentioned do not preclude either Government from making agreements with other countries in the general interest of the consolidation of peace."

(Repeated to Paris, No. 159, Saving; Rome, No. 55, Saving; Bucharest, No. 169; Warsaw, No. 130; Athens, No. 154; Sofia, No. 87; Belgrade, No. 124; and Moscow, No. 93.)

[E 3376/143/44] No. 42.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 185.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, May 5, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 163, third paragraph.

Military attaché and air attaché have drawn my attention to the following considerations which I think you will agree should be taken into account in deciding venue of the proposed staff conversations.

2. They consider preliminary conversations in some form would be advisable here for the following reasons :—

(*a*) It would be easier to estimate the capability of Turkish present forces.
(*b*) It would be easier to examine Turkish plans on the spot.
(*c*) A clearer insight could be afforded into the mentality of the Turkish General Staff.
(*d*) Such conversations would encourage the Turkish General Staff to abandon their present attitude of secrecy and suspicion of foreign service representatives.
(*e*) It would be possible to avoid the despatch of vague or limited or even contradictory instructions by the Turkish General Staff to their representatives in London, as has happened on at least one previous occasion.

3. It appears from the passage referred to in my telegram No. 163 that the Turkish Government intend to delegate special experts to London, and I do not wish to suggest that full conversations should take place here rather than in London. On the other hand, there seems much force in what the attachés say as to preliminary conversations here. General Weygand has probably covered much of the ground, but I do not think this renders my suggestion unnecessary.

[C 6668/3356/18] No. 43.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 189.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, May 5, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 184.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs gave me an account on 5th May of the conversations during M. Potemkin's visit.

2. They had exchanged information fully as regards their prospective negotiations, and each had expressed himself fully satisfied with the correctness and loyalty of the other's Government.

3. M. Potemkin had stated that the Soviet Government applauded Turkish understanding with His Majesty's Government as regards the Mediterranean. As regards the Balkans, they equally approved the Turkish attitude, though they thought it unduly weak where Roumania was concerned. M. Potemkin emphasised the importance of doing everything possible to solve the Bulgarian and Roumanian difficulty, and had promised Soviet support for this. Soviet Government would use their influence with Bulgaria. Both had agreed as to the need for disposing of this question in order to strengthen the position in the Balkans and make it easier to clarify the position of Yugoslavia.

4. Minister for Foreign Affairs had expressed agreement with Soviet's point of view (1) as regards the possible interpretation of the British guarantee to Poland as applying to attack by Russia, and (2) application of the Polish-Roumanian Treaty to all aggressors and not to the Soviet only.

5. M. Potemkin had spoken of the possibility of a threefold pact (His Majesty's Government, France and the U.S.S.R. Minister for Foreign Affairs had said he would not like to be approached to join such a pact after [group undecypherable] three had concluded it amongst themselves. He desired that Turkey should figure amongst the original contracting parties, with a limited responsibility.

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6. M. Potemkin had assured the Minister for Foreign Affairs that Turkey could always count on material aid from the Soviet.

7. He had asked Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the Soviet could rely on Turkey's assistance if they joined Roumania in a war against Germany. Minister for Foreign Affairs had replied this would be impossible unless Turkish Government could be quite sure of the attitude of Bulgaria.

8. He further informed me that Ismet had emphasised to General Weygand that the French Government and His Majesty's Government should find a way of bringing the Soviet in, and had pointed out the disadvantage of their remaining [? neutral] throughout a general war. Also, that Ismet had insisted with M. Potemkin that the Soviet should accept whatever terms His Majesty's Government and France could offer them, pointing out to him the importance from the Soviet's point of view that they should [two groups undecypherable], amongst partisans and disadvantage which they would suffer if an ultimate settlement were made without them.

See my immediately following telegram.

(Repeated to Paris, Moscow, Warsaw and Bucharest, and Saving to Sofia and Belgrade.)

[R 3684/661/67] No. 44.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (*Received May 7.*)

(No. 192.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, May 6, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 144, paragraph 2, and your telegram No. 145.

On 6th May Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that the Turkish Government, with the consent of the parliamentary group of the Popular party, agrees to the declaration proposed by you, with certain minor amendments.

My immediately following telegram gives French text, with amendments desired by the Turkish Government. [Group undecypherable] are in italics.

2. Minister for Foreign Affairs explained that policy stated in Turkish declaration still required formal parliamentary consent. He desires to bring the declaration, as amended, before a meeting of the National Assembly next week. He asked me to inform you of this and enquires on what day you should propose to make the same statement before Parliament. He is anxious that statements in the two Parliaments should synchronise. After passing National Assembly, the text of declaration would be released to the local news-agency.

3. Meetings of the Assembly take place Monday, Wednesday and Friday.

4. It is a foregone conclusion that the declaration will be passed by the Assembly, and Minister for Foreign Affairs will not be at the discussions with the parliamentary groups; they admitted the four independent members in order to indicate the national importance which they attach to the declaration.

5. See my telegram No. 195.

(Repeated to Paris and Saving to Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia.)

[R 3685/661/67] No. 45.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received May 7.*)

(No. 193.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, May 6, 1939.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text referred to (explanations in my immediately following telegram) :—

"Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté dans le Royaume Uni et le Gouvernement turc sont entrés en étroite consultation, et les discussions dans lesquelles ils se sont engagés et qui sont encore en cours ont révélé leur identité de vue habituelle.

"Il est convenu que les deux États concluront un accord définitif *de longue durée comportant des engagements réciproques dans l'intérêt de leur sécurité nationale.*

"En attendant la conclusion de l'accord *définitif*, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté et le Gouvernement turc déclarent dans le cas d'un acte d'agression qui conduirait à une guerre dans *la région méditerranéenne*, ils seraient prêts *à coopérer effectivement* et à s'accorder mutuellement toute *aide et assistance* en leur pouvoir.

"Cette déclaration, aussi bien que l'accord envisagé, *n'est* dirigée contre aucun pays, mais *a* pour but d'assurer à la Grande-Bretagne et à la Turquie *une aide et assistance* réciproque dans le cas où celle-ci s'avérerait nécessaire.

"Il est reconnu par les deux Gouvernements que certaines questions, y comprise la définition plus précise des diverses conditions dans lesquelles *se déclencherait le jeu des engagements réciproques*, demanderont un examen plus approfondi avant que l'accord *définitif* puisse être complété. Cet examen est actuellement en cours.

"Il est entendu que les dispositions ci-dessus énoncées n'empêchent ni l'un ni l'autre Gouvernement de conclure dans l'intérêt général de la consolidation de la paix des accords avec d'autres pays."

(Repeated to Paris, Athens and Bucharest, and Saving to Belgrade and Sofia.)

[R 3686/661/67] No. 46.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received May 7.*)

(No. 194.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, May 6, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 193.

Following are explanations of Turkish amendments :—

(*a*) Objection to word "permanent" is that it implies no time limit whatever.

(*b*) Their reason for desiring "aid and assistance" is to make certain that all forms of assistance—military, material and financial—are covered. Use of the two substantives is, of course, unnecessary, but it appears to clear their minds and gives them satisfaction.

(*c*) By "définitif" I think they mean final agreement as distinct from interim understanding in paragraph 9 of your telegram No. 144.

(Repeated to Paris, and Saving to Sofia, Bucharest, Belgrade and Athens.)

[R 3687/661/67] No. 47.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received May 7.*)

(No. 195.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, May 6, 1939.*

MY telegrams Nos. 192 and 193.

I mentioned to Minister for Foreign Affairs point raised in your telegram No. 144 regarding absence of reference to Balkans. I said Prime Minister was certain to be questioned in the House of Commons as to reason for this omission. Minister for Foreign Affairs explained reason for not referring to Balkans was that matter was still under discussion between us. (He intends to give me full answer of Turkish Government to other points raised in your telegram some time next week, but said that on broad lines Turkish answer would be in the affirmative.)

2. Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed that in the event of question being asked, answer could be given on following lines :—

3. Turkey's obligations in the Balkans are already covered by Balkan Pact. As regards British obligations, His Majesty's Government have already given guarantees to Greece and Roumania. Question of Balkans is, however, continuing to form the subject of consultations between the Turkish Government and His Majesty's Government, and these conversations are proceeding in accordance with customary identity of views mentioned in paragraph 1 of declaration.

(Repeated to Paris, Sofia, Bucharest, Belgrade and Athens.)

[R 3325/661/67] No. 48.

Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps (Paris).

(No. 193.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 7, 1939.*

ANGORA telegram No. 163 and my telegrams Nos. 144 and 145 to Angora [the former of 26th April and the two latter of 29th April: Guarantee to Turkey].

I should be grateful if you would keep the French Government informed in general terms of the present stage in our exchange of views with the Turkish Government, as revealed by the two telegrams under reference.

2. While the possibility of an early declaration on the part of His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government relating to the Mediterranean only is still under discussion, I am inclined to think that, if the Turkish Government see grave objections to it, it would, for the reasons given at the end of paragraph 2 of my telegram to Angora No. 144, perhaps be unwise to press it. The question, therefore, of mutual collaboration between His Majesty's Government and Turkey in the event of war breaking out in the Mediterranean would then have to be covered by the interim understanding. Whether or not this understanding would be made public must depend largely on the circumstances obtaining internationally and internally (*i.e.*, parliamentary considerations) at the moment when that understanding is reached.

3. The problem of the manner in which France can be associated with either the declaration (if it is made), the interim understanding or the eventual treaty is bound to arise sooner or later.

4. As regards the declaration, as it would be bilateral in form and makes specific mention of the future negotiation of a treaty between the United Kingdom and Turkey, it would probably suffice if the French and Turkish Governments could arrange for a simultaneous declaration to be made by them on similar lines to my telegram No. 145 to Angora, with such changes as may be appropriate.

5. As regards the interim understanding, I think it should suffice if, once an agreed text were reached between His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government, the two Governments communicated it to the French Government, who would then, if they saw fit, conclude a similar arrangement with the Turkish Government.

6. The question of an ultimate treaty between France and Turkey is one which those two Governments will doubtless consider in due course. I am only concerned at the present stage to let it be known to the French Government that His Majesty's Government, as at present advised, prefer the idea of bilateral treaties with Turkey rather than a single tripartite instrument. Bilateral instruments are easier to negotiate and can take greater account of the individual requirements—strategical and political—of the participants, and do not give as formidable an impression of encirclement.

(Repeated to Angora, No. 160.)

[R 3787/661/67] No. 49.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 201.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, May 8, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 192.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that he gave to representatives of Balkan *Entente* and of Saarabad Pact Powers an outline of the gist of declaration.

2. He also made a statement to Bulgarian Minister. The latter turned extremely white.

3. Minister for Foreign Affairs then said that German Ambassador had seen a report of our negotiations and forthcoming declaration in local newspaper (since suppressed on account of this publication). Herr von Papen had at once called on Secretary-General. On being informed that report was well-founded,

Herr von Papen remarked that Turkish decision would completely upset the equilibrium and would increase risk of war from 40 to 60 per cent. He urged Secretary-General to delay matters, as Germany would shortly put a very favourable proposal before Turkey. Secretary-General said that Turkish Government could not go back. After further conversation, Herr von Papen divulged that proposal which he expected to make involved entry of Italy and Bulgaria into Balkan *Entente*, followed by a guarantee of Balkan external frontiers by Germany. Secretary-General pointed out that it had been the entry of Italy into Albania which had necessitated Turkish policy of understanding with Western Powers, and that actual admission of Italy into Balkan *Entente* would be the last straw.

4. Minister for Foreign Affairs connected in his mind remarks of German Ambassador, pallor of Bulgarian Minister, and demonstration during military parade in Sofia on 6th May as indications that the Axis policy must have already gone some way in heading Bulgaria off from Balkan *Entente*.

5. Having in mind your telegram No. 159, I asked Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he considered Bulgaria as lost to the Balkan *Entente*. He said he would not go so far. Bulgarian Government would probably think things over in the light of forthcoming declaration of Anglo-Turkish policy and of presence of Turkish troops in Thrace, and might modify their views. I then mentioned, on most hypothetical basis, suggestion in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 159. He said he thought it would be of no use at present to mention the Dobruja. On the other hand, it would help him greatly in his conversations with M. Gafencu here if His Majesty's Government could make some statement to Roumanian Government of importance which they attached to inclusion of Bulgaria in Balkan *Entente*. I venture to suggest that if something of the kind could be said at Bucharest, and if I could inform Minister for Foreign Affairs, no harm and possibly some good might be done.

(Repeated to Paris, Rome, Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia.)

[E 3401/63/89] No. 50.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 202. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, May 8, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 198.

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me on 8th May in order to speak about Hatay negotiations.

2. His Excellency described in angry terms the exasperation caused by attitude of French Government. He said there was now a complete "*crise de confiance*." French Government had played with Turkish Government and had deceived them. It was impossible to carry on negotiations thus as Turkish Government could place no faith in French proposals, which might at any moment be modified. He was in the act of drafting a telegram to Turkish Ambassador in Paris.

3. I gathered from Minister for Foreign Affairs that he intends to regard negotiations as suspended. I asked him what were the difficulties which divided the two Governments. He said that it was not so much a case of concrete difficulties as of the way Turkish Government were being treated, which had destroyed all confidence on their side. They had acted like children. Apart from this, as far as I was able to gather, the main difficulties concerned certain villages which French desired to retain, fact that French Government were insisting that transfer of Hatay should not come into force until termination of mandate, question of frontier guarantees, date of withdrawal of French troops, &c.

4. As regards the first of these points, Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked to me angrily that French Government were bargaining about a few villages when Turkey was offering the whole of her manhood to co-operate with Western Powers.

5. Minister for Foreign Affairs added that result had been to place him in a most awkward position *vis-à-vis* his colleagues and the entire Government in

correspondingly awkward position *vis-à-vis* the party. They had had definite promises from French Government, on the strength of which they had said that negotiations were within reach of a satisfactory conclusion, and now they had been entirely let down. He had had these promises from M. Bonnet, M. Massigli and General Weygand.

6. Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke with great heat, and it is quite clear that this question is having the worst possible effect on Franco-Turkish relations. He said Turkish Government regarded the matter as quite distinct from wider questions now at issue, but that they would do nothing with France on the wider questions if it were not for the wishes of His Majesty's Government.

7. Minister for Foreign Affairs said he felt bound to inform me of this owing to closeness and frankness of our relations.

8. I hesitate to put forward any suggestion, but you will see that the main trouble is due to three things:—

(*a*) Turkish *amour-propre* has been wounded.
(*b*) French Government appear to have given general promises, which they have not fulfilled.
(*c*) There is, therefore, entire lack of confidence that French Government will abide by proposals which they made.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[R 3689/661/67] No. 51.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 161.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 9, 1939.*
[To Angora only.]

YOUR telegrams Nos. 192 to 197 inclusive [of 6th May: Turkish negotiations].

1. With regard to the proposed declaration, most of the amendments suggested by the Turkish Government are unobjectionable. One alteration of substance in paragraph 3, however, I cannot agree to. To take the paragraphs of the proposed declaration in turn, the following are my comments:—

Paragraph 1.—Agreed.

Paragraph 2.—Agreed on the assumption that the words "comportant des engagements réciproques" are merely intended to be a translation of my original wording "of a reciprocal character." If this is so, the English translation of this paragraph would read as follows:—

> "It is agreed that the two countries will conclude a definitive long-term agreement of a reciprocal character in the interest of their national security."

Paragraph 3.—The Turkish draft merely speaks of "an act of aggression in the Mediterranean area," and takes no account of my original wording "an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean." I am quite prepared to alter "Mediterranean" to "Mediterranean area." I am, however, surprised at the omission from the Turkish text of the words "leading to war." Your telegram No. 194 contains no explanation of this particular Turkish amendment. These words are essential from our point of view in order to ensure that the Turkish undertaking operates equally in the case where Great Britain is at war with Italy as a result of an act of aggression committed outside the Mediterranean area. Your telegram No. 163 (point 1) shows that the Turkish Government appreciated this necessity, and I had understood from your telegram No. 167, paragraph 2 (*a*) and paragraph 3, that the Turkish Government for their part were prepared to couch their undertaking in such a way as to cover this contingency. I trust, therefore, that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs will be prepared to agree to the reinsertion of the words "leading to war" in this particular phrase. I have no objection to the insertion of the words "to co-operate effectively," and to the use of the terms "aid and assistance." I

trust, therefore, that the Turkish Government can be persuaded to agree to the following wording of this paragraph:—

> "Pending the completion of the definitive agreement, His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government declare that in the event of an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean area they would be prepared to co-operate effectively and to lend each other all aid and assistance in their power."

Paragraph 4.—I agree to the present tense, but should be grateful for information on two points:—

(*a*) The word after "envisage" has not been decypherable. Please let me know what it is and whether it affects in any way our original wording "like the proposed agreement."
(*b*) I should be glad to know if the words after "réciproque" imply more than the English version "should the necessity arise."

On the assumption that (*a*) and (*b*) do not affect the original English version, this paragraph will now read as follows:—

> "This declaration, like the proposed agreement, is not directed against any country, but is designed to assure Great Britain and Turkey of mutual aid and assistance should the necessity arise."

Paragraph 5.—Agreed. The paragraph will now read as follows in English:—

> "It is recognised by the two Governments that certain matters, including the more precise definition of the various conditions which would bring the reciprocal engagements into operation, will require closer examination before the definitive agreement can be completed. This examination is proceeding."

Paragraph 6.—Agreed.

2. I am still very reluctant to omit all mention of the Balkans in this declaration, and would urge upon the Turkish Government that between paragraphs 5 and 6 a further paragraph be entered to the following effect:—

> "The two Governments recognise that it is also necessary to ensure the establishment of security in the Balkans, and they are consulting together with the object of achieving this purpose as speedily as possible."

The above would form paragraph 6 and the former paragraph 6 be renumbered paragraph 7. You should urge this insertion upon the Turkish Government in the declaration since it will be most difficult to explain the omission of all reference to the Balkans from the declaration itself (*vide* your telegram No. 195).

3. It will be of great value if you can obtain the consent of the Turkish Government to the foregoing alterations before Wednesday midday when there will be a Foreign Policy Committee of the Cabinet. Otherwise I see little chance of arranging publication before next week.

(Repeated to Sofia, No. 98; Bucharest, No. 214; Belgrade, No. 138; and Athens, No. 169.)

[E 3408/207/44] No. 52.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 218.)
Angora, April 28, 1939.

My Lord,

WITH reference to paragraph 6 of despatch No. 143 of the 14th April from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad to your Lordship, I have the honour to report that Naji Shaukat, Iraqi Minister of the Interior, arrived in Angora on the 24th April, and left again for Bagdad on the 26th April. During his stay here, he was received by the President of the Republic and had several interviews with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2. Naji Shaukat informed the counsellor of this Embassy that the President of the Republic had told him, among other things, that Turkey would never join the German front and that Turkey's policy was the same as that of her English friends. M. Ismet Inönü went on to say that the occupation of Albania by Italy caused him grave anxiety. Yugoslavia, he said, had virtually joined the axis; Roumania was in a tottering condition and Italy was only separated from Bulgaria by some ninety kilometres of friendly Yugoslav soil, the signification of the situation thus defined being that Turkey must defend herself at the Straits and on her Thracian frontier.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Representatives at Baghdad, Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia and Athens.

I have, &c.
H. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

[E 3561/0/44] No. 53.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received May* 12.)

(No. 244 E. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Angora, May* 6, 1939.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 42 of the 28th January last, regarding the Turco-German Credits Agreement, I have the honour to inform you that my commercial secretary learns that the list of works on which these credits are to be expended has now been drawn up by the Turkish Government and submitted to Germany.

2. It appears that 90 million out of the total credit of 150 million reichsmarks are to be expended on commercial undertakings and the remaining 60 million on armaments. The details of the commercial undertakings are as follows:—

(1) Mining installations.
(2) Plant for the execution of the agricultural programme, for the handling of agricultural products and for drainage and irrigation works.
(3) The construction of power stations.
(4) Locomotives and rolling-stock for the State Railways.
(5) Plant for the development of a chemical industry.
(6) The construction of harbours and ports.
(7) The construction of a locomotive and an internal combustion engine factory.
(8) Equipment of hospitals with scientific apparatus.
(9) Plant for additional textile factories.
(10) Construction of cement, firebrick and porcelain factories.
(11) Passenger and cargo ships.

3. The expenditure on armaments is to cover war supplies of every kind, except the materials which are normally supplied against cash or short-term credits (that is, less than eighteen months) and aircraft. Beyond the general 90–60 distribution as between non-military and military supplies, there is no indication of the amounts to be allotted under the various heads, and my commercial secretary considers that, as in the case of the first list supplied to the Export Credits Guarantee Department in respect of the United Kingdom credit, the list represents a general guide to the partition of the money. It is not intended in any sense to be definite and will, no doubt, be subjected to considerable modifications in its application.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin and to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.
H. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

[R 3796/661/67] No. 54.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received May* 10.)

(No. 205.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, May* 10, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 161.

1. Omission of the words in paragraph 3 of proposed declaration "leading to war" from the French version given in my telegram No. 193 was due to cyphering error, which is regretted. The words: "qui conduirait à une guerre" should be added after "agression."

2. The words in paragraph 4 after "envisagé" are "n'est dirigé." Apart from the change of tense, there is no departure from the original English text and the version given in your telegram under reference is accurate.

3. I will telegraph regarding suggested addition to paragraph as soon as possible.

(Repeated to Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia.)

[R 3797/661/67] No. 55.

Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps (Paris).

(By Telephone.)

(No. 195.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Foreign Office, May* 10, 1939.

MY telegram to Angora No. 161 [of 9th May: Turkish negotiations].

Turkish Government have agreed to our suggestions, and final English text of declaration was handed to M. Cambon this morning.

M. Cambon repeated the desire of the French Government that the declaration should take a tripartite form. He was told of our objection to this on the grounds that it might give an undue impression of organised encirclement. He was also told that it was considered most important to announce the declaration by Friday at latest, and it was suggested to him that the French Government should at once get in touch with the Turkish Government with a view to examining how their association with the declaration could best be arranged.

(Repeated to Angora, No. 166, in cypher.)

[R 3797/661/67] No. 56.

Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps (Paris).

(No. 187. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May* 10, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 201 and your despatch No. 615 [of 10th May: Turkish negotiations].

You will see from my telegram No. 169 to Angora that I am doing my best to arrange with Turkish Government that declaration should be in tripartite form that French Government desires. It will, however, be necessary to publish on Friday next, and French Government will therefore appreciate that, if Turkish Government, for whatever reason, raise objections, the announcement will have to be in bipartite form. Further delay is, in our opinion, dangerous owing to the opportunity which it would give for German and Italian intrigues at Angora.

It is possible that Turkish Government may make difficulties on account of the strong feelings referred to in Angora telegram No. 202. I hope, therefore, that French Government for their part will do their best to allay the irritation which evidently exists in regard to the Hatay question (see also my telegram No. 188, Saving, to Paris).

(Repeated to Angora, No. 171.)

[R 3797/661/67] No. 57.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 169.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May* 10, 1939.

MY telegram No. 164 [of 10th May: Turkish negotiations].

1. The French Government attach the utmost importance to being associated in a tripartite declaration, and I feel that there is considerable force in their argument that, if separate declarations are made by His Majesty's Government and the French Government, it will be misinterpreted as a sign that the two Governments are not in complete accord, and this fact will be exploited by the Axis Powers. I should be very glad, therefore, if Turkish Government could see their way to agree to amend the present text so as to include the French Government. This will involve textual alterations given in my immediately succeeding telegram.

2. This decision has been taken subsequently to my telegram to Paris No. 195.

3. If Turkish Government agree to this alteration, as I sincerely hope they will, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to announce the terms of the declaration in Parliament on Friday morning.

4. If you think it would be of use you may say that I spoke frankly to French Ambassador this afternoon on matters raised in your telegram No. 202. I told ambassador that, without, naturally, expressing any opinion about the merits of particular causes of difference, His Majesty's Government must view with profound regret any unnecessary misunderstanding between Turkey and France.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 185, Saving.)

[R 3797/661/67] No. 58.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 170.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May* 10, 1939.

MY telegram No. 169 [of to-day's date: Turkish negotiations].

The following are the alterations in the declaration which would be required to convert it from a bipartite into a tripartite form:—

Paragraph 1: Insert the words "the French Government" between "United Kingdom" and "and." Add a comma after the word "Kingdom."

Paragraph 2: Alter "two" to "three."

Paragraph 3: Add comma after "His Majesty's Government" and insert the words "the French Government" after the words "His Majesty's Government."

Paragraph 4: Add comma after "Great Britain" and insert the word "France" after "Great Britain."

Paragraphs 5 *and* 6: Alter "two" to "three."

Paragraph 7: Alter "either" to "any of the three."

(Repeated to Paris, No. 186, Saving.)

[R 3804/661/67] No. 59.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (*Received May* 11.)

(No. 209.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, May* 10, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 144.

I have now received oral communication giving reply of Turkish Government on other points in your telegram, apart from proposed declaration which is covered separately in my telegram No. 206, &c.

2. Communication expresses gratification that general agreement exists on fundamental points. Harmony of views which the Minister for Foreign Affairs considers he can indicate below enables him to state that procedure by four stages suggested in your telegram No. 144 is accepted.

3. Communication then deals with the following points in your telegram No. 144:—

4. *Point* (1)—The Minister for Foreign Affairs confirms that "last-named Power" refers to Italy (see second paragraph of my telegram No. 180). He suggests cancelling the words "last-named."

5. *Point* (2).—The Minister for Foreign Affairs understands reasons for which His Majesty's Government prefer the original text without the addition proposed by the Turkish Government. The Minister for Foreign Affairs considers "during conversations regarding elaboration of the definitive agreement this question can usefully be threshed out and that it will probably not be difficult to give it a form satisfactory to the two parties."

6. *Point* (3).—The Minister for Foreign Affairs has taken act of your statement on the question of Anglo-Soviet assistance. He continues to hope that an arrangement will take place in the predominant interests of peace.

7. *Point* (4).—Complete agreement.

8. *Point* (5).—While noting that agreement exists between the two Governments, the Minister for Foreign Affairs wishes to draw attention to the fact "he does not interpret final sentence of point (5) of the British communication as constituting a plan." (This refers to the last sentence of paragraph 6 of your telegram No. 144.)

9. *Point* (6).—Communication states, as has already been stated above, that Turkish Government is in agreement with regard to the adoption of procedure suggested by His Majesty's Government. This disposes of objections raised in point (6) in the sense desired by His Majesty's Government.

(Repeated to Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia.)

[R 3880/661/67] No. 60.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received May* 11.)

[By Telephone.]

(No. 215.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, May* 11, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 176.

Turkish Government have been unable to reach agreement with French Ambassador.

2. They will therefore make declaration in bilateral form to-morrow afternoon, 12th May.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[R 3875/661/67] No. 61.

Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps (Paris).

[By Telephone.]

(No. 198.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Foreign Office, May* 11, 1939.

ANGORA telegrams Nos. 212 and 213 [of 11th May: Turkish negotiations].

2. It is clear that the Turkish Government are prepared to make tripartite declaration (as we urged them to do in our telegram No. 169 to Angora) if the French Government are prepared to meet them over a clause connected with the Hatay negotiations.

3. You should at once see M. Bonnet and explain to him that His Majesty's Government will at 11 A.M. to-morrow, Friday, make a declaration in the House of Commons in tripartite if French Government have before then fixed this up with the Turkish Government. Failing this, His Majesty's Government will make the declaration at that hour to-morrow in its bipartite form.

[T 6131/436/384] No. 62.

Viscount Halifax to His Majesty's Representatives at Athens, Belgrade, Berlin, Brussels, Bucharest, Budapest, Lisbon, Moscow, Rome, Sofia, Tokyo, Warsaw and Washington.

(Intel No. 43. Personal.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May* 11, 1939.

Turkey.

AGREED text of simultaneous Anglo-Turkish declaration (Intel No. 40, paragraph 2) announces:—

(*a*) Agreement to conclude long-term reciprocal security pact.
(*b*) Co-operation and assistance meantime "in the event of an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean area."
(*c*) Declaration and proposed agreement are not directed against any country.
(*d*) Conditions which would bring the reciprocal engagements into operation will require closer examination before (*a*) can be concluded.
(*e*) Consultation proceeding to ensure speedy establishment of Balkan security.
(*f*) Both Governments are free to consolidate peace by agreements with other countries.

2. Form of French association remains for decision between France and Turkey. Unless tripartite or identic bilateral declaration can be negotiated by Friday, 12th May, present bilateral Anglo-Turkish Declaration will be made public.

[R 3996/661/67] No. 63.

Question asked in the House of Commons, May 12, 1939, *and Statement made by Prime Minister respecting the Anglo-Turkish Agreement.*

GREAT BRITAIN AND TURKEY.

Mr. Attlee (by Private Notice) asked the Prime Minister whether he has any statement to make on the progress of the recent discussions between His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government.

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir, but I would prefer to make the statement later in the day and, if it were convenient to close the business shortly before the House rises, I would reply to the right hon. gentleman then.

ANGLO-TURKISH AGREEMENT.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[*Captain Margesson.*]

The Prime Minister (*Mr. Chamberlain*): The right hon. gentleman opposite asked me this morning whether I had any statement to make on the progress of the discussions between His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government, and I promised to make a statement in reply to that question this afternoon, and the statement is as follows:—

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Turkish Government have entered into close consultation, and the discussions which have taken place between them and which are still continuing have revealed their customary identity of view.

2. It is agreed that the two countries will conclude a definitive long-term agreement of a reciprocal character in the interest of their national security.

3. Pending the completion of the definitive agreement, His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government declare that, in the event of an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean area, they would be prepared to co-operate effectively and to lend each other all aid and assistance in their power.

4. This declaration, like the proposed agreement, is not directed against any country, but is designed to assure Great Britain and Turkey of mutual aid and assistance should the necessity arise.

5. It is recognised by the two Governments that certain matters, including the more precise definition of the various conditions which would bring the reciprocal engagements into operation, will require closer examination before the definitive agreement can be completed. This examination is proceeding.

6. The two Governments recognise that it is also necessary to ensure the establishment of security in the Balkans, and they are consulting together with the object of achieving this purpose as speedily as possible.

7. It is understood that the arrangements above mentioned do not preclude either Government from making agreements with other countries in the general interest of the consolidation of peace.

8. A similar declaration is being made in Angora this evening.

Mr. Attlee: May I ask the right hon. gentleman, while expressing the satisfaction that I am sure we all feel at this agreement, whether the agreement will be followed up by staff talks?

The Prime Minister: That does not arise until the definitive agreement is concluded.

Mr. Arthur Henderson: Can the right hon. gentleman say whether this declaration is covered by article 19 of the Montreux Convention, which deals with the passage of British ships into the Black Sea, so as to permit of the passage of British warships to the assistance of Roumania in the event of that country being attacked by another?

The Prime Minister: The statement which I read out obviously does not cover specific points of that kind but it is agreed that the two countries will conclude a definitive long term agreement, and matters of that kind would no doubt be considered then.

Mr. Benn: Does that mean that the limit which at present exists on the entry of ships into the Black Sea is now waived?

The Prime Minister: It does not mean anything more than what I have said.

Lieut.-Commander Fletcher: May I ask whether the use of the term "Mediterranean area" was employed in order to exclude the Dardanelles and the Black Sea?

The Prime Minister: No, Sir.

Mr. Cocks: I do not want to press the Prime Minister if he does not want to answer, but can he define more clearly what is meant by "Mediterranean area"? Does it include other seas leading into the Mediterranean, such as the Adriatic and the Black Sea?

The Prime Minister: I would prefer not to give a definition.

Mr. Mander: Does the Prime Minister consider that, if this potentially valuable agreement is to come into effective force at once, it is essential that staff conversations should take place now and not possibly after many months?

Mr. Stephen: Can the Prime Minister give us an assurance that it is no part of this agreement that the conscription of young men of this country shall be added to beyond the class 20–21, as is already proposed?

Mr. Benjamin Smith: Can the right hon. gentleman say whether, in view of the fact that an agreement already exists between Turkey and Russia for the passage of Russian ships into the Black Sea, such an agreement will be embodied in the terms of the definitive agreement?

The Prime Minister: I cannot say what will be included in the terms of the definitive agreement at this stage.

Mr. Silverman: Can the right hon. gentleman say whether the words

"an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean area"

means an act of aggression anywhere or an act of aggression in the Mediterranean area?

The Prime Minister: It means an act of aggression that leads to war in the Mediterranean.

[R 3903/661/67] No. 64.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received May* 12.)

(No. 216.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, May* 11, 1939.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

1. Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador, after a somewhat heated discussion, came to an agreement on the basis of a single clause, under which French Government undertakes to cede Hatay to Turkey by 20th June. There was some discussion as to *modalités*, and there was evidently a subtle underlying fear on the part of Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in spite of this covering agreement, negotiations might break down (or even be made to break down) over question of point of detail when *modalités* came to be worked out.

2. Finally, however, the two reached agreement. I was present, not altogether intentionally, as I had joined the meeting to go through text of proposed trilateral declaration and to make certain that agreement between Turks and French had, in fact, been reached. I made it clear that I had no direct concern in Hatay.

3. We separated after two hours of this discussion to inform our Governments that agreement had been reached and that trilateral declaration would be made.

4. Less than an hour later Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me to say that, after all, Turkish Government had decided upon the bilateral declaration. He had reported proceedings to Prime Minister and President of the Republic, who had decided they could not place sufficient confidence in the French assurances to justify tripartite declaration. His Excellency (and also Secretary-General, who has been with me since) laid great stress on their determination that their relations of complete harmony with His Majesty's Government should not be prejudiced by being linked with the French Government. As regards the latter, they made no bones about asserting the complete lack of confidence.

5. My French colleague was informed of decision of the Turkish Government. He is naturally furious and speaks of the complete suspension of negotiations, saying that, after efforts made by his Government in the last two days to reach agreement with Turkish Government, the French Government cannot possibly continue negotiations.

6. Secretary-General rang me up shortly afterwards and, as I was anxious as to possible developments, I asked if he would come and see me quite personally. It was clear from his conversation that the Turkish Government are determined not to come to agreement with the French over Hatay until they see daylight to the end of the new negotiations and have secured themselves against any likelihood of breakdown on individual points. I remarked that after to-night's events it would be out of the question for the French Government to make a fresh initiative. Secretary-General said Turkish Government would have no pride about taking the initiative themselves. He was convinced that agreement could be reached in a short time, after which Franco-Turkish declaration could be made.

7. Secretary-General explained, as regards wider negotiations, that Turkish Government considered essential factor from point of view of ensuring against war was the existence of Anglo-Turkish Agreement. If war came, Franco Turkish Agreement must follow automatically.

8. I confessed to some anxiety as to reactions in Paris if my French colleague is in the same frame of mind when he telephones to Quai d'Orsay as when he telephoned me.

9. It may be worth mentioning that, in the course of discussions with Minister for Foreign Affairs, there was even a danger of French Government being defeated in the Chamber if they were too yielding about Hatay. I do not know how far this is accurate.

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10. My French colleague has rung me up again since above was drafted. He has telephoned M. Léger. I spoke to him in the sense of last three sentences of paragraph 6 above. He said that he "imagined" that, if Turkish Government made a proposal for a settlement, French Government would be prepared to examine it.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[R 3925/661/67] No. 65.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received May* 12.)

[By Telephone.]

(No. 217.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, May* 12, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 178.

I am seeing Minister for Foreign Affairs at once. In the meantime, I should inform you that, in discussing text of tripartite declaration last night, following point arose:—

2. In paragraphs 2 and 3 mention is made of definitive long-term agreement. Wording does not indicate whether such agreement will be bilateral or trilateral. Context rather tends to suggest the latter.

3. We agreed, therefore, that it might be possible, in reply to a question, if asked, for it to be explained in Parliaments that this point still remains open and undecided.

4. You may wish to cover this point if trilateral declaration is made.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[R 3929/661/67] No. 66.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (*Received May* 12.)

[By Telephone.]

(No. 218.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, May* 12, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 178.

It has proved impossible to reach agreement in the short time.

2. Declaration will, therefore, be made here in bilateral form.

3. In his speech Minister for Foreign Affairs alluded to conversations in progress with the French Government which will reach an early conclusion.

[R 3903/661/67] No. 67.

Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps (Paris).

[By Telephone.]

(No. 199.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Foreign Office, May* 12, 1939.

ANGORA telegram No. 216 and my telegram No. 178 to Angora [of 12th May: Anglo-Turkish declaration].

You should tell the French Government that we are doing our utmost to persuade the Turkish Government to withdraw their objections to the declaration being made to-day in tripartite form. We hope that, for their part, they will, without delay, go as far as they possibly can to remove the misapprehensions under which the Turkish Government appear at present to be labouring as regards the Hatay settlement. (I have just received your telegram No. 204 on this point.)

2. If, however, in spite of our combined efforts, the Turkish Government remain obdurate, I feel that major political considerations will make it essential that declaration should be made this afternoon in bilateral form at 3·45 P.M. English summer time.

3. In that case, His Majesty's Government would, if questioned, state arrangements were being made for the Turkish and French Governments to make an analogous declaration in the near future.

(Repeated to Angora, No. 177, Most Immediate (in cypher).)

[R 3880/661/67] No. 68.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

[By Telephone.]

(No. 178.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May* 12, 1939.

(*En clair.*) YOUR telegram No. 215 [of 11th May: Turkish negotiations].

This is most unfortunate and you should inform the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs at once that I am withholding announcement in House of Commons till 3·45 P.M. (English summer time) this afternoon in the hopes that there may be a chance for him to reach necessary arrangements to-day with the French Government. You should urge him to do his utmost to this end, since we attach the utmost importance to the declaration being made in tripartite form. (End of *en clair.*)

2. You may assure his Excellency that, as far as I am concerned, I will exert all influence in my power with the French Government to ensure that any arrangements which the Turkish and French Governments may reach over Hatay will be fully implemented.

3. Meanwhile, the declaration will be made in bilateral form at 3·45 P.M. this afternoon, unless I hear from you that agreement has been reached between the French and Turkish Governments for tripartite declaration.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 200 (by telephone).)

[R 3964/661/67] No. 69.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (*Received May* 13.)

(No. 219.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, May* 12, 1939.

MY telegram No. 218.

Immediately on receipt of your telegram No. 178 I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs and spoke as instructed. I induced him to send Secretary-General to my French colleague with a proposal from Turkish side. My French colleague agreed to receive him.

2. Turkish proposal, which involved cession of Hatay by 1st June amongst other things, went much too far, and result was as reported in my telegram under reference. My French colleague has promised me texts of discussions at his meeting with Secretary-General, and I will inform you.

3. My French colleague has now withdrawn to position that nothing further can be done on his side, and that Turks must make fresh proposals.

4. Both Secretary-General and Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, assured me that interview ended most amicably, and that negotiations will be pursued immediately with good hope of early settlement, after which Franco-Turkish declaration will be possible.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[R 3965/661/67] No. 70.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (*Received May* 13.)

(No. 221.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Angora, May* 12, 1939.

PRIME Minister said that Turkish policy had thus far been one of complete neutrality designed to keep the country as far as possible apart from international complications. When, however, trouble had spread to the Balkan and Mediterranean regions, Turkey had no longer been able to remain neutral without jeopardising her own security. It was vital for Turkey that all States in Mediterranean should have free exercise of their rights without any encouragement being given to ideas of hegemony. In the circumstances, Government considered best way of saving Turkey from war was to associate her with those countries which were united together for peace but not shrinking from war if necessary. For that reason he was asking the Assembly to approve association of Turkey and Great Britain in defence of peace and security—an association directed against none and nourishing no aims of encirclement, but designed rather to ward off catastrophe of war.

2. After emphasising close and cordial nature of Anglo-Turkish relations, the Prime Minister described how consultations between the two Governments, undertaken as a result of recent disquieting happenings in Europe, had led to declaration which he then proceeded to read.

3. M. R . . . . Say . . . . expressed conviction that declaration, together with subsequent agreements foreshadowed in it, would help notably to weigh down the scales on the side of peace. Policy of Turkey and her ally was to keep peace and to attack the rights of no one. In pursuit of peace, Turkish Government would continue to exert every effort; but they would not hesitate firmly to oppose by force of arms any threat to the common rights and interests of Great Britain and Turkey.

4. Further points were:—

(*a*) Friendly conversations were proceeding with France with a view to conclusion of agreements similar to those with Great Britain.

(*b*) Closest touch was being maintained with U.S.S.R. Visit of M. Potemkin had shown that Turkish and Soviet views were in complete harmony.

(*c*) It was to be hoped that Turkish relations with Balkan allies would continue to be as cordial as ever and that Balkan *Entente*, in which Turkey's rôle remained unchanged, might be further enlarged and fulfil a still more useful function.

(Repeated to Paris, Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia, Moscow, Rome, Cairo and Warsaw (*en clair*, by post).)

[E 3547/143/44] No. 71.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (*Received May* 13.)

(No. 222.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, May* 13, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 144, paragraph 8.

Now that acquiescence in stage 1 has been completed, I submit following review of position as regards further proceedings:—

2. *Stage* 2.—I hope it will be possible for you to send me draft of interim understanding at an early date. Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me about it yesterday and is evidently anxious to proceed with rapidity.

3. *Stage* 3.—Subjects included in this may be divided into two categories: (*a*) those which can be proceeded with at once without awaiting conversations here or in London; (*b*) those to be covered by conversations.

Under (*a*) I place specifically orders for war material and request for assistance in military preparations. As to these, I have already informed Turkish Government of forthcoming despatch of gun turrets announced in your telegram No. 153, and I trust I may shortly receive instructions as to the other items mentioned in my telegram No. 168. It would seem even more important to give

Turkish Government early answer on my telegram No. 150 (guns and coast-defence mountings, &c., for the Straits). As regards my telegram No. 161 (paragraphs 1 and 2), [† four] Turkish officers have now left to visit Maginot Line, and I will now ask Minister for Foreign Affairs again whether he has sent necessary instructions to Turkish Embassy. Under this category would also be included list of Turkish requirements mentioned in my telegram No. 183 and my despatch No. 245. This list has been modified by Turkish General Staff and arranged in order of priority. I hope to receive revised list very soon and will send by first opportunity. If necessary, I will telegraph essential items.

Under (*b*) I would place all general matters referred to under point 5 in my telegram No. 163. I have now received your [† despatch No. 180], and am informing Minister for Foreign Affairs at once. Beyond that, I would only submit that, now that declaration has been made, it may be necessary to be prepared for merciless policy of reaction by Germany, such as cutting off of war material or of markets. Minister for Foreign Affairs has on several occasions recently repeated his reliance on us to supply these deficiencies. As to financial assistance, his attitude is expressed in paragraph 8 of my telegram No. 209.

4. *Stage* 4.—No comment at present beyond that Turkish Government appear to contemplate some public statement after final conclusion (see my telegram No. 159, point 3, at end of paragraph 4).

[E 3548/142/44] No. 72.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received May* 14.)

(No. 223. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, May* 13, 1939.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Question arises whether further negotiations and also ultimate agreement are to be bilateral or tripartite.

2. As regards conduct of negotiations, I most strongly recommend that this should be bilateral. Any other course will produce difficulties with the Turks and would impair prospects of smooth progress. I know Minister for Foreign Affairs' idea is to proceed bilaterally with me as hitherto, and that, as regards my French colleague, communications which pass between Minister for Foreign Affairs and me should be regarded as having passed similarly between him and my French colleague. I do not know whether French Government would agree to this, and it would, I submit, be inadvisable to put the question to them. But we have slipped automatically into something like this procedure during negotiations for stage 1, and at meeting reported in my telegram No. 216 Minister for Foreign Affairs actually asked my French colleague whether he would be prepared to take our exchanges up to date as covering equally French Government, *mutatis mutandis*. My French colleague agreed without hesitation.

3. It appears from last sentence of Sir E. Phipps's telegram No. 200 that French Government themselves are prepared to leave open questions of the character of arrangements subsequent to the declaration.

4. In actual practice, so long as Hatay question remains unsettled, the natural course would be for me to proceed bilaterally, keeping my French colleague informed as hitherto, and giving him copies of my communications to Minister for Foreign Affairs. I should prefer to press on in the same way. I realise this is a matter of some delicacy, but I would, of course, watch it carefully and let you know at once if it did not seem to be working.

5. On the other hand, if, without giving French Government any opening for objection, you can establish that our negotiations are to be conducted bilaterally (my French colleague acting simultaneously for Franco-Turkish negotiations), it might avoid difficulty later, though the matter does not seem to arise so long as Hatay remains unsettled.

(Private.)

6. It will be clear from the above that it is not only Hatay, but the present personal position of my French colleague which causes my anxiety.

[R 3981/661/67] No. 73.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received May* 14.)

(No. 225.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, May* 13, 1939.

MY telegram No. 219.

Following are translations of texts discussed between Turkish Government and my French colleague, with additional information given by him:—

2.—(*a*) Text referred to in first paragraph of my telegram No. 216:—

"French and Turkish Governments agree to conclude before 20th June, 1939, a definitive arrangement, having for object the cession by France, in so far as she is concerned, of territory of Hatay to Turkey."

(My French colleague explains that in respect of it it was "*constaté*" that important differences of view existed with regard to modalités of cession.)

3.—(*b*) Text proposed by Secretary-General on 12th May (see my telegram No. [† 221]):—

"French Government accept, in so far as it is concerned, the cession of Hatay to Turkey on 1st June, 1939.

"Without prejudice to above provision, Turkish Government accept, on its side, to conclude with France an agreement destined to settle amicably the questions connected with this territorial cession."

4.—(*c*) Text proposed by French Ambassador in substitution for (*b*):—

"French and Turkish Governments will conclude before 20th June a treaty

"(*a*) Providing for cession by France, in so far as she is concerned, of Hatay to Turkey.

"(*b*) Settling amicably the question connected with this cession."

In proposing this text French Ambassador emphasised that the last five words of (*b*) should be understood as not excluding *a priori* any of questions of which he had spoken during preliminary conversations.

Secretary-General, on the other hand, gave the formula a restrictive interpretation. He also asked for the insertion of the word "immediately" before "cession" in (*a*).

5. French Ambassador then realised that it was impossible to reach a solution in a few hours, and conversation was broken off.

6. I met my French colleague at dinner on 12th May. He said that breakdown of this conversation had made the position much worse and that he would do nothing more. The Turks must come forward with some proposal.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[E 3559/142/44] No. 74.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received May* 15.)

(No. 226.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, May* 15, 1939.

SIR E. PHIPPS'S telegram No. 288, Saving, first sentence.

My French colleague has said much the same.

2. I fear that Turkish reaction will be to accuse French Government of linking up Hatay and general European situation, which they themselves profess to have studiously avoided doing.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[E 3526/143/44] No. 75.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 186.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 16, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 150 [of 21st April: Heavy guns and mountings ordered by Turkey in United Kingdom for defence at Dardanelles].

Please inform Minister for Foreign Affairs as follows:—

2. His Majesty's Government fully sympathise with, and indeed share, anxiety of Turkish Government to obtain earliest possible delivery of guns and mountings. In point of fact conversion of 13·5-inch naval mountings and construction of 15-inch coast-defence mountings had already been given equal priority with similar construction required for battleships and cruisers of His Majesty's Government's own construction programme. Moreover, the guns themselves, both 13·5 inch and 15 inch, are being supplied direct from Admiralty stock, thereby ensuring far earlier delivery than would be possible if new guns had to be manufactured.

3. It is understood that whole programme of gun-mounting work at Messrs. Vickers' factories is already operating at maximum speed. In order, however, to leave no stone unturned to achieve object desired equally by Turkish Government and His Majesty's Government, Admiralty are urging Messrs. Vickers to do everything possible, consistent with their concurrent obligations, to press forward delivery of these equipments to Turkey.

4. Foregoing information has already been communicated semi-officially by First Lord of Admiralty to Turkish Ambassador.

[E 3593/143/44] No. 76.

Sir E. Phipps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 296. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, May 16, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 288, Saving, of 13th May.

In view of this rather unfortunate attitude on the part of the French military authorities, I thought it advisable to meet the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Le Bourget on his return from England on 14th May.

2. I was able, in the course of our conversation, to express the hope that the Turkish Military Mission would be well received here. M. Bonnet promised that this should be done.

3. When I saw his Excellency this morning I asked how the negotiations were proceedings between France and Turkey. He replied that he fully expected an early and favourable solution; but he complained that the Turks had more than once gone back on their word regarding the Hatay and had increased their demands. For instance, some time ago they had been content with a Franco-Turkish condominium, whereas recently they had insisted on the complete cession of the Hatay to Turkey.

4. M. Bonnet did not address the slightest reproach to His Majesty's Government for having concluded their bilateral agreement with Turkey.

(Repeated to Angora (by bag).)

[E 3547/143/44] No. 77.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 188.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 17, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 222 [of 13th May: Anglo-Turkish negotiations].

I am grateful for your review of the position.

2. As regards stage 2, I entirely share the desire of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to proceed as rapidly as possible. This stage contemplates covering a large number of questions, but as possible what must be cleared up

in the first instance is the question how our two Governments propose to co-operate in order to defend the independence of Greece and Roumania if attacked. Agreement on this all-important point will constitute an essential step in achieving—to quote clause 6 of the Anglo-Turkish Declaration—"the establishment of security in the Balkans." The Turkish Government are aware of the nature of the guarantee which His Majesty's Government have given to Roumania and Greece, but I am not clear as to what obligations the Turkish Government for their part have undertaken *vis-à-vis* these two countries. We feel that our close relations with the Turkish Government and the commitments which we have now assumed towards one another entitle us to ask for full information on this subject.

3. The Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs when he was here gave an account of his talks at Angora at Easter and of the signed *procès-verbal* which had resulted therefrom. You will have seen from the record which was sent to you under cover of Mr. Strang's letter of 28th April that Turkey has undertaken certain commitments as regards Roumania, which go rather beyond her obligations under the Balkan Pact. It is difficult for me to assess the precise nature of these commitments, but in any case they seem to fall short of those that His Majesty's Government have for their part undertaken as regards Roumania. For your own information we also believe that a closer understanding exists between Turkey and Greece than is revealed in the Turco-Greek Treaty of April 1938.

4. In the case of Greece, we assume that the obligations which Turkey has now undertaken in the Anglo-Turkish declaration would, in any event, involve Turkey in war should Greece be attacked, since this would lead to war in the Mediterranean area. The case of Roumania is different, but here again His Majesty's Government attach the greatest importance to the co-operation of Turkey in the event of Great Britain having to implement her guarantee to Roumania. Indeed, one of our original objects in entering into the present negotiations with the Turkish Government was to put us in as good a position as possible to implement our guarantee to Roumania, inasmuch as, owing to the Montreux Convention, it is only when Turkey is a belligerent that His Majesty's Government can send armed assistance to Roumania by sea.

5. It is essential, therefore, that the undertakings which the Turkish Government have already assumed or may now assume *vis-à-vis* Greece and Roumania should be in complete harmony with the undertakings which His Majesty's Government have undertaken towards these two countries, or should not at least be such as would make our obligations more difficult of fulfilment.

6. I shall be glad if you will approach the Turkish Government in the sense of this telegram. One of your arguments will, no doubt, be that, as Turkish Government will fully appreciate, a complete knowledge of the position occupied by both Governments *vis-à-vis* Roumania and Greece is a *sine qua non* for the success of the staff talks which we hope will now shortly be initiated.

7. If it emerges from your enquiries that the Turkish obligations *vis-à-vis* Roumania and Greece are of such a nature as to make complete harmony with our own difficult to attain, I foresee that it will be necessary for us to induce the Turkish Government to adapt them to the new circumstances created by the declaration of mutual assistance which our two Governments have just made.

8. I shall address to you shortly separate telegrams on the questions coming under the head of stage 3.

[E 3573/143/44] No. 78.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 189. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 17, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 227 [of 15th May: Anglo-Turkish staff conversations].

I will telegraph fully as soon as possible. Meanwhile, following point arises.

2. There is to be a debate on foreign affairs on Friday, 19th May, when enquiry about staff conversations addressed by Mr. Attlee to Prime Minister on 12th May may be repeated.

3. Answer to be given to such further enquiries is still under consideration here; but I should be glad to learn as soon as possible whether, assuming that His Majesty's Government were to decide that it will be best to announce that conversations are shortly to begin, Turkish Government for their part would see any objection.

4. In this connexion I should explain that His Majesty's Government have in mind a procedure (recall of service attachés and their return to Angora with a senior officer) which may in practice make it impossible to conceal fact that conversations of some kind are taking place.

[E 3548/143/44] No. 79.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 190.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May* 17, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 223 [of 13th May: Anglo-Turkish negotiations].

I agree with you that, at any rate for the present, negotiations must continue on a bilateral basis; indeed, any other course until French Government have arranged their own declaration would evidently involve delays which we must at all costs avoid. I have had no hint from Paris so far that such a course would be resented, and I do not propose to approach French Government in the matter. They may, of course, themselves bring it up, in which case we shall have to reconsider the position. In the meantime, the essential thing is that the French Government should know exactly what is happening to the course of your negotiations, and this seems fully provided for by the procedure which has developed during the negotiations for stage 1.

[E 3637/9/44] No. 80.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (*Received May* 18.)

(No. 234.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, May* 17, 1939.

MY telegram No. 229.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me on 17th May that the German Ambassador had been to see him before leaving.

2. Herr von Papen's main line of approach to recent developments had been to urge the Turkish Government not to commit themselves to a definite agreement with His Majesty's Government, and, if they must do so, to ensure that any such agreement contained a definition of the term "aggressor." Herr von Papen argued that it was His Majesty's Government who were definitely preparing to provoke war.

3. Herr von Papen had at first been appealing and had then become threatening. He had asked if the Turkish Government realised their position if Germany ceased to purchase Turkish goods. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had replied that Germany did not deal fairly with Turkey over commercial matters and charged Turkey exorbitant prices. Germany would never find so satisfactory an alternative market.

4. On the political side Germany had made friends with Turkey's ancient enemy, and, just as in 1911, was preparing to encourage Italy to attack Turkey.

5. The immediate impression is that the German Ambassador has accepted the Anglo-Turkish understanding and that the German reaction will not be very serious, though they may try to impede conclusion of final agreement.

6. He told me that the German Ambassador had been anxious for the Turks to send Numan to Berlin for final negotiations on commercial agreement. Turkish Government have, however, decided to send only a commercial expert with strict instructions to avoid all political discussions.

(Repeated to Berlin.)

[R 4145/661/67] No. 81.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 191.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May* 18, 1939.

MY telegram No. 182 [of 13th May: Anglo-Turkish Declaration].

There will be a debate on Friday, 19th May, on foreign policy, which will include discussions of Anglo-Turkish Declaration. Question 2 in my telegram under reference will almost inevitably be raised, and I propose, if the Turkish Government have no objection, to say that the term "Mediterranean area" in this declaration includes the Dardanelles and the Adriatic, but not the Black Sea. We regard the question of the Black Sea as dependent on the result of the consultations about Balkan security mentioned in paragraph 6 of the declaration.

(Repeated to Paris, Saving, No. 209 (*en clair*).)

[R 4322/661/67] No. 82.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (*Received May* 19.)

(No. 238.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, May* 18, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 188.

I have given Minister for Foreign Affairs in writing such parts as are suitable and have discussed matter with him.

2. Briefly his suggestion is that, as you have promised draft of interim understanding, you should include in your draft any clause which you consider suitable and desirable from your point of view to meet the case of undertakings to Greece and Roumania. If Turkish Government disagree, they can suggest amendments.

3. He explained that there were two points which exercised his mind:—

(*a*) British guarantees to Greece and Roumania are unilateral and can, therefore, juridically be withdrawn whenever we see fit. It would be difficult for Turkey, on her side, to bind herself by a written document to any guarantee in these cases while British guarantee remained as described above. Juridical position which might result would be that Turkey would find herself bound, whereas His Majesty's Government were free. He agreed with me that this was really a drafting point.

(*b*) Turkey could not give a guarantee to Roumania which would cover her in the case of an attack by Soviets.

4. Apart from this, I think he is prepared to go very far.

5. He told me that as regards Greece, in addition to Balkan *Entente*, his obligations are that, if Greece is attacked, Turkey must maintain benevolent and armed neutrality. This would involve mobilisation.

[R 4268/661/67] No. 83.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 196.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, May* 20, 1939.

FOLLOWING references were made to Turkish negotiations in Prime Minister's speech on 19th May:—

"Our discussions very speedily revealed such a similarity in our interests and outlook that two Governments were enabled to make the declaration of 12th May, which foreshadowed the conclusion of a definitive

long-term agreement of a reciprocal nature. The declaration was very warmly welcomed by this House, and the general satisfaction which has been demonstrated throughout the country shows how high is now the prestige of Turkey in this country, and how greatly her friendship is valued. That friendship was begun under the long and memorable presidency of M. Atatürk, and it has been further strengthened under the distinguished present President, General Inönü. I recollect with pleasure that I had an opportunity of meeting him at the Coronation, and I would like to say what satisfaction it gives to the members of His Majesty's Government to be able to co-operate so harmoniously with him and his present Ministers. Let me just observe in passing that we attach great importance to the reciprocal character of the agreements which we have made with Turkey and Poland.

"The long-term agreement cannot, of course, be concluded in the twinkling of an eye, and in these days events move so quickly that it does not seem advisable to wait. It did not seem to us advisable to wait until that agreement could be concluded before making clear to one another and to the world where we should stand in the event of an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean area. We have declared our intention in that event to give one another mutual aid and co-operation, but the House will remember that this declaration goes further than the Mediterranean; it recognises the necessity of ensuring the establishment of security in the Balkans. We have agreed that on that matter we shall have consultations together, the results of which, I have no doubt, we shall be able to embody in the long-term treaty."

Declaration was warmly welcomed by other speakers.

[R 4266/661/67] No. 84.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 198.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, May 20, 1939.*

IN course of debate on 19th May Sir Archibald Sinclair said :—

"I associate myself with everything that has been said in welcoming the agreement with the great and proud nation of Turkey. But the committee must not cherish the illusion that we have got a binding agreement for mutual assistance with Turkey yet. The formula only meant an agreement to agree. It is in the right direction; it has had an excellent effect abroad, but do not let anyone suppose that if any one of the countries in the Mediterranean area which we have guaranteed were the object of aggression next week that Turkey would necessarily move a man, a ship or a gun. Turkey would not move unless and until—and this brings me to my last point—the co-operation of Russia was assured."

2. To this Mr. Butler later replied :—

"He (Sir Archibald Sinclair) said that if there were an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean area, Turkey would not move a ship or man a gun unless there was already an agreement with Russia. This is, in the view of the Government, a misreading of the declaration to which Turkey has put her hand, and I think it should be definitely repudiated by the Government."

3. Mr. Butler then read Clause 3 of the declaration and concluded :—

"He will therefore see that the point about which he expressed some anxiety is in fact covered."

[R 4267/790/7] No. 85.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 14. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, May 15, 1939.*

MR. RENDEL'S telegram No. 31, Saving.

Minister for Foreign Affairs on 15th May read me extracts from a telegram from Turkish Minister at Sofia, who had been instructed to question President of the Council about his speech.

2. M. Kiosseivanoff had said that Bulgaria no longer required Dedeagatch, which was natural outlet for Adrianople district and should belong to Turkey. He seems to have mentioned portion of [group undecypherable] as an alternative. As regards Macedonia, M. Kiosseivanoff said that he had no claims beyond some rectifications in the Rhodope district.

3. M. Kiosseivanoff said that he could not join the Balkan *Entente* while Yugoslavia was in such a flabby condition. Moreover, the Balkan *Entente* provided for certain guarantees of outside frontiers and he had none.

4. Minister for Foreign Affairs still thinks in the long run that Bulgaria will draw towards the Balkan *Entente*. He said that the Bulgarian Government had at first refused invitation to Economic Conference at Bucharest, but now seemed to be considering it.

5. I had a long conversation with my Bulgarian colleague two days ago. He took the usual line about Dobruja. I said Bulgaria might or might not ultimately obtain consideration of her claims, but that there was one way to make certain that she never obtained anything, and that was to put spokes in the wheels of the Balkan *Entente*.

He said that Bulgaria would never join Germany. She would merely do nothing, unless she received something in Dobruja.

(Repeated to Sofia, No. 22, Saving; Athens, No. 20, Saving; Belgrade, No. 23, Saving; and Bucharest, No. 27, Saving.)

[E 3828/9/44] No. 86.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 241.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, May 23, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 234.

German Chargé d'Affaires has since been active in pressing Turkish Government not to conclude definite agreement with us, at all events, pending some German offer; he has even enquired what Turkish Government wanted in the way of a guarantee and what German Government could do to prevent Turkey from signing definitive agreement.

2. Secretary-General has informed counsellor of conversation on the above lines with German Chargé d'Affaires. Secretary-General, in reply, took the line that Turkey's mind was made up and that German guarantees could no longer be trusted. On the other hand, agreement was not directed against Germany, towards which country Turkey's attitude had not altered either as regards economic or political relations. If Germany were not the aggressor, she need not worry.

3. German Chargé d'Affaires asked what would be Turkey's position if Germany were involved in hostilities. Secretary-General replied that if Italian co-operation were involved, Turkey would act. If Germany were engaged alone, matter would need consideration, but if Germany were the aggressor, Turkey's general attitude was against aggression. Definition of "aggression" might be difficult, but Turkey would act on her own interpretation.

4. German Chargé d'Affaires enquired Turkey's attitude in the event of a plebiscite on Danzig resulting in a demand for union with Germany followed by a Polish march on Danzig. Secretary-General replied that, if Germany accepted

such a demand, Turkey would consider Germany had committed a clear aggression whether Poles had first marched or not. If consequences of such an aggression were to bring Italy in, Turkey would act.

(Repeated to Berlin.)

[R 4328/661/67] No. 87.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 262.)

My Lord, *Angora, May 16, 1939.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 221 of the 12th May containing a summary of the speech made on the 12th May to the Kamutay by the Turkish Prime Minister when submitting to it, for approval, the text of the Anglo-Turkish Declaration regarding co-operation and mutual help, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship the accompanying full translation,(1) in French, of the speech.

2. A crowded House listened with close attention to the Prime Minister's words; and was manifestly conscious of the importance of the step that was being taken by the Government. I was present in the diplomatic box with my French and Soviet colleagues and the representatives of the Balkan Powers, with the exception of Bulgaria.

3. On the conclusion of the Prime Minister's speech, M. Saffet Arikan, Deputy for Erzincan and former Minister of Education, rose and emphasised that the joint declaration was not directed against any nation, and that Anglo-Turkish policy aimed at the establishment of peace. M. Arikan was succeeded by M. Fethi Okyar, Deputy for Bolu, and late Turkish Ambassador in London, who said that, up to now, Turkey's policy had been to be friendly with all nations, and especially her neighbours, in order to create an atmosphere of peace, in which she could devote herself to internal reconstruction. But events in Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania and Albania had disturbed that atmosphere, and obliged all nations to take measures for their security and the defence of their frontiers. It was at this juncture that England, with whom Turkey had long been on friendly terms, proposed joint action against any attempt to disturb peace in the Mediterranean. In face of this proposal, and in view of the insecurity everywhere prevailing, the Turkish Government could no longer maintain its attitude of neutrality. By accepting this proposal, Turkey had ensured peace and security in the Mediterranean. Turkey's geographical position, her heroic army and fleet, joined with England's strength, made perpetual peace in the Mediterranean certain. Turkey's action cannot be regarded as hostile to any Power. It was taken in order to protect her frontiers, because a Great Power had landed in a small Balkan country that ought to belong only to a Balkan people. The same Great Power was busy fortifying islands close to the Turkish coasts. In the circumstances, Turkey could no longer remain neutral. Her interests and England's interests were the same, namely, to preserve peace, and to prevent Europe and the Mediterranean from passing under the hegemony of one or two States. The Anglo-Turkish Agreement brought joy to all Turkish hearts. It must be followed by a strengthening of relations with Russia and with the friendly Balkan Powers. Efforts must be made to induce Bulgaria to give up her territorial aspirations and to enter the circle of peace. Turkey to-day was smaller than the Ottoman Empire, but her greater importance was shown by the fact that a great nation like England treated her as a friend and an equal. Turkey had lost territory in the past, but was determined to lose not an inch more in the future.

4. The next orator was General Kâzim Ozalp, ex-Minister of Defence, who stressed the joint vital interests of England and Turkey in the Mediterranean, and the defensive character of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement.

5. The Kamutay, then, by the unanimous vote of the 358 members present, approved the Anglo-Turkish Declaration.

I have, &c.

HUGHE KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN

(1) Not printed.

[E 3881/43/44] No. 88.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 267.)

My Lord, *Angora, May 18, 1939.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 93 of the 2nd March last, I have the honour to inform you that on the 17th May I proceeded, with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the exchange of ratifications of the Armaments Credit Agreement between the United Kingdom and Turkey, signed at London on the 27th May, 1938.

2. The instrument of ratification of the agreement, which was signed on behalf of the Government of the Turkish Republic on the 10th February last, is enclosed herein,(1) together with the certificate of exchange of ratifications,(1) in original, which was signed by myself and his Excellency M. Şükrü Saracoğlu at the time of the exchange.

I have, &c.

H. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

(1) Not printed.

[E 3863/9/44] No. 89.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 270.)

My Lord, *Angora, May 18, 1939.*

I HAVE the honour, in my telegram No. 174 of 28th April, to inform your Lordship of the first conversation between my newly-arrived German colleague and the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, of which M. Saracoğlu had been good enough to give me an account.

2. Herr von Papen's reception here has not been warm. Indeed, it is hard to believe that the German Government can have been so blind to their own interests as to insist, against the wishes of the Turkish Government, on appointing an ambassador who is already so unfavourably remembered and so completely distrusted in this country.

3. Herr von Papen has undoubtedly come in for some very plain speaking, and he can be under no misconception as to what is felt about him here, and what is felt about his country.

4. There is little room for doubt that neither he nor his Government had real knowledge as to the advanced state of our negotiations with the Turkish Government at the time of his arrival, and Herr von Papen appears to have been quite frank in admitting to more than one of his hearers that he had come too late.

5. His riposte shows signs of this lack of preparation. He pleaded with the Turkish Government for delay and promised some favourable proposal from the side of the Axis. This in itself goes to show that the German Government had been taken by surprise. Otherwise Herr von Papen would have been able to produce his counter-attraction at once in some more perceptible form. But, as reported in my telegram No. 201 of the 8th May, it was not until pressed by M. Numan Menemencioğlu, the Secretary-General, that Herr von Papen gave any indication as to the nature of the proposal which he hoped shortly to put forward.

6. When these arguments proved unavailing, Herr von Papen fell back on threats as to the power of Germany to cut off trade with this country, and he appears finally to have adopted a vaguely menacing tone, indicating that Turkey would do well to think twice before placing herself in British hands. His Majesty's Government could not permanently divert the natural course of trade to the extent of compensating Turkey indefinitely for loss of the German market, though she might do so for two or three years. On the political side, it was His Majesty's Government who were working for a war, and their policy of encirclement was continually bringing war nearer.

7. M. Saracoğlu gave me, on the 17th May, an outline of his farewell conversation with Herr von Papen, who had used the arguments outlined in the preceding paragraphs. In reply to Herr von Papen's suggestion that Germany might close her markets, his Excellency had pointed out that hitherto Turkey had been more than amenable to German commercial methods. She had allowed Germany to overcharge her systematically for goods purchased by Turkey. The market might indeed be closed down, but Germany would have great difficulty in finding another customer so complacent.

8. On the political side, M. Saracoğlu had reminded Herr von Papen that in 1911 Kaiser Wilhelm II, who had proclaimed himself the protector of Moslems, had in that capacity allowed his Italian allies to dismember his Turkish friends. The present situation was analogous; Germany and Italy stood together and constituted a threat to the Eastern Mediterranean and to Turkey.

9. To Herr von Papen's argument that it was His Majesty's Government who were preparing war by their encirclement policy, M. Saracoğlu had answered, with perfect logic, that His Majesty's Government had no such intention, but that, after the successive seizures of Austria, the Sudetenland, Czecho-Slovakia and finally Albania, His Majesty's Government and the other European Powers were naturally drawing together to ensure against further aggression.

10. With regard to Italy, Herr von Papen appears to have repeated the statement of which I had the honour to inform your Lordship in my telegram No. 174, that it was Germany who controlled Italian policy. My United States colleague had even heard on good authority that the German Ambassador had gone so far as to offer the Dodecanese to Turkey, though I have been unable to verify this story.

11. In any case, my German colleague has now left, on the night of the 16th May, for Berlin to report, as he put it smilingly to me the same morning, "on the situation which you have created." I said I was sorry that in the short time I should have no opportunity of conversation with him. We arranged that he should inform me as soon as he returned, which he hoped would be within a fortnight.

12. My military attaché was on Herr von Papen's train to Haydarpaşa the same evening and had some conversation with his Excellency.

13. Herr von Papen stated that he had been following the British press and had come to the conclusion that there was still a body of public opinion in England which has prepared to seek a European settlement by means of a conference. He based his view on certain correspondence in *The Times*, and informed Colonel Ross that he had recently written personally to the Prime Minister, whom he had known as Chancellor of the Exchequer during the Lausanne Conference when he himself was Chancellor of the Reich. Herr von Papen also mentioned Danzig, stating that in his opinion Herr Hitler's offer to the Polish Government was a perfectly good one, and that under this offer the Poles would still have been able to use Danzig. There had been no question of cutting Poland off from the sea, while, on the other hand, the German corridor through the Polish Corridor was quite a normal requirement.

14. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin.

I have, &c.
H. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

[R 4304/661/67] No. 90.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. —(*Received May 27.*)

(No. 253.)
(Telegraphic) *Angora, May 26, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 238.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has now addressed to me written reply, of which the following is a summary: He agrees that in case of aggression against Greece the resulting war would have the character of a war in the Mediterranean area and would potentially entail Turco-British co-operation if Turkey or England decided to take part

2. He then defines the juridicial position of Turkey and His Majesty's Government as regards Greece as follows:—

(*a*) Turkish treaty obligations to Greece involve no obligation to go to her assistance unless Greece is attacked by Bulgaria alone or by a third Power acting in concert with Bulgaria. In this connexion he mentioned Greek reservation at the time of the conclusion of Balkan Pact regarding concerted Italian and Bulgarian action.

(*b*) Obligation of His Majesty's Government is conditional on Greek resistance to aggression; it is also unilateral and without time-limit, and it can be terminated at will by His Majesty's Government.

3. Article 3 of joint declaration provides that Turkish forces co-operate with Great Britain if Great Britain decides to resist aggression against Greece. In fact, even if His Majesty's Government withdrew their guarantee to Greece or if conditions necessary for implementation of that guarantee were absent, Turkey and His Majesty's Government are bound in any case where Italy takes part directly or indirectly in an aggression leading to a war in which either were engaged.

4. Therefore, position in Mediterranean area in the event of direct or indirect aggression by Italy is quite clear and can be very easily defined in final agreement.

5. As regards Roumania and Balkan area in general, the position is somewhat different. Following eventualities may be considered:—

(*a*) Italian-German action spreading to the Balkans.

(*b*) Possible neutrality of one of the two Axis Powers in presence of an aggression in the Balkans by the other.

(*c*) Aggression against Roumania by a Power other than Italy or Germany.

6. Turkish treaty position in face of these alternatives is known. Her obligation to Roumania is confined to case of action by Bulgaria, either alone or in combination with another Power. In the case of combined action, Turkey has made reservations regarding the Soviets.

7. In first two eventualities, while Turkey has up to the present assumed no juridicial obligations towards Roumania, yet in the case of the first eventuality Turkey and Great Britain already co-operate effectively in the Mediterranean. In the second eventuality, Turkey's obligations are limited to those arising out of article 3 of joint declaration. In the third eventuality, Turkey has no obligations as long as there is no question of Bulgarian action. In this connexion it must be made clear that Turkey is in no case disposed to assume an obligation to render assistance under a general formula covering equally action by Russia against Roumania, even though Great Britain were carrying out her guarantee to Roumania, and even though Turco-British mutual assistance had already begun as a result of a direct or indirect action by Italy. In such an eventuality—quite theoretical in any case—Turkish engagements as regards Mediterranean area would have their full effect without any co-operation in Roumania being contemplated.

8. British guarantee to Roumania is similar to guarantee to Greece, but this case presents an essential difference as regards its effect on the application of the Turco-British assistance.

9. Except in the event of Italian action, Great Britain's unilateral and conditional guarantee to Roumania does not involve Turco-British co-operation, the Mediterranean area not being in question. In these circumstances such co-operation can only be ensured if a direct engagement to that effect be entered into. But it is precisely this point that brings out eventuality of combining a unilateral obligation with a clause in a long-term contract. If an article covering this point is inserted in definitive agreement, then either (*a*) British guarantee to Roumania would be maintained for the duration of the definitive agreement, thereby giving Roumania an assurance with no counter-obligation on her side and leaving her complete freedom of action, or (*b*) British guarantee would be withdrawn, in which case there would result a somewhat vague state of affairs in regard to putting into operation of Turco-British mutual assistance, or (*c*) position of British guarantee would be left open, His Majesty's Government retaining the power to maintain or withdraw it. In that case, the contemplated assistance to

Roumania would be left dependent solely on the whim of His Majesty's Government without threat to Turkish operations, but might bring into play Turco-British assistance, which would, nevertheless, be indirectly linked up with unilateral guarantee. There appears to be nothing to be gained by thus replacing a unilateral guarantee by a lasting agreement, which entails no obligation whatever on the party most concerned.

10. In considering the two eventualities of Germany or of another Power attacking either alone or in combination with other countries (but not with Italy), the Minister for Foreign Affairs wishes to avoid any uncertainty which might be interpreted as implying the possibility of Turkey against Russia or isolated resistance by Turkey against Germany or another Power.

11. He goes on to say that, if definitive agreement provides for unilateral assistance in case of aggression leading to a war in the Balkans, such a general formula covering the whole Balkan area would, in the absence of restrictive clause already suggested by Turkey, mean the grant by His Majesty's Government and by Turkey of a lasting guarantee to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria without any counterpart on their part. The result would undoubtedly be inconvenient in so far as the success of Turco-British efforts at Belgrade and Sofia is concerned.

12. For these reasons the Minister for Foreign Affairs again emphasises the advantage of the formula which he has already proposed, whereby the coming into play of Turco-British assistance would depend on an aggression of Axis Powers leading to a war in the Balkans in such a way as to threaten the security of Turkey.

13. At the same time he states that his views are not rigid, and admits that adaptation is possible during the forthcoming exchange of views. As this is now imminent, he has been anxious to give a general review of the considerations which arise in question of Balkan security, which is a rather more complicated matter than that of assistance in the Mediterranean.

[R 4511/661/67] No. 91.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 215.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June* 1, 1939.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 238 and 253 [of 18th and 26th May respectively: Anglo-Turkish negotiations].

I have carefully studied the points made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in his communication to you, and I hope that the draft for the interim understanding contained in my immediately following telegram will be found to be in harmony with the attitude of the Turkish Government, subject to the comments made below.

2. As regards Greece, while alive to the considerations in paragraph 3 of your telegram, it seems to us that what is essential at this stage is to ensure that both Great Britain and Turkey should give direct guarantees to Greece, and that the operation of these guarantees should coincide in all respects. Article 1 of the draft interim agreement therefore provides for a direct guarantee by Turkey to Greece, but stipulates that it shall only come into operation in the event of it being necessary for His Majesty's Government to implement the direct guarantee which they have given to Greece. In thus inviting Turkey to give a direct guarantee to Greece we are asking her to undertake no further obligation than she has already indirectly assumed as a result of the Anglo-Turkish declaration.

3. Another reason why it may be valuable to define in the written agreement our mutual obligations towards Greece is that the knowledge that these guarantees have been laid down in a clear and precise form may, in the case of foreign aggression, strengthen the will of Greece to resist that aggression.

4. For your own information, an argument that has influenced us in including the clause about Greece in the draft has been to facilitate the introduction of the much more essential similar clause about Roumania, which admittedly involves asking Turkey to assume an obligation which to some extent goes beyond what we know to be her present commitments.

5. As regards Roumania, it is from our point of view very important that Turkey should give Roumania a direct guarantee, since it is only when Turkey is a belligerent that Great Britain and France will be able fully to implement their guarantee to Roumania by rendering direct and effective assistance to that country by way of the Dardanelles. In addition, the argument in paragraph 3 in favour of direct guarantees also applies in the case of Roumania.

6. It will be noted that article 2 of the draft interim understanding specifies, as in the case of Greece, that no further undertaking which Turkey may assume as regards Roumania can come into operation unless and until our own guarantee equally comes into operation. There is, accordingly, no question of any risk, as suggested in paragraphs 9 and 10 of your telegram No. 253, of Turkey finding herself involved in isolated resistance against Germany or another Power.

7. I do not anticipate any difficulty in meeting the Minister for Foreign Affairs' point as to excluding the case of Russian aggression from Turkey's obligations to Roumania. This point can probably best be met eventually by a separate exchange of notes, but discussion of this will be facilitated when Anglo-Soviet negotiations have reached a more advanced stage.

8. As regards the other possible eventualities, it seems from your telegram under reference that Turkey is prepared to co-operate in assisting Roumania if action by both the United Kingdom and Turkey becomes necessary under the terms of the joint declaration as a result of an attack on Roumania which brought about "war in the Mediterranean area." Such co-operation, to be effective, could not be confined to the Mediterranean area pure and simple, but would have to include direct assistance to Roumania.

9. It equally appears that Turkey is reluctant to undertake an obligation to assist Roumania in a war in which Italy would be neutral and where, therefore, there would presumably be no war in the Mediterranean. The possibility of Italy remaining neutral has been much diminished by the conclusion of the German and Italian Treaty. Assuming, however, the neutrality of Italy, and apart from the case of aggression by Russia, already excepted, Roumania might be the victim of attack either by Bulgaria or by or through Hungary. The case of attack by Bulgaria is already provided for in Turkey's commitments under the Balkan Pact. The only case which remains to be provided for is the possibility of attack by Hungary or by Germany through Hungary. Separate action by Hungary is most unlikely without the direct instigation and active participation of Germany, and, in any case, might well not involve Great Britain and France's guarantee, if, in fact, such an unsupported attack constituted no clear threat to Roumania's independence. But an attack by Germany, either with Hungary's co-operation or acquiescence or in the face of Hungarian opposition, involving the possible penetration of Germany to the Black Sea, would surely constitute such a serious threat to Turkish national security as to render it essential for Turkey, in her own interests, actively to assist in the defence of Roumania.

10. Although, therefore, we appreciate the Turkish Government's wish that they should only undertake a commitment to assist Roumania if a "threat to Turkish national security" is in existence, we hope they will feel able to agree that a threat to Roumanian independence is for practical purposes the same as a threat to Turkish security, and so to withdraw their proposal that a clause specifically providing for such a condition should be included in the interim understanding. From the Roumanian point of view, such a clause would be thought to weaken the efficacy of the British guarantee for the reasons given in paragraph 5 above; and we do not wish any doubts to arise regarding our assistance to Roumania, such as might weaken the Roumanian will to resist. From the Turkish point of view, it will be realised that the British guarantee to Roumania only applies in the event of a clear threat to the independence of that country, which the Roumanian Government think it necessary to resist, and for the reasons given above such a threat to Roumania's independent existence would, in fact, constitute a threat to Turkish national security. This should appeal to Turkey as a conclusive argument in favour of assuming an obligation to assist us in endeavouring to prevent German domination of Roumania. Turkish co-operation with us in this matter is of great practical importance, and we believe that it is at least as much in the interests of Turkey as of the United Kingdom to undertake as regards Roumania the same commitments (subject, of course, to the point referred to in paragraph 7 above) as we are prepared to undertake.

11. You will observe that my draft for the interim understanding deals only with the question of Turkish assistance to Greece and Roumania, and that it contains no general formula covering the whole Balkan area. There are, therefore, no grounds for the fears expressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs (see paragraph 11 of your telegram No. 253) in regard to the position of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

12. I trust that, making such use of the considerations advanced above as you think desirable, you will be able to persuade the Turkish Government that it is in their own ultimate interest to agree to accept the further commitment as regards Roumania which I have provided for in paragraph 2 of the draft interim understanding.

[R 4811/661/67] No. 92.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 216.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 1, 1939.*

MY immediately preceding telegram [of the Anglo-Turkish negotiations].

Following is text of draft of the interim understanding for consideration by the Turkish Government:

"Whereas His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom declared on 13th April, 1939, that, in the event of any action being taken which clearly threatened the independence of Greece or Roumania and which the Greek or Roumanian Governments respectively considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Greek or Roumanian Government, as the case might be, all the support in their power;

"And whereas His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government are desirous of developing further certain of the mutual undertakings contained in the joint Anglo-Turkish Declaration of the 12th May;

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Turkish Government have agreed as follows:

"*Article* 1.—In the event of an act of aggression leading to a war in the Mediterranean area which involved Greece and in which His Majesty's Government came to the assistance of Greece under their above-mentioned declaration of 13th April, 1939, the Turkish Government will for their part lend to the Greek Government all aid and assistance in their power. The Turkish Government will give the Greek Government a direct undertaking to this effect.

"*Article* 2.—If circumstances arise which bring the guarantee given by His Majesty's Government to Roumania into operation, the Turkish Government will for their part lend to the Roumanian Government all aid and assistance in their power and will give the Roumanian Government a direct undertaking to this effect.

"*Article* 3.—The Turkish Government and His Majesty's Government agree that conversations should take place between experts on either side to consider how the mutual co-operation, aid and assistance between Turkey and the United Kingdom which results from the joint declaration of 12th May and from the present agreement can best be carried out."

[E 4037/63/89] No. 93.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (*Received June 3.*)

(No. 270.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, June 2, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 232.

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me on 2nd June to tell me Hatay negotiations had reached complete deadlock.

2. He had communicated written proposals to my French colleague on 15th May. Since then, in the course of discussions he had shown himself prepared to make small concessions for the sake of agreement.

3. The French Government had, however, increased their demands on both points mentioned in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 231. As regards villages, the Minister for Foreign Affairs had been willing to hand over Kessab and two other Armenian villages in return for corresponding cession of certain Turkish villages. The French Government had not only offered most inadequate compensation, but had asked for the cession by Turkey of Turkish village named Mussaoek, including slopes of mountain on Hatay side. As regards Chobanbey–Nisibin Railway, the French Government were now asking for prolongation of control by French company for an undefined period after the expiry of the present concession nine years hence, in spite of written proposal made by the French Ambassador here for transfer on the expiration of the concession.

4. Minister for Foreign Affairs regarded these French demands as based on purely strategic grounds, and said that they were on the same lines as proposals made to him by M. de Chambrun in Paris in 1932. He questioned whether the French Government even seriously intended to come to an agreement. Meanwhile, the population of Mussaoek had heard of the intended transfer and were in revolt.

5. He was uncertain whether to reply to the present proposals or not beyond saying that they had created a very painful impression. In any case, he should withdraw any concessions offered on his side since written proposals of 15th May.

6. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that it would be a long time before Franco-Turkish relations could be placed on a good footing.

Please repeat to Paris.(1)

(1) Repeated to Paris, No. 288, Saving, of June 3, by Foreign Office.

[R 4807/661/67] No. 94.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Campbell (Belgrade).

(No. 26. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 3, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 121 [of 25th May: Anglo-Turkish negotiations].

Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires called on 30th May in connexion with Anglo-Turkish Declaration, but spoke entirely unofficially. He was evidently perturbed at possible reactions to any further mention of the Balkans, having apparently the impression that we were engaged on drafting an extremely comprehensive treaty with Turkey, which might include such matters as question of recognition of Albania, &c. Among other things he seemed to think that such a treaty would have to cover the possibility of His Majesty's Government giving Italy a free hand in the Balkans. He said he feared that the only result of our negotiations with the Turks would be to draw down on the Balkan *Entente* and on Yugoslavia in particular the wrath of the Axis.

2. M. Milanovitch was assured that no consideration had yet been given here to the terms of the eventual treaty with Turkey. At the moment we were merely proceeding with consultations with the Turkish Government with a view to clearing up the position created by our guarantees to Greece and Roumania.

3. As regards paragraph 6 of the joint declaration, about which he had expressed anxiety, M. Milanovitch was reminded that Turkey was a member of the Balkan *Entente* and, therefore, anything that threatened the security of the Balkans must threaten Turkey. In view of the fact that Turkey was a Mediterranean Power and that by the joint declaration the United Kingdom and Turkey mutually guaranteed each other in the Mediterranean area, it was only natural that both His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government should be concerned and should make their concern public regarding the necessity for security in the Balkans.

(Repeated to Sofia, No. 22; Athens, No. 34; Bucharest, No. 34; and Angora, No. 18; all Saving.)

[E 4059/9/44] No. 95.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 277. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, June 4, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 255.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me on 4th June that a list was being prepared of all German technicians and others in public and private employment in Turkey, and that if position with Germany grew worse, "it would be the uprooting of German culture from Turkey."

He would look to Great Britain.

2. German Ambassador has returned and is seeing Minister for Foreign Affairs on 5th June.

[R 4081/661/67] No. 96.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (Received June 7.)

(No. 279.)
My Lord, *Angora, May 24, 1939.*

IT has long been recognised that, considerable latitude though it may be permitted in other matters, the Turkish press does not with impunity criticise the foreign policy of the Government. Thus, overt disapprobation of the Anglo Turkish declaration of the 12th May was clearly not to be anticipated. Nevertheless, the volume and cordiality of the approval with which the declaration has been greeted by all organs of the press, both metropolitan and provincial, has far surpassed my expectations, and it is not difficult to discern in a large proportion of the comments a spontaneity which no governmental *mot d'ordre* could have infused.

2. Three main themes are elaborated by the different commentators, namely: the consonance of the new step with the fundamental principles of Republican Turkish policy, the significance of the declaration as a stabilising factor in the general European situation, and the essentially defensive and non-provocative character of the association between Great Britain and Turkey. A natural satisfaction was also expressed by many writers at the increase in Turkish security, to which recent happenings appeared to foreshadow a menace. On the first point all are agreed that the declaration is in full accord with the principle enunciated by the late President of "security within and peace without," but those who had tended to identify this principle with the maintenance of absolute neutrality descry a change of attitude, whereas those who had regarded the neutrality hitherto maintained as merely epiphenomenal refuse to admit any break in the continuity of Turkish policy. The theme, naturally satisfying to national pride, that the declaration has far more than parochial importance is widely stressed both in general terms and with particular reference to the heartening effect which it may be expected to have on other Balkan nations. And the point that the declaration neither constitutes nor implies any threat to any nation whatsoever unless the latter harbours aggressive designs is firmly emphasised, but in no case by way of an apologia designed to turn aside totalitarian wrath.

3. The alignment of Turkey with the democratic Powers has to some extent emboldened the Turkish press to criticise more openly the methods and aims of German and Italian policy. The *Tan*, indeed, has openly proclaimed anti-Fascist leanings, and went so far as to claim that the Anglo-Turkish agreement, "although reached somewhat late," was a victory for the policy which the newspaper had adopted. In general, however, the language of the press, though firm, is neither bellicose nor undignified. Considerable resentment has been aroused by the ungracious attitude of the German and Italian press towards the agreement, which is interpreted as a symptom of annoyance at the frustration of aggressive designs on the Near and Middle East. The comments of the German press, in particular, have called forth suitably acid retorts to the alternate warnings to Turkey regarding the real aims of British policy as discerned from Berlin and general threats as to the consequences of incurring German displeasure.

4. Personal experience and the reports which have reached me indicate that the welcome accorded to the declaration by the press is matched by the approval with which it has been greeted in official and other circles. I myself was a witness of the obvious enthusiasm displayed by the Grand National Assembly on the occasion of the Prime Minister's statement. The general public, so far as my information goes, are both pleased and proud at the association of their country with Great Britain; and His Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna reports, for instance, that the broadcast announcement of the declaration was greeted in places of public resort with applause.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Berlin, Rome, Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia and to His Majesty's Consular Officers in Turkey.

I have, &c.
H. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

[E 4136/182/44] No. 97.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.- (Received June 7.)

(No. 291.)
My Lord, *Angora, May 31, 1939.*

WITH reference to Sir Percy Loraine's despatch No. 223 of the 10th May, 1935, I have the honour to report that the Fifth General Congress of the Republican People's party was formally opened by the President of the Republic in the building of the Grand National Assembly on the 29th May. The ceremony was attended by members of the Diplomatic Body.

2. M. Ismet Inönü delivered an inaugural speech, mainly devoted to internal affairs and, in particular, to the functions of the party in the political life of the country. His references to foreign affairs form the subject of a separate despatch. After paying tribute to his predecessor and asking the gathering to observe five minutes' silence in his memory, the President declared that the congress opened at a time when it had become clear to all that the Turkish nation had achieved its political maturity, expressed as it was in the present Republican régime. He remarked that the recent elections to the Grand National Assembly had shown proof of this, since the electors had so eagerly and so conscientiously discharged their duties. In the choice of the representatives of the nation, they must seek to give free expression to the wishes of the people, and the party would strive to do so to an increasing extent. M. Ismet Inönü then laid down what he considered to be the basis of the democratic structure most adapted to the needs of the country, and announced the creation, to which further reference is made in paragraph 5 below, of an independent group of Deputies. Turning to the functions of the party organisations and the "People's Houses," he laid stress on the task which was laid upon them to direct and stimulate national thought and national activity, subject to the overriding control of the Central Committee.

3. The congress, continued M. Ismet Inönü, had before them an account of the achievements of the régime since their last session, and he did not propose to weary them with a detailed analysis of the Government's plans for the future. He would, however, allude to two of the most important of their tasks. The former was the education of the agricultural population and the raising of their standard of living, for they were convinced that progress in these directions, affecting as it did the largest section of the population, would immeasurably increase the stature of the nation. The second point was national defence. By reason of the prevailing international situation, yet more must be done for the armed forces of Turkey which had always, in any event, been the object of the Government's special care. From this the President, as recorded in my immediately following despatch, turned to review the international situation and Turkey's foreign policy.

4. Your Lordship will recall that in 1930 the late M. Atatürk experimented with a free Opposition. The experiment lasted only a few months before it was terminated, but in that time many passions were aroused and it became clear that the country was not ripe for orthodox parliamentary methods. Nevertheless, until the recent elections, there have sat in the Grand National Assembly a certain number of "independent" Deputies, approved by the People's

party, whose function has been to criticise the Government to a limited extent. At the last elections, with the exception of four Deputies chosen as representatives of the minorities, no "independents" were elected. In his speech, the President announced that a group of Deputies was to be detached from the Popular party to form, still within the party, an independent group. He expressed the hope that this group, to which the present congress would entrust duties, would collaborate effectively with the majority and with the Government in power, while at the same time affording the nation a further guarantee for the good conduct of public business. It is understood that the leader of the new Independent Group will be M. Ali Rana Tarhan, whose resignation of the post of Minister of Customs and Monopolies was recorded in my despatch No. 290 of the 29th May. It is too early yet to judge what functions the new group will perform, or, indeed, will be permitted to perform. In conversation with the counsellor to His Majesty's Embassy, a high official of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs did not appear to take the new step very seriously, and stated that there had been reluctance among Deputies who had been nominated to form part of the Opposition about being appointed leader of the group. And if, as appears to be contemplated, vacancies in the official Opposition are to be filled by the translation of Popular party Deputies, it hardly seems likely that any more spectacular activities are to be expected from this party within a party, than from the "independent" Deputies who have sat in previous Assemblies.

I have, &c.

H. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

[E 4137/297/44] No. 98.

Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 292.)

Angora, May 31, 1939.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour, in continuation of my despatch No. 291 of to-day's date, to transmit to your Lordship herewith a French translation(1) of those portions of the speech delivered by the President of the Republic to the fifth general congress of the Republican People's party which relate to foreign affairs. This part of the speech was very warmly applauded.

2. Expressing his firm hope that the present uncertainties of the international situation would be resolved by peaceful collaboration and not by war, M. Ismet Inönü observed, nevertheless, that the vital right of the smaller nations to free and independent existence must be fully respected. It was in search of security that Turkey had been led to contract the international engagements by which she was bound to other nations professing the same principles as herself. Alluding to the Anglo-Turkish understanding, he emphasised that this was a reciprocal engagement between two States which harboured no aggressive designs and sought only to preserve their own security, while holding fast to a common ideal of peace and humanity. With her neighbours Turkey no longer had any differences; but she was profoundly concerned for their safety and would make every effort in her power to ward off threats to their security, since these would later result in menace to her own. After a reference to the close and cordial nature of Turco-Soviet collaboration, M. Ismet Inönü said that after settlement—now all but achieved—of the question of the Sanjak of Alexandretta, nothing could mar the intimacy of Franco-Turkish relations.

3. In this time of crisis, the President declared, his hearers would not be surprised at the necessity of strengthening in every possible way the armed forces of the country. Turkey realised that, apart from the question of her own defence, she had undertaken a task on behalf of humanity as a whole. If a new struggle should take place, the Turkish nation would play its part side by side with those peoples whose ideals and interests she shared. Nevertheless, even if there appeared to be a cleavage between the nations, she did not think of denying to other peoples the right to live; she acknowledged the duties which they had to carry out in the world and the qualities with which they were endowed

I have, &c.

H. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN

(1) Not printed.

[R 4566/661/67] No. 99.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 226.)

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 7, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 272 [of 3rd June: Anglo-Turkish negotiations].

1. *Point (a).*—General clause referring to identity of views was omitted for reasons quoted by you in paragraph 2. I should, however, if the Turkish Government desire, be perfectly prepared to agree to a repetition of such reference in the interim understanding. If the Turkish Government wish this, perhaps they would suggest a form of words.

2. *Point (b).*—In my view, the object of the interim understanding is to clear up certain loose ends, and, in particular, to bring into harmony the obligations to His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government in the specific cases of Greece and Roumania. The interim understanding will in no way either modify or supersede the obligations undertaken by His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government in the declaration of the 12th May, of which clause 3 specifically provides for direct Anglo-Turkish mutual assistance in the event of any Turco-Italian or Anglo-Italian war. For these reasons it seems to me unnecessary to elaborate this aspect further in the interim understanding.

3. I agree that you should, if necessary, use with Minister for Foreign Affairs further arguments proposed by you in paragraph 3.

4. I also agree with your proposal to keep your French colleague informed in the manner you suggest. I have for my part communicated to the French Government direct instructions which I have communicated to you.

[E 4154/9/44] No. 100.

Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (Received June 8.)

(No. 280.)

(Telegraphic.) *Angora, June 7, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 277.

German Ambassador has seen the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the President of the Republic.

2. Their general impression is that, so far, German reaction to Anglo-Turkish negotiations is milder than they had expected.

3. Herr von Papen brought no proposal from the German side, but seems to have confined himself to warning Turkey that she was binding herself to the side which was preparing for war and to a vague hint that, if the final Anglo-Turkish Agreement appeared contrary to German interests, Turco-German relations would suffer.

4. As regards commercial relations, German intention seems to be to continue on the present footing until the conclusion of the final agreement, when they will review the situation. In reply to question by Minister for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Papen seems to have been reassuring even about war material, with the exception of heavy guns (see my telegram No. 248). He nevertheless indicated the possibility of ultimate embargo on exports of munitions, and the Turkish Government are going slow as regards the export of chrome and cereals to Germany. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out to Herr von Papen that if Germany cut off the supply of munitions, Turkey would be obliged to cease export to Germany of corresponding value of Turkish goods, otherwise balance would be heavily against Turkey.

5. Minister for Foreign Affairs derived from Herr von Papen's conversation a vague impression that the latter was trying to convince him of Germany's pacifist intentions and of her readiness to discuss outstanding problems with His Majesty's Government. He suggested that there were two objects in this: (*a*) to convince Turkish Government of the uselessness of Anglo-Turkish negotiations, and (*b*) that these sentiments should be passed on to ourselves.

[E 4212/1142/44] No. 101.

Mr. Mack to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 350. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, June 10, 1939.*

SPEAKING before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate on 9th June M. Bonnet gave an account of the state of the conversations with Turkey. He distinguished, on the one hand, between the conversations concerning the final settlement of the territorial questions affecting Turkey and Syria, and, on the other hand, those dealing with the declaration of mutual assistance between France and Turkey.

2. M. Bonnet recalled the principal stages in the affair of the sanjak. The Turkish Government had claimed, in virtue of their rights under the agreements of the 20th October, 1921, on the subject of the Sanjak of Alexandretta, that the guarantee which Syria assumed under the treaty of 1936 was not of equal value to that which the French Government had given. Out of this arose the negotiations which ended in the adoption of the Geneva Agreements of the 29th May, 1937.

3. The attempt to make the new system work, M. Bonnet went on to say, led to difficulties which continually increased throughout 1938. In these circumstances, Turkey asked, at the beginning of 1939, for the return of the sanjak. The French Government considered that it was to the interest of Syria to put an end to an equivocal situation which was embittering the relations between the two neighbours. This was the object of the negotiations which appeared to be on the eve of conclusion.

4. As regards the negotiations for a declaration of mutual assistance between France and Turkey, M. Bonnet declared that its conclusion was also near. He underlined the fact that the two negotiations, although parallel, had a separate character, and had been conducted separately.

[E 4814/63/89] No. 102.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 289.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, June 14, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 270.

1. Secretary-General asked me to call on 14th June, on instructions from Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tell me that a further deadlock has occurred.

2. Agreement now exists on all main points. Difficulties, however, instantly arise on matters of detail, in particular (1) French plead the right to fly French flag over cemetery at Alexandretta and require an undertaking that cemetery will be kept open to visitors. Turkish attitude is that all cemeteries in Turkey are always open, and that it is quite impossible to agree to flying of French flag. (2) Turks desire to buy out and close the three French schools. French resist this on the grounds that it would mean destruction of French influence. Turks are inclined to see in this some political motive.

3. It appears that these are the two points which present greatest difficulty, and Secretary-General said Turkish Government had no intention of giving way. Other small points, however, remain outstanding, such as actual frontier line on southern border, method of payment by Turkey of sum of 38 million francs for taking over certain rights, properties, and interests, cession of Government houses at Antioch and at Alexandretta, and arrangements for assumption by Turkey of certain obligations in regard to payment of pensions.

Turks appear to be particularly upset because Prime Minister yesterday stated in National Assembly that signature of agreement was imminent. These difficulties on small matters cropped up almost immediately afterwards.

Please repeat to Paris.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 251, Saving (by bag).)

[E 4283/63/89] No. 103.

Sir E. Phipps to Viscount Halifax. (Received June 15.)

(No. 361. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, June 14, 1939.*

M. DALADIER told me this afternoon that the Turks are proving very difficult over the negotiations. They continue to bring forward new demands all the time.

2. The Turks now refuse to allow any French schools in the Hatay, although they will allow Italian schools, on the ground that there are fewer Italians there than French. This M. Daladier will not agree to.

3. M. Bonnet says the Turks are making difficulties even over the French war cemetery at Alexandretta, being unwilling to give the French full possession of it or to allow the French flag to fly there.

4. MM. Daladier and Bonnet are both clearly annoyed in consequence.

(Repeated to Angora, in cypher, by telegraph, No. 13.)

[R 4882/661/67] No. 104.

Sir R. Campbell to Viscount Halifax. (Received June 15.)

(No. 129.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, June 14, 1939.*

ANGORA telegram No. 285, paragraphs 3 and 4.

Owing to corruption in transmission, passage in which I am quoted is not clear. So far as I can judge it does not seem quite correctly to represent my views, which may be summarised as follows:—

2. Risk of Yugoslavia joining combination with Italy and Hungary has, I think, been further diminished by (*a*) increased suspicion of Italy, (*b*) increased determination not to abandon Roumania, and, perhaps, (*c*) German recognition (however grudging it may be) of Yugoslavia's position as a member of the Balkan *Entente*.

3. Although I have suspicion that Roumania is to some extent using Yugoslavia as a stalking-horse in the matter of clause 6 of Anglo-Turkish Declaration, there is no doubt that Yugoslav Government were at first very nervous that it would increase difficulties of their position *vis-à-vis* Berlin and Rome. In the last few days, however, Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed himself to my Turkish colleague as well satisfied with Turkish written reply to Roumanian observations, of which copy was communicated to Belgrade. This is due to fact that Prince Regent's visit to Rome and Berlin have passed off without unpleasantness, and that Yugoslav Government will now be emboldened in a general way to take a rather more active part in the promotion of *solidarity* of Balkan *Entente*.

4. This improvement has *not*, however, gone so far as to permit them to view with equanimity repetition in definitive Anglo-Turkish Agreement of reference to Balkan *security* contained in clause 6 of declaration. Indeed, they would, I am sure, vastly prefer no further mention of it.

5. The aim of Yugoslav Government is to preserve position of *independence* (neutrality is perhaps an ambiguous word in this connexion). In other words, they do not want to commit themselves in advance to any Power or combination of Powers. If war comes they will still, I think, remain neutral as long as circumstances permit (*i.e.*, until Yugoslav interests are threatened or until pressure of public opinion forces them in). If they are forced in—which they now realise may occur sooner rather than later—it will be on the right side. But *until that occurs* they will in no circumstances publicly declare themselves.

6. If it be thought essential to include reference to Balkan security in definitive Anglo-Turkish Agreement, I would much prefer it were done as before, without consultation with or knowledge of Yugoslav Government. Even so it would make my position here difficult. I cannot even guarantee that it would not entail Yugoslavia's nominal secession from Balkan *Entente*, although, as stated in paragraph 1 above, I do not think this would necessarily be followed by her joining combination with Italy and Hungary. She would perhaps be more likely to throw herself upon the mercy of Germany.

(Repeated to Angora, Athens, Bucharest and Saving to Sofia.)

[E 4329/9/44] No. 105.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received June* 16.)

(No. 291.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, June* 15, 1939.

MY telegram No. 277.

I asked Secretary-General on 14th June if he could tell me more about position in regard to trade relations with Germany and German employees in Turkey.

2. M. Numan informed me that Turkish Government had enquired in Berlin whether German Government intended to continue trade relations as hitherto. They had received no reply.

3. Turkish Government were faced with problem that the season for exports of Turkish goods to Germany was approaching and sales were now being arranged. It was impossible for them to authorise sales unless they were certain that Germany intended to continue normal trade, otherwise they might be faced with position in which they had exported to Germany some 40 million marks' worth of goods for which they could not receive payment. This would be fatal for Turkish economy and would be an instrument in the hands of Germany for working up popular feeling against Turkish policy.

4. In the absence, therefore, of German answer, Turkish Government were closing down slowly on exports to Germany and were holding up authorisation for sales to Germany. They were, of course, being pressed on all sides by Turkish exporters to grant authorisation.

5. Secretary-General explained that it was quite clear that, unless they retained the initiative in this matter, Germany would get the whip-hand and would use economic pressure for political purposes, and that this would in due course inevitably have effect on public opinion here.

6. As regards German employees, the same principle is being followed. For instance, the contract of Herr von der Osten, professor of archæology at the university, has been suspended. He is receiving pay till October and has been informed that no decision would be taken as regards renewal of his contract until international situation clears. I mention this case as an example, but it is one of many.

[R 4909/661/67] No. 106.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (*Angora*).

(No. 245.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June* 17, 1939.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 285 and 287 [of 15th June] and Bucharest telegram No. 243 [of 15th June: Anglo-Turkish negotiations].

Are you now satisfied that M. Gafencu is not going to make any further difficulties with regard to our proposal that Turkey should give publicly a direct guarantee to Roumania, or that his attitude is likely in any other way to interfere with the negotiation of the Anglo-Turkish interim agreement? If you think that in the light of M. Gafencu's conversation with you it would be desirable for His Majesty's Minister at Bucharest to speak to M. Gafencu on this subject, I am prepared to instruct Sir R. Hoare accordingly.

2. Meanwhile, may I take it that since the Turkish Foreign Minister has had an opportunity of discussing the Anglo-Turkish declaration with M. Gafencu personally he will now be in a position to give me an answer without further delay to my proposals for the interim agreement between our two Governments as set forth in my telegrams Nos. 215 and 216? I attach importance to completing these negotiations as quickly as possible.

(Repeated to Bucharest, No. 272.)

[R 4953/661/67] No. 107.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received June* 19.)

(No. 296.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, June* 19, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 243.

I went over the ground again with the Secretary-General on 18th June. I think M. Gafencu's views can be summarised as follows: In theory, he is in favour of everything which strengthens Anglo-Turkish co-operation in the Balkans, including even the Turkish guarantee of Roumania, provided that Roumania (and Yugoslavia) are not thereby exposed to further counter-pressure from Germany. This in practice makes him very shy of direct Turkish guarantee of Roumania in any published form.

2. The Secretary-General repeated that Turkish policy would not be affected by M. Gafencu's views. I do not, however, take this to mean that the Turkish Government will agree to an out-and-out guarantee of Roumania (or even of Greece) as asked for by us. I can only give forecast of their attitude based on conjecture, but the reply which I expect to receive is a counter-suggestion, according to which Turkish Government would be prepared and undertake to assist and support His Majesty's Government by every means in their power in the event of His Majesty's Government having to put into force their guarantee of Roumania. I think they will reply similarly as regards Greece.

3. Secretary-General promised to arrange for me to exchange views with the Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible after his return here on 19th June. I will continue to press for direct guarantee, but I should be grateful for your views as to Turkish counter-suggestion which I have foreshadowed. It seems to me to amount to the same thing as direct guarantee and may have advantages if it reduces the danger of German pressure on Roumania.

4. My answer to your questions is, therefore: (1) That I do not think M. Gafencu will make further difficulties; (2) that his views regarding direct Turkish guarantees are on the lines to which the Turkish Government were themselves inclining; and (3) I doubt the advantage of pursuing this particular point at Bucharest.

(Repeated to Athens, Belgrade and Bucharest.)

[R 5012/661/67] No. 108.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (*Received June* 20.)

(No. 300.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, June* 19, 1939.

SIR R. CAMPBELL'S telegram No. 129, paragraph 4.

It is clear from above telegram and also from information regarding views of Roumanian Government, that both Yugoslav and Roumanian Governments are anxious as to implications of clause 6 of Anglo-Turkish Declaration. This anxiety seems to arise from fear that clause 6 implies an intention on our part to embody in the final agreement some provision which will either draw other Balkan States into a direct commitment against the Axis Powers, or at least compromise them by some undertaking on the part of ourselves and Turkey, which, in the long run, would range them with us against the Axis.

2. I venture to suggest that an examination of the origin and purpose of clause 6 will show that these fears are delusive.

3. *Origin* of clause 6 is briefly due to the fact that whereas Turkish Government were willing to commit themselves definitely in the case of war in the Mediterranean, they were not ready to go so far as regards the Balkans. They therefore separated the two points which we had originally included in one clause (see your telegram No. 126, in which the Mediterranean and the Balkans are coupled, and my telegrams Nos. 163 and 167, which show how the Turkish Government separated them). Furthermore, we were unable to reach agreement as to the wording of a clause relating to the Balkan amendments owing to resistance of the Turks on their amendment regarding menace to Turkish security.

(see second paragraph of my telegram No. 163). From that time, in so far as declaration was concerned, we concentrated on the Mediterranean point, and the first text of Anglo-Turkish Declaration, contained in your telegram No. 145, omitted all reference to the Balkans. Reasons for this were stated in your telegram No. 144 and so also were the objections. It was in consequence of those objections that, at the last moment before the issue of the declaration, clause 6 was inserted (your telegram No. 161, second paragraph).

4. *Purpose* of clause 6 was, I suggest, partly fulfilled by the fact of its inclusion in the declaration which avoided creating the impression that the Anglo-Turkish obligations only covered the Mediterranean area. As regards any further purpose, clause is vague as the Minister for Foreign Affairs says (see my telegram No. 287, third paragraph). It does no more than admit the necessity of Balkan security and commits ourselves and the Turkish Government to consultation with this object. In this connexion it exists concurrently with our admission of Turkey's predominant rôle in the Balkans, as defined in my telegram No. 133, paragraph 8.

5. If these consultations produce a definite result, there would seem to be no reason for clause 6 to reappear in the final agreement. Its purpose will have been achieved.

6. It remains, therefore, to enquire how far these consultations are likely to produce desired result. Points which arise are the following:—

(*a*) Guarantees for Greece and Roumania.
(*b*) Position of Bulgaria.
(*c*) Position of Yugoslavia.

As regards (*a*), we await the Turkish reply to our wish for interim agreement (your telegrams Nos. 215 and 216). As to this, see my telegram No. 296. As far as I can tell before receiving their answer, Turkish Government, though they may not be ready to give a direct guarantee, will make constructive proposal which would appear to meet the case. The final wording on this point must figure in Anglo-Turkish Agreement, and we must face Yugoslav and Roumanian reactions. As regards (*b*), we can do but little in our final agreement with Turkey. We have hitherto regarded this as a matter between Balkan States, and whatever action we may now decide on, it hardly seems a matter for inclusion in an Anglo-Turkish Agreement. It would come more suitably under Turkey's predominant rôle, our own part being off stage. As regards (*c*), we have avoided giving any direct guarantee to Yugoslavia owing to delicacy of their position.

7. I suggest, therefore, that though (*c*) will naturally appear in the final agreements, (*b*) and (*c*) would in no case be included. If we can secure a satisfactory solution of (*a*), coupled with some definite understanding as to what, in fact, would constitute a menace to Turkish security, we shall have done all that we can. These points will appear individually in the final agreement, and there will be neither need nor material for any repetition of clause 6. Anything beyond this which can be done in the Balkans would be done by or through Turkey. This would also be in accordance with explanations given by Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Gafencu, as reported in paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 268.

(Repeated to Belgrade, Sofia, Athens and Bucharest.)

[E 4481/143/44] No. 109.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 301.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, June 20, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 295.

Secretary-General has stated to French Ambassador that it is impossible to make progress with Anglo-Turkish Interim Agreement until the Turkish Government knows our proposals on financial and economic points.

2. I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs last night at reception for the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and he spoke in the same sense as reported in my telegram No. 295. I ascertained that reply to proposals in your telegrams

Nos. 215 and 216 has actually been ready for ten days. Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, feels unable to commit himself by handing it to me until he knows where he stands on these other points. It is just possible that I may be able to induce him to give me advance copy, but it is quite clear that no definite progress can be made until I have your instructions.

3. In addition to financial and economic points, Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed earnest desire that concrete progress should be made in regard to supply of material on the list given us by the Turkish Government (my despatch No. 245). His Excellency pointed out that, although negotiations with the Turkish mission in London had been proceeding for some time, no deliveries of material had taken place. He regarded it as most important that early deliveries should be made, partly owing to shortage here, and partly owing to the moral effect which would be created, not only in Turkey, but in Greece and Roumania, by the knowledge that these supplies are arriving. He informed me that supplies of war material from Germany to Bulgaria are increasing. The German supplies to Turkey have now practically ceased.

4. Brigadier Lund tells me that he has the definite impression that progress in staff conversations is being held up on this account. He is telegraphing to the Committee of Imperial Defence.

[E 4481/143/44] No. 110.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 305.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, June 21, 1939.*

MY immediately preceding telegram and your telegram No. 126, paragraph 7, point 2.

French Ambassador states that staff conversations between France and Turkey will begin about mid-July.

2. In the absence of French Military Attaché, French Naval Attaché has asked my military attaché whether he considered these conversations should be tripartite. Military attaché replied that personally he thought not. Ground work was being done by British delegation, and it would be unnecessary for them to join with French in preliminary conversations which the latter would hold with the Turks. But when the final plans were approaching completion, it would be necessary to co-ordinate the efforts of all three countries.

3. I should be grateful for information as to whether this represents your own views and those of the service departments.

[R 4955/661/67] No. 111.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 247.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 22, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 296 [of 19th June: Anglo-Turkish negotiations], paragraph 3.

It is difficult to formulate views until we know the exact text of what the Turks propose. Generally speaking, however, you may take it that if the Turkish text ensures beyond all manner of doubt Turkish belligerency on our side in the event of His Majesty's Government giving effect to their guarantees to Greece and/or Roumania, our requirements would be covered.

[R 5153/661/67] No. 112.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received June* 23.)

(No. 310.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, June* 23, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 216.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has now sent me counter-draft in French of interim understanding as follows :—

2. Preamble is identical with that in your telegram No. 216, except that order of first and second paragraphs has been inverted, and in paragraphs 1 and 3 thus inverted the order in which the two Governments are mentioned is also reversed.

3. There follow three articles, viz. :—

"*Article* 1.—In the event of an act of aggression aimed at Turkish territories or leading to a war in such a way as to be considered by Turkey as likely to threaten ('étant susceptible de porter atteinte') her security, Turkish Government and British Government will co-operate effectively to ward off such an aggression or threat, and they will lend each other mutually all aid and assistance in their power.

"*Article* 2.—Without prejudice to provisions contained in article 1 of present agreement, Turkish Government undertake, for duration of guarantee given by Great Britain to Greece and Roumania by its declarations of 13th April, 1939, to lend to the British Government engaged in a war in virtue of said declarations all aid and assistance in its power.

"*Article* 3 is identical with article 3 in our draft.

4. Draft thus sent me is in the nature of an advance copy for preliminary discussion. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that when agreement was reached, he would formally send me draft with covering letter. I think this procedure is designed to keep matter open until Turkish Government know where they stand in regard to financial and economic transactions. I said the best thing I could do was to submit his draft at once to you.

5. His Excellency asked whether interim understanding was to be signed and published. I said I would refer this to you. As regards publication, I had supposed nothing more would be published until final agreement.

[E 4540/1142/44] No. 113.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (*Received June* 24.)

(No. 311.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Angora, June* 23, 1939.

MY telegram No. 305.

Agreement was signed 23rd June.

[R 5181/661/67] No. 114.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (*Received June* 24.)

(No. 313.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Angora, June* 24, 1939.

PRIME Minister accompanied reading of Franco-Turkish Declaration, with a short explanation of each article.

2. He explained that article 6 showed that search for security was not limited to dangers in Mediterranean. Balkan *Entente*, which provided security on one side, had emerged stronger still from recent conversations, and continued determined to remain an essential element in the service of peace. It was clear that article 6 in no way modified rights and duties of members of Balkan *Entente*.

That *Entente*, without in any way being confused with Anglo-Turkish or Franco-Turkish Agreements, retained its full and entire independence and its character as an independent factor in the service of peace.

Article 6 only covered security needs and particular situations which Turkey and France had in mind, and the same was true in the case of the Anglo-Turkish Declaration.

(Repeated to Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia.)

[R 5012/661/67] No. 115.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (*Angora*).

(No. 248.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June* 24, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 300 [of 19th June : Anglo-Turkish negotiations].

I entirely agree with your analysis of the origin and purpose of clause 6 of the Anglo-Turkish Declaration, as set forth in paragraphs 1–5. We are committed to consultations and those consultations will, I hope, continue, but I share your view that there is no necessity to labour the point regarding their continuance when it comes to drafting the definitive agreement.

2. Please so inform the Turkish Government, and if they concur and see no objection, I will take steps so to inform the Governments at Belgrade, Athens and Bucharest, to which posts you should repeat your reply giving the views of the Turkish Government.

(Addressed to Angora. Repeated, Saving, to Belgrade, No. 30; Sofia, No. 28; Athens, No. 40; Bucharest, No. 39; and Paris, No. 278.)

[E 4553/1142/44] No. 116.

Sir E. Phipps to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received June* 26.)

(No. 814.)
My Lord, *Paris, June* 24, 1939.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 392, Saving, of to-day, reporting the signature simultaneously in Paris and in Angora of agreements between France and Turkey, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copies of the texts, as printed in the *Temps* (semi-official), dated the 25th June, of the following documents :—

(1) A Franco-Turkish declaration of mutual assistance.
(2) A unilateral declaration by the French Government concerning Syria and the Lebanon.
(3) The speeches exchanged by M. Bonnet and the Turkish Ambassador.
(4) An explanatory memorandum issued to the press by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
(5) Reports from Angora of the signature of the Franco-Turkish agreements there.(')

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora.

I have, &c.
ERIC PHIPPS.

(') Not printed.

Enclosure in No. 116.

Extract from the Temps *of June* 25, 1939.

La Signature du Pacte franco-turc d'Assistance mutuelle.

Le Pacte d'Assistance mutuelle.

LA déclaration commune assurant l'assistance mutuelle de la France et de la Turquie, au cas d'un acte d'agression dans la région méditerranéenne ou dans les Balkans, est ainsi conçue :

Déclaration.

Le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement turc sont entrés en étroite consultation et les discussions dans lesquelles ils se sont engagés et qui sont encore en cours ont révélé leur identité de vue habituelle.

2. Il est convenu que les deux États concluront un accord définitif de longue durée comportant des engagements réciproques dans l'intérêt de leur sécurité nationale.

3. En attendant la conclusion de l'accord définitif, le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement turc déclarent que, dans le cas d'un acte d'agression qui conduirait à une guerre dans la région méditerranéenne, ils seraient prêts à coopérer effectivement et à s'accorder mutuellement toute l'aide et l'assistance en leur pouvoir.

4. Cette déclaration, ainsi que l'accord envisagé, n'est dirigée contre aucun pays, mais a pour but d'assurer à la France et à la Turquie une aide et une assistance réciproques dans le cas où celles-ci s'avéreraient nécessaires.

5. Il est reconnu par les deux Gouvernements que certaines questions, y compris la définition plus précise des diverses conditions dans lesquelles se déclencherait le jeu des engagements réciproques, demanderont un examen plus approfondi avant que l'accord définitif ne puisse être conclu. Cet examen est actuellement en cours.

6. Les deux Gouvernements reconnaissent qu'il est également nécessaire d'assurer l'établissement de la sécurité dans les Balkans et sont en consultation afin d'atteindre ce but le plus rapidement possible.

7. Il est entendu que les dispositions ci-dessus énoncées n'empêchent ni l'un ni l'autre Gouvernement de conclure, dans l'intérêt général de la consolidation de la paix, des accords avec d'autres pays.

BONNET. SUAD DAVAZ.

Paris, le 23 *juin* 1939.

Voici la déclaration française relative " à la pérennité de la mission assumée par la France en Syrie et au Liban " :

Le Gouvernement de la République déclare qu'il n'entre aucunement dans les intentions de la France de renoncer, en faveur d'un tiers, à la mission qu'elle assume en Syrie et au Liban.

BONNET.

Paris, le 23 *juin* 1939.

Les signatures échangées, M. Georges Bonnet a prononcé devant le micro les paroles suivantes :

Allocution de M. Georges Bonnet.

La déclaration d'assistance mutuelle franco-turque reprend exactement les termes de la déclaration anglo-turque du 12 mai.

Elle est destinée à rendre strictement parallèles les obligations qui lient la France et la Grande-Bretagne et celles qui lient déjà la Grande-Bretagne et la Turquie.

Elle prévoit, en effet :

" (1) Que les deux Gouvernements, français et turc, s'accorderont mutuellement toute l'aide et l'assistance en leur pouvoir, dans le cas d'un acte d'agression qui conduirait à une guerre dans la région méditerranéenne,

" Et (2) que cet engagement sera précisé dans un accord définitif qui aura également pour but d'assurer l'établissement de la sécurité dans les Balkans."

" Tels sont les deux points essentiels de cette déclaration. Il convient, d'ailleurs, de souligner, à ce propos, que, comme elle l'indique expressément, elle n'est dirigée contre aucun pays.

" Réplique exacte de la déclaration anglo-turque, la déclaration franco-turque a été élaborée en même temps que celle-ci, au cours d'une négociation qui a associé Paris, Londres et Ankara et dont le succès marque une solidarité essentielle au maintien de la paix.

" Je suis tout particulièrement heureux de voir ainsi resserrés les liens qui unissent la France et la Turquie, dont l'étroite entente se manifeste ainsi à la fois sur les problèmes particuliers et sur le plan plus élevé de la politique générale."

Réponse de M. Suad Davaz.

L'Ambassadeur de Turquie à Paris a pris ensuite la parole, et s'est exprimé ainsi :

Votre Ministre des Affaires étrangères, mon ami Georges Bonnet, vous a donné à l'instant même les renseignements nécessaires sur ce que nous faisons actuellement.

Je ne puis ajouter que ceci : je voudrais dire combien je ressens une grande joie de voir scellée aujourd'hui l'union franco-turque.

Les deux pays, en signant les accords d'aujourd'hui, l'ont fait pour consolider la paix. Ces accords ne sont dirigés contre personne; ils ont été conçus dans le but le plus pacifique. Notre idéal est la paix et c'est de cette manière que nous collaborons à son maintien. Ce faisant la France, la Turquie et l'Angleterre feront tout ce qui est en leur pouvoir pour maintenir cette paix qui est chère à l'humanité tout entière.

La Rétrocession à la Turquie du Sandjak d'Alexandrette.

LES documents signés hier, à Ankara, savoir : un arrangement, un protocole et deux lettres annexes, sont analysés et commentés dans la note suivante qui a été remise à la presse après la cérémonie du Quai d'Orsay :

La France est guidée par le souci d'affranchir les relations mutuelles de la Turquie et de la Syrie de la lourde équivoque dont les grevait la persistance, sous des formes plus ou moins nettes de prétentions turques. Les rapports des deux pays seront désormais fondés sur la confiance réciproque. La Turquie reconnaît le caractère immuable de sa frontière avec sa voisine. Elle s'engage à ne rien entreprendre qui soit de nature à compromettre l'intégrité territoriale ou la tranquillité intérieure de cette dernière. C'est pour la première fois qu'elle contracte, dans ce domaine, une obligation unilatérale en vertu de laquelle elle s'interdit de s'ingérer, de quelque manière que ce soit, dans les affaires de la Syrie et, même simplement, de chercher à y exercer la moindre influence.

Tant par leur portée que par leur solennité, ces engagements libèrent la Syrie d'une menace morale et matérielle qui pesait sur sa vie politique. A Damas, et plus encore en Djézireh et à Alep, l'opinion mesure, à sa juste valeur, l'intérêt que présente pour le pays un assainissement qui, s'il est payé d'un prix incontestablement élevé, n'en affranchit pas moins la Syrie d'une lourde préoccupation et lui ouvre, sur son patrimoine définitivement consolidé, la perspective d'une existence paisible.

La France a saisi cette occasion de dégager de toute incertitude et de tout doute sa propre politique au Levant. C'est à cette fin que tient la déclaration par laquelle elle affirme qu'il n'entre aucunement dans ses intentions de renoncer, en faveur d'un tiers, à la mission qu'elle assume en Syrie et au Liban. Spontané et unilatéral, cet acte a une valeur *erga omnes*. Il vaut à l'égard des tiers, ce terme étant pris dans son acception la plus large. En même temps, donc, que la Syrie assure son avenir, la France proclame la pérennité de ses objectifs au Levant.

La rétrocession du sandjak ne pouvait être grevée de conditions qui eussent tendu à retourner contre la Turquie au profit de la Syrie, l'hypothèque dont la négociation avait pour objet de préparer la mainlevée. La Turquie, plus que toute autre Puissance est jalouse de ses prérogatives. Tout ce qui peut paraître

limiter sa souveraineté lui est suspect. Faisant désormais partie intégrante de la Turquie, le sandjak perd sa personnalité propre ainsi que, par voie de conséquence, l'autonomie dont il jouissait à l'intérieur des frontières syriennes. C'est ce principe qui forme l'assise du système.

Les relations contractuelles des Puissances avec la Turquie s'étendent automatiquement au territoire réintégré. Il n'en pouvait être autrement. Quant aux groupes ethniques de sang autre que turc, il n'était pas moins clair qu'Ankara écarterait résolument toute tentative de leur assurer une protection externe. Il a fallu ainsi éliminer des textes toutes les dispositions par lesquelles eussent été conférées aux éléments en cause certaines franchises ou garanties.

Il n'en reste pas moins que les individus qui désireront ne pas acquérir la nationalité turque auront, pendant un délai de six mois à dater de l'entrée en vigueur des accords, la faculté d'opter pour la nationalité syrienne ou pour la nationalité libanaise. Ceux qui agiront de la sorte devront, dans les dix-huit mois suivants, transporter leur domicile hors du territoire, après avoir liquidé leur avoir immobilier. Ils seront libres d'aliéner ou d'emporter leurs effets mobiliers de toute nature, ainsi que leur cheptel. Le produit de cette liquidation sera bloqué à un compte spécial de la banque centrale de la République turque à Alexandrette. Les modalités de transfert seront réglées par voie d'arrangement entre les parties contractantes. Quant aux étrangers, ceux qui le demanderont auront la latitude d'être admis au bénéfice du même régime.

Les accords règlent les conditions dans lesquelles les intérêts moraux et matériels de la France sont dédommagés. Les biens fonciers et les droits incorporels de nos nationaux sont cédés contre le versement d'une indemnité globale et forfaitaire dont il incombera au Gouvernement de la République de répartir le montant entre les œuvres ou entreprises dépossédées ou évincées. De même, en ce qui concerne les dépendances du domaine privé de la France dans le sandjak.

Le cimetière militaire dans lequel nous avons regroupé, en 1935, les cendres de nos soldats morts au cours de la campagne de Cilicie continuera d'être propriété française. Nous en assurerons le gardiennage. Il ne sera pas interdit, aux fêtes d'usage, d'y célébrer des cérémonies commémoratives selon les rites que la décence et la piété ont consacrés. Quant aux édifices cultuels : églises et paroisses latines, ainsi que leurs dépendances, tous ceux qui relèvent de congrégations françaises resteront affectés à leur destination actuelle.

Telle est l'économie des accords qui fixent désormais le statut des relations franco-turques au Levant. Depuis 1936 ces rapports étaient tendus. Le retour du sandjak à la Turquie doit avoir pour effet de dissiper l'atmosphère irritante qu'entretenait la question d'Alexandrette.

Encore est-il que, de la province en cause, une portion non négligeable reste à la Syrie : la région de Kessab, sur les pentes méridionales du Djebel-Akra. Cette rectification laisse à la Syrie une contrée dont la population autochtone est de race arménienne et assure au pays une frontière orographiquement mieux assise.

Aucun obstacle ne s'oppose donc plus à l'établissement de rapports confiants entre la France et la Turquie. Telle est la raison essentielle pour laquelle les deux Puissances ont tenu à faire coïncider la signature des actes relatifs à la Syrie avec celle de la déclaration par laquelle elles s'engagent mutuellement à se prêter assistance en cas de conflit.

[R 5029/661/67] No. 117.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Campbell (Belgrade).

(No. 33. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 26, 1939.*

ANGORA telegram No. 300 [of the 19th June: Anglo-Turkish negotiations].

Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires stated on 20th June that he had been instructed by Yugoslav Government to express latter's gratitude, since it was understood that the idea had been dropped of including in definitive Anglo-Turkish Agreement any clause on the lines of clause 6 of the joint declaration of 12th May. Yugoslav Government desired particularly to express gratitude for understanding

which they felt had been shown by His Majesty's Government of the peculiar position of Yugoslavia and, indeed, of Balkans as a whole in regard to this point.

2. Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires went on to express hope that Franco-Turkish Declaration should not include clause similar to our own clause 6 or, alternatively, that if Anglo-Turkish definitive agreement were about to be signed, idea of preliminary Franco-Turkish Declaration might be abandoned and the stage of a Franco-Turkish definitive agreement reached immediately. Latter agreement would, Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires suggested, exclude any mention of clause 6 as was believed to be intention in case of Anglo-Turkish definitive agreement. On this point it was repeated to Chargé d'Affaires that present conversations were confined to tidying up the position with regard to Roumania and Greece so as to ensure complete harmony between Turkish and British obligations, and that no step had as yet been made in negotiation of definitive agreement. Chargé d'Affaires expressed surprise, declaring that it was generally understood that we were on point of signing a definitive agreement.

3. Yugoslav representations, which had also been made at Paris and Angora, were made too late for any effective action to be possible, and, indeed, any important difference in texts of Franco-Turkish and Anglo-Turkish Governments would, in any case, have inevitably aroused comment. It may, however, as you will have seen from my telegram No. 248 to Angora, prove possible to meet point of view of Yugoslav Government in definitive agreement.

(Repeated, Saving, to Sofia, No. 30; Bucharest, No. 42; Athens, No. 43; Angora, No. 24; and Paris, No. 284 (by bag).)

[R 5210/661/67] No. 118.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 315.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, June 26, 1939.*

SECRETARY-GENERAL read to me this morning *procès-verbal* of conversations during M. Gafencu's visit.

2. Following appear to be main points of interest not covered by my previous telegrams :—

(*a*) Bulgarian Minister had also spoken to Soviet Ambassador in the sense reported in my telegram No. 284. Minister for Foreign Affairs and M. Gafencu were inclined to attribute his action to Italian influence.

(*b*) Minister for Foreign Affairs had asked M. Gafencu's attitude to the question of a Black Sea pact. The latter had replied that Roumania intended to maintain her present independence, though in certain circumstances he might consider it.

(*c*) Minister for Foreign Affairs had explained that article 6 of Anglo-Turkish declaration was in no way intended to compromise other Balkan States and would not appear *tel quel* in final agreement.

(*d*) Importance of closer relations with Poland and Turkey was realised and it was agreed that Roumania could usefully act as intermediary. Secretary-General explained to me that for Turkey to approach Poland direct might exaggerate difficulties with Russia.

(*e*) Similarly, importance of closer Roumanian-Russian relations was admitted, together with utility of Turkey as an intermediary.

(*f*) Mention was made of a proposal for a Yugoslav-Bulgarian-Turkish understanding. Both Ministers for Foreign Affairs rejected it. I asked Secretary-General where this proposal had come from. He said partly from Yugoslavia, but more insistently from Bulgaria. He reminded me of a conversation reported in my despatch No. 124, paragraph 7, in which he had mentioned impossibility of a grouping of Balkan Powers from north to south, as it would depend on Germany.

(Repeated to Belgrade, Athens, Bucharest and Sofia.)

[R 5251/661/67] No. 119.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Campbell (Belgrade).

(No. 35. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 27, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 33, Saving, [of 26th June: Anglo-Turkish negotiations].

Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires called again on 26th June to enquire whether we were now in a position to reply to his representations of 20th June on the subject of clause 6 of the Anglo-Turkish Joint Declaration of 12th May.

2. It was pointed out to him that his *démarche* had come too late to enable anything to be done with a view to securing omission of similar clause from Franco-Turkish Declaration, as text of latter had already been agreed to by the French and Turkish Governments and was on the point of signature at the time.

3. With regard to the chargé d'affaires' general remarks on the elimination of any mention of Balkan security in the definitive agreement to be concluded between His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government, it was explained to him, for his private information, that, so far as His Majesty's Government were concerned, no reason was seen why it should be necessary to reproduce clause 6 in the final treaty. The Turkish Government had been informed of this view and their opinion on the point was being ascertained. If it emerged that the ideas of the Turkish Government coincided with our own, we should then, it was hoped, be able to inform the chargé d'affaires officially that there was no intention to repeat clause 6. The chargé d'affaires was assured that it had long been in our minds that the incorporation of clause 6 in the joint declaration could be considered all that was required to meet the situation. His *démarche* had resulted in a definite decision being taken on the point.

(Repeated to Sofia, No. 32, Saving; Bucharest, No. 44, Saving; Athens, No. 44, Saving; Angora, No. 26, Saving; and Paris, No. 286, Saving (*en clair*) (by bag).)

[E 4685/43/44] No. 120.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 350. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 29, 1939.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 255 of the 29th June, regarding the degree of financial and economic assistance which His Majesty's Government are able to afford to the Turkish Government, I have to inform your Excellency that I gave the Turkish Ambassador this afternoon the gist of the instructions contained in that telegram.

2. I explained, in general terms, that His Majesty's Government were prepared, after due consideration, to give the Turkish Government credits to the extent of £10 million, to be spent in the purchase of military, naval and air material in this country. This decision had been taken notwithstanding His Majesty's Government's own grave financial difficulties, and notwithstanding the assistance which had been given to the Turkish Government in the past.

3. On the strength of the £10 million which His Majesty's Government were prepared to give as credits, orders for £6 million could be placed by the Turkish Government without further delay. That was to say, the Service Departments could, without further discussion, promise to deliver material to a value of about £6 million by June, or at any rate by December 1940, provided that firm orders for this material were placed at an early date. The use of the remaining £4 million would depend upon Turkish strategical needs, as determined by the staff conversations now in progress. It would also be necessary to consult the French Government.

4. The financial details of this arrangement would have to be worked out between the Turkish authorities and the Export Credits Guarantee Department, and I suggested that for this purpose the Turkish Government should send a financial representative to London.

5. I also explained that the supply of this material and the grant of the credits depended upon the conclusion of a satisfactory political agreement, which

I felt sure would soon be reached. In reply to the enquiries of Dr. Aras, I said that His Majesty's Government did not wish to link the credits specifically either to the second stage of the political negotiations, *i.e.*, the interim proposed agreement, or the third stage, *i.e.*, the final long-term alliance. It might prove to be the case that sufficient agreement could be reached at the second stage to make the third stage unnecessary. The point His Majesty's Government wished to make was that the credits were part of a generally satisfactory political settlement.

6. Dr. Aras particularly asked whether the grant of the £10 million took account of the cash loan about which Bay Fethi Okyar, when he came to see me on the 26th June, had given me a special message from the Turkish Prime Minister. I said that it did not do so. As you will have seen from the final paragraph of my telegram under reference, His Majesty's Government are not in fact in a position to give the Turkish Government a loan of this kind.

7. In conclusion, I told Dr. Aras that I realised that the communication which I had just made to him would not meet all the hopes which the Turkish Government might have entertained. But I trusted that the Turkish Government would realise that it was not a question of what His Majesty's Government would wish to do, but of what they were able to do. Their own problems were very grave, and they had gone as far as they could in the direction of satisfying the needs of the Turkish Government.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[R 5153/661/67] No. 121.

Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps (Paris).

[By Bag.]

(No. 280. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Foreign Office, June 29, 1939.*

MY immediately preceding Savingram.

Following is draft reply to Angora:—

Your telegram No. 310 [of 23rd June: Anglo-Turkish negotiations].

1. Please thank Minister for Foreign Affairs for communicating to me an advance copy of Turkish counter-draft for preliminary discussion.

2. I agree to proposed changes in the preamble.

3. I think that the idea proposed as basis of article 2 is satisfactory. The Turkish draft for article 2 is not, however, very well-phrased, and I suggest the following alternative wording, which has the same meaning: "So long as the guarantees given by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to Greece and Roumania respectively in their declaration of 13th April, 1939, remain in force, the Turkish Government undertake to co-operate effectively and to lend to the United Kingdom all aid and assistance in their power in the event of the United Kingdom being engaged in hostilities in virtue of either of the said guarantees." You will observe that we have reinserted the words "to co-operate effectively" so as to correspond with clause 3 of the Anglo-Turkish Declaration of 12th May.

4. Proposed article 1 presents, however, serious difficulties. Since the case of an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean area is already covered by the declaration of 12th May, the use of the term "act of aggression aimed at Turkish territories" can only have the effect of binding us to come to the assistance of Turkey in the event of an act of aggression which did not lead to war in that area, and this would involve acceptance by us of an obligation going far beyond anything hitherto contemplated. We do not imagine that Turkey really requires our assistance to cover her against aggression from Russia, Iraq or Iran; and even if it were feasible, she could hardly expect us to do so, especially as Iraq is our ally.

5. The text now proposed by the Turkish Government would also cover the case of aggression by Bulgaria. So far as Bulgaria is concerned, I had always been under the impression that Turkey regarded herself as perfectly competent, in conjunction with other Balkan *Entente* Powers, to deal with any possible act of aggression by that country alone. Would not one result of article 1 as proposed

in the Turkish counter-draft be that Bulgaria would consider that our undertaking was directed specifically against her. If so, it would probably arouse great resentment at Sofia, and the chances of making sure of a friendly Bulgaria, which both the Turkish Government and His Majesty's Government have so much at heart, would, as a result, be gravely diminished.

6. I imagine that the words in the same article "leading to a war in such a way as to be considered by Turkey as likely to threaten her security" are intended to apply to a case where Turkey is involved in a war as a result of an act of aggression against a member of the Balkan *Entente*. Since the particular cases of aggression against Greece and Roumania are already dealt with, this can only apply to an act of aggression against Yugoslavia. His Majesty's Government feel that this is a matter which ought to be dealt with by consultation if and when the cases arise. The proposed Turkish text would mean the virtual participation by His Majesty's Government in the Balkan Pact, and any suggestion of this would obviously have dangerous repercussions. These would be even more far-reaching than the repercussions of clause 6 in the joint declaration of 12th May, which has already caused so much misapprehension. One result might be to drive Yugoslavia out of the *entente*. For these reasons His Majesty's Government consider that it would be unwise in present circumstances to undertake publicly to come to the assistance of Yugoslavia, if attacked.

7. Please put above considerations to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and express the hope that in the circumstances he will not insist on article 1 as put forward by him. Abandonment of article 1 will, of course, involve omission of the words "without prejudice . . . . of present agreement" from Turkish text of article 2.

8. If the Turkish Government think that the respective obligations of the two Governments do not appear to be evenly balanced in the interim understanding, I am perfectly prepared, in substitution for the Turkish article 1, to reaffirm clauses 3 and 4 of the joint declaration of 12th May. These could be included in the understanding as articles 1 and 2. Article 3 in our draft would then become article 4, which would be preceded by present Turkish article 2.

9. I am in favour of publication of the interim understanding, more especially as it is impossible to say exactly when the definitive agreement will be concluded. Indeed, I think it would be impossible to keep secret the fact that the interim understanding has been concluded, and publication of its text would seem essential to allay possible suspicions of other Governments.

[R 5153/661/67] No. 122.

Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps (Paris).

(No. 291. Saving.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Foreign Office, June 29, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 236, Saving, and Angora telegram No. 310 [of 2nd and 23rd June respectively: Anglo-Turkish negotiations].

1. Please inform French Government of reply from Turkish Government to my proposed draft for the interim understanding.

2. Before replying to this I am anxious to ascertain views of the French Government as to whether it would not be advisable to endeavour to conclude the interim understanding in tripartite form. Now that the Franco-Turkish Joint Declaration has been completed, there should be no practical difficulties in the way of this course, and I think it very desirable that it should be adopted if possible. I am not saying anything to the Turkish Government on this point until I learn the views of the French Government. I should be glad to receive them as soon as possible.

3. The preliminary draft of a reply to Angora telegram No. 310 is contained in my telegram No. 289, Saving. In communicating it to the French Government you should say that I will be grateful for their observations on its substance, adding that, if it should be their desire that the interim understanding should be in tripartite form, it should be easy to make the consequential verbal alterations.

[E 4685/43/44] No. 123.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 255.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 29, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 310 [of 23rd June], paragraph 4: [Financial and economic questions connected with proposed Anglo-Turkish Alliance].

Financial and economic suggestions made by Turkish officials during last few months have been varied and far-reaching, but I presume that questions which mainly interest Turkish Government in connexion with present negotiations are:—

(1) Can His Majesty's Government provide a loan or further credits for improvement in peace-time, either on a long- or short-term programme, of defences of Straits and Bulgarian frontier and re-equipment of Turkish forces?

(2) Can His Majesty's Government help Turkish Government to find alternative sources from which they can obtain supplies and alternative markets in which to sell Turkish goods in event—which is now looming—of Germany showing her displeasure at Turkey's political policy by cutting down her trade with Turkey?

(3) *A fortiori*, can His Majesty's Government assure Turkish Government that they could help them to find alternative sources of supply (for military and non-military goods necessary to keep Turkish forces and population going) and markets (in which they could dispose of Turkish exports to pay for these goods) in a number of different war situations, in which Turkey might be cut off from some or all of her normal suppliers and markets?

(4) Failing alternative markets, what could His Majesty's Government do financially to enable Turkey to acquire supplies in war?

2. His Majesty's Government have given careful and sympathetic consideration to Turkey's financial needs and are, as a result, prepared to grant Turkish Government further credits for defence purposes to extent of £10 million. This money will be available when new Export Guarantee Bill is passed, probably by end of July.

3. You may inform Turkish Government of this decision. Its fulfilment is naturally dependent upon conclusion of satisfactory political agreement, and it is desirable that this should be made clear to Turkish Government at outset, even though they would be likely to take it for granted. It should also be emphasised that this decision has been reached despite the many calls upon His Majesty's Government, which confront them with a most serious financial problem, and despite the fact that financial assistance has already been promised to Turkey on a far greater scale than to any other country.

4. A similar communication is being made to Turkish Ambassador in London.

5. Best method of expending this sum of £10 million will need careful consideration from strategic aspect. As a result of discussions with Turkish officers now in London, His Majesty's Government have formed fairly clear idea of extent to which they can supply Turkish defence requirements within next twelve or, at any rate, eighteen months without too much interference with British rearmament programme. This estimate, which includes twenty 3·7-inch A.A. guns, fifty "Battle" aircraft and naval material for defence of Straits, comes to scarcely more than one-tenth of total Turkish demands. But this makes it all the more desirable that supply of material from this country should be determined not merely by what happens to be available (although this must inevitably be a limiting factor in all circumstances) but also by relative urgency of various Turkish requirements. His Majesty's Government hope to form clearer estimate of this aspect when list of priorities mentioned in your telegram No. B.M. 4 [of 26th June] is received.

6. Meanwhile, however, His Majesty's Government find it necessary to promise General Orbay a certain amount of material without further delay. He is accordingly being given a list of items (including those mentioned in preceding paragraph) which Service Departments can, without further discussion, undertake to supply in fairly near future (*i.e.*, up to December 1940) if orders are

placed at early date. Value of these items is about £6 million and he is also being told that use of remaining £4 million must depend upon a more exact appreciation of Turkish strategical needs, undertaken in conjunction with French Government, who may be in a position to supply certain items more easily than His Majesty's Government. The supply of material is subject to same condition regarding political agreement as applies to its sale on credit.

7. You may inform Turkish Government of communication which is being made to General Orbay.

8. Detailed financial arrangements will have to be made with Export Credits Guarantee Department, and His Majesty's Government suggest that Turkish Government should send a financial representative to London for this purpose.

9. For your own information only. Although His Majesty's Government do not wish slightest hint to be given to Turkish Government at this stage that they might increase credits above £10 million, provision is, in fact, being made in new Bill for £15 million. But additional £5 million will not represent new credits. It will consist of use for armament purposes of £5 million out of £10 million industrial credits given under Guarantee Agreement of 27th May, 1938.

10. This £5 million furnishes a reserve to meet further Turkish demands if these are shown to be well-founded, so long at any rate as £5 million or more of original £10 million remains unused, or used for purposes which Turkish Government are prepared to forgo for sake of securing more armaments. In this connexion it must be remembered that Turkish Government can, under Export Guarantees Act, 1939, already use at least one-third of the £10 million for arms factories, &c. (though not arms), and Turkish Government already know that this is so. Turkish Government have, in fact, made enquiries for such factories of Brasserts during last few days, value of prospective orders being about £3 million to £4 million. Possibility of accepting these orders has not yet been examined, but owing to present inability of His Majesty's Government to export machine tools, acceptance may prove very difficult.

11. As regards points (1), (2) and (3) in paragraph 2, question of finding alternative markets for Turkish goods if German purchases are reduced has been considered, but with best will in world His Majesty's Government do not see how they can help. In view of great difficulty of increasing imports from Turkey into the United Kingdom, even with the Mediterranean open for commercial traffic, His Majesty's Government think that Soviet Union would be country best able to replace, both as market and supplier, those countries with which Turkey could not trade owing to unwillingness on their part or owing to war conditions. Turkish Government will doubtless wish to explore this possibility with Soviet Government direct.

12. Provided, however, that their difficulties are understood from outset, you may inform Turkish Government that His Majesty's Government will be glad to consider any economic suggestions which Turkish Government may put forward. They think that this should be done through diplomatic channel in first instance, and when nature of suggestions and range of subjects which they involve is better known, it will be possible to consider whether oral discussions between experts on either side could usefully be initiated.

13. Question of a cash loan to support Turkish currency has also been fully considered, but conclusion is that it is impossible owing to His Majesty's Government's own grave financial and exchange difficulties. You will probably think it best to avoid this topic unless Turkish Government revive it. For your own confidential information, such a loan, which will need special *ad hoc* legislation, is being considered for Poland. But financial position of Poland is far graver than that of Turkey, and, in view of what has been and is about to be done for Turkey in other directions, I hope Turkish Government will understand that Polish loan, if it is given, can afford no precedent for themselves

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

TURKEY

PART XXXVIII

JULY TO DECEMBER 1939

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Printed for the use of the Foreign Office.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Turkey.

PART XXXVIII.—JULY TO DECEMBER 1939.

[E 4710/1142/44] No. 1.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received July* 1.)

(No. 321.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Angora, June* 30, 1939.

MY telegram No. 311.

Grand National Assembly, after discussion to-day, passed unanimously Franco-Turkish Agreements of 23rd June relating to Hatay.

[E 4838/498/44] No. 2.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received July* 6.)

(No. 354 E.)
My Lord, *Angora, June* 28, 1939.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 100 E. of the 1st March last, regarding Turkish foreign trade during the final quarter of 1938, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a report covering the first quarter of 1939.

2. Tables I and II cover imports and exports by principal countries, whilst Tables III and IV show the value of the principal imports and exports by customs categories. The total foreign trade of Turkey during the quarter under review is some £T. 6 million less than during the corresponding period of 1938, but a debit balance of £T. 1·8 million in the first quarter of 1938 has been decreased to one of £T. 0·4 million during the corresponding period of 1939. The decrease in the total foreign trade, however, merely reflects the feverish buying activity which was a dominant feature of the Turkish market during the final quarter of 1938, and is not a true reflection of normal trade as only small stocks of many Turkish commodities were left over for export during the first quarter of 1939.

3. United Kingdom exports to Turkey show a considerable falling off, £T. 1·6 against £T. 3·1 million, while imports from Turkey have also fallen from £T. 1·2 to £T. 0·8 million.

4. Germany, on the other hand, continued to increase her commercial exchanges with this country, whose imports from Germany were £T. 12·7 million in the first quarter of 1938, but £T. 15·4 million in the first quarter of the current year. Turkish exports to Germany also increased from £T. 12·7 to £T. 16·4 million. (Since the quarter under review, the political situation has had an

influence on the commercial relations between this country and Germany and the statistics for the current quarter may reveal a very different state of affairs.)

5. Italian purchases of Turkish products, on the other hand, show a falling off (£T. 3·6 against £T. 6·5 million), but this may be taken to be largely seasonal and due to the state of the olive crop. Italian exports to Turkey, however, increased from £T. 1·5 to £T. 2·3 million.

6. The figures for Turco-United States trade are not a true reflection of normal trading conditions owing to the early shipment of the tobacco crop in the last months of 1938. The figures of all countries interested in Turkish tobacco were similarly affected by early shipments.

7. With the above reservation Turkish imports and exports remained steady during the quarter and presented no abnormal features. With the approaching completion of the iron and steel works at Karabuk there has been a falling off in iron and steel imports, and the local production of sugar is reflected in lower imports of that commodity. It is to be expected that the local production of woollen and cotton tissues and yarns will be reflected in the figures for the current year on an even greater scale than is revealed by the enclosed figures, as several mills have come into operation recently.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.
H. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

Enclosure in No. 2.

TABLE I.—*Exports by Principal Countries, Value and Percentage of Total.*

	Jan.–Mar. 1939.	*Per-centage.*	*Jan.–Mar. 1938.*	*Per-centage.*
	£T.		*£T.*	
United Kingdom ...	839,123	2·52	1,235,358	3·79
Germany	16,444,003	54·53	12,715,948	38·98
Italy	3,641,987	12·08	6,587,797	20·19
United States ...	1,979,153	6·56	2,310,596	7·08
France	1,009,882	3·66	1,312,596	4·02
Roumania	630,581	2·09	240,980	0·73
Poland	521,390	1·73	196,032	0·60
Canada	413,296	1·38	26,365	0·08
Greece	320,295	1·26	278,162	0·85
Holland	459,915	1·52	706,755	2·17

TABLE II.—*Imports by Principal Countries.*

	Jan.–Mar. 1939.	*Per-centage.*	*Jan.–Mar. 1938.*	*Per-centage.*
	£T.		*£T.*	
United Kingdom ...	1,601,549	5·24	3,127,452	9·25
Germany	15,464,443	50·61	12,711,068	38·02
Italy	2,327,101	7·61	1,558,146	4·65
United States ...	2,152,377	7·05	5,663,374	16·94
U.S.S.R.	1,581,419	5·10	1,980,117	5·86
Sweden	716,738	2·35	599,950	1·77
Roumania	661,234	2·16	83,952	0·25
Poland	633,649	2·07	221,235	0·66
France	512,511	1·68	373,299	1·60
Brazil	416,959	1·37	495,748	1·48

TABLE III.—*Principal Imports by Customs Categories.*

Commodity.	*First quarter 1939.* *£T.*	*First quarter 1938.* *£T.*
Hides	877,216	960,619
Woollen yarns and tissues	1,110,142	1,084,681
Sugar and sweets	870,320	1,588,179
Coffee, cocoa and tea	666,455	737,380
Timber, &c.	707,899	396,715
Paper and cardboard	1,027,867	1,270,561
Cotton yarns	1,203,772	1,730,504
Cotton tissues	3,079,374	3,483,725
Rubber and rubber goods	426,076	403,171
Oilcloths and linos	353,530	360,656
Porcelain	365,889	189,218
Glass and glassware	437,631	454,622
Iron and steel	4,525,038	5,178,879
Copper and copper alloys	1,035,627	509,914
Machines (general)	4,421,737	4,589,384
Transport vehicles	1,296,044	1,944,449
Combustibles	1,378,137	1,517,143

TABLE IV.—*Principal Exports by Customs Categories.*

Commodity.	*First quarter 1939.* *£T.*	*First quarter 1938.* *£T.*
Wool and hair	3,235,710	1,261,949
Cereals	3,792,025	5,146,569
Fruit	6,583,050	6,190,458
Tobacco	6,644,958	9,430,337
Vegetable products	1,583,480	1,045,445
Cotton	1,575,061	3,177,919
Minerals	1,734,936	977,656

[E 4837/1142/44] No. 3.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 6.)

(No. 357.)

My Lord, *Angora, June 29, 1939.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 305 of the 21st June, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship the accompanying copies of the following instruments regarding the settlement of the Hatay question, which were signed at Angora on the 23rd June by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and the French Ambassador in Angora:—

(1) An arrangement for the settlement of territorial questions between Turkey and Syria;
(2) A protocol concerning certain financial questions and the acquisition by the Turkish Government of property hitherto in French ownership;
(3) Two annexes to the protocol;
(4) A *procès-verbal* concerning the property of persons opting for Syrian or Lebanese nationality;
(5) An exchange of letters recognising the validity of the contracts of three archæological expeditions; and
(6) An exchange of letters relating to the transfer abroad of the moneys of persons of foreign nationality.

Copies of the texts of these instruments have been furnished to me by the French Ambassador.

2. So far as the interests of British subjects are concerned, it will be observed that the second exchange of letters between M. Sükrü Saracoğlu and M. Massigli places on record the decision of the Turkish Government to accord on request to foreign persons and companies established in the Hatay the same facilities for the export of foreign currency and of the proceeds in Turkish currency of their property as are secured by article 4 of the main agreement and by the *procès-verbal* to persons opting for Syrian or Lebanese nationality. A further point of interest is that the Turkish Government have agreed by the former exchange of letters to recognise as valid the contract for archæological research in the Hatay granted on the 1st October, 1935, to the British Museum.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris (without enclosures) and to His Majesty's consular officers at Aleppo and Alexandretta (with enclosures).

I have, &c.
H. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

Enclosure in No. 3.

(1)

Arrangement portant Règlement définitif des Questions territoriales entre la Turquie et la Syrie.

PRÉAMBULE.

LE Président de la République française et le Président de la République turque,

Ayant égard aux dispositions énoncées dans l'article 7 de l'Accord du 20 octobre 1921 et dans la lettre complétant les articles 7 et 8 dudit accord,

Convaincus de l'intérêt que présente un règlement territorial qui, consolidant définitivement la frontière entre la Syrie et la Turquie, ait pour effet d'affranchir de toute équivoque, et par là même d'assainir les rapports mutuels des deux pays,

Ont nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Le Président de la République française :

Son Excellence M. René Massigli, Ambassadeur de France en Turquie, Commandeur de la Légion d'Honneur;

Le Président de la République turque :

M. Sükrü Saracoglu, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, Député d'Izmir.

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pouvoirs et les avoir trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des articles suivants :

ARTICLE 1er.

La France en ce qui la concerne consent à ce que la ligne décrite par les protocoles du 30 mai 1926, du 22 juin 1929 et du 3 mai 1930 soit rectifiée :

(*a*) Depuis le point où la Kara-Sou franchit la frontière actuelle jusqu'à la borne portant le No. 230, de manière à coïncider avec la limite dont l'abornement sur le terrain se trouve consigné dans le protocole souscrit à Antioche le 19 mai 1930, étant entendu que le village de Guenid entre les bornes 17 et 20 sera entièrement attribué à la Turquie et que de la borne No. 224 la ligne rejoindra directement la borne No. 230, laissant en territoire turc la route allant de Yeni Chéhir à Antioche;

(*b*) Et de la borne portant le No. 419 suivant une ligne se dirigeant vers le nord-est jusqu'à un point à environ 1,200 mètres sud ouest d'Askorane, de ce point, passant à l'est d'Askorane et de Godja Qairaq, elle se dirigera vers le nord jusqu'à un point situé à environ 1 kilom. nord-est de Godja Qairaq.

De ce point la ligne se dirigera vers l'ouest jusqu'à un point situé environ 1 kilom. au nord du château ruiné pour gagner ensuite au sud-ouest la côte 1010 (ouest du château ruiné); elle empruntera ensuite en direction du sud-ouest le fond du ravin au nord de Bachemete qui aboutit vers le ruisseau de Kara Doarane et suivra enfin ce ruisseau jusqu'à la mer.

Dans les trois secteurs ci-dessus énoncés, la commission qui a achevé ses opérations le 19 mai 1939 sera chargée de déterminer sur le terrain la nouvelle ligne.

Les territoires sis au delà de la ligne ainsi définie seront évacués par les forces françaises au plus tard le 23 juillet 1939, date à laquelle sera également achevée la translation par les autorités françaises des attributions restant entre leurs mains.

ARTICLE 2.

Les citoyens du Sandjak d'Alexandrette établis sur les territoires visés au dernier alinéa de l'article 1 acquerront de plein droit la nationalité turque.

ARTICLE 3.

Les personnes âgées de plus de dix-huit ans acquérant en vertu de l'article 2 la nationalité turque auront la faculté, pendant une période de six mois à dater de la mise en vigueur du présent arrangement, d'opter pour la nationalité syrienne ou libanaise.

Les personnes désirant faire usage de la faculté prévue ci-dessus remettront une déclaration à cet effet à l'autorité administrative dont relève le lieu de leur résidence. Un récépissé leur sera délivré. Les listes d'optants seront communiquées à intervalles aussi rapprochés que possible à l'autorité consulaire française.

ARTICLE 4.

Les personnes ayant exercé le droit d'option conformément aux dispositions de l'article 3, devront, dans les dix-huit mois qui suivront, transporter leur domicile hors de la Turquie.

Elles devront liquider leurs biens immobiliers et elles seront libres d'aliéner ou d'emporter leurs biens meubles de toute nature, ainsi que leur cheptel.

Les montants provenant de la liquidation ci-dessus prévue seront versés à un compte bloqué à la Banque centrale de la République de Turquie à Alexandrette et ils feront, quant au mode de leur transfert, l'objet d'un arrangement spécial entre les Gouvernements français et turc.

Les montants en monnaies autres que la monnaie turque se trouvant en la possession des personnes visées à l'alinéa 1 du présent article pourront être exportés suivant les modalités prévues au procès-verbal annexé au présent arrangement.

ARTICLE 5.

Les femmes mariées suivront la condition de leurs maris et les enfants âgés de moins de dix-huit ans suivront la condition de leurs parents pour tout ce qui concerne l'application des dispositions énoncées aux articles 2, 3 et 4.

ARTICLE 6.

Le Gouvernement français aura le droit de nommer un gardien pour l'entretien et la garde du cimetière militaire d'Alexandrette, sis sur un terrain appartenant à l'Etat français, et qui sera maintenu dans sa consistance actuelle.

ARTICLE 7.

La Turquie reconnaît comme constituant la limite définitive de son territoire la ligne décrite par la Convention du 30 mai 1926, le Protocole du 22 juin 1929 et le Protocole du 3 mai 1930, telle qu'elle se trouve rectifiée en vertu du présent arrangement.

En conséquence, la Turquie condamne toute action qui serait de nature à porter atteinte à l'intégrité territoriale, à mettre en péril ou à compromettre la tranquillité intérieure de la Syrie ou qui tendrait aux mêmes fins, et elle s'engage à interdire, et éventuellement à réprimer sur son territoire, toute action de cette nature.

ARTICLE 8.

Aucune disposition des traités et accords antérieurs ne pourra être interprétée comme étant contraire aux engagements contenus à l'article 7.

ARTICLE 9.

Les hautes parties contractantes prendront, la France en territoire syrien et la Turquie sur son propre territoire, toutes mesures propres à empêcher la préparation ou la perpétration d'actes dirigés contre la sécurité ou le régime respectifs des deux pays voisins.

ARTICLE 10.

En vue de permettre la conclusion d'un nouvel accord, la Convention d'Amitié et de Bon Voisinage en date du 30 mai 1926 et les accords complémentaires sont prorogés jusqu'au 15 mars 1940.

Les dispositions de ces actes seront valables pour l'ensemble de la frontière turco-syrienne telle qu'elle résulte des Protocoles du 30 mai 1926, du 22 juin 1929 et du 3 mai 1930, ainsi que de la rectification prévue par le présent arrangement.

Il est toutefois entendu que les dispositions relatives aux droits de pâcage et de transhumance sont toutes pour supprimées.

ARTICLE 11.

Le présent arrangement sera ratifié et les instruments de ratification seront échangés à Paris le plus tôt que faire se pourra et au plus tard le 22 juillet 1939. Il entrera en vigueur le jour de l'échange des ratifications.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires susnommés ont signé le présent arrangement et y ont apposé leurs cachets.

Fait à Ankara, en double exemplaire, le 23 juin 1939.

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(2)

PROTOCOLE.

AU moment de procéder à la signature de l'arrangement en date de ce jour, les plénipotentiaires soussignés sont également convenus des dispositions ci-après :

ARTICLE 1er.

La Turquie décharge les Gouvernements syrien et libanais de toute obligation se rapportant au service des pensions militaires et civiles des citoyens du sandjak qui acquerront la nationalité turque en vertu de l'article 2 de l'arrangement portant règlement définitif des questions territoriales entre la Turquie et la Syrie et qui n'exerceront pas le droit d'option prévu à l'article 3 dudit arrangement.

Aucune charge n'incombera à la Turquie pour le service des pensions militaires et civiles des personnes ne remplissant pas les conditions visées à l'alinéa précédent.

ARTICLE 2.

(1) Les biens, droits et intérêts au sandjak des personnes morales de nationalité française, ainsi que les biens immobiliers des personnes physiques appartenant à la même nationalité, passeront en toute propriété au Gouvernement turc moyennant une somme globale de 35 millions de francs français.

Sur cette somme :

(a) Trois millions de francs français seront versés, dès la mise en vigueur des actes en date de ce jour, en contre-valeur des biens visés à l'annexe I au présent protocole;

(b) Vingt-cinq millions de francs français seront mis à la disposition du Gouvernement français dans les trente jours qui suivront la mise en vigueur du présent protocole;

(c) Le solde sera versé le 23 août 1939 au compte de clearing

(2) Les personnes morales visées au présent article pourront disposer de leurs avoirs liquides en monnaie étrangère en se conformant aux stipulations du procès-verbal annexé à l'article 4 de l'arrangement en date de ce jour.

Leurs avoirs en monnaie turque seront versés au compte bloqué visé au 3ème alinéa dudit article 4.

(3) Pour le transfert de leurs avoirs en monnaie étrangère et du produit de la liquidation éventuelle de leurs biens meubles, les personnes physiques de nationalité française bénéficieront des dispositions de l'article 4 de l'arrangement et du procès-verbal s'y référant.

ARTICLE 3.

Les mutations foncières prévues au présent protocole ne donneront lieu à la perception d'aucun impôt, ni droit. Elles auront lieu sans frais d'aucune sorte.

ARTICLE 4.

La ligne du Chemin de Fer Payas-Alexandrette sera remise dans un délai de trente jours, à dater de la mise en vigueur du présent protocole, à l'administration des Chemins de Fer d'Etat turc qui en assumera l'exploitation.

Les modalités du transfert seront déterminées entre les deux administrations intéressées.

ARTICLE 5.

Sous réserve des règlements prévus dans le présent protocole et dans l'arrangement en date de ce jour, les hautes parties contractantes déclarent renoncer mutuellement à toute revendication financière ultérieure, fondée sur les ajustements résultant dudit arrangement.

ARTICLE 6.

Le présent protocole sera ratifié. Les instruments de ratification en seront échangés dans les mêmes conditions que ceux de l'arrangement en date de ce jour.

Fait à Ankara, en double exemplaire, le 23 juin 1939.

(3)

ANNEXE 1.

Ad. *Article* 2.

Moyennant le versement entre les mains du Caissier Payeur Central du Trésor public à Paris, dès la mise en vigueur de l'arrangement en date de ce jour, de la somme de 3 millions de francs français, la France cède à la Turquie en toute propriété les dépendances du domaine militaire dans le territoire du Hatay, savoir :

(a) L'immeuble sis à Alexandrette, dénommé Caserne Derigoiu et déjà occupé par les troupes turques;

(b) Le réseau téléphonique de l'Armée française du Levant.

La cession de la caserne comprend le fonds, les clôtures, les bâtiments dans la consistance et l'état où ils se trouvaient au moment où la garnison turque en a pris possession.

Le réseau cédé comprend les lignes tant urbaines qu'interurbaines et tant aériennes que souterraines, les installations et appareils existant tant dans les postes centraux qu'aux domiciles des abonnés. Reste propriété de l'armée française le matériel appartenant aux éléments des forces françaises qui stationnent actuellement dans le territoire. Les modalités de la remise du réseau seront arrêtées d'un commun accord par les représentants des hautes parties contractantes à Antioche. Toutefois les troupes françaises n'auront pas à se dessaisir, antérieurement au 23 juillet 1939, des lignes qui leur sont nécessaires.

Fait à Ankara, en double exemplaire, le 23 juin 1939.

ANNEXE 2.

LES deux immeubles de la Banque de Syrie et du Liban à Alexandrette et à Antioche ont été attribués en toute propriété à l'Etat français et leur contre-valeur (un million de francs français) a été déduite des montants dont il est tenu compte pour calculer la somme globale à verser par le Gouvernement turc au Gouvernement français, ainsi qu'il est stipulé à l'article 2 du protocole.

Fait à Ankara, en double exemplaire, le 23 juin 1939.

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(4)

Procès-verbal.

SE référant à l'article 4 de l'arrangement signé en date de ce jour les hautes parties contractantes sont convenues de ce qui suit :

Les personnes physiques ayant exercé leur droit d'option en conformité des dispositions des articles 3 et 5 de l'arrangement en date de ce jour ainsi que les personnes morales sandjakiennes, établies sur les territoires visés à l'article 1, dernier alinéa, dudit arrangement et désireuses, en liaison avec l'option susvisée, de cesser leur activité dans le sandjak, auront la faculté d'emporter avec elles leurs avoirs en devises étrangères à condition qu'elles aient effectué, dans les quinze jours qui suivront l'avis y relatif qui sera publié dans le sandjak dès la signature du présent arrangement, les dépôts prévus par les dispositions ci-dessous énoncées, le fait d'effectuer ces dépôts ne constituant aucune présomption quant à l'exercice du droit d'option ou à la décision de cesser l'activité

1. Les personnes morales ci-dessus visées, désireuses de transférer à l'étranger leurs avoirs en devises étrangères, sont tenues d'en faire le dépôt à la succursale de la Banque centrale de la République à Alexandrette ou à la Banque agricole à Antioche agissant pour le compte de la Banque centrale.

Le permis d'exportation y afférent leur sera délivré par l'Office du Change sur présentation du certificat de dépôt délivré par la Banque centrale ou par la Banque agricole agissant pour le compte de la Banque centrale et sur la preuve que ces montants ont été acquis antérieurement à la mise en vigueur dans le sandjak de la réglementation sur l'exportation des devises. Il sera, le cas échéant, déduit de ces montants les sommes en devises étrangères qui, à la date du dépôt, seraient dues par ces personnes morales à toute personne ayant acquis et gardé la nationalité turque en vertu des articles 2 et 3 de l'arrangement susmentionné.

Les monnaies étrangères détenues par lesdites personnes morales et acquises après la mise en vigueur de la réglementation susvisée devront être converties en monnaie turque. Elles ne pourront être transférées qu'en conformité des dispositions de l'article 4 de l'alinéa 3 de l'arrangement.

2. Les personnes physiques et morales exerçant le commerce d'exportation devront établir que les sommes déposées ne constituent pas le produit d'une exportation de marchandises faite après la date de la mise en vigueur dans le sandjak de la réglementation sur l'exportation des devises.

Les devises étrangères constituant la contre-valeur des marchandises exportées sous le régime de ladite réglementation ne pouvant faire l'objet du mode de transfert ci-dessus prévu, les engagements assumés par ces exportateurs quant à la rentrée des devises étrangères demeurent valables.

3. Les personnes physiques ne rentrant pas dans la catégorie mentionnée à l'alinéa 2 ci-dessus ne seront pas tenues de prouver la provenance des devises dont elles effectueront le dépôt. Sur présentation des certificats de dépôt, les permis de transfert de devises leur seront immédiatement délivrés.

4. Les pièces de monnaie en or seront pour leur exportation soumises aux mêmes règles que les devises étrangères.

Fait à Ankara, en double exemplaire, le 23 juin 1939.

(5)

Exchange of Letters.

Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to French Ambassador.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Ankara, le 23 juin* 1939.

ME référant à l'arrangement portant règlement définitif des questions territoriales entre la Turquie et la Syrie en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que le Gouvernement de la République reconnaît la validité des contrats ci-après énumérés, passés par le Haut Commissaire de la République française au nom de l'Administration du Sandjak en ce qui concerne les fouilles archéologiques à effectuer dans le territoire visé par l'article 1er de l'arrangement susdit :

1. Contrat avec l'Université de Princeton et les Musées nationaux de la République française (Date du contrat : 8 avril 1937; durée du contrat : six ans à dater du 1er janvier 1937);
2. Contrat avec la Mission du Musée britannique, sous la direction de Sir Leonard Woolley (Date du contrat : 1er octobre 1936; durée du contrat : cinq ans);
3. Contrat avec la Mission de l'Institut oriental de Chicago, sous la direction du Dr. Calvin MacEvan (Date du contrat : 20 septembre 1935; durée du contrat : six ans).

Veuillez, &c.

French Ambassador to Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

M. le Ministre, *Ankara, le 23 juin* 1939.

PAR sa lettre en date de ce jour, votre Excellence a bien voulu porter à ma connaissance que le Gouvernement de la République reconnaissait la validité des contrats ci-après énumérés et relatifs aux fouilles archéologiques à effectuer dans le territoire visé à l'article 1er de l'arrangement en date de ce jour :

1. Contrat avec l'Université de Princeton et les Musées nationaux de la République française (Date du contrat : 8 avril 1937; durée du contrat : six ans à dater du 1er janvier 1937);
2. Contrat avec la Mission du Musée britannique, sous la direction de Sir Leonard Woolley (Date du contrat : 1er octobre 1936; durée du contrat : cinq ans);
3. Contrat avec la Mission de l'Institut oriental de Chicago, sous la direction du Dr. Calvin MacEvan (Date du contrat : 20 septembre 1935; durée du contrat : six ans).

J'ai l'honneur de vous remercier de cette communication dont j'ai pris acte.

Veuillez, &c.

(6)

Exchange of Letters.

Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to French Ambassador.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Ankara, le 23 juin* 1939.

EN me référant à l'arrangement portant règlement définitif des questions territoriales entre la Turquie et la Syrie, à la date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance ce qui suit :

Sans préjudice des dispositions spéciales des accords en date de ce jour, le Gouvernement turc est décidé, si la demande lui en est faite par les intéressés, à faire bénéficier des dispositions de l'article 4 de l'arrangement et du procès-verbal s'y référant, les personnes physiques et morales de nationalité étrangère, établies à la date de l'arrangement dans les territoires visés à l'article 1er dudit arrangement et désirant transférer hors du territoire leurs avoirs en monnaies étrangères et le produit de la liquidation éventuelle de leurs biens de toute nature.

Veuillez, &c.

French Ambassador to Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

M. le Ministre, *Ankara, le 23 juin* 1939.

PAR sa lettre du 23 juin, votre Excellence a bien voulu, en se référant à l'arrangement en date de ce jour portant règlement définitif des questions territoriales entre la Turquie et la Syrie, porter à ma connaissance ce qui suit :

" Sans préjudice des dispositions spéciales des accords en date de ce jour, le Gouvernement turc est décidé, si la demande lui en est faite par les intéressés, à faire bénéficier des dispositions de l'article 4 de l'arrangement et du procès-verbal s'y référant, les personnes physiques et morales de nationalité étrangère, établies à la date de l'arrangement dans les territoires visés à l'article 1er dudit arrangement et désirant transférer hors du territoire leurs avoirs en monnaies étrangères et le produit de la liquidation éventuelle de leurs biens de toute nature."

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de cette communication dont j'ai pris acte.

Veuillez, &c.

Déclaration.

LE Gouvernement de la République déclare qu'il n'entre aucunement dans les intentions de la France de renoncer en faveur d'un tiers à la mission qu'elle assume en Syrie et au Liban.

Paris, le 23 juin 1939. GEORGES BONNET

Pour copie certifiée conforme,

Le Ministre plénipotentiaire,
Chef du Service du Protocole :
M. Luzi.

M. Guariglia, Ambassadeur d'Italie à Paris, à Son Excellence M. Georges Bonnet, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Paris, le 10 juillet 1939.

D'ORDRE de mon Gouvernement, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence ce qui suit :

Le Gouvernement royal a eu connaissance par la presse de l'accord intervenu le 23 juin 1939 entre le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement turc relatif à la cession du Sandjak d'Alexandrette.

L'Italie, en sa qualité de Puissance mandante (voir décision du 25 avril 1920 du Conseil suprême des principales Puissances alliées et associées, réunies à San Remo), a l'honneur de faire toutes les réserves les plus amples et les plus formelles sur le contenu dudit accord négocié et conclu à son insu et sans son consentement et qui semble en contraste évident avec les buts du mandat et avec la volonté des populations intéressées.

Puisque la presse a publié aussi certaines déclarations écrites et verbales, faites en cette occasion par le Gouvernement français et par votre Excellence, le Gouvernement italien exprime les mêmes réserves à l'égard de ces déclarations.

GUARIGLIA

M. Georges Bonnet, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, à Son Excellence M. Guariglia, Ambassadeur d'Italie à Paris.

Paris, le 22 juillet 1939.

A LA date du 10 de ce mois et sous le no. 4003, votre Excellence a bien voulu me saisir des vues de son Gouvernement au sujet de l'Arrangement franco-turc du 23 juin dernier.

J'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence que l'acte en question doit être considéré comme la conséquence inéluctable d'engagements qui remontent au 20 octobre 1921 et auxquels l'Italie, en tant que besoin, a elle-même souscrit. Les

accords conclus à cette date ont reconnu à la Turquie des intérêts spéciaux dans la région d'Alexandrette et d'Antioche. Par le Traité de Lausanne, le Gouvernement royal, en effet, a acquiescé, non seulement à l'hypothèque ainsi conférée à cette Puissance sur le sandjak, mais encore à la rétrocession concomitante à la Turquie d'une portion beaucoup plus étendue du pays que, par la résolution du 25 avril 1920, les principales Puissances alliées ont confié à la tutelle de la France. C'est l'attestation même qu'un remaniement territorial, pour peu qu'il soit déterminé par la préoccupation exclusive des intérêts du pupille, n'est pas incompatible avec les obligations énoncées par le mandat.

Aussi bien est-ce le seul souci qui pouvait animer la France lorsqu'elle a signé l'arrangement auquel votre Excellence a fait allusion. Invoquant les droits qu'elle tenait des textes de 1921, la Turquie s'est estimée fondée à requérir d'abord la prépondérance dans le sandjak, puis l'incorporation de cette province à son propre territoire. La dernière phase de la négociation qui s'est engagée à Genève sur ce point s'est ouverte au mois de septembre 1936. Il ne pouvait échapper, dès lors, à aucun observateur non prévenu que l'issue de la controverse dût, à plus ou moins brève échéance, être la rétrocession de la région en cause et que cette mesure était la condition *sine qua non* de l'assainissement des relations turco-syriennes.

L'accord du 23 juin dernier a donc eu pour objet le règlement définitif des questions territoriales entre les deux pays et, par voie de conséquence, la reconnaissance du caractère désormais immuable de la frontière, ainsi que l'affirmation solennelle du désintéressement total, y compris dans le domaine politique, de la Turquie en Syrie.

Puissance mandataire, la France était seule à avoir qualité pour mesurer la portée des compensations que les parties s'accordaient réciproquement. C'est consciente de ses devoirs tutélaires qu'elle a estimé que le sacrifice imposé à la Syrie n'excédait pas, en valeur, l'avantage conventionnel à échoir à celle-ci.

Si, en l'occurrence, la France n'a obéi qu'au souci des intérêts permanents de la nation syrienne, elle ne s'en est pas moins préoccupée de veiller à ce que fussent sauvegardés les droits des tiers. Telle est la raison pour laquelle elle n'a consenti à la rétrocession que pour autant que, *pro parte qua*, elle était fondée à le faire. La teneur de l'article premier de l'arrangement exclut, à cet égard, toute équivoque.

Au demeurant, la Puissance mandataire se propose-t-elle de saisir le Conseil de la Société des Nations de l'ensemble des textes qui viennent d'être signés. Votre Excellence trouvera ci-joint une ampliation certifiée conforme de ces actes, ainsi, du reste, que de la déclaration par laquelle la France proclame son intention de ne point se dessaisir, au profit d'un tiers, de la mission qu'elle a assumée au Levant.

GEORGES BONNET.

[E 4971/1142/44] No. 4.

Consul Davis to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 12.)

(No. 50.)

My Lord, *Aleppo*, July 4, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that here in Aleppo the announcement that by the terms of the Franco-Turkish Agreement signed at Angora on the 23rd June last the Sanjak of Alexandretta is to be ceded outright by France to Turkey on the 23rd July has been received with a dejected apathy which can only be ascribed to fatalism. The loss of the sanjak had in effect so long been regarded as inevitable that its translation from the realm of probability into that of actual fact has caused but a faint reaction even among the big Aleppo commercial interest which is most directly hit by the loss.

2. The general tone of comment in the local Arabic press was that this somewhat cynical sacrifice of the sanjak, involving the handing over to Turkish rule of the non-Turkish majority of its inhabitants, was in effect forced on France by the inescapable facts of the international situation, and that the Syrian Nationalists were at least as blameworthy as the French for the state of affairs

which had necessitated this unpalatable amputation of one of Syria's fairest provinces. It was suggested that if the Syrian Nationalists had from 1936 onwards loyally co-operated with the mandatory Power in general and in particular had stood shoulder to shoulder with France in the negotiations concerning the sanjak, if they had accepted the Geneva Agreement and done their best to ensure its subsequent execution, the worst might possibly have been avoided and the attachment, at least in name, of the sanjak to Syria might have been perpetuated.

3. Apart from these recriminations, there was a general feeling of relief that the question had finally been settled and that with the definite cession of the sanjak to Turkey there was an end to those illusory hopes regarding trade facilities, customs and currency union, and freedom of traffic and travel which Aleppo had fondly continued to cherish on the basis of the Geneva Agreement. All prospects of trade with or through Alexandretta have now been written off by the commercial community at Aleppo which is settling down to develop alternative traffic routes through Tripoli and Lattakia. Already the supplies of fresh fish, vegetables and fruit which used to come to Aleppo from Antioch and Alexandretta have been completely cut off, and alternative sources of supply have been discovered or developed, especially in the Lattakia district. Aleppo import and export firms have ceased dealing with Alexandretta and have opened relations with Beirut, Tripoli and Lattakia instead. There is no longer any transit trade at Alexandretta, and the local traffic is so inconsiderable that shipping companies do not find it worth while to send their vessels there. Alexandretta shipping agents are already talking about closing down.

4. Before the terms of the Franco-Turkish Agreement were announced many rumours had been current here to the effect that all or part of the provinces of Aleppo and the Jezireh would also be handed over to Turkey by France. Though these rumours have now proved incorrect, few qualified persons here regard the Sanjak of Alexandretta as the ultimate limit of Turkish territorial ambitions in North Syria. There is strong support for the school of thought which believes that in the next international crisis Turkey will again be found demanding, and France conceding, further portions of Syrian territory, while in the event of a European war the French army would relinquish to the Turkish army the task of defending northern Syria. It is generally felt that the history of Turkey's ever-increasing demands in the sanjak dispute furnish the most reliable guide to the manner in which her new undertaking not to do anything to compromise the territorial integrity or internal order of Syria is likely to be executed. Without sharing these doubts as to Turkey's ultimate intentions one can at least appreciate the disquietude to which they give rise among a population whose memory of Turkish domination is still very green and whose confidence in France's ability to maintain her position in Syria has suffered more than one rude shock.

5. A copy of this despatch has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and Angora and His Majesty's Consular Officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &c.
A. W. DAVIS.

[E 5064/1142/44] No. 5.

M. Crolla to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 12.)

(Translation.)
Italian Embassy,
My Lord, *London, July 12, 1939.*

IN accordance with instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your Excellency's knowledge the text, transcribed below, of a note which the Italian Ambassador at Paris addressed on the 10th July to the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in regard to the cession of the Sanjak of Alexandretta to Turkey :—

"In accordance with instructions from my Government, I have the honour to make the following declarations to your Excellency.

"The Italian Government have learned from the press of the agreement concluded on the 23rd June last between the French and Turkish Governments regarding the cession of the Sanjak of Alexandretta to Turkey.

"Italy, in her capacity of mandating Power (*cf.*, decision dated the 25th April, 1920, of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers which met at San Remo), has the honour to make every reservation of the most comprehensive character regarding the contents of the said agreement, which was negotiated and concluded without her knowledge and consent, and which appears to be in clear contradiction to the purposes of the mandate and to the will of the populations concerned.

"Inasmuch as the press has also reported certain declarations, written and oral, made on that occasion by the French Government and by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, the Italian Government formulate similar reservations with regard to such declarations."

I have, &c.
G. CROLLA.

[R 5569/664/67] No. 6.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Istanbul).

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 12, 1939.*

YOUR Telegram No. 334 [of 10th July: Anglo Turkish negotiations].

On the question of the next stage in the negotiations you may inform the Turkish Government that I am disposed to think there are advantages in proceeding on a tripartite basis, and that I have every reason to believe that such a procedure will be agreeable to the French Government.

[E 5006/111/44] No. 7.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 379. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Angora, July 5, 1939.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's circular despatch of the 9th June, 1938, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith my report on the heads of foreign missions in Turkey in 1938–39.

I have, &c.
H. M. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

Enclosure in No. 7.

Report on the Heads of Foreign Missions in Turkey.

(Passages marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports.)

Afghanistan.

Sirdar Faiz Mohammed Khan: presented letters the 6th February, 1939, married.

I met Faiz Mohammed in Kabul in 1935 when he was Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was good enough to give a dinner in honour of my wife and myself. I find him as friendly and well disposed as on that occasion. As representative of one of the Saadabad Powers he has to some extent a special position here, though he seems to play no very active part. His entertainments suffer more than most from the language difficulty among his guests. His wife appears to be completely inarticulate in all languages, though otherwise pleasant. He is a good sort, fond of shooting, and talks good English.

Belgium.

M. Georges de Raymond left in October 1938, since when M. Hadelin Rothé, counsellor of legation, has acted as chargé d'affaires. He wears a depressed look and is generally colourless, in contrast to his Chilean wife, who is both cheerful and colourful. The Belgian Legation is one of the best arranged houses of moderate size in Angora.

Brazil.

Dr. A. F. Lopes de Almeida, mentioned in last year's report, remains on the Diplomatic List, but has not been seen in Angora this year and is thought to have left for some other post.

Bulgaria.

*M. Théodore Christoff, fully accredited Minister, presented his letters on the 12th June, 1936.

M. Christoff is a serious-minded man, who makes a favourable impression; but he is of a retiring nature and has a rather nervous manner. I doubt his having a strong character, but I think he is an honest-minded man, an able representative, and not an intriguer. He professes strong Anglophil sympathies, and I think they are genuine. (Written in 1937.)

I am sure M. Christoff is good-intentioned, though I should not like to guess how far that quality has led him along the proverbial pavement. He makes a good impression and talks well. But he is animated by a passion for the redress of his country's grievances, which urges him beyond the bounds of discretion, and at times his conversation betrays a complete lack of political common sense. He is certainly retiring and looks ill.

China.

Mr. Dekien Toung: presented letters (Lettres de Cabinet) on the 13th April, 1938.

Most friendly; talks barely intelligible French. He was chargé d'affaires in Vienna up to the *Anschluss*.

Denmark.

M. Sven Peter Duurloo: presented letters the 10th March, 1939.

I knew him first as chargé d'affaires in Kovno some years ago. Looks young and had in those days an overwhelming wife, who, so far, has not appeared in Angora, though he tells me she will join him later. Heavy in appearance and wears large glasses. The level of the Ankara Palace Hotel, where he stays, seems not to affect him, but he suffers from mild forms of mountain-sickness when he climbs to the altitude of this embassy. He seems to have little interest in Turkish affairs. Somewhat to his surprise, however, he has found that there are Danish interests to be protected in the Hatay.

Egypt.

Mohammed-el-Mofty-el-Gazaerli Bey, whose name appears in last year's report, is on the point of leaving Angora. He is to be succeeded by Abdul Rahman Azzam, at present Minister in Bagdad, who was here a short time ago with the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs. He has not yet presented his letters. I met him during the entertainments for Yehia Pasha and found him pleasant and very friendly. Talks excellent English.

France.

M. René Massigli: presented letters the 13th January, 1939; married.

M. Massigli is already so well known to the Foreign Office that it would be superfluous to describe him at length. We are old friends and maintain close contact on all points. His extreme vivacity and quickness of mind constitute, I think, rather a difficulty for him with the Turks, who are slow in thought and expression. It is greatly to his credit that he has come through the recent acrimonious Hatay negotiations without impairing his own personal relations with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and other Turkish officials. He is married to a pleasant and vivacious Swiss lady and they entertain on a large scale in their vast new white marble embassy.

Germany.

Herr Franz von Papen: presented his letters on the 29th April, 1939.

His previous history as German military attaché in Washington is well enough known. After his removal from Washington he was Chief of the General Staff of the Fourth Turkish army under General Liman von Sanders. His next public appearance on any large scale was as German Chancellor, shortly before the advent of Herr Hitler. He subsequently held the post of Vice-Chancellor under Herr Hitler; narrowly escaped death at the time of the purge on the 30th June, 1934, and emerged as German representative in Vienna with the personal rank of ambassador.

It would have been difficult for the German Government to hit upon a more unpopular nominee for their embassy in Turkey. Herr von Papen's conduct during his previous service in Turkey has never been forgotten and he is heartily distrusted and disliked. It can safely be conjectured that his reception here was something of a shock to him. It also seems incredible that the German Government should not have guessed that Anglo-Turkish negotiations were in an advanced stage. The declaration was made a fortnight after the arrival of their new ambassador and he and his embassy seem to have been largely taken by surprise. Herr von Papen is known to have remarked on more than one occasion that he had come too late.

Herr von Papen is extremely pleasant to meet and almost exaggeratedly friendly in manner. I should not be inclined to describe him as a heavyweight: there is a suggestion of dilettantism and superficiality about him, accompanied, however, by a certain artfulness which may constitute his chief claim to efficiency. He is always ready to discuss present international problems and puts his country's case with remarkable glibness and more dispassionately than some.

I cannot believe that he finds work very harmonious with his counsellor, Dr. Kroll, who is clearly a violent party-man.

Greece.

*Early in the year M. Raphael Raphael was appointed Greek Minister in Angora. He presented his letters of credence on the 25th January.

Before his appointment to Turkey M. Raphael was a senior member of the staff of the Greek Legation at Berne, and has been much concerned with League of Nations work.

I have not yet seen a great deal of M. Raphael, but he appears to be an intelligent and competent official, of good experience and temperate judgment.

He appears to be well liked by all those who have come into contact with him.

M. Raphael is married to a Greek lady of an Alexandrian family. (Written in 1936.)

M. Raphael is one of the best informed of the foreign representatives here, being naturally in close touch with the Turkish Government and the other Balkan representatives. I consider him to be one of the most intelligent of the heads of foreign missions here.

It is generally said that when (if ever) the Greek Legation becomes an embassy M. Raphael will stay on.

Hungary.

*M. Zoltan de Máriássy, fully accredited Minister, presented his letters on the 10th June, 1935.

M. de Máriássy is a bachelor and has already become popular in the society of Angora; I think deservedly so. He is, in my opinion, a diplomatic agent of ability and good sense, and his agreeable demeanour and the pleasing and cheerful atmosphere which surrounds him are certainly a great asset to him in the conduct of his official and social duties. He entertains a very friendly feeling indeed for England, which strikes me as being quite sincere. (Written in 1936.)

M. Máriássy's hospitality and social success continue and so, I think, does his friendly feeling for England. But circumstances seem to have drawn him recently into closer association with the German and Italian Embassies. I am inclined to doubt his sincerity.

His English is picturesque and attractive. He is a keen gardener. I heard him describe how he had "administered some nefilements to his roses six weeks before they flourished."

Is also accredited to Iraq and Iran.

Iran.

*Mr. Khalil Fahimi presented his letters on the 14th May, 1936.

During my residence in Iran as His Majesty's Minister I was well acquainted with this Iranian representative, who was then known as Fahim-el-Mulk, and had at various times held Cabinet office. Immediately before his designation as Iranian Ambassador to Turkey he had been for some years Governor-General of Azerbaijan.

Mr. Fahimi is a cultured and gentle person, but of no decided views of his own. His manners and address are agreeable, and I feel sure that he will be generally liked in Angora. I fancy that he stands in wholesome awe of his Imperial master and expect that he will prove a satisfactory representative of his country in Turkey, except in the unlikely event of a diplomatic tussle between the two countries, which all his personal inclinations would incline him to avoid. (Written in 1936.)

*During the past year Mr. Fahimi has displayed a certain interest in the promotion of British economic enterprises in Iran. (Written in 1937.)

I first met Mr. Fahimi in Tabriz, when he was Governor-General of Azerbaijan, where he received me in the friendliest fashion. We continue our friendly relations. Both he and Mme. Fahimi are popular and have social gifts.

Iraq.

M. Nadji Shevket left Angora on the 6th January, having been appointed Minister of the Interior in Iraq.

The legation is in charge of M. Gaylani, formerly Iraqi Consul-General in Jerusalem. M. Gaylani has acted as chargé d'affaires *ad interim* in previous years when consul-general in Istanbul, before he was transferred to Jerusalem. He expects to be promoted minister very soon and hopes to be sent to Cairo.

Italy.

Signor Ottavio de Peppo presented letters the 29th August, 1938.

It is difficult to describe Signor de Peppo beyond saying that he does not impress me as possessed of great capacities. My French colleague treats him as a joke and he may be right. Before coming to Angora he was "chef de cabinet" to Count Ciano. It is said that he had to choose between remaining in the service and marrying the non-Italian lady of his choice. In spite of his previous appointment I doubt whether there is much either of energy or of cunning behind the Roman lines of his countenance. Boredom is his most salient characteristic, though he livens up somewhat in the company of ladies. His imposing new embassy building is rising rapidly from the ground, keeping neck-and-neck, as it were, with our own.

No wife has been seen here, as far as I am aware.

Japan.

Mr. Toshiko Taketomi presented his letters as Japanese Ambassador on the 15th March, 1937.

I have had no occasion to see Mr. Taketomi since Japan attacked China. Before that I found him friendly and amiable enough, and outwardly Anglophil in his personal sentiments. But, like so many of his compatriots, he is rather inscrutable, and I fancy that his apparent joviality and good-fellowship are not much more than a convenient mask for his true feelings, whatever they may be.

In the circumstances, I can form no useful opinion of his professional ability, but I should doubt his outlook being either broad or statesmanlike. (Written in 1937.)

Whenever I have seen Mr. Taketomi I have found him agreeable and friendly. His wife is a lady of considerable dignity and distinction.

He was firmly put in his place by the Turkish Government a year ago over a rally of Japanese diplomats in Istanbul, said to have been convoked with the object of co-ordinating and intensifying anti-Soviet activities in the Balkans and Near East.

Netherlands.

Dr. Philip Visser presented his letters the 9th June, 1938; married.

Dr. Visser's main interest in life is travelling and mountaineering. He knows India fairly well and has been in Kashmir. These expeditions survive in the form of a Tibetan servant, who functions in his somewhat circumscribed legation.

Both Dr. and Mme. Visser are extremely pleasant and talk perfect English. Beyond certain commercial interests which have been giving him trouble I do not think he can have much to do here. He is a great talker and a vigorous dancer. He is well-informed generally and follows world events closely.

Norway.

*M. Sigurd Bentzon, fully accredited minister, presented his credentials on the 8th October, 1930, and was the first Norwegian Minister to be accredited to Turkey. He speaks perfect English, and has an agreeable and well-bred English wife.

In spite of a great show of friendliness, I have reached the definite conclusion that M. Bentzon's politico-spiritual home is in Berlin, that he is a convinced pro-German, and that his apparent anglophilism is fraudulent.

My personal relations with M. Bentzon are perfectly good and cordial, but I do not trust him. (Written in 1937.)

I have known M. and Mme. Bentzon for a considerable time, having been *en poste* with them in The Hague and in Paris. In the short time in which I have been able to associate with them in Angora I have seen few traces of M. Bentzon's pro-German proclivities, though there is certainly a penchant in that direction. His wife is, I should say, far from sharing it.

They went on leave not long after our arrival, full of the hope that their long period of service in Angora would be terminated. It is stated that he has been appointed to The Hague, so the hope seems to have been gratified.

Poland.

*Count George Potocki having been appointed Polish Ambassador in Washington, his successor, M. Michel Sokolnicki, presented his credentials as Polish Ambassador to Turkey on the 12th June, 1936. M. Sokolnicki's personal tastes, being intellectual, literary and artistic, are in strong contrast to those of his predecessor. I have not yet been able to see a great deal of M. Sokolnicki, but I should judge him to be a man of distinct ability, though maybe not of abundant energy. His demeanour towards myself and the feelings that he expresses for the United Kingdom are friendly, and, I think, genuinely so. Both he and his wife have been rather seriously ill since their arrival in this country. Mme. Sokolnicka is an agreeable lady of good education and manners. She is a keen and competent bridge player and will be a welcome addition to Angora society.

The Polish Embassy is in Angora. It is a large, well-situated house, built almost entirely of materials sent from Poland. There is no house in Constantinople, but the Ambassador has a summer villa at his disposal on the Bosphorus. (Written in 1936.)

I regard M. Sokolnicki as one of the soundest and most reliable of my colleagues. He has excellent judgment and is calm and deliberate. His wife is also clever. They are admirable colleagues, and entertain with great taste and success. They live in what is easily the best embassy house in Angora.

Roumania.

M. Basile Stoica: presented letters as first Roumanian Ambassador on the 15th March, 1939: married.

M. Stoica is a man of considerable learning, a collector of books, and a student of history and archæology. He has a somewhat uncouth manner, which makes him unattractive, and in spite of his culture he is uncultivated. He has not contributed to the solution of Balkan problems by standing up on all occasions for the most extreme nationalistic and intransigent point of view on the Roumanian side.

His wife has not enhanced his position here by complaining to all and sundry, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs downwards, of his neglect of her and by appealing, even, I am told, to the Iranian Ambassador, for mediation to set matters right. It is not certain that there is anything to set right. I have met more attractive and more united couples.

Soviet Union.

M. Alexei Terentiev: presented letters on the 21st April, 1938: married.

M. Terentiev was formerly consul-general at Smyrna. He was absent for some time as representative of the Soviets at the marriage celebrations in Tehran.

and I have not seen much of him. He is always friendly and entertains on the lavish scale so familiar in Soviet missions. His wife, a large lady almost his equal in shape and size, is also pleasant, but one can say little more.

Sweden.

Baron Eric Gyllenstierna: presented letters the 5th May, 1938.

Tall, gloomy and dyspeptic. Possessed of great wealth and large properties in South Sweden. He is said to have had four wives and to be about to contract a fifth alliance, if that word is not too suggestive of permanence in his case. He is a descendant of Hamlet's friend and seems to have acquired vicariously the temperament of that melancholy Prince. He is of immense height and is to be seen towering over his fellow guests at an evening party like a monument erected to commemorate some frightful catastrophe.

Switzerland.

M. Etienne Lardy: presented letters the 9th June, 1938: married.

I knew him in China, where he was consul-general in Shanghai. He is pompous and fond of his own opinions. His wife is a pleasant and kindly lady and they have a nearly grown-up daughter, who appears on all social occasions.

United States of America.

*Following on the retirement of Mr. Robert P. Skinner, the post of United States Ambassador has been filled by Mr. John van Antwerp MacMurray. He presented his credentials on the 19th March, 1936. Mr. MacMurray came from the post of United States Minister to the Baltic States, and he had previously been Minister in Peking, where, I believe, his relations with his British colleague were all that could be desired. United States interests in this country are not very considerable, and the post of American Ambassador must necessarily be one rather of observation than of great diplomatic activity, the principal interests being economic rather than political. My impression is that Mr. MacMurray, formed by a longish experience in diplomatic duties, will discharge his functions with dignity and efficiency. His attitude towards me myself has been most friendly from the outset; I have had no difficulty in quickly establishing with him friendly and cordial personal relations, and I gauge him to be a man straightforward in his methods of thought and honourable in his dealings. I judge him also to be a sincere friend of England and a sincere admirer of the moral weight that England carries in the counsels of the nations. Mr. MacMurray is accompanied by a wife and daughter. (Written in 1936.)

*Mr. MacMurray has been absent from Angora since the spring of 1937, having been recently employed on a mission in the Philippines. It seems doubtful whether he will return to Turkey. I shall regret it if he does not. (Written in 1937.)

I knew Mr. MacMurray when he was minister in Riga and met him again two years ago in the Philippines. Since my arrival in Angora we have been in very close and constant touch, and I have kept him very fully informed of what has been passing. He has been most helpful on many occasions in giving me his views and information acquired from his angle.

The United States Government have bought a large piece of ground and are about to build a new embassy.

Yugoslavia.

M. Adzemovitch left Angora in May on appointment as Yugoslav Minister to Cairo.

His successor, M. Ilija Shumenkovitch, has recently arrived in Turkey, but has not yet presented his letters of credence; nor have I met him.

Representatives not Resident in Angora.

Estonia.

M. Hans Markus presented letters on the 6th June.

He is also accredited to Poland and Roumania, being resident at Warsaw.

He is large, friendly and pleasant. Formerly counsellor in London.

Finland.

*M. Onni Talas, fully accredited Minister, presented his letters of credence on the 17th October, 1934. He is also accredited to Budapest, Belgrade and Sofia, and has so far made only one short appearance in Angora.

From the little I have seen of him, I have found him elderly, agreeable and friendly. (Written in 1934.)

Visited Angora for Atatürk's funeral and signed a number of letters modifying the Turco-Finnish Clearing Agreement, but otherwise left no mark.

I have never seen him.

Lithuania.

*M. Jurgis Baltrusaitis, fully accredited Minister, presented his credentials on the 20th May, 1932. He left almost immediately, and has not since reappeared in Turkey, where he has no Legation and practically no interests. He is also Lithuanian Minister in Moscow. (Written in 1932.)

*M. Baltrusaitis came to Turkey from Moscow in 1933 for the celebrations in connexion with the tenth anniversary of the republic. He travelled here with the delegation representing the U.S.S.R. at the celebrations and returned with it. He did not remain long enough at Angora to become generally known, but was communicative and friendly to His Majesty's Embassy. (Written in 1933.)

I have known M. Baltrusaitis on and off for a long time, but we have not so far met under the Turkish sky.

[E 4877/43/44] No. 8.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen (Istanbul).

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 13, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 319 [of 30th June: Turkish military and other requirements].

The following are particulars of material which can be supplied immediately:—

(a) *Admiralty.*—500 mines, 200 21-inch torpedoes and 350 depth charges—these will be ready for shipment early in August; 350 further depth charges can be shipped later in the year.

(b) *War Office.*—20 3·7-inch anti-aircraft guns. Four of these with equipment can be despatched to reach Turkey about 1st September, and similar batches at monthly intervals thereafter.

(c) *Air Ministry.*—50 Battle bombers and 14 or possibly 15 Hurricane fighters, with bombs and ammunition. These can be shipped during August.

2. These particulars have been made known in greater detail to General Orbay's mission.

3. As regards (*b*), it is essential that Turkish army should be in a position to use guns immediately on arrival. An offer has therefore been made to train the necessary Turkish officer instructors at a special course beginning middle of August. These officers would be back at about the same time as the first guns arrive.

4. As regards (*c*), a further 50 Battles, 30 equipments to convert Blenheims already in possession of Turkish air force into fighters, 50 training machines, training facilities for Turkish personnel in this country, and photographic, &c., apparatus have also been offered to General Orbay. It is doubtful whether Turkish air force could, with its present resources in pilots, &c., make use of any greater number of machines (or faster or more modern machines) than those now offered.

5. These shipments are dependent on conclusion of necessary financial arrangements between Export Credits Guarantee Department and Turkish representative.

[E 5056/43/44] No. 9.

Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received July* 14.)

(No. 12.)
(Telegraphic.) *Istanbul, July* 14, 1939.

MY telegram No. 325.

I have now received Turkish reply and am sending text by safe hand due in London 18th July. Identical communication has been made to French Embassy, who have telegraphed to Paris.

2. Following is summary :—

3. Communication points out that it was agreed from the beginning of negotiations that Turkish co-operation in the peace front would only be possible with substantial support, both [*sic*] military, financial and economic. In this connexion Minister for Foreign Affairs refers to previous correspondence, in which Turkish standpoint was made clear, namely, my telegram No. 133, paragraph 4 (text of Turkish communication in my despatch No. 201, paragraph 4); my telegram No. 163, paragraph 1, point 5 (text in my despatch No. 219, point 5); and also to the reply in your telegram No. 144, paragraph 6.

4. Communication goes on to state that proposals contained in your telegram No. 255 only deal with one aspect of the question.

5. Minister for Foreign Affairs prefers to approach the matter by presenting a constructive plan on the following lines:

Point 1.—Credit for war material. Turkish military requirements, as fixed by Turkish General Staff before conclusion of Anglo-Turkish Agreement, requires a credit of £35 million. This would cover expenses of construction, reorganisation and expansion of armament industry. Some of this sum would be required for purchases in America, Belgium and Sweden. As regards provision of materials necessitated by joint plans of general staffs, such provisions, as well as expense of special fortifications, should involve no present or future charge on Turkish budget.

Point 2.—A bullion loan of £15 million at as early a date as possible. This gold reserve to be employed as cover for national currency and to place finance and economy on a healthy basis.

Point 3.—A credit of £10 million to cover expenses necessitated by early realisation of needs indicated in point 1 and to de-block all frozen balances due to free currency countries.

Point 4.—The above £35 million and £10 million (points 1 and 3) would be long-term loans on the same conditions as those for British Government loans.

Point 5.—Turkish Government should have the option of meeting the service of the loan of £15 million (point 2) by deliveries of tobacco.

Point 6.—As the credits and loans mentioned in points 2 and 3 would be provided to place financial situation on a healthy basis, to adjust prices, to pay off blocked balances, and thus to normalise commercial exchanges between Turkey and free currency countries, Turkish Government could easily meet the annual service on sums mentioned in points 1 and 3 just as they are at present able to ensure equal or even larger payments to Germany for requirements of the same kind. These payments are charged on ordinary budget and are largely covered by surplus of Turkish exports to Germany.

Point 7.—Turkish Government express hope that above-mentioned proposals will result in diverting Turkish trade from German markets and gradually directing it to free currency countries. Turkish Government rely on the Allies to help them to adopt counter measures in the event of above proposals proving inadequate or in the event of German and Italian economic pressure.

Point 8.—The above proposals constitute a complete review of the suggestions of Turkish Government to His Majesty's Government and French Government. It is suggested that the last two Governments should come to an agreement together as to how best to meet these requirements and in what proportion therein to participate.

6. I will telegraph as soon as possible such comments as I can offer.

[E 5082/43/44] No. 10.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received July* 16.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) *Istanbul, July* 15, 1939.

MY telegram No. 12.

In the first place I would offer the following comments on certain of the points raised by the Turkish Government as indicated in paragraph 5 of my above-mentioned telegram. These comments have been drawn up in consultation with my commercial secretary.

2. *Point* 1.—(*a*) The sum of £35 million mentioned does not appear exaggerated as representing what is necessary to bring the Turkish armed forces up to a reasonable stage of up-to-date equipment necessary to face a modern enemy of any large scale.

(*b*) If it is necessary for Turkey to order munitions in the United States, Belgium or Sweden, she should explore the possibility of obtaining the necessary credits from those countries.

(*c*) Suggestion in the last sentence under point 1 in my telegram hardly appears reasonable.

Point 2.—Figure previously mentioned has been £8 million (see my predecessor's letter to you of [? 13th October]). There is an underlying, though undefined, suggestion in the Turkish communication that the Turkish Government are contemplating devaluation. Local press is also writing in favour of it. In my opinion, this deserves the maximum degree of encouragement and should be facilitated as the best solution of our present commercial difficulties, and also on account of the excellent feeling which would be created by detaching Turkey from the German commercial system. But as other free currency countries stand to benefit equally with ourselves and France, why should they not furnish some of the necessary gold cover (*e.g.*, the United States)?

Point 3.—Turkish demands are overstated. The amounts blocked in various clearings, excluding Czecho-Slovakia, are about £4 million.

Point 4.—Not unreasonable in the circumstances.

Point 5.—I would venture to reiterate the importance which I attach to the purchase of Turkish tobacco and suggest that, from the point of view of advertisement and sale, there could be no more favourable moment than the present.

Points 6 *and* 7.—I consider it by no means certain that Germany can afford to dispense with the Turkish market—as indicated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in speech reported in my despatch No. 386, German trade seems to be continuing with the exception of the supply to Turkey of big guns. My impression is that Germany will take no drastic action until the terms of the definitive agreement are known. What the Turks fear is that Germany will cut off purchases at the psychological moment when seasonal produce is ready for sale.

3. In the second place, it appears to me that the whole question of financial and economic assistance to Turkey is so complicated that it can only be satisfactorily dealt with by the despatch to the United Kingdom of a strong financial and commercial mission from Turkey, and I think it would be useful if such a mission were accompanied by my commercial secretary. There is at present in Paris a Turkish Commercial Mission (see Paris despatch No. 804) negotiating a revision of the Franco-Turkish Trade and Clearing Agreement. This mission might form a basis, but it would need considerable strengthening.

4. Thirdly, it seems impossible for these negotiations to be divorced from those connected with the present state of the Anglo-Turkish trade in general (see your despatch No. 349). I have so far made no communication to the Turkish Government on that despatch (*a*) because you have asked for my observations, (*b*) because the substance has already been given to the Turkish Commercial Secretary in London, and (*c*) because your instructions are based upon the hypothesis that the Turkish Government are unwilling to devalue Turkish currency. Communication summarised in my telegram No. 12 points in the opposite direction, and it would therefore appear that the whole question will need re-examination in the light of the proposals summarised in that telegram.

[R 5808/661/67] No. 11.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received July* 15.)

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) *Istanbul, July* 15, 1939.

YOUR despatch No. 327.

On receipt of your telegram No. 2, I requested the counsellor to inform the secretary-general in Angora.

2. Secretary-general expressed some disappointment as he anticipated that the result of tripartite proceedings would be to cause inevitable delay. He further enquired whether the final agreement was also to be tripartite. Counsellor replied that, judging from your telegram No. 2, this looked likely.

3. I feel compelled to draw attention to the risk of creating bad feeling here if we and the French Government decide on tripartite procedure, and then inform the Turkish Government of our decision. The Turks will naturally expect to be consulted on equal terms, and would I think resent the failure to do this although their feelings might be mitigated if some communication could be made to them in due course, explaining that, in view of close relations with the French Government on all matters, we feel that this procedure is the most practicable and, indeed, the only possible one.

[E 5166/297/44] No. 12.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received July* 19.)

(No. 386.)
My Lord, *Angora, July* 10, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that, in answer to a question by the leader of the Opposition in the Kamutay, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs made a speech on foreign affairs on the 8th July.

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs emphasised that Turkey desired peace at home and abroad. She had for the past fifteen years had visible proof of the benefits brought by peace at home, namely, increased production; extension of industry; spread of education; formation of a strong army, and an annual increase in population by 350,000 souls. No victory in war could give such results. Turkey for many years followed a policy of neutrality in order to ensure for herself peace. She had supported the League of Nations, but its authority declined and the attempt to limit armaments failed; Axes came into being; the distance between the sound of words and the clanking of arms became less; the independence of certain countries was unjustifiably suppressed; events in Central Europe gave rise to a grave crisis which still endures, and, finally, Albania was invaded. The invasion of this country, which produces neither food-stuffs nor raw material, was responsible for Turkey's decision to abandon her policy of neutralty, and to join the peace front. The result was the Turco-British declaration.

3. Her action was violently criticised by the newspapers of the opposing front. They forget that, in the basic books of the totalitarian States, alliance with England is recommended to the German people. Is it logical to consider as bad for Turkey a friendship which is recommended to Germany?

4. Following on Turkey's conversations with England, she engaged in conversations with France. The settlement of the Hatay question having left no differences outstanding between France and Turkey, a joint declaration, identical with the Turco-British declaration, was made, and the negotiation of the definitive treaties of mutual assistance was begun.

5. While the invasion of Albania was the chief reason for Turkey joining the peace front, her action was the natural outcome of the political events of recent years. Turkey, France and England learnt to know and respect each other on the field of battle. They had also a long tradition of friendship. They co-operated on sanctions, at Montreux and at Nyon. Events in Czecho-Slovakia and in Albania produced in them the same reactions.

6. "We are to-day engaged in settling the details of a long-term definitive agreement which will ensure the unity of the three Powers. I can tell you now that we are at work on the Turco-British Treaty of Mutual Assistance. This will contain clauses determining the collaboration of the two countries in various spheres."

7. Turkey's friendship with the U.S.S.R. retains its original warmth. Every international question has always found the two countries side by side. The visit of M. Potemkin revealed once again the strength of our friendship, and showed that our two countries, in the presence of all events, react in the same way.

8. Recent contacts and exchanges of views have clearly proved that the Balkan Pact will continue to serve as effectively and as powerfully as ever the cause of peace in the Balkans.

9. In joining the peace front, Turkey's only aim was to consolidate peace. She is resolved to maintain with all Powers, including Germany and Italy, normal relations. She desires that her relations, whether commercial or cultural, with these Powers should continue as in the past, but expects to find this desire reciprocated. With Italy our commercial exchanges are normal. With Germany they were, in the first few days, marked with some uncertainty, but are now becoming normal, so that to-day, except on one point, there is no cause for complaint. It is hoped that this point will shortly be cleared up. It was rumoured that Turkish students in Germany were being ill-treated, but the rumour was found to be baseless.

10. The Minister for Foreign Affairs concluded his speech by reaffirming Turkey's policy to be one of peace. She did not desire peace at any price, but a peace which guaranteed Turkey's honour and security, and maintained intact the engagements with which that honour and security were bound up.

11. The speech was warmly applauded. The Assembly then rose until the 11th September.

I have, &c.
HUGHE KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

[E 5149/43/44] No. 13.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received July* 19.)

(No. 394.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Istanbul presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Istanbul telegrams Nos. 12 and 15 of the 14th and 15th July, 1939, has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, undated, respecting Turkish proposals for military, economic and financial assistance.

Istanbul, July 15, 1939.

Enclosure in No. 13.

Note from Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

LE Ministre des Affaires étrangères a pris connaissance de la communication orale que son Excellence Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen a bien voulu lui faire le 4e juillet.

Dès le début des conversations engagées et des correspondances échangées en vue d'arriver à la conclusion des Accords anglo-britanniques, il avait été convenu que la contribution de la Turquie à l'action de paix entreprise par les Puissances occidentales, aussi bien que sa prise de position d'une manière efficace dans l'éventualité d'une conflagration ne pouvaient produire leur plein effet sans que les forces défensives et combattives turques aient été entièrement conformes aux points de vue militaire, financier et économique.

M. Saracoğlu avait eu, en effet, l'honneur de faire connaître le 15 avril la manière de voir du Gouvernement de la République à ce sujet dans les termes suivants :

" Si la Turquie prend dès maintenant ouvertement position contre les Puissances de l'Axe il s'ensuivrait au cas où celles-ci seraient déterminées à déclencher une nouvelle guerre générale l'accumulation dans un très bref délai de toutes les forces adverses sur les Détroits. Cette probabilité conduit la Turquie, qui aurait dès lors à supporter toute la pression de l'Axe, à vouloir être préalablement fixée sur l'aide que l'Angleterre et éventuellement la France et l'Union soviétique pourraient effectivement lui fournir. C'est un élément indispensable pour les préparatifs à faire par la Turquie."

D'autre part, le Ministre des Affaires étrangères a fait ressortir dans sa lettre du 25 avril, alinéa V, que :

" La Turquie ayant des intérêts primordiaux au point de vue économique et en ce qui concerne les armements à sauvegarder en Allemagne et, d'autre part, la défense terrestre des Détroits étant de la plus grande importance pour l'efficacité de l'assistance mutuelle turco-britannique, des conversations seraient immédiatement engagées à Londres en vue de régler l'aide britannique à la Turquie dans les domaines économique, financier, de fournitures militaires de différentes sortes, ainsi que pour fixer les modalités de l'assistance effective en présence de différentes probabilités."

La réponse britannique du 1er mai constatait l'accord sur ce dernier point, étant bien entendu que le Gouvernement turc n'a pas attribué à la retenue des termes de la dernière partie de la réponse anglaise au point V, la signification d'une réserve et a clairement fait ressortir cette compréhension dans sa réponse formant la base de l'accord intervenu.

Or, la dernière communication de son Excellence Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen contient des suggestions qui n'envisagent qu'un seul aspect du problème posé et qui paraissent, même sur ce seul aspect, tout à fait insuffisantes à assurer le résultat escompté.

Pour ces motifs, M. Saracoğlu préférerait aborder le sujet par la présentation d'un plan constructif qu'il s'empresse d'exposer succinctement dans les alinéas suivants :

1. Crédit pour le matériel de guerre.

Les besoins militaires de la Turquie, tels qu'ils ont été arrêtés par le Grand Etat-Major turc avant la conclusion des Accords turco-britanniques, exigent un crédit de £35 millions en comprenant dans ce chiffre les dépenses pour la construction, réorganisation et agrandissement de l'industrie de guerre.

La Turquie devrait pouvoir disposer d'une partie de cette somme pour des achats de matériels en Amérique, en Belgique et en Suède.

En ce qui concerne la fourniture découlant des besoins arrêtés par un plan commun d'États-Majors, celle-ci aussi bien que les dépenses affectées aux fortifications spéciales ne devraient faire peser aucune charge actuelle ou future sur le budget turc.

2. Une avance de fonds en or s'élevant à £15 millions devrait être consentie à la Turquie dans le délai le plus court. Cette réserve d'or serait employée par le Gouvernement turc comme couverture de la monnaie nationale et servirait aux besoins de l'assainissement financier et économique.

3. Un crédit de £10 millions devrait être ouvert à la Turquie pour couvrir les dépenses résultant de la mise en œuvre rapide du matériel de guerre fourni et de l'industrialisation et organisation à accomplir en vertu de l'alinéa 1 ci-dessus, ainsi que pour le déblocage général des fonds gelés en Turquie des pays à devises transférables.

La Turquie ne pouvant envisager de prélever sur ses budgets de quelques années à venir les dépenses ci-dessus relatées, un crédit est indispensable pour faire face à ces besoins dont l'importance est indéniable.

4. L'ensemble des conditions de ces avances et crédits, y compris la réserve d'or mentionnée à l'alinéa 2, devraient être les mêmes que celles dont bénéficient les avances et crédits contractés par le Gouvernement britannique. Ils devraient tous revêtir la forme et la modalité financières d'emprunts à long terme.

5. La Turquie devrait pouvoir user de la faculté d'effectuer le payement des annuités de l'emprunt de £15 millions indiqué à l'alinéa 2 par des fournitures de tabacs.

6. Les crédits et avances mentionnés dans les alinéas 2 et 3 devant, par une opération monétaire appropriée, avoir pour effet d'assainir la situation financière, de niveler les prix, de nettoyer les créances gelées et de rendre ainsi possible la normalisation des échanges commerciaux entre la Turquie et les pays à devises libres, le Gouvernement de la République pourrait facilement faire face aux annuités des emprunts de 35 et de 10 millions (alinéas 1 et 3), comme il assure aujourd'hui et dans les cadres des échanges avec l'Allemagne les payements équivalents, voire même supérieurs, pour les besoins du même genre.

Il y a lieu de remarquer que les payements effectués à cet effet sont prélevés du budget ordinaire et largement couverts par le surplus des exportations turques en Allemagne.

7. Le Gouvernement turc espère fermement que par les opérations ci-dessus envisagées et les mesures financières et économiques qui en découleraient, les échanges commerciaux de la Turquie pourraient être détachés du marché allemand et graduellement dirigés vers les marchés à devises libres.

Cet espoir dispense le Gouvernement de la République de suggérer pour le moment des mesures et aides économiques proprement dites.

Toutefois, si les mesures dont il s'agit s'avéraient inopérantes ou insuffisamment efficaces, ou bien encore si l'Allemagne et l'Italie se livraient conjointement ou séparément à des pressions économiques dont la portée serait plus grande que celle déjà envisagée, la Turquie ne doute pas que ses alliés lui viendraient en aide en vue de faire face à ces pressions et d'adopter les contre-mesures qui s'imposeraient.

8. Les aides de caractère militaire, financier et économique ci-dessus exposées forment un ensemble de suggestions du Gouvernement turc aux Gouvernements britannique et français qui pourraient y pourvoir d'un commun accord et suivant la répartition qu'ils jugeraient la plus opportune.

[E 5152/43/44] No. 14.

Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.— (Received July 19.)

(No. 23.)
(Telegraphic.) *Istanbul, July 18, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 15.

Secretary-General has expressed the hope that your reply to Turkish financial proposals may be received quickly.

2. He explained that the reason for this was that his Government had decided, provided that the necessary financial backing was forthcoming, to place trade between Turkey and United Kingdom and France and United States on a "compensation" basis.

3. For this purpose a "Compensation" Office, supported by three Turkish banks, would be created, whose superintendents would :—

(1) Work all compensation transactions, both officially and privately.
(2) Regulate question of premiums.
(3) Issue free exchange for freights, insurance, &c.
(4) And, principally, regulate sterling-lira exchange at about 9 liras instead of present 5·93, in order to bring Turkish goods within reach of the United Kingdom and other democratic markets.

4. He hoped that by the setting up of a Compensation Office the difficulties under which Anglo-Turkish commercial exchange at present suffers, such as percentage reserved to Turkish Government low sterling rate and high compensation premium, would be removed. In this way, Turkey would sever her present economic ties with Germany, and United Kingdom trade would be on a purely financial basis.

5. He pointed out, however, the drawback of "compensation" system was that it needed strong financial backing, as it would probably have to meet a German onslaught represented by barter price of fixation well above world parities. He considered it essential, therefore, for Turkey to have trading gold reserve mentioned, after which he was confident Compensation Office would be a success.

6. In course of conversation Secretary-General emphasised that the amounts asked for in Turkish Government memorandum were not exaggerated. Amount of material at present on order in Germany, he stated, exceeded 35 million sterling, which would be paid by goods without credit on loans. If this could be done with Germany, why not with United Kingdom, and France and United States? Turkey's aim was to free herself of economic dependence on Germany and to develop an economic association with free exchange Powers.

7. I understand a communication in similar terms has been made to my French colleague.

8. I feel strongly that economic detachment of Turkey from German system should offer no insuperable difficulties, even without assistance of France and United States. "Compensation" system, as outlined by Secretary-General, appears to be practical, though gold cover mentioned as necessary is probably over-estimated.

[R 5808/661/67] No. 15.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Istanbul).

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 20, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No 16 [of 15th July: Anglo-Turkish negotiations].

I appreciate the risk to which you refer in paragraph 3. I think, therefore, that you should now explain to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs that the French Government have informed me that they consider it would be advantageous to make the next stages tripartite. You might add that I myself consider that there are strong arguments in favour of this course (see, for instance, my telegram No. 169 [of 10th May]), and trust that the Minister for Foreign Affairs will agree. I would welcome his assurance that he at least sees no strong objection in principle to such a course.

2. Finally, you should emphasise that I am fully aware of necessity of avoiding anything likely to cause delay, and should assure him that I will, of course do everything possible to ensure that acceptance of present suggestion will hold up proceedings as little as possible.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 357, Saving.)

[R 5948/861/67] No. 16.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 22.)

(No. 29.)
(Telegraphic.) *Istanbul, July 21, 1939.*

I AM grateful for your telegram No. 13.

2. I am asking for earliest possible interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

3. Meanwhile, as regards second paragraph, I had been on the point of telegraphing following information given to me by the French Ambassador:

4. "At an interview between French Ambassador and Hantzinger, President of the Republic and the Secretary-General, Ismet's tone about negotiations with France and ourselves was hard and bitter. He said that Turkey was weaker now than two months ago. Before Anglo-Turkish negotiations, war material ordered in Germany was arriving regularly and being paid for in Turkish produce. Since these negotiations had started, Germany had held up delivery of big guns and nothing was coming in from the British side."

5. As regards this last statement, I trust President of the Republic has since been enlightened, because on 19th July I gave Minister for Foreign Affairs full summary of information in your telegram No. 4. Moreover, as General Orbay must have been in possession of these particulars for some time, I feel certain that military authorities must be aware of the real situation.

6. Nevertheless, in spite of second paragraph of your telegram, I feel that you should have above information. My French colleague is greatly impressed with the need for speeding matters up both as regards financial proposals and as regards the political side of the agreement. As regards financial proposals, Secretary-General has impressed upon French Ambassador importance which the Turkish Government attach to successful termination with the utmost speed. French Ambassador feels that the Germans are watching these negotiations closely in the hope that they may break down, when they themselves will come in with some proposals to Turkish Government.

7. As regards political points, I fully realise necessity of some delay in order to co-ordinate British and French views, but I hope you will forgive me if I once more express anxiety as to effects here of any delay, however unavoidable.

8. I have refrained from commenting upon French aide-mémoire of 7th July, copy of which has been given to me by French Ambassador. I would, however, venture to observe that point regarding possibility of a German attack through Bulgaria (see third paragraph of French aide-mémoire) has been mentioned to me once or twice by Secretary-General. M. Numan raised this point again on 17th July in conversation with French Ambassador and General Huntzinger, urging that, in such an eventuality, Turkey desired to be guaranteed against Germany. My own views as regards this point are contained in paragraph 3, point 2, of my letter to Mr. Ingram of 16th June. It seems incredible that Turkey should regard any such eventuality as anything less than a direct threat to her own security.

[R 5543/661/67] No. 17.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen (Istanbul).

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 24, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 324 [of 1st July: Anglo-Turkish negotiations]

Please thank Minister for Foreign Affairs for his helpful suggestions for the proposed further explanations about clause 6.

2. I have, however, now come to the conclusion, after careful consideration, that the best course would probably be to avoid saying anything more unless we are pressed. I am instructing His Majesty's representatives at Athens, Belgrade and Bucharest accordingly, and I hope Minister for Foreign Affairs will agree with me. I have been strengthened in the above view by the fact that this question has not been brought up during the visit here of Prince Paul.

3. Fundamental difficulty of any explanation is that whereas in any future agreements with Turkey there will be no repetition of the present wording of clause 6, this does not mean, and must not give the Balkan Governments the impression that it does mean, that we are not going to give effect to the principle embodied in this clause. On the contrary, further arrangements with Turkey will have to embody this principle, and our real argument must be that it does not clash in any way with the interests of any member of the Balkan *Entente*.

4. Delay in my reply has been due to necessity for consulting French Government.

5. Repeated, Saving, to Sofia, No. 36; Athens, No. 55; Belgrade, No. 43; and Bucharest, No. 54 (in cypher).)

[E 5606/43/44] No. 18.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen (Istanbul).

(No. 444.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 2, 1939.*

THE Turkish Ambassador came to see me to-day to say good-bye before going to Turkey on leave. His Excellency said that his intention was to leave as soon as the work of the Turkish Military Mission was ended, which he hoped would be in about two weeks, and stay away about a month. He asked me what I thought of his intention to go on leave at the present moment.

2. I said that, as regards the international situation, it was of course impossible to foresee events. As regards the treaty negotiations between our two Governments, the position was that His Majesty's Government had prepared a revised draft agreement which should be ready very shortly for submission to the Turkish Government. I thought that it would be very useful, when the Turkish Government were in possession of the draft, that his Excellency should be in Turkey in order to be able to give any explanations that might be necessary. Dr. Aras asked that, if possible, he might see the draft before he left.

3. In reply to my question how we now stood as regards the financial and economic aspect of our negotiations, Dr. Aras spoke of the urgent necessity for Turkey to reconcile her foreign policy of co-operation with Great Britain and France with her internal policy. In order to do this, she must free herself from her present dependence on German markets, and she could not do this without assistance from the democratic Powers. His Government had now put forward certain proposals which were intended to attain this end, and were now, he understood, being examined by the competent departments of His Majesty's Government. He asked me to use my influence to help Turkey to obtain the harmony between her internal and external policy which was so essential for her in present circumstances. I said that I would, of course, do all that I could, but I felt it necessary to remind his Excellency of the formidable difficulties confronting the Chancellor of the Exchequer in regard to our own finances, and particularly to the question of exchange.

4. Dr. Aras then said that, since agreement had been reached with the Turkish Military Mission on many heads regarding the armaments which Turkey was to obtain in this country, it was vitally important that a beginning should be made immediately with the delivery of the various items. At any moment, his Excellency said, some untoward event might happen in Europe, and it was vital for Turkey that her armaments should be shipped before rather than after such a happening. He made a most pressing plea that nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of delivery at the earliest possible moment.

5. I then asked his Excellency what he thought of the general European situation, to which he replied that he thought it quite possible that within a month we might expect some form of proposals from the German Government for a settlement of the present problems. He thought that the German Government would put forward some such proposals for propaganda purposes, for purposes of internal policy, and also as a *ballon d'essai*. As regards the prospects of war, he found it extremely difficult to make any prognostication, since, as he put it, Europe was now at the mercy of events rather than of intentions.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[E 5503/5182/44] No. 19.

Consul Davis to Viscount Halifax. (*Received August 4.*)

(No. 50.)
My Lord, *Aleppo, July 27, 1939.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 55 of the 10th July, 1939, regarding the Armenians in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, I have the honour to report that the exodus of the Armenian refugees is now complete, over 90 per cent. of the Armenian population having left the sanjak before the departure of the last French soldier on the 23rd July.

2. The emigration was, on the whole, conducted without undue hardship, though some privation was inevitable in removing such a large body of poor people without adequate preparation in the height of summer. The ones who suffered most were those, about 4,000 in number, who were removed from Alexandretta by sea to Turtous on the Syrian coast, where they were obliged to camp out under the burning sun without tents or shelter of any kind. Those who came to Aleppo, about 3,500 altogether, were given free transport by the local chauffeurs and were at once accommodated in schools and other institutions belonging to the Armenian community which were empty owing to the summer vacation, and are being looked after by local charitable organisations until such time as they can be moved on to their new homes. This work is facilitated by the

grants allocated to the refugees by the French mandatory authorities who have already spent over 500,000 francs in Aleppo alone. A gift of 100,000 francs has also been received from the Italian Government through the Italian Consul in Aleppo for the relief of the refugees. The Hatay Customs and frontier authorities gave the departing refugees little trouble apart from a formal and somewhat perfunctory search for gold and foreign exchange, and complete exemption from customs duties was accorded to them by the Syrian authorities on their arrival. Of the inhabitants of Mousa Dagh, some 4,000 were removed by sea to Badrousiyé, a village on the coast just outside the southern frontier of the sanjak, and some 2,500 went by land to Kessab. The total number of Armenian refugees is therefore in the region of 14,000, composed as follows:—

From.	*Now in.*	*Number.*
Mousa Dagh	Kessab	2,500
Mousa Dagh	Badrousiyé ...	4,000
Boylan, Antioch and Alexandretta	Tartous ...	4,000
Kirik Khan and Rihaniyé ...	Aleppo	3,500
		14,000

The refugees will remain in Badrousiyé, Tartous and Aleppo temporarily and will later move to permanent settlements in the Lebanon. The refugees in Kessab may remain there permanently.

3. In each district a few Armenians have remained behind to gather in the harvest and to look after their own and their friends' properties. Most of these will also leave in the next six months. The other Christians, especially the Greek Orthodox, will also leave in the next six months. They are now complaining that while the emigration of the Armenians has been assisted, they have been completely neglected by the French and left to shift for themselves; nevertheless, they prefer to move out and place themselves again under French rule rather than remain to become Turkish citizens. An official announcement to the effect that conscription will be applied in the Hatay as from the 1st January next has strengthened their resolution to depart.

4. A copy of this despatch has been sent direct to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and Istanbul and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &c.
A. W. DAVIS.

[R 6236/661/67] No. 20.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Istanbul).

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 4, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 59 [of 3rd August: Anglo-Turkish negotiations].

I fully appreciate importance of considerations advanced by you.

2. You might explain to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, when expressing my regret for the inevitable delay that has occurred, that I have been giving the most careful study to the Turkish counter-proposals as described in your telegram No. 310 [of 23rd June] and that in preparing the new draft I have done my best to incorporate the Turkish desiderata so far as is possible. You may say that I have now communicated this draft for the urgent observations of the French Government.

3. As regards the danger that the Turkish Government may think that we and the French are about to present them with a cut and dried decision, you might point out that purely geographical considerations render it desirable that I should ascertain the views of the French Government before communicating the new draft to the Turkish Government. After all, any guarantees that we may undertake in the agreement to give Turkey must be equally participated in by the French Government. This by no means carries with it any implication that the Turkish Government will not be consulted on equal terms all along the line.

4. You will no doubt take the opportunity to enquire of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he is yet in a position to give me his views on the question of making the next stage tripartite (my telegram No. 13 [of 20th July]).

(Repeated to Paris, No. 382, Saving.)

[E 5642/140/44] No. 21.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received August* 11.)

(No. 433 E.)

My Lord, *Istanbul, August* 5, 1939.

WITH reference to Sir Percy Loraine's despatch No. 299 E. of the 16th June, 1938, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a translation(1) of the Turkish budget estimates for the financial year 1939–40 as voted by the Grand National Assembly. The corresponding figures for 1938–39 are shown in a parallel column. I also enclose as a matter of interest a statement(1) showing the estimates and final accounts of the various budgets of the Turkish Republic since its inception in 1924.

2. Revenue is estimated to yield £T. 261,110,000 against an estimated expenditure of £T. 261,064,192, leaving a surplus of £T. 45,808. These figures are the highest ever voted by the Turkish Republic and represent an increase of £T. 11,061,000 and £T. 11,100,000 in estimated receipts and expenditure respectively over the preceding year.

3. During the period 1924–30 the highest levels were reached in 1929–30, when receipts were some 64 per cent. higher than during 1924–25. During the period of world depression, however, receipts receded and the lowest level was touched during 1931–32, when they were some 21 per cent. lower than during the period 1929–30. Since that date, however, receipts have increased rapidly, as is shown by the following figures:—

Year.	Receipts.	Increase over 1924–25.	Difference over preceding year.
		£T. Million	
1924–25	138·4	...	...
1929–30	206·1	+ 67·7	+ 67·7
1931–32	162·1	+ 23·7	— 44·0
1934–35 ...	190·0	+ 51·6	+ 27·9
1935–36	200·5	+ 62·1	+ 10·5
1936–37	236·5	+ 98·1	+ 36·0
1937–38	260·9	+ 122·5	+ 24·4
1938–39	257·0	+ 118·6	— 3·9 calculated

4. For the period 1938–39 total revenue figures are not yet available, but the figures for the eleven months, June 1938 to April 1939, amounted to £T. 235,400,000, which, with the addition of the probable collections during May of £T. 21,600,000 (calculated on the basis of collections during May 1937), would indicate that revenue will amount to some £T. 257 million. From these figures it would appear that revenue has receded in comparison with the previous fiscal period. This is not so, however, as tax alleviations amounting to some £10 million were granted during the period 1938–39. Consequently revenue would show an increase of some £T. 6 million over the preceding exercise had these alleviations not been accorded.

5. The continual growth of receipts, and the fact that since 1934–35 collections have always exceeded the estimates, must be taken as an indication of the satisfactory economic conditions prevailing in the country.

6. Since 1926 balanced budgets have always been presented to the Grand National Assembly, but the equilibrium of the budget has often been upset by the subsequent voting of supplementary or extraordinary credits which have had to be

(1) Not printed.

offset by internal borrowing. Such was the case in 1930–31 owing to the diminution of receipts, in 1933–34, 1934–35 and 1935–36 as a result of the vote of supplementary credits, and especially during the last three fiscal years, owing to the system of extraordinary credits created in 1936. Since 1930–31 the following loans have been contracted:—

	£T. million.	
1930–31	21·1	Match Loan.
1932–33	4·3	Ergani 1933 Loan.
1933–34	4·2	Ditto.
1934–35	12·3	Ditto.
1935–36	13·1	Sivas–Erzerum Loan, nine months' bonds and reserve bonds.
1936–37	20·1	Ditto.
1937–38 (provisional figures)	45·1	Ditto.

7. Other than the above the Treasury has issued bonds in respect of public works effected in the country and as cover for orders placed abroad. The value of these bonds, which amounted to £T. 45 million as at the 31st May, 1935, amounted to £T. 99,300,000 as at the 31st May, 1938. The following figures show the growth, during the last four years, of loans contracted by the Treasury under various heads:—

	1935.	*1936.*	*1937.*	*1938.*
		£T. million.		
Ergani Loan, 1933	11·4	11·1	10·7	10·3
Sivas–Erzerum Loan, 1934 ..	2·0	6·4	10·8	15·0
5½ bonds, legal reserve	3·8	7·2	10·6	19·0
Nine months' bonds (Central Bank)	...	...	20·2	43·9
Afion–Antalya Loan	2	6·6	7·2	7·8
U.S.S.R. industrial credit ..	10·9	10·9	11·3	13·7
Suppliers and contractors ..	46·0	55·1	70·9	77·8
Banks	23·0	22·7	23·7	24·6
	86·4	120·0	165·4	212·1

8. The amount set aside in the budget to meet the servicing of the public debt is £T. 40,739,599, a decrease of £T. 998,791 in comparison with the previous year. This amount is formed as follows:—

Internal Debt.	£T.
Service of the 1938 loan created by Law No. 3322 ...	788,000
Service of the 1933 loan created by Law No. 2094 ...	1,144,843
Service of the loan of 1934 created by Law No. 2403	1,894,000
Service of the naval lottery	30,075
	3,856,918

Floating Debt.	
Forced expropriations in Istanbul (Law No. 1885) ...	30,000
5 per cent. debt obligations (Laws Nos. 1513, 2248, 2701, 2808 and 3523)	949,610
2 per cent. obligations for old debts, Central Bank:	
(*a*) Amortisation of bonds	2,572,061
(*b*) Interest bonds	1,420,000
Capital of the Agricultural Bank (Law No. 3202) ...	1,289,030
	6,337,701

External Debt.

	£T.
(*a*) Ottoman Debt Service	4,050,000
(*b*) Loans (Foreign), Match Loan	1,034,550
(*c*) Sundry debts—	
Bonds issued under Laws Nos. 664, 1013, 1177, 1244, 1550 and 2425	6,870,000
Bonds and debts	10,000,000
U.S.S.R. credit (Law No. 2434)	800,000
United States debt (Laws Nos. 2670 and 3022)	129,330
Total	17,805,330
Pensions (retiring, widows and orphans)	16,655,100
Grand total	40,739,569

This sum represents but 13·4 per cent. of the budget expenditure, whereas before the war debt servicing and amortisation represented approximately one-third of the budget total.

9. Credits for the purpose of national defence during the present year amount to £T. 125,815,000 against £T. 108,995,000 during the preceding year. These credits represent 39·5 per cent. and 35·4 per cent. of the respective budget totals. Expenditure during 1939–40 will exceed that of 1938–39 by some £16·8 million. The credits are divided as follows: —

1939–40.	*Ordinary.* £T.	*Extraordinary.* £T.
Land forces	68,067,000	25,310,000
Air force	8,502,000	...
Navy	6,984,000	...
Military factories	6,284,000	2,500,000
Cartographic section	892,000	...
Bonds maturing	6,870,000	...
Total ...	125,815,000	

10. The estimate of budgetary receipts follows normal practice and shows no outstanding variations over the preceding year. Small increases are estimated under practically all heads, and these will no doubt be realised, as crop prospects are generally good, and there should be a normal increase of business over the year.

11. Law No. 3628, voted on the 30th May last and reported in my despatch No. 367 E. of the 1st July, authorised supplementary credits to various Government departments up to a total of £T. 58,917,000. By far the largest grants under this credit were made to the Ministry of National Defence (£T. 27,810,000) for general rearmament, and to the Ministry of Public Works for the construction of railways. The credits accorded to the Ministry of National Defence are included in the figures shown in the ninth paragraph of this despatch.

12. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Oversea Trade.

I have, &c.
H. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

[E 5668/143/44]

No. 22.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Istanbul).

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 12, 1939.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 52 [of 30th July], last paragraph, and No. 344 [of 8th August].

Question of the despatch of war material to Turkey was discussed at length with the counsellor of the Turkish Embassy on 11th August.

2. Counsellor was reminded that, when His Majesty's Government had informed the Turkish Government at the beginning of July that they were prepared to grant credit of £10 million for the purchase of war material in this country, they had indicated that this was dependent on the conclusion of a satisfactory political agreement.

3. His Majesty's Government had also asked the Turkish Government to send a financial representative to London as soon as possible to settle details. Mainly, no doubt, because the Turkish Government had not found the offer adequate and had, in consequence, made various counter-proposals, no financial representative had yet arrived, and discussions for an agreement covering the £10 million credits had not even been begun.

4. Meanwhile, General Orbay's mission had received much information regarding the extent to which His Majesty's Government could, from the supply point of view, meet the demands of the Turkish Government in the matter of naval, military and air material. He had been told that material to the value of about £6,500,000 could be supplied by various dates up to the end of December 1940, provided that early orders were placed. He had also been informed that a certain amount of material could be despatched to Turkey straight away.

5. The material which could be despatched at once was, however, being held up by the fact that no political and no credit agreement had yet been signed.

6. So far as political agreement was concerned, His Majesty's Government still adhered to the principle that credits were part of a satisfactory political settlement. They recognised, however, that the negotiation of such an agreement must in any circumstances take a certain time, and in view of the urgent representations of the Turkish Government they did not wish to interpret this condition so strictly as to preclude, until such time as the political agreement had been signed, the immediate despatch of such material as was now ready to leave this country if means could be found for its payment.

7. As regards credit agreement, however, the position was that His Majesty's Government had no authority, parliamentary or otherwise, to allow the despatch of this material unless it had been paid for in cash; under the scheme proposed this cash would be raised by the sale of bonds guaranteed by the Export Credits Guarantee Department under the relevant Acts of Parliament, and the bonds could only be guaranteed after the conclusion of a guarantee agreement. To do otherwise would be contrary to the Constitution and no way of getting round this difficulty had yet been found.

8. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government, therefore, it was urgently necessary that the Turkish Government should, without prejudice either to their wider counter-proposals in the financial and economic sphere, or to His Majesty's Government's reserves as regards the signing of a political agreement, enter forthwith into negotiations for the conclusion of a credit agreement which would cover the £10 million. So far as could be seen, the Turkish Government intended, in any case, to accept this credit, since General Orbay had indicated to the Service Departments the proportion in which the Turkish Government propose to spend it in regard to naval, military and air material respectively. The sooner, therefore, the agreement could be signed, the better.

9. Meanwhile, His Majesty's Government were anxious to find a way whereby the material which was already prepared for shipment could leave even in advance of the signature of the credit agreement. This could be arranged if the Turkish Government were prepared to use for this purpose the balance of the £8 million credit of 1938. This balance amounted to £867,000, if a sum of £1,125,000 needed for completing fortifications of the Dardanelles (which material could not in any case be delivered for some time) were left over for payment under the new £10 million credit. The counsellor was given a list of material, ready to leave, which could be covered by this balance. Value of this material amounts to about £950,000. If Turkish Government cared to pay cash from their own resources for difference, this cash payment could be returned directly credit agreement was signed.

10. Full record of conversation follows by bag.

11. Please inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of this conversation, explaining that shipment of material referred to in paragraph 9 waits only on Turkish Government's acceptance of proposals communicated to Turkish Counsellor and emphasising importance of Turkish Government sending a representative as soon as possible to negotiate agreement covering new credit.

[R 6414/661/67] No. 23.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Istanbul).

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 12, 1939.*

MY despatch No. 441 [of 3rd August: Anglo-Turkish negotiations].

As soon as your French colleague has received instructions from his Government to co-operate with you, you should communicate the new draft for the definitive agreement to the Turkish Government, subject to the following amendment: In article 4, for the words "will immediately consult together with a view to such action as may be mutually agreed upon" substitute "will immediately consult together with a view to such common action as might be considered effective." This amendment was made in accordance with the desire of the French Government. Latter suggested an alternative wording, namely: "with a view to the common action to be taken as a result," as preferable. I am prepared to accept this if necessary, but I have informed French Government that, as they gave me two alternatives to choose from, I have selected that which seemed to me the less likely to offend Yugoslav susceptibilities.

2. In making your communication to the Turkish Government, you should explain that the new draft is based on the assumption that they will agree to the interim understanding being telescoped into the definitive agreement (your telegram No. 330 [of the 7th August]). The draft has accordingly been worded in a form suitable for a final tripartite treaty to be participated in by the French, Turkish and British Governments.

3. The following comments may be of use to you in your conversations with the Turkish Government, with regard to the new draft:—

(*a*) *Preamble.*—I do not consider that the form of words previously under discussion for the preamble of the interim understanding is suitable for the final treaty. I have accordingly adopted a new wording, in which, as you will note, a reference to the principles of the Covenant of the League of Nations has been included.

(*b*) *Articles* 1.—You will see that this repeats, in wording suitable to a formal treaty, clause 3 in the joint declarations of 12th May and 23rd June, which it is intended that the final treaty should supersede. While the obligations remain the same, the wording of the article has been changed so as to divide it into two parts, one providing for the case of the United Kingdom and France being involved in war, and the other for a similar eventuality in the case of Turkey. I have considered whether it would be desirable to attempt to define more precisely in the agreement itself the exact scope of the term "Mediterranean area," but have come to the conclusion that this would be unwise. I have, however, suggested to the French Government that they should consider reaching a similar understanding with the Turkish Government to that which we reached shortly after the joint declaration (see your telegram No. 239 [of 18th May]), namely, that the term should include the Dardanelles and the Adriatic, but not the Black Sea.

(*c*) *Articles* 2 *and* 4.—These are designed to cover the possibility of a war in which Italy is not a belligerent and in which article 1 would therefore not be applicable. You will see that article 2 provides for assistance to Turkey by France and the United Kingdom in the event of Turkey being at war with a European Power in consequence of aggression by that Power against Turkey. In practice the only cases of such an attack on Turkey which would be likely to arise are those of an attack by Bulgaria or an attack by Germany through Bulgaria or by sea. In return for this undertaking by the French and British Governments a similar undertaking by the Turkish Government has been provided for, to apply in the event of direct aggression against France and the United Kingdom. The purpose of this is to secure complete reciprocity in regard to the obligations of the parties concerned. I feel that it is desirable as a matter of tactics to require in the first instance this corresponding undertaking by Turkey. For your own information I am [illegible] prepared in the last resort to

abandon this requirement, which I realise represents an obligation which the Turkish Government have from the outset made it clear they do not wish to undertake.

(*d*) *Article* 4 is designed to deal with the case of an act of aggression by Germany against, *e.g.*, Yugoslavia, which Turkey considered as a threat to her security. In this case an undertaking to *consult* together is provided for. Again, with a view to emphasising the reciprocal nature of this agreement, a corresponding undertaking is provided for which would cover the case of France and the United Kingdom being at war in consequence of an act of aggression by Germany against Holland or Switzerland, and Poland, and eventually Russia. In this case, too, the obligation is only to take part in consultation.

(*e*) You will note that the undertakings are in all cases limited to acts of aggression by a *European* Power. The result is that no guarantee is given to Turkey against attack by Iran, Syria or Iraq, but this is a limitation that is desirable in order to avoid affecting the susceptibilities of at any rate the Iraqi Government. On the other hand, Turkey is of course equally exempted so far as attack on ourselves by, say, Japan is concerned.

(*f*) *Article* 3 is merely a revised wording of the form of undertaking as regards Greece and Roumania, which the Turkish Government (your telegram No. 310 [of 23rd May]) have said that they are ready to accept. This article should accordingly present no difficulty.

(*g*) *Article* 7.—This, as you will see, puts the duration of the treaty at a period of five years. You should explain to the Turkish Government in this connexion that this is the period which we have been discussing in the Russian and Polish negotiations. It is felt that the adoption of any different period in the case of Turkey would arouse undesirable comment.

4. You will see from the above that I fully appreciate the argument that the Turkish Government in contemplating the conditions of Turkish security cannot in effect limit themselves to the possibility of aggression against Roumania or Greece. One point which the Turkish Government are most anxious to see covered is undoubtedly the case of an act of aggression against Turkey by Bulgaria, and, as you will observe, His Majesty's Government and the French Government are prepared to give the Turkish Government a guarantee to come to their assistance in such an eventuality.

5. It is, of course, much more difficult to cover the case of an attack by Germany on Yugoslavia which, though in its initial stages might appear to be intended solely against that country, was in effect destined to be developed against Turkey. This must have been the eventuality which the Turkish Government contemplated when they used the phrase "an act of aggression . . . . leading to a war in such a way as to be considered by Turkey as likely to threaten her security" (paragraph 5 of your telegram No. 310 [of 23rd June]). I do not feel that it is possible to give a definite undertaking in advance to come to Turkey's assistance in such a case. First, the existence of such an indirect guarantee would be bound to arouse the gravest apprehensions in Yugoslavia, which I am anxious at all costs to avoid (*cf.* Yugoslavia's suspicions of article 6 of the Anglo-Turkish declaration). This is an argument that may be of use to you in your conversations. Secondly, the effect of such an undertaking would be that it would inevitably be left to the Turkish Government to decide whether any attack on Yugoslavia, in fact, amounted to a threat on Turkey. Thus, the final decision as to when France and Great Britain should intervene in defence of Yugoslavia would be left entirely to the Turkish Government. I consider that the most that can be done is to give an undertaking to the Turkish Government that in an eventuality of this kind the French Government and His Majesty's Government would immediately consult with the Turkish Government with a view to the common action to be taken as a result.

6. The draft treaty has been prepared with the above considerations in mind, and I feel that it should go a long way towards meeting the requirements of the Turkish Government. I sincerely hope that it will be acceptable to them. I consider that it does amount to an acceptance by the French and British Governments of the Turkish invitation to place themselves at once on a footing of

"equilibrium and complete solidarity," and you should emphasise the care which has been taken to define the obligations of the contracting parties on a basis of strict reciprocity.

7. As mentioned in my despatch under reference, I had originally intended to include in the draft treaty an article designed to exclude the possibility that Turkey, if she undertook to defend Roumania, might be obliged to go to war with Russia. I am prepared to meet the Turkish Government on this point, but have not been able to arrive at a satisfactory form of wording. I should appreciate any suggestions by the Turkish Government as to how the point could best be met. I explained in my telegram No. 215 [of the 1st June] that an alternative method to cover the Turkish point might be that of a separate confidential exchange of notes. This seems to me less satisfactory than the inclusion of the point in the treaty itself, but I realise that it may ultimately prove the only means of getting round the difficulty, which seems to be one of form or method rather than substance.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 399, Saving (*en clair*).)

[E 5826/43/44] No. 24.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Istanbul).

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 14, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 83 [of 18th August: Anglo-Turkish commercial negotiations].

According to Turkish Embassy, mission about to reach London is to conduct negotiations about (1) future basis of Anglo-Turkish trade, and (2) technical aspects of credits which His Majesty's Government have decided to accord to Turkey.

2. As regards proposals for financial and economic assistance, these are being actively considered in conjunction with French Government.

3. I presume that (1) means primarily the conclusion of a new Trade and Clearing Agreement, and (2) the £10 million. But it is possible the mission will raise questions of loans and credits beyond £10 million already offered.

[E 5812/43/44] No. 25.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 15.)

(No. 78.)
(Telegraphic.) *Istanbul, August 15, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 51.

I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs accordingly on 14th August.

2. He informed me verbally this morning:—

(*a*) That he agreed to pay the £83,000 and will take the necessary steps for the purpose.

(*b*) As regards arrangements for the 10 million credit, he asked me to state that Turkish Government are willing to accept, in the case of credit, the terms usual in the case of a loan raised by His Majesty's Government. He is prepared to send the necessary instructions to the Turkish Ambassador at once to sign on this basis.

(*c*) If you do not find this possible, he will, as soon as possible, send an expert to London to discuss conditions.

3. As regards (*b*), I pointed out negotiations would, nevertheless, be necessary, and urged the necessity of sending an expert at once. I am seeing him again on 16th August and will again emphasise this.

[C 11609/3356/18] No. 26.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 16.)

(No. 77.)
(Telegraphic.) *Istanbul, August 15, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 70.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me on 15th August that the Soviet Government have replied that they are willing to furnish a draft, but in the first instance, they ask the Turkish Government to answer the five following questions:—

(1) Is it their intention that proposed pact should apply against aggression only or should it go further? The Minister for Foreign Affairs interprets this as an allusion to indirect aggression.
(2) Is the pact to apply only to sea or both to land and sea?
(3) Is it to be independent as between Russia–Turkey alone or based upon Anglo-France Russian Pact?
(4) Is it to apply only to defence of the two contracting parties against aggression, or is it to apply in a case in which either of the contracting parties is involved in a war owing to its outside obligations?
(5) In the latter case, the Turkish Government is asked to state the other countries as to which Turkey has obligations.

(Repeated to Moscow.)

[E 5732/43/44] No. 27.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen (Istanbul).

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 16, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 76 [of 14th August: Anglo-Turkish trade].

Please explain urgently to Minister for Foreign Affairs that transfer of all Anglo-Turkish trade to a compensation basis as from 20th August is impossible for following reasons:—

(1) The present position is governed by the existing Anglo-Turkish Clearing Agreements, and, so far as the legal position in the United Kingdom is concerned, by the Treasury orders by which these agreements are given force of law. The agreements provide for denunciation only after three months' notice. Though His Majesty's Government will be glad to waive this provision when a new agreement has been concluded, they cannot waive it in advance of any such agreement. Furthermore, until a new order can be issued bringing into force the the new agreement, the Clearing Office are bound to apply all sums received by them in accordance with the terms of the existing agreements. For example, the goods in respect of which compensation transactions can be carried out under the agreement are specified in the Fourth Schedule. The Clearing Office would have no power to deal with any sterling arising from imports into this country of other Turkish goods, except in accordance with the terms of the agreements, that is to say, in the normal case 70 per cent. to Sub-Account A and 30 per cent. to Sub-Account B. In addition, so far as the allocation of the proceeds of imports of goods included in the Fourth Schedule is concerned, the Clearing Office would be bound by the terms of the existing agreement.
(2) As intimated in paragraph 12 of Board of Trade letter enclosed in my despatch No. 349 [of 30th June], His Majesty's Government, relying on the provision in the agreements that three months' notice is required for denunciation, have informed United Kingdom traders that the existing system will be maintained during the current quarter, *i.e.*, until the end of September. Traders have presumably therefore, entered into arrangements to sell goods to Turkish importers for payment through the ordinary clearing, and would have strong ground for complaint if they were precluded from fulfilling their legal commitments.

(3) The Turkish proposals under reference contain no information about the method of allocating the proceeds of Turkish sales in this country between outstanding dents, current compensation trade and the Central Bank. (The suggestion in paragraph 5 of your telegram may be correct, but there is no confirmation of this from the Turkish Government.) Any basis of allocation which Turkish Government may propose would require careful examination, in order that His Majesty's Government may be satisfied that the various British interests are adequately protected.

(4) No mention is made of Anglo-Turkish commodities, whose position would plainly have to be completely safeguarded.

2. His Majesty's Government do not want in any way to retard the introduction of a system of compensation trade, on a basis to be agreed between the two Governments, between this country and Turkey, and, indeed, share the anxiety of the Turkish Government that a new agreement in this sense should be concluded before the start of the coming Turkish export season. The Turkish Government will, I hope, understand that, for the reasons mentioned above, it is impossible to reach agreement on these matters by 20th August, but the Turkish Embassy have already been told that His Majesty's Government accept the Turkish Government's recent invitation to start negotiations in London with a view to developing the commercial exchanges between the two countries, and that His Majesty's Government share their anxiety to start as soon as possible. Situation as described in paragraph 1 of your telegram under reference makes it all the more desirable that Turkish Government should lose no time in sending delegation to London with full powers to negotiate.

[E 5607/43/44] No. 28

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Istanbul).

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August 17, 1939.*

TURKISH Ambassador, acting on instructions, has suggested that fresh negotiations should be opened in London at an early date between Turkey and the United Kingdom with a view to developing the commercial exchanges between the two countries.

2. His Excellency has been informed in reply that His Majesty's Government will be happy to open such negotiations at any time that may be convenient and that they fully agree with the Turkish Government in thinking it most desirable that the negotiations should take place as soon as possible in view of the approach of the Turkish export season.

3. Please inform Turkish Government accordingly.

[E 5820/43/44] No. 29.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.- (Received August 18.)

(No. 82.)
(Telegraphic.) *Istanbul, August 17, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 78.

I have now received [group undecypherable] communication from Minister for Foreign Affairs in the following sense:—

2. Turkish Government agree to allocate £867,000 of the £6 million credit of 1938, and to pay £83,000 in the terms proposed in paragraph 9 of your telegram No. 51, in return for delivery of material immediately available up to £950,000.

3. Minister for Foreign Affairs had not thought it necessary to give a definite answer to proposal of His Majesty's Government for credit of £10 million before receiving the reply of His Majesty's Government to his counter-proposals covering the whole range of financial and economic points (my telegram No. 12)

4. Turkish Government accept the present proposal that conversations should take place regarding £10 million credit, without prejudice to Turkish counter-proposal as regards economic and financial part of the final agreement

(my telegram No. 12), and without prejudice to the reservation regarding prior conclusion of that agreement.

5. Subject to the reservations, Turkish Government are ready to conclude an agreement on basis of financial conditions existing in the case of any of the recent loans contracted by His Majesty's Government themselves.

6. If this last proposal, which Minister for Foreign Affairs considers normal and reasonable, is accepted, the Turkish Government will at once appoint a specialist to settle with His Majesty's Government the necessary formalities.

7. When I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 16th August, I pointed out that his proposals as regards the ordinary conditions of a loan issued by His Majesty's Government would be hardly [? likely] to be acceptable, and urged him to send an expert at once. He was inclined to stick to his point and argued, as the proposed credit would be guaranteed by His Majesty's Government, the conditions should apply.

[E 5798/588/44] No. 30.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 446.)
My Lord, *Istanbul, August 11, 1939.*

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my despatch No. 416 of the 26th July, to inform your Lordship that at the invitation of the Turkish Government the Commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean fleet paid an official visit to Istanbul in H.M.S. *Warspite* from the 2nd to the 6th August. The flagship was accompanied by His Majesty's ships *Cossack*, *Maori*, *Zulu* and *Nubian*.

2. The shortness of Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham's stay made it inevitable that the programme of official entertainments should be heavily charged. On this occasion the Ministry for Foreign Affairs were furnished at the earliest possible moment with a tentative outline of the hospitality which the commander-in-chief and I myself were anxious to offer. The Turkish General Staff had thus only to provide for the vacant dates; and the necessity, which arose on the occasion of Rear-Admiral Wells' visit in 1937, of asking them to cancel functions which they had arranged was thus obviated. An account of the official engagements is enclosed for your Lordship's information.(')

3. I had hoped that the President of the Republic, who had previously been in the neighbourhood, would receive the commander-in-chief in Istanbul; and that the Chief of the Turkish Staff would be able to come down from Angora in order to meet him. Only a few days before the visit, however, I was informed that M. Ismet Inönü desired to receive Admiral Cunningham in Angora, and that Marshal Fevzi Çakmak was too busy to come to Istanbul. It was accordingly arranged that on the third day of the visit the commander-in-chief, accompanied by his Chief of Staff, his Staff Officer (Plans) and his flag lieutenant, as well as by my naval and military attachés, should be flown to Angora, returning the same evening. This addition to an already overcrowded programme was somewhat arduous, but I feel sure that in the circumstances the journey was necessary, and that it proved valuable.

4. So far as the political aspect is concerned, the visit of the squadron was an unqualified success. There has always been a strongly anglophile tendency in the Turkish navy, and it was also to be expected that in view of our present relations with this country Admiral Cunningham and his officers would be most cordially welcomed in official and military circles. This was indeed the case. On the other hand, the intense interest displayed by the local population and their obviously spontaneous manifestations of enthusiasm exceeded my expectations. In fact when His Majesty's ships were open to the public in the afternoon of the 5th August the popular response proved, I fear, a source of some embarrassment. Judging from previous visits not many of the public were expected to avail themselves of an invitation which involved them in the expense of transport between the shore and the squadron; but on this occasion virtually every craft in the vicinity, which was approximately Bosphorus-worthy, was pressed into service, and the ships, particularly H.M.S. *Warspite*, were overrun by several thousands of sightseers

(') Not printed

5. The Turkish press naturally gave great prominence to the visit, and the commander-in-chief's movements were the principal item of news throughout the squadron's stay. Most newspapers, in addition, devoted one or more leading articles to the subject, the tone of which left nothing to be desired. Writing under the probably inadvertently archaic heading " Wellcome," M. Abidin Daver in the *Cumhuriyet* and *République* described the Royal Navy as one of the chief of the various agencies which held the gods of war in check, and dwelt at length on the menace to aggressors constituted by the blockade which it would enforce immediately on the outbreak of a conflict. And other articles were equally enthusiastic. Through the good offices of the captain of the fleet I was able to arrange for a party of some twenty-five Turkish journalists, accompanied by the press attaché to thie embassy, to be conducted over H.M.S. *Warspite;* this act of courtesy and hospitality was very deeply appreciated, and will be found, I am confident, amply to have repaid the trouble involved.

6. In conclusion, I should like to place on record my appreciation of the way in which the commander-in-chief and the officers of his squadron carried out an extremely heavy programme, which left them, I fear, little opportunity of consulting their own tastes in the disposition of their time. They have left behind them in all circles with which they were brought into contact the happiest impressions of a visit which, though all too short, has brought yet closer together not only our two navies but also our two peoples.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean Station, and to His Majesty's Consular Officers in Turkey.

I have, &c.

H. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

[E 5828/43/44] No. 31.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (*Received August* 19.)

(By Telephone.)

(No. 85.)
(Telegraphic.) *Istanbul, August* 19, 1939.

MY telegram No. 84.

Commercial secretary saw Minister of Commerce and Director-General of Department of External Commerce this morning and discussed with them proposals to place all Turkish commodities on a compensation basis.

2. Commercial secretary explained the difficulties as set out in your telegram No. 58, whereupon Minister of Commerce drew his attention to the extreme urgency of the measures which he wished to introduce, explaining that Turkish export season for several main commodities and its sultanas, figs and hazelnuts should open immediately. He also pointed out that it was essential that Turkish Government's action should be made public before Germany entered this market.

3. In order to meet legal difficulties with which His Majesty's Government are faced, Minister proposed that, without interfering with working of present Clearing and Payments Agreements, His Majesty's Government should consent to place all Turkish exportable commodities on List 4 of Trade and Clearing Agreement. In order to make this action easier for His Majesty's Government, he was prepared to agree to a payment of only 10 per cent. to Clearing Account B and 10 per cent. to Account A for liquidation of blocked balances. He urged that His Majesty's Government would accept this proposal, but should they find it impossible to do so, he begged that they should at least agree to immediate transfer of sultanas, figs and hazelnuts to Schedule 4.

4. He stipulated that this arrangement was to be provisional only and without prejudice to negotiations which are about to open in London. He is particularly anxious to have an urgent reply, as [I he is] delaying opening of export season until a reply is received from you.

5. I should add that the Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me yesterday that agreement with France which had been negotiated recently provided for purchase by France of Turkish tobacco to a value of 20 million francs and opium to a value of 7½ million francs. Agreement provided for payment to Turkish

Government of 10 per cent. only in free exchange, and liquidation of blocked balances will be taken over by Société franco-turque previously constituted to effect service of Ottoman Debt by sale of Turkish commodities in France.

6. Minister of Commerce confirmed my supposition regarding objects of recently created semi-official " Takas " Office, reported in my telegram No. 65.

7. In view of extreme importance and natural urgency which Turkish Government attach to reduction of Turkish trade with all countries to a compensation basis, and in view of concessions which they are prepared to make in respect of Clearing Account B, I feel strongly that we should do everything possible to meet their wishes as expressed above. Both Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Commerce displayed considerable anxiety. They attach the greatest importance to measures which they are about to introduce, and which without collaboration of His Majesty's Government cannot, in fact, be fully effective.

[E 5828/43/44] No. 32.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (*Istanbul*).

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 21, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 85 [of 19th August: Anglo-Turkish compensation trade].

His Majesty's Government are most anxious to help the Turkish Government in the difficult situation in which they find themselves and to go as far as possible towards meeting their proposals.

2. They therefore agree, on the conditions indicated below, to accept the alternative proposal of the Turkish Government to transfer to Schedule 4 sultanas, figs and hazel-nuts.

3. But in spite of their anxiety to meet the wishes of the Turkish Government, His Majesty's Government are unable, without making a new Treasury order (which would lead to delay), to vary the percentages in which sterling derived from compensation sales is split up, *i.e.*, 10 per cent. to Sub-Account A, 30 per cent. to Sub-Account B, and 60 per cent. to Sub-Account C.

4. At the same time, His Majesty's Government do not feel able to transfer such important items as those mentioned in paragraph 2 to compensation trade without increasing the percentage allotted to Sub-Account A to 20 per cent.

5. They therefore make the following suggestion with the object of meeting these difficulties:—

6. The Clearing Office would continue to pay to Sub-Account B 30 per cent. of all sterling derived from compensation sales as extended under paragraph 2; but the Turkish Government would agree to hand over from Sub-Account B to a blocked sterling account, held in London in the name of the Central Bank of Turkey, one-third of the sterling sums paid into Sub-Account B between the entry into force of the temporary agreement (*i.e.*, the exchange of notes referred to in paragraph 9 below) and the conclusion of the final agreement (in other words, 10 per cent. of all compensation sterling received during that period). The amount so accumulated in the blocked account would be held intact until the final agreement became operative. Provision would be made in the final agreement for this amount then to be transferred to Sub-Account A.

7. This may appear a cumbrous procedure, but the Clearing Office have at present no power to vary the allocations to the different accounts (as already indicated in paragraph 3 above) or to take a special contribution into the clearing.

8. This arrangement would, of course, be without prejudice to the ultimate form which the final agreement may take.

9. The arrangement can best be effected by an exchange of notes between yourself and the Turkish Government. For your convenience, I am sending you in my telegram No. 63 the draft text of a note to be addressed to you by the Turkish Government, and in my telegram No. 64 a similar draft of your acknowledgment.

10. Two subsidiary points arise out of the present proposals:—

(*a*) His Majesty's Government assume that the present import into Turkey of United Kingdom goods for payment through Sub-Account A would continue to be permitted within limits of existing quotas.

(*b*) For your own information: You will recollect that articles 4 (2) (iii) and 5 (vii) of Supplementary Agreement provide that receipts in clearing in respect of raisins and figs in excess of £322,000 per annum shall be transferred to Anglo-Turkish Commodities (Limited). In view of small likelihood that receipts will reach this figure during the period of provisional arrangements, His Majesty's Government consider that no provision need be made to amend existing provisions in this respect pending negotiation of final agreement.

[E 5933/143/44] No. 33.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Istanbul).

(No. 73.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Foreign Office, August 23, 1939.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 78 and 82 of 15th and 17th August: Anglo-Turkish negotiations].

I am glad to note that the Turkish Government accept our proposals for the immediate despatch of material to Turkey. I note, however, that their acceptance is subject to what is practically a condition that the rate of interest for the new credits should be the current rate for British Government loans.

2. I am afraid that His Majesty's Government are unable to accept this suggestion. The Turkish Government evidently want to secure the same terms for the new credit as for the credits granted under the Armaments Credit Agreement of 1938 (though it should be noted that the latter provides for a fresh rate to be fixed in 1943 on the basis of the rates then current, while the Turkish Government are apparently now asking for present-day rates throughout).

3. The agreement of 1938 was an isolated measure, which has not been repeated in the subsequent cases in which His Majesty's Government have given assistance to foreign Governments to purchase armaments in this country. It was concluded on exceptionally advantageous terms to Turkey, but it must be remembered that the Guarantee Agreement which formed part of the same general scheme provided for the issue of £10 million of bills at 5½ per cent.

4. Since then, as the need to give further assistance to other countries has developed, His Majesty's Government have taken powers to guarantee credits for armaments under the Export Credit Scheme, and they have, as a result, concluded agreements with several countries, in particular Poland, Roumania and Greece, similar in nature to the Anglo-Turkish Guarantee Agreement; in the case of each of these three countries, the interest rate is 5 per cent. and provision was made for repayment within twenty years.

5. His Majesty's Government propose that a similar agreement with the same rate of interest providing for repayment within twenty years should be concluded with the Turkish Government, to cover the new credit of £10 million. They cannot, in their dealings with any country, agree to a lower rate of interest than 5 per cent., as a sufficient margin must be left between the face-value of the bonds to be sold and the actual price which they will fetch, in order to cover the expenses and premium of the Export Credits Guarantee Department (as in the case of the Guarantee Agreement, with the working of which the Turkish Government are familiar).

6. His Majesty's Government can plainly not give preferential treatment to Turkey over Poland, Roumania and Greece; nor would such treatment be justified. The rate is not only much lower than any which Turkey can command in the London market, but is also ½ per cent. lower than the rate charged under the Guarantee Agreement.

7. Please speak urgently to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the lines of the preceding paragraphs and urge him to accept the basis proposed by His Majesty's Government. You should ask him whether, in the knowledge that His Majesty's Government cannot accept his views as regards the rate of interest for the new credit, he is still willing to accept our proposals for the immediate delivery of material to be paid for from the 1938 credit. If so, His Majesty's Government will proceed at once with despatch of material, but he must realise that the only source from which the payment for the remainder of the Dardanelles scheme can, in that case, be made is the new credit, and that His Majesty's Government cannot give better terms than those which I have mentioned. If, on

the other hand, the Turkish Government cannot commit themselves to leaving the Dardanelles scheme to be paid for out of the new credit, in the absence of any agreement in respect of that credit, this will mean that scheme for making immediate deliveries on strength of old credit will have to be held in suspense. Moreover, the balance of 1938 credit is insufficient to cover both the completion of Dardanelles defences *and* other items already submitted, including especially a contract for Lysander aircraft (which is in any case, offering considerable difficulty owing—for your information—to the prices which the Turkish Government have agreed to pay being too high), so that something would have to be dropped.

8. It is, therefore, most important that the Turkish Government should reach a decision on this question at once, and I trust that they will be able to accept our proposals. You may inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government are very anxious that the despatch of materials should not be held up by any formalities. If the Turkish Government are prepared definitely to agree to interest at 5 per cent. and repayment within twenty years, the details of the agreement to be on the same lines as the similar agreements already concluded with Roumania and Greece, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to start delivery at once, without waiting for the formal signature of the agreement, provided that Turkish Embassy in London is authorised to give us an assurance in writing that the Turkish Government will furnish bonds to the necessary amount to cover the cost of these stores when the agreement has been signed and the bonds are available.

9. Similar communication is being made to Turkish Chargé d'Affaires.

[E 5951/1142/44] No. 34.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 443.)
My Lord, *Istanbul, August 11, 1939.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 375 of the 4th July, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the Turkish official *Gazette* of the 11th July published four laws, Nos. 3711–3714, voted by the Grand National Assembly on the 7th July, which relate to the incorporation into Turkey of the Sanjak of Alexandretta. Translations of these laws are transmitted herewith.(1)

2. Law No. 3711 creates the new vilayet of the Hatay with the seat of Administration at Antioch, and comprising the territory of the former sanjak together with the *kaza* of Dörtyol and the *nahije* of Hassa, which have hitherto been included in the vilayet of Seyhan (Adana). The "Articles Transitoires" of the law govern the change-over from the financial and administrative system established for the former Hatay Government to that of Turkey.

3. Law No. 3712 provides for the introduction of conscription into the Hatay.

4. Law No. 3713 deals with the judicial and legal consequences of the annexation. Among its provisions attention may be called to article 4, which allows of appeals being entered with the Court of Cassation at Angora against judgments pronounced in the name of the mandatory authority before the creation of the State of the Hatay; and to article 10, which extends amnesty to all persons sentenced for offences committed before the 2nd September, 1938, when the National Assembly of the Hatay was constituted.

5. Law 3714 transfers the administration of the port of Alexandretta and of the Payas Alexandretta Railway to the Turkish State Harbour Administration and to the Turkish State Railway Administration respectively.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's consular officers at Mersin, Aleppo and Alexandretta.

I have, &c.
HUGHE KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

(1) Not printed.

[E 5939/1142/44] No. 35.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 452.)

My Lord, *Istanbul, August 16, 1939.*

WITH reference to the despatch No. 59 of the 27th July addressed to your Lordship by His Majesty's Consul, Aleppo, regarding the cession of the Sanjak of Alexandretta to Turkey, I have the honour to inform you that extensive rejoicings took place throughout Turkey to celebrate the event in question. Streets were beflagged and public buildings and large numbers of private dwellings were illuminated.

2. Press comments are naturally enthusiastic and take the view that the transfer of the Hatay has removed the last obstacle to the resumption of cordial relations between France and Turkey. On the other hand, the departure of a large proportion of the non-Turkish elements has caused a certain feeling of irritation, and it is pointed out that the Turkey of to-day is not the régime of oppression of twenty years ago, since all persons, irrespective of race or creed, are equal in the sight of the law, and that, providing they abstain from becoming the tools of foreign subversive propaganda, their happiness and prosperity under the new régime is assured. Moreover, Turkey was magnanimous, and persons who may have been guilty of hostile acts towards her might rest assured that the past was forgotten.

3. The weight of Turkish taxation and the menace of military service as citizens of the Turkish Republic has no doubt greatly reinforced the political urge on certain sections of the population of the Hatay to emigrate to areas where commerce is less handicapped. The difference between prevailing official and the "black" rates for Syrian money has also been a consideration of no small importance, and residents in the Hatay have found it convenient to follow their money, which in many cases was remitted to Syria and other neighbouring countries when the transfer of the Hatay area to Turkey became evident. It is rumoured on the Istanbul market, though I have so far been unable to confirm the information, that the branches of the Central Bank of Turkey in the Hatay are now buying foreign currency at "black" rates, as a means of (1) securing foreign exchange, and (2) persuading would-be emigrants that full value for their moneys can be obtained under the new régime.

4. I am given to understand that, as a result of the above circumstances, business is largely at a standstill, and the uncertainty as to whether Hatay is to be incorporated into the existing clearing systems in force in Turkey is causing customers to refrain from placing orders, or suppliers from accepting them, until a definite régime is established.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.

H. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

[R 6754/661/67] No. 36.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Istanbul).

(No. 76.)

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 24, 1939.*

IN view of the deterioration in the international situation, I regard it as of the utmost importance that the political agreement, text of which was contained in my telegram No. 377 of the 4th August, should be signed without further delay. I am in close touch with the French Government with a view to reaching an early decision as to how far it is possible for our two Governments to meet the Turkish financial and economic requirements. Meanwhile, as you will see from my telegram No. 62, His Majesty's Government have gone a long way towards meeting the immediate difficulties of the Turkish Government over compensation trade. As regards war material, I hope within the next twenty-four hours to inform you of decisions which will have resulted from the special efforts being made by His Majesty's Government to overcome very real difficulties of a constitutional nature.

2. While I realise that until full and definite information on the above points is in the hands of the Turkish Government they are likely to be averse from

committing themselves to signature of the political treaty, it is becoming more and more essential to make progress with the text of the ultimate agreement which I understand from your telegram No. 81 has now been in the possession of the Turkish Government since the 16th August.

3. In its present form the agreement is governmental in form and full powers only require signature of the Secretary of State. This is the form which is being used in the case of the Polish Agreement. The use of heads of States form would involve serious constitutional difficulties in view of the position of the Dominions, and it is most desirable that the Turkish Government should be discouraged from insisting on it. These difficulties might be very hard to circumvent and the delay would be inordinate. I therefore propose to telegraph to you *en clair* authority to sign, and you should request the Turkish Government to accept this pending the receipt of eventual full power.

4. In bringing the foregoing to the attention of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in whatever way you think best please impress on his Excellency necessity of making rapid progress, so that we should be in a position to afford the world proof of the solidarity of our Governments in the face of common danger. It is for this reason and not, of course, that I doubt in the remotest degree Turkish good faith that I am so anxious to publish our agreement.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 453, Saving (*en clair*, by bag).)

[E 5979/143/44] No. 37.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen (Istanbul).

[By Telephone.]

(No. 81.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August 25, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 73 [of the 23rd August: Immediate shipment of armaments to Turkey].

In view of changing political circumstances, His Majesty's Government are at once despatching such war material as is ready without waiting for final agreement to be reached regarding terms of credit.

2. Please inform Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs urgently. A further telegram will follow about financial terms.

[R 6794/661/67] No. 38.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Istanbul).

(No. 84.)

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 25, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 80.

Retention of Turkey in the peace front is obviously vital at this stage, and His Majesty's Government are ready to make great sacrifices to attain this end. You should be guided by this consideration, and if the Turkish Government put forward any requests which do not appear wholly inacceptable, and the satisfaction of which you regard as essential, you should take the line that you will at once, of course, transmit them. You should add that His Majesty's Government will wish to go as far as they possibly can to meet them, and in the present circumstances, and those that may shortly develop, you have no doubt that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to go to great lengths.

You should then refer to me urgently, and I will make every effort to let you have an immediate favourable reply. I hope that this measure of discretion will help you to conclude with von Papen

[E 6008/43/44] No. 39.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 110.)
(Telegraphic.) *Istanbul, August 26, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 108.

I have now had conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs, which I consider very satisfactory. He assured me that Turkey's policy had not changed, and reminded me that decision to follow policy in sympathy with Great Britain had been taken long ago. Polish Ambassador tells me that he already had received similar assurance.

2. I am reporting in my two immediately following telegrams his provisional replies on points in our note, and I consider these replies as confirming my view that Turkish Government are determined to pursue policy represented by Anglo-Turkish Agreement.

3. I spoke to him of your urgent desire to see rapid conclusion of the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Agreement.

4. I asked him about Herr von Papen's activities. He stated that, beyond action reported in my telegram No. 87, German Ambassador had used no pressure at present, and Minister for Foreign Affairs' impression had been that his Excellency was somewhat discountenanced. Minister for Foreign Affairs assured me that up to now German Ambassador had made no mention of possible Turco-Italian Pact beyond a vague suggestion [two groups omitted] repetition of what German Ambassador had said on several much earlier occasions.

5. Herr von Papen is to see the President this afternoon. Minister for Foreign Affairs does not expect him to raise any new point, but has promised to inform me as soon as possible if he does so.

[R 6707/661/67] No. 40

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 28.)

[By Telephone.]

(No. 113.)
(Telegraphic.) *Istanbul, August 26, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 85.

I am inclined to think that despatch of proposed mission would be interpreted as a sign of panic and possibly of distrust of Turkish Government. I am encouraged at interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs reported in my telegrams Nos. 110, 111 and 112 to believe that there is no need for either, though time is no doubt an important factor.

2. I agree that arrival of mission would tend to encourage increased demands, and so also would further lapse of time.

3. The only possible danger seems to be that German Ambassador may spring some surprise at his audience with President of the Republic this afternoon, but Minister for Foreign Affairs has promised to inform me at once if this occurs, and I think it unlikely President would surrender then and there to a German bribe or threat. If he did, action could hardly [group undecypherable] in time.

4. If I may have immediate instructions regarding financial and economic points, together with power to offer something as regards gold loan or tobacco purchase or both, I think Turkish Government will come into line. A third point on which some concession might be possible would be rate of interest on new credit (see my telegram No. 111). It would also be necessary for me to know how far I can go in accepting Minister for Foreign Affairs' views on draft definitive agreement. These views are enumerated in my telegrams Nos. 93 and 112.

5. If you can give me urgent instructions and discretion on all these points, together with necessary telegram regarding full powers, I will at once approach Minister for Foreign Affairs. I have already told him of my hope that agreement may be concluded next week.

6. I realise responsibility which I am incurring in expressing these views, but if Turkish Government were to decide to reverse their policy now, I do not think mission could arrive in time to save situation. I should still propose, however, to act on paragraph 3 of your telegram under reference if it appears advisable to do so.

7. It would be helpful to me if your reply could reach me in morning of 28th August.

[C 12134/15/18] No. 41.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Istanbul).

(No. 91.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 26, 1939.*

THE following appreciation may be of use in any discussions you may have with the Turkish Government on the situation arising from the recent German-Soviet Agreement:

1. While it must be evident to all that the conclusion of the Russo-German Pact of Non-Aggression has radically changed the political situation and rendered the position of Poland more difficult, nevertheless all our information goes to show that Poland will defend herself if attacked, and it is always possible that the Germans (and Russians) have under-estimated the fighting capacity of the Polish nation. In any case, if Poland fights, we and the French fight also; and Germany will be forced to maintain an increasingly large number of troops on the Siegfried Line. This means that Germany's aim of a lightning result will not be achieved, and that war once started by an attack on Poland will continue in the west and elsewhere. During this period the military strength of France and Great Britain will be on the increase, while the economic and possibly also the military strength of Germany will be on the decrease.

2. We have positive and entirely reliable evidence that Germany's stocks of certain raw materials essential for war purposes are very low. Indeed, her oil supply (including coal-produced oil) and that of certain other essential materials, such as copper, is unlikely under war conditions to last more than about five months. Unless, therefore, she can obtain the full production of the Galician and Roumanian fields it is difficult to see how she can carry on a campaign into 1940; and even with the full production of these fields available (which for various reasons is most unlikely) she would even then not have sufficient for her needs after the first year of war. As for the Russian output, it is difficult to see how she could possibly obtain any material supplies from Baku, under war conditions and given the poor state of Russian communications. In any case, the annual exports of oil from Baku are only 1¼ million tons. These difficulties apply in greater or lesser degree to Germany obtaining regular supplies of any kind from Russia in considerable quantities. Further, there is every reason to suppose that the rate of Soviet production cannot be materially increased even under war conditions. Unless, therefore, the Soviet Union is prepared to reduce the standard of living of her own people and to sacrifice her own industry to Germany's benefit, the raw materials she can supply to Germany are strictly limited both in quantity and in kind. There is, in addition, the question of transport, which has always been one of the principal limiting factors in Russian development and trade. Since at the outset of war sea routes from Russia to Germany, other than those in the Baltic, will be closed, much of the material Germany will require from the Soviet Union will have to be carried by rail from the distant south-eastern and eastern districts of the U.S.S.R. This difficulty will not be removed even should Germany and Russia obtain common frontier in East Poland. Moreover, our own information is that the state of the German railways is far from satisfactory. If, therefore, a sea blockade is maintained—and it will be—we may assume that the Germans will find it increasingly difficult to engage on large-scale hostilities after the spring of 1940, either on land or in the air.

3. Thus, even with some form of active co-operation on the part of the Soviet Union, the long-term prospects of war are unfavourable to Germany.

4. As for the possibility of Germany receiving direct military assistance from Russia, we may take it that the Soviet Government's present policy is that of neutrality; first, because she can have no desire to help Germany to increase

her field of domination on Russia's frontiers; secondly, because we have reason to believe that her military and naval forces are not capable of any effective offensive; and thirdly, because she no doubt wishes to be able eventually to throw in her weight on the winning side. We can therefore discount the likelihood of Germany receiving military support from Russia in present circumstances.

5. Again, the political repercussions of Germany's pact with Moscow are by no means all to the advantage of Germany, and have already gone some way to mitigate what appeared at first sight to be its undoubted advantages from the German point of view. In the first place Japan has been publicly slighted by the tearing up of the Anti-Comintern Pact and by the signing of a document article 4 of which runs counter to Germany's previous engagement to Japan. In the second place, the realisation of the political cynicism animating both the German and the Soviet Government has already produced a healthy reaction in Western Europe and in the United States of America. As for the Mediterranean, Catholic Spain is now even less likely than before to favour the Axis, with consequently great benefit to our naval position.

6. It may be that the Turkish Government has some fear of incurring the active displeasure of Russia by maintaining her connexion with the Western Powers. I see no ground for such fear, but in any case I am confident that the new Turkey, in alliance with Great Britain and France, would be able to deal with Russian hostility, if it arose, even more effectively than the old Turkey dealt with it repeatedly in the past.

7. To resume, I am of the opinion, which I trust the Turkish Government will share, that if Germany provokes a war in the near future, even with the qualified assistance of the Soviet, it will result, after not too long a period of bloodshed and horror, in the internal collapse of the two colossi with feet of clay. For this to come about, however, it is essential that the vigorous, intelligent nations composing the present Peace Front should stand firm in their intention of resisting force by force. To this end the entire strength of the British Empire will be placed behind the Turkish Republic.

8. These arguments are supplied to you for use at your discretion and in the form you consider most likely to achieve our object.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 296; Bucharest, No. 336; Lisbon No. 122; and Cairo, No. 550.)

[R 6821/661/67] No. 42.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (*Received August 27.*)

[By Telephone.]

(No. 347.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, August 27, 1939.*

ISTANBUL, telegram No. 117.

It will be evident that up till now German pressure has not succeeded. I consider the present to be psychological moment for securing conclusion of our agreement.

2. I propose on 28th August to ask Minister for Foreign Affairs and to go through text of draft [group undecypherable] agreement, examining his comments and to agree with him on final text which I can refer to you. As regards Minister for Foreign Affairs [two groups undecypherable] (see my telegrams Nos. 93 and 112 from Istanbul), I consider that in the last resort [two groups undecypherable] accepted [group undecypherable] and do what I can to hold him to your original draft.

3. As regards financial and economic matters, commercial secretary and I are strongly of opinion that initial and fundamental point is gold loan. [Group undecypherable] clear to us all [group undecypherable]. We feel whole circumstances can be [group undecypherable]ed by [group undecypherable], such as, say, £10 million at low rate of interest to support Turkish plans, service of which could be effected by sale in United Kingdom of Turkish commodities, not necessarily only tobacco. If this is settled, most other points in my telegram No. 112 from Istanbul should be easy of settlement, and some would tend to settle themselves. You will see from my telegram No. 111 from Istanbul that question of new £10 million credit for armaments is now [group undecypherable].

4. In view of need for rapid action, I would suggest division of bullion loan between ourselves and France be discussed between the two Governments later.

5. I will, of course, discuss the whole matter with my French colleague before seeing Minister for Foreign Affairs and endeavour to induce him to accompany me. But, if necessary, I propose to act alone. [Two groups undecypherable] should be immediately [group undecypherable] term to you this need not finally commit you.

6. Above is subject to any instructions which you may have sent me in the meanwhile, and in the light of which I would regulate my action.

7. I should add that our delay in concluding agreement is having bad effect on Turkish public opinion.

8. I beg for the earliest reply by telephone.

[R 6818/661/67] No. 43.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen (*Angora*).

(No. 270
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 27, 1939.*

ISTANBUL telegram No. 112 of 26th August: Negotiations with Turkey.

1. If what the Turkish Government intend is to provide for the possibility that at the end of any one term of the treaty either the United Kingdom or France but not both may wish to terminate the agreement, the simplest way of meeting their new point would seem to be to provide that in such case the agreement should continue so between the other country and Turkey. A revised version of article 7 on these lines is given in paragraph 3 of this telegram.

2. If, however, the intention of the Turkish Government, absurd though this is, is to provide for the possibility that either the United Kingdom or France may wish to withdraw from the obligations of the agreement during the period of its validity, the only way of meeting them would seem to be to agree to separate Anglo-Turkish and Franco-Turkish exchanges of notes. These would have to be kept confidential and would be to the effect that if one of the parties to the agreement sought to terminate its obligations under it at a time when it was not entitled to do so under article 7, the agreement would, notwithstanding this, remain valid as between the two remaining parties.

3. Following amendments are required to meet Turkish points (*a*) and (*b*) in Istanbul telegram No. 93 [of 24th August]:—

Preamble.—Omit words "in accordance with . . . . League of Nations."

Article 5.—Omit words "which is in conformity . . . . League of Nations."

Article 7.—First paragraph of this should now read as follows:—

"The present Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature and shall remain in force for fifteen years, unless one of the contracting Governments gives notice, not less than six months before the expiration of a period of five years or ten years from its entry into force, of its intention to terminate the agreement. If such notice is given by the Turkish Government or by the Governments of both the United Kingdom and France, the agreement will terminate on the expiry of the said period of five or ten years, as the case may be. If such notice is given by either the Government of the United Kingdom or the Government of France but not by the other, the agreement will remain in force as between the Turkish Government and the other contracting Government which has not denounced it."

(Repeated to Paris, No. 265.)

[R 6797/661/67] No. 44

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 275.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 28, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 113 and previous telegrams from Istanbul, and your telegram No. 347 from Angora: [Negotiations with Turkey].

I much regret that, in spite of importance of settling economic and financial questions at earliest date, it will not be possible to authorise you to hold out hopes regarding bullion loan or regarding tobacco at present. The most you can tell Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs on 28th August is to assure him that whole position is under active consideration.

2. For your own information, our losses of gold have been very great, and our exchange position is so difficult that question will arise of cutting down our own purchase of munitions in Canada and United States of America. Bullion loan, therefore, involves utmost difficulties. As regards tobacco and other points, need for rapid decision is fully realised, but we can give you no decisions till whole matter has been discussed by Cabinet.

3. Treasury officials have already had a long and friendly private talk with Halit Nazmi, who is an old friend of theirs. They feel that they have convinced the Turkish delegates that His Majesty's Government are doing all they can to reach agreement at the earliest possible moment on the various problems at issue.

[R 6826/661/67] No. 45.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen (Angora).

(By Telephone.

(No. 276.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 28, 1939.*

PARIS telegram No. 583, Saving, and Paris telegram No. 277 [of 27th and 28th August: Negotiations with Turkey].

In view of possible risk to whole agreement and, in any case, of the certainty of further delay which this would cause, I consider that it would be undesirable to raise with the Turkish Government the question of including in agreement any obligation of the nature discussed in paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 264 to Paris. In the event of a war over Poland, Turkish obligation, as at present provided for, will accordingly be one of consultation only, under article 4.

2. You will have seen from telegrams above referred to that both we and the French are prepared to accept (*a*) and (*b*) of the four points in paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 93. We are also in agreement as to the abandonment of the requirement in article 2, paragraph 2, of the draft treaty, and you are authorised to agree to this abandonment, if necessary, though of course we should prefer to see the paragraph left in. If it is omitted, you should try to extend article 4 to cover the case of aggression against France or the United Kingdom, but you need not insist on this if it seems likely to cause difficulty.

3. The only outstanding point is (*d*). I think it essential that I should see exact wording which Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes, and I assume he will give you this in your interview to-day (your telegram No. 112 [of 26th August]). There should accordingly be very little delay incurred in awaiting these comments. Please telegraph result of your interview "Most Immediate."

(Repeated to Paris, No. 267.)

[R 6826/661/67] No. 46.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 278.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 28, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 276 [of to-day's date: Negotiations with Turkey], paragraph 2.

1. If decision is to abandon article 2, paragraph (2), and to provide for consultation in the case of direct aggression against either the United Kingdom or France, the following alterations to article 4 would be required

2. Article should then start: "Without prejudice to the provisions of articles 1 and 3 above." This is necessary to ensure that there is no doubt which article is applicable in the event of an act of aggression against the United Kingdom or France which leads to war in the Mediterranean area. In such a case, article 1 will, of course, be the operative one.

3. Paragraphs (1) and (2) of article 4 should be numbered (2) and (3), and a new paragraph (1) should be inserted to read as follows: 'Aggression by a European Power against either the United Kingdom or France."

(Repeated to Paris, No. 270.)

[E 6070/1142/44] No. 47.

Sir E. Phipps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 29).

(No. 1112 E.)
My Lord, *Paris, August 27, 1939.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 905 E. of the 13th July, I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship that, as a result of the commercial negotiations which have been proceeding in Paris between the French delegation, headed by M. Hervé Alphand, Director of the Commercial Agreements Department at the Ministry of Commerce, and the Turkish delegation, headed by M. Halid Nezni Kessmir, Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Commerce in Turkey, various economic arrangements were signed on the 23rd instant by M. Bonnet and M. Kessmir. A statement issued to the press by the Ministry of Commerce summarises these arrangements as follows.

2. A codicil to the Convention of Commerce and Navigation of the 29th August 1929 maintains in force most-favoured-nation treatment on both sides. Measures are provided for with the object of bringing about an expansion in trade between the two countries and of thawing more rapidly French credits that are in arrear. For the latter purpose a payments agreement improves very considerably the system of private clearing, which becomes the sole method of trade between France and Turkey.

3. In place of the former exchange "points" of 35 per cent. (*i.e.*, the proportion of the value of Turkish imports into France credited to the Central Bank of Turkey to be used as it thinks fit), which hampered transactions and which the two delegations have decided to reduce to a considerable extent, special facilities have been placed at the disposal of the Turkish Government to meet the cost of French books, reviews and journals sold in Turkey and also for the settlement of certain non-commercial expenditure such as the subsistence of Turkish students in France, official missions, touring, &c.

4. The statement concludes by saying that the arrangements which have just been signed complete very happily, in the economic sphere, the political agreement which has recently drawn closer the ties of friendship between the two countries.

5. The newspapers state that under the terms of the new agreement, which will take effect from the 1st September next, the exchange "points" which stood at 35 per cent. (exclusive of 5 per cent. earmarked for trade arrears) will be reduced to 6 per cent. This provision, added to a rearrangement of the mechanism for transferring Turkish import certificates, which should lead to a reduction of the import bounty, and the generalising of private clearing, justify the hope that there will be a substantial increase in French exports to Turkey. The articles, the sale of which will be encouraged, are chiefly luxury products. In return France would increase her purchases in Turkey, particularly of tobacco. Transfers of financial (*i.e.*, non-commercial) credits will continue to be effected under the conditions now in force through the Société commerciale franco-turque

6. I have forwarded a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Representative at Angora and to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.
E. PHIPPS.

[E 6063/43/44] No. 48.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 284.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 29, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 353 [of 28th August: Financial assistance to Turkey].

Mr. Waley saw M. Kesmir to-day and informed him that the Chancellor of the Exchequer and I had considered the requests for assistance which the Turkish Government had made. As a result he was authorised to say that His Majesty's Government would be ready to consider making a loan to the Turkish Government not exceeding £3 million sterling in order to facilitate the liberation of the gold which the Central Bank had pledged, on condition that this loan would not be drawn off in gold or in foreign exchange, except *pari passu* with the already existing resources of the Central Bank in gold and foreign exchange.

2. Mr. Waley, speaking personally, thought it possible that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to consider any other analogous formula which the Turkish Government might wish to suggest so long as it had the same result; that is to say that the loan would not be immediately transferred into gold or foreign exchange, but that the transfers would be spread out over a fairly long period.

3. Further, His Majesty's Government would be ready to lend to the Turkish Government the sterling amount necessary to secure the transfer of the clearing arrears (about £2 million). Mr. Waley handed M. Kesmir a note in the terms of the preceding paragraphs.

4. In explaining the position to M. Kesmir, Mr. Waley made clear that our desire to help was only limited by the possibilities of the present position, and that the most careful consideration had been given to the Turkish requests by the Ministers concerned before the conclusion described above had been reached. M. Kesmir said that he was not at the moment qualified to comment on the proposals, but would report them immediately to his Government and ask for instructions.

[R 6923/661/67] No. 49.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 356.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, August 29, 1939.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

My French colleague and I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning and worked through the French text of the draft.

2. The following amendments were discussed:

(*a*) *Preamble.*—Reference to League of Nations is maintained, but for "principles" read "spirit."

(*b*) *Article* 1 (1).—Add at the beginning: "In the event of an act of aggression by a Mediterranean Power against the United Kingdom or France or in the event of" after which continue as in your original draft.

Article 1 (2).—Add similarly at the beginning, substituting "Turkey" for "United Kingdom or France."

These two additions are designed to meet the Minister for Foreign Affairs' argument that the article in the original form does not provide for direct aggression by a Mediterranean Power, but only for aggression "leading to war in the Mediterranean." This point would seem to be covered by article 2 (1) and he saw no harm in this amendment.

(*c*) *Article* 2 (2). Cancel from "Turkish Government" to the end and substitute "Turkish Government will co-operate with the Government of the United Kingdom and the French Government in the manner which, by common accord, shall be recognised as the most efficacious."

(*d*) *Article* 4.—The Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests adding at the end "high contracting parties agree notwithstanding that, in the event foreseen in paragraph 2 of this article, the carrying of war into the security zone, to be delimited by their General Staffs, will automatically bring into play material assistance at the request of any one of the contracting parties."

We are taking this up again with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, pointing out that as we are now guaranteeing Turkey against Bulgaria, there seems no

point in it, especially in view of the provisions of this article. In any case, in its present form it commits us too far.

(*e*) *Article* 5.—Omit reference to League of Nations.

(*f*) *Article* 6.—Add at the beginning: "A military convention which shall be an integral part of the present treaty will be concluded with the least possible delay. In addition, conversations shall take place." Continue as in the original text.

(*g*) The Minister for Foreign Affairs desires here to insert an article to cover the point referred to in my telegram No. 112 and your telegram No. 270. Text is as follows (translated):—

> "The engagements contained in the present tripartite treaty are binding at the same time and with the same consequences and effects, for the one part, on Turkey and Great Britain, and, for the other part, on Turkey and France as the bilateral engagements."

Draft at the end of your telegram No. 270 seems far preferable, and I shall try to secure his acceptance if I can do so without his raising the point discussed in second paragraph of your telegram No. 270. Otherwise, we will press for separate and confidential exchange of letters.

(*h*) Following is text proposed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as amended in certain details by my French colleague and myself:—

> "The present treaty, which will come into force on the day of its signature, shall be ratified. Instruments of ratification will be exchanged at Angora as soon as possible.
>
> "The present treaty shall remain in force for fifteen years, if none of the contracting parties has notified to the others its intention to terminate six months before the expiration of the above-mentioned period."

(*Note by Communications Department.* Remainder undecypherable; repetition asked for.)

[R 6910/661/67] No. 50.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 286.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 30, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 286 [of 29th August: Negotiations with Turkey].

Following alterations will now be required to adapt agreement to its new form:—

2. The preamble should now read as follows:—

"The President of the French Republic, His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India (in respect of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) and the President of the Turkish Republic;

"Desiring to conclude a treaty of a reciprocal character in the interest of their national security, and to provide for mutual assistance in resistance to aggression, in accordance with the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations;

"Have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:—

"The President of the French Republic:

"(*A.B.*)

"His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

"For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

"(*C.D.*)

"The President of the Turkish Republic:

"(*E.F.*)

"Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:—"

3. *Article* 3.—For words "in the event of those Governments" substitute "in the event of the United Kingdom and France."

4. *Article* 4.—In both sub-paragraphs for words "one of the contracting Governments" substitute "the Government of one of the high contracting parties." In the last sentence for "the contracting Governments" substitute "the high contracting parties."

5. *Article* 6.—For words "three Governments" substitute "high contracting parties."

6. In both articles 5 and 6 "agreement" should read "treaty."

7. *Article* 7.—Following is redraft of this article in the light of the new form of the agreement:—

"The present treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications shall be deposited simultaneously at Angora at the earliest possible moment.

"The treaty shall come into force on the date of deposit and shall remain in force for fifteen years unless the Government of one of the high contracting parties gives notice, not less than six months before the expiration of a period of five years or ten years from its entry into force, of the intention of that high contracting party to terminate the treaty. If such notice is given by the Turkish Government or by the Governments of both the United Kingdom and France, the treaty will terminate on the expiry of the said period of five or ten years, as the case may be. If such notice is given by either the Government of the United Kingdom or the Government of France, but not by the other, the treaty will remain in force as between Turkey and the other high contracting party who has not denounced it.

"In witness whereof the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

"Done at Angora the in triplicate."

8. In view of the Turkish requirement that there should be ratification, you should make every effort to secure that there should be provision for bringing the treaty provisionally into operation on signature. This would seem best done by means of a protocol of signature annexed to the treaty. Following is draft for this protocol:—

"Pending the ratification of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance signed this day, the undersigned plenipotentiaries agree that the said treaty shall be regarded as having entered into force provisionally from the date of signature.

"In the event of ratification being delayed, the high contracting parties will, at the request of any one of them, consult together as to the measures to be adopted with regard to the continuance of their mutual co-operation. If no agreement is reached, any high contracting party shall then have the right to terminate the provisional operation of the said treaty by giving (one) month's notice to each of the other high contracting parties.

"Done at Angora the day of , 1939."

9. You will appreciate that effect of the preamble given in paragraph 2 is that the treaty does *not* apply to the Dominions. Question of possible participation by any Dominion is entirely one for it, and any mention of it would at best involve serious delay. You should, therefore, not encourage idea of a Dominion accession clause. Our present proposals as to form should give the Turkish Government all they can reasonably require.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 281, Immediate.)

[R 6910/661/67] No. 51.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora)

(No. 291.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 30, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 356 [of 29th August: Negotiations with Turkey].

Following are my comments on amendments proposed:—

(*a*) I agree.

(*b*) I do not like these additions, which, in my opinion, are aimed too specifically at Italy. The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs argues that present wording of article 1 does not specifically provide for the case of direct aggression by a Mediterranean Power. It is, however, inconceivable that any such aggression could occur without there following "war in the Mediterranean area." In any event, as you yourself point out, the case of direct aggression by Italy against Turkey, which is that which Minister for Foreign Affairs must be thinking of, is separately provided for in article 2 (1), so that it is redundant to elaborate article 1 with this case in view.

(*c*) Proposed amendment of article 2 (2) provides for an obligation on the part of Turkey which is slightly further-reaching than that which I have suggested for first paragraph of article 4 (my telegram No. 278 [of 27th August]). I am prepared to accept it. Article 4 should accordingly revert to its original form, subject to the amendment in paragraph 1 of my telegram No. 52 to Istanbul [of 12th August]. In endeavouring to obtain the omission of the proposed addition to article 1, as instructed at (*b*) above, you might use as a consideration to be borne in mind the fact that we for our part are agreeing to a reduction of Turkey's obligations under article 2 (2) without requiring any corresponding watering down of our obligations under article 2 (1) which we might logically have been entitled to expect in order to maintain the principle of reciprocity.

(*d*) I agree with attitude you propose to adopt this suggested amendment.

(*e*) I agree.

(*f*) Terms of a military convention have already been agreed upon in their essentials. Nature of the convention is such that it is impossible that it should be published, which would seem inevitable if the treaty itself states that the military convention forms an "integral part" of it. Turkish point could, if necessary, be met by providing *in the military convention* that it form an integral part of the treaty.

(*g*) Turkish draft seems clumsy, and I approve course proposed by you.

(*h*) I am sending you in my telegram No. 200 a text which I consider is much more suitable. I note that your draft does not mention provision for denunciation at fifth and tenth year. This is, of course, essential, and I see from your telegram No. 93 [of the 24th August], paragraph 4 (*b*), that Minister for Foreign Affairs himself was contemplating this. In all our negotiations for formation of a peace front we have contemplated an original period of only five years. Our recently-concluded treaty with Poland can be terminated any time after five years. Assumption of a non-terminable obligation for a longer period in the case of an analogous treaty would place us in an impossible position *vis-à-vis* the Polish Government and, further, would be difficult to explain to public opinion here.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 499. Saving (by bag), *en clair*.)

[R 6953/661/67] No. 52.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received August* 31.)

(No. 359.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, August* 30, 1939.

MY telegram No. 356.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, my French colleague and I have now reached agreement in principle on the text of the treaty. The Minister for Foreign Affairs still has to consult his colleagues and submit the text to legal advisers. He hopes to meet us again on 1st September.

2. The text is in the form shown in my telegram No. 356, subject to the following further amendments (references are to paragraph 2 in my telegram No. 356):—

(*b*) For "Mediterranean Power" read in both paragraphs "European Power on the Mediterranean seaboard." The object is to exclude Egypt.

(*d*) (This is the addition proposed by the Turkish Government.) It is understood that letters on this subject shall be exchanged separately.

(*f*) Read "a military convention shall be concluded with the least possible delay; it shall be considered as an integral part of the present treaty."

(*g*) We have accepted the Turkish text, feeling it better to do so, and thus avoid raising more complicated points such as those touched on in the second paragraph of your telegram No. 270. This becomes article 7.

(*h*) Becomes article 8.

3. I informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs of your acceptance of the treaty form (your telegram No. 286).

[R 6953/661/67] No. 53.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 298.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 31, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 359 [of 30th August: Negotiations with Turkey].
Following are my observations:—

(*b*) Revised wording for addition to article 1 does not get round the objection that it is too specifically aimed at Italy, which is most undesirable at this critical and delicate stage of developments in Europe. I regard it as of greatest importance that original wording of article 1 in my despatch No. 441 [of 3rd August] should be retained.

(*f*) We prefer method of meeting the Turkish point given in my telegram No. 291 [of 30th August], but we are prepared, if necessary, to accept this addition to article 6.

(*g*) We are ready to agree to Turkish text; but in view of what I have said in my telegram No. 291 about the necessity for five-year breaks (on which we must insist), adequate provisions for denunciation in the new article 8 will have to be included, and these must be consistent with the new wording of article 7. For purpose of drafting these you may be able to utilise at any rate parts of the draft in my telegram No. 290 [of 30th August].

2. I note that there is no further mention of the "security zone" proposal for article 4. What is the position as regards this? This proposal would require most careful consideration. We understand from the French that it has been dropped and replaced by some other scheme.

3. You will appreciate that we must submit final text to Ministers before it is definitely approved.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 287, Immediate.)

[R 6979/661/67] No. 54.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 299.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 31, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 365 [of 31st August: Turkish negotiations].

I am afraid I cannot agree to alteration you suggest in paragraph 3 of your telegram under reference, and you must do your best to induce Minister for Foreign Affairs to modify his views by use of arguments set forth in paragraph (*h*) of my telegram No. 291 [of 30th August].

2. As regards (*d*), your telegram under reference does not say why passage mentioned in your telegram No. 356 has been dropped or what the arrangement is which is to be the subject of exchange of letters mentioned at (*d*) in your telegram No. 359 [of 30th August]. It is essential that I should be fully informed of what is proposed, and you should agree to nothing under this head until you have my authority.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 292, Immediate.)

[E 6203/6203/44] No. 55.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 1.)

(No. 468. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Istanbul, August* 22, 1939.

WITH reference to Sir Percy Loraine's despatch No. 47, Confidential, of the 3rd February, 1938, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship the accompanying notes on leading Turkish perosnalities, revised up to the 30th June, last.

2. It will be observed that the former alphabetical arrangement has been retained, and that, as in last year's report, a list showing the new surnames has been added for purposes of reference.

3. Seven of the personalities in last year's report, including, of course, the former President of the Republic, have since died and their names will be found at the end of the report. Nine new biographies have been compiled, of which seven are those of Deputies, hitherto little known, who attained to Cabinet rank during the last eighteen months, namely, M. Hasan Ali Yücel, Minister of Education; M. Cezmi Erçin, Minister of Commerce; M. Faiz Öztrak, Minister of the Interior; M. Hüsnü Çaker, Minister of National Economy; M. Raif Karadeniz, Minister of Customs and Monopolies; General Naci Tinaz, Minister of National Defence, and M. Tevfik Fikret Silay, for some months Minister of Justice. The remaining two new biographies are those of M. Ahmet Fikri Tuzer, Secretary-General of the People's party, and M. Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, a distinguished journalist recently elected to the Grand National Assembly.

I have, &c.
H. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

Enclosure in No. 55.

Notes on Leading Turkish Personalities.

1. ***Abdulhalik (Renda).***

Born at Yanina about 1870. Belongs to a family of Albanian Tosks. Educated at Yanina and at Mülkiye College, Constantinople. In 1908 appointed member of the Council of State. Uncle by marriage of the late Talat Pasha. In 1910–11, Vali of Skoplje (Usküp). 1914–15, Vali of Van. For a short period in 1915 was Under-Secretary for the Interior. 1915–16, Vali of Bitlis, and 1916–17 of Aleppo. Again became Under-Secretary of the Interior, holding post until the armistice. Arrested in May 1920 and deported to Malta on charge of atrocities committed at Aleppo during the war. Learnt to play tennis and bridge at Malta. In 1923 was Vali of Smyrna, when he got on well with Europeans. In July elected Deputy for Çankiri. In January 1924 succeeded Hasan Fehmi Bey as Minister of Finance, and held post till March 1925. Resigned on fall of Fethi Bey and became director-general of the Agricultural Bank and chairman of the Parliamentary Committee of Finance. In July 1926 became Minister of Finance. He soon showed himself aware of the weakness of Turkey's financial position abroad, and visited Europe in the summer of 1927, when he was identified with an arrangement for the settlement of the "coupons" question. In September he was re-elected Deputy for Çankiri, and in November, on the reconstruction of Ismet Pasha's Cabinet, became Minister of National Defence and Acting Minister of Marine. The latter post was subsequently merged in the former, which he retained in Ismet Pasha's Cabinet as reconstructed in September 1930. Succeeded Saracoğlu Şükrü Bey as Minister of Finance in December 1930, and retained his portfolio in Ismet Pasha's new Cabinet, May 1931. Resigned, February 1934, on account of ill-health, and in April was elected president of Parliamentary Group of People's party. Elected President of Grand National Assembly March 1935, and has been re-elected annually since that date. During

Atatürk's last illness he was never considered a likely candidate for the Presidency of the Republic: he merely acted as head of the State for twenty-three hours between the announcements of Atatürk's death and Ismet Inönü's election. Re-elected Deputy for Çankiri in March 1939.

Abdulhalik knows Greek and speaks fair French. He owed his early advancement to his relationship with Talat Pasha, though he was never a prominent Unionist figure. Though not possessed of brilliance, he has considerable administrative capacity, and enjoys a reputation for scrupulous honesty —a virtue which was as acceptable at the Ministry of Finance as in that of Defence, where peculation in connexion with munitions contracts had previously been rampant. Is essentially a moderate, and was the only member of the Cabinet to observe the Ramazan fast. Is a keen gardener, a good bridge player and agreeable in conversation. Was much liked by representatives of foreign business firms seeking contracts.

2. *Abidin* (*Özmen*).

Graduated from the Mülkiye (Civil) School in 1911, and was for many years Civil Inspector and Vali at various places, including Antalya. Appointed Vali of Brusa in June 1933. Elected Deputy for Aydin in May 1934, and appointed Minister of Public Instruction (now called "Kültür") in July. Later, on adopting a surname as required by law, dropped the first two syllables of his name, which was previously Zeynelabidin. Re-elected Deputy for Aydin in February 1935. In June resigned Ministry of Education and appointed First Civil Inspector General.

Little is known of Abidin's personality, except that he looks gross and stupid. He was a complete failure as Minister of Education, but may be a good administrator.

3. *Afet, Mlle.*

Born about 1900. Eldest adopted daughter of Atatürk, to whom she was a sort of unofficial personal adviser in cultural matters. Received a (probably somewhat superficial) training in archæology and ancient history abroad, chiefly at Geneva at the hands of Professor Pittard, an anthropologist of international, though slightly dubious, reputation. Is part-author of the *Turkish Official History* and vice-president of the Turkish Historical Association, the chosen instrument of Atatürk for much of the work of re-creating Turkey's historical background. She presided ably in September 1937 over an historical congress attended at Istanbul by leading scholars from a number of foreign countries, and has attended learned gatherings abroad. In 1938 (July) she was elected vice-president of the Annual Conference of the International Education Bureau.

Bayan Afet is agreeable in manner, neat in appearance, and (by all accounts) purposeful and efficient in her work. She was very close to the former President, whom she habitually accompanied wherever he might reside, and enjoyed his confidence in matters ranging considerably beyond the strictly cultural sphere. She received a legacy of £T. 800 a month under the terms of Atatürk's will.

4. *Ahmet Fikri* (*Tuzer*).

Born about 1885. Graduated from military medical school as captain in 1905. Served in military hospitals during the Great War and was promoted colonel. Appointed an Under-Secretary for Health in 1924. In 1927 he was elected Deputy for Erzerum, and has been re-elected at all subsequent elections. President of the Public Health Committee of the Assembly from 1928 to 1938. In 1938 he was elected to the Council of the People's party, and in January 1939 appointed Secretary-General of the party, an office which had previously been held by Dr. Refik Saydam as Minister of the Interior.

5. *Ahmet Sukrü* (*Esmer*).

Born about 1888. A journalist by profession. During the Armistice period he was on the staff of the *Vakit*, to which he contributed many attacks on the Allies. Represented his paper at the Lausanne conference, and became chief editor of the *Son Saat* in 1926. In 1931, as editor of the *Milliyet*, he had become a person of considerable importance in the journalistic world, and his leading

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articles became gradually less anti-British (except during the disorders in Cyprus). In 1933 he accompanied the Turkish delegation to the London Economic Congress. In March 1939 he was elected Deputy for Istanbul and became secretary of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly; in June he was nominated a member of the newly constituted Independent Group the People's party.

Ahmed Sükrü Esmer, who was educated at Columbia University, speaks fluent English, and is married to a pleasant lady, said to come from one of the Baltic States, who also speaks good English. He is now foreign editor of the semi-official *Ulus*, and contributes an article each day on some aspect of foreign affairs.

6. *Ali* (*Çetinkaya*).

Born about 1875 at Afyon Karahisar. Educated at the Constantinople Military School. Commanded a battalion at Çatalca during the Balkan war, and served in the Great War as a colonel. Organised resistance to the Greeks at Ayvalik in 1919. Was elected a Deputy for Constantinople in December, and remained there to attend the debates till March 1920, when he was deported to Malta. Released a year later, he at once took his seat in the Angora Assembly. After his re-election in 1923 he became one of the chief organisers of the People's party, and in November 1924 was elected vice-president of the executive bureau of the party, a position which he still fills. In March 1925 he was appointed president of the Angora Independence Tribunal; soon afterwards shot with impunity a fellow Deputy in the Chamber, and unconcernedly passed death sentences till the Independence Tribunals were acolished early in 1927. 1925–27 was president of the Defence Commission of the Assembly, and in November 1927, on his re-election as Deputy for Afyon Karahisar, became a member of the Budget Commission. Appointed Minister of Public Works, February 1934. In the summer of 1937 he undertook a tour of inspection in Sweden, Denmark and Germany. He retained his post in Celal Bayar's Cabinets (October 1937 and November 1938) and again in Dr. Saydam's Cabinet (January 1939). Re-elected Deputy for Afyon Karahisar in March 1939. In April he became Minister for Communications on the separation of the Ministry of Public Works into two departments.

Ali, known as the "bald-headed," is a curious phenomenon, for, in spite of his record, he is attractive. Until recently only spoke Turkish, but for some years has been studying English, which he speaks haltingly, but reads with a certain facility. He has an engaging smile, and was once very aptly described by a British visitor to Angora as resembling "a benevolent Scotch elder." During the summer of 1927 rumour was busy with his name as a possible successor to Ismet Pasha. It is doubtful if he could have filled the bill, though his surprising honesty could not have failed to be an asset. He is not a conversationalist. As Minister of Public Works he took up a truculent attitude to foreign concessionary companies, and was successful in forcing many of them to sell out on terms favourable to the Government.

7. *Ali* (*Türkgeldi*).

Born about 1885, a diplomat *de carrière*. In 1925 he was Chargé d'Affaires at Sofia and in 1926 counsellor at Berlin. He then served in Rome and in 1927 returned to Angora as Director of the Balkan Section at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Appointed Chargé d'Affaires at The Hague in 1928 with the rank of counsellor (first class), and in 1929 Minister at Rio de Janeiro. In 1935 he was at the Ministry as head of a Department, and in the autumn became Acting Secretary-General. In December 1936 he was appointed Minister in Albania, but he relinquished his post in February 1938 following upon the suicide of his first secretary. Is now living in seclusion in Istanbul.

Ali Türkgeldi belongs to a good Turkish family. His father held high offices at the Sublime Porte and Palace under the old régime. He is a friendly and capable official.

8. *Ali Cenani.*

Born about 1880 at Ayintap (Gazi Antep), which he represented in the Constantinople Parliament, being for a time reporter for the budget. Was deported to Malta in 1919 on a charge of complicity in the massacres of Armenians at Ayintap. On being released he joined the Kemalist movement, and

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was Deputy for Ayintap from 1921 to 1931. In November 1924 became Minister of Commerce. In 1925 his commercial legislation showed that he was leading the ultra-Nationalist movement against Christian employees and foreign capital. In May 1926 he resigned owing to reported differences with the Minister of Finance. He nevertheless continued to be influential, and for two years was the chief Turkish delegate for commercial negotiations with foreign countries, being responsible in particular for the Turco-Russian Commercial Treaty of March 1927. Became reporter of the Budget Commission in November 1927, but fell from grace early in 1928, when he was tried by the High Court for a misuse of public funds while Minister of Commerce. Was heavily fined, but his sentence of imprisonment was commuted. After reappearing in influential circles, left Turkey for Damascus in mysterious circumstances in December 1929. Though reported to owe £T. 100,000 to the Turkish Government, he once more reappeared at Angora, where his past seemed in a fair way to being forgotten, but he was not re-elected at the general election of April 1931.

Ali Cenani was for long the leading business man in the Ayintap area, and in business circles was considered honest and go-ahead. Much of his property is now in Syria, and he has frittered away most of his considerable wealth. He is a poor speaker, of jaundiced appearance, and has been described as active, resourceful and wily. He plays a vigorous, but not very good, game of bridge. His two daughters have received an American college education, and his son, who is in the diplomatic service, was educated at the English High School in Constantinople.

9. *Ali Fuat (Cebesoy), General.*

Born in Constantinople in 1882. Grandson of the renegade German who was Turkish delegate at Berlin Congress. Graduated from the military school in 1905. 1908–11, military attaché at Rome. During the war fought on the Caucasus and Palestine fronts. Was one of the first Turkish generals to join the Kemalist movement, and was one of Mustafa Kemal's most trusted leaders until his tendency to take an independent line in the field led, late in 1920, to his appointment as Kemalist Ambassador at Moscow, where he was chiefly instrumental in securing the signature of the Turco-Russian Treaty of March 1921. Was recalled in April 1922 owing to an incident in the Embassy in Moscow, and resumed his military command. In 1923 was elected Deputy for Angora and Vice-President of the Assembly. Later became inspector-general at Konya, but resigned his post in October 1924, by which time he had become completely associated with the Rauf–Adnan–Refet Opposition group. In November he resigned from the People's party and became secretary-general of the new Progressive party. In 1926 was arrested and tried at Smyrna for participation in the alleged plot against Mustafa Kemal, but was acquitted. His reception by the President in November 1926, and again early in 1927, gave rise to a rumour that Ali Fuat was returning to the Kemalist fold, but this was not confirmed, and he ceased to be a Deputy in September 1927. Lived in retirement until June 1933, when he stood as independent candidate for Konya, with the Gazi's full approval, and was unanimously elected Deputy, Ismet Pasha having issued a manifesto to the electors praising Ali Fuat for services rendered to the national cause, and declared he had "followed the same path as the Gazi." He was re-elected for Konya in 1935, and again in 1939, but this time as representative of the People's party. After taking little part in parliamentary life for six years he was appointed Minister of Public Works in April 1939.

General Ali Fuat has a reputation for honesty. During the war was not on good terms with the German commanders, and during the armistice period was believed to be violently anti-British, but he was on good terms with the British mission in Moscow.

10. *Ali Sait (Akbaytuğan), General.*

Born near Bandirma (Panderma) in 1874, of Circassian origin. Graduated from the Military College in 1898, and held several minor staff appointments till 1907, when, with the rank of major, he was sent to the Yemen. Returned to Constantinople in 1909, and in 1913, during the Balkan war, was in charge of the lines of communication. Was then for a time control officer on the Anatolian Railway until January 1914, when he was promoted colonel and posted to Sanaa, in the Yemen, where he remained until some time after the 1918 armistice, when he was finally induced to surrender to the British authorities at Aden, whom he

had fought for four years, during most of which he was out of touch with his Government. Interned in Egypt for a short time, Ali Sait Pasha, who had now been promoted general, returned to Constantinople early in 1919 and was Military Governor of the capital till March 1920, when, on the occupation of the town, he was deported to Malta. Immediately after his release in October 1921 he joined Mustafa Kemal, and in the following year he succeeded Kâzim Karabekir Pasha as General Officer Commanding the Eastern Army. In October 1924 he was appointed Inspector-General of the First Army Area, and later of the Third Area. Was promoted to be a general of the first class in August 1927. Relinquished his inspectorate and was appointed member of the Supreme Military Council in September 1935. Elected Deputy for Kocaeli in November 1937, and re-elected in March 1939.

General Ali Sait is pleasant, courteous and has a well-modulated voice. Was probably at one time decidedly pro-British, and still is, as he says, "in the interests of his country," but he chooses to forget rather than to forgive his treatment at British hands. Not a strong personality. He is interested in Iraq oil to such an extent that on an Angora ball-room floor he produced to a member of the Embassy a largish map, on which the position of his wells was clearly shown. Speaks a little English, a consequence of Malta, where he also learnt to play tennis. Both he and his massive wife used to be very popular in Angora society, but, when the attendance of military officers at social functions was vetoed in March 1928, they transferred their domicile to Constantinople.

11. *Asim (Gündüz), General.*

Born about 1882 in Constantinople. Passed out of Military College in 1902 with rank of staff captain, and was attached to the Imperial Guard. From 1907 to 1909 served on staff of Monastir division. In 1909 appointed to General Staff. Pursued a course of military studies in Germany from 1912 till January 1915, when on his return he was attached to Turkish General Headquarters, remaining there till end of war. Again in Germany 1918–19. In November 1920 became chief of the Intelligence Section of the General Staff, but soon after threw in his lot with the Nationalists and became Chief of Staff to Fevzi Pasha. In November 1924 became General Officer Commanding the IXth Army Corps, in August 1926 was promoted Divisional General and later commanded the 7th Corps. In October 1928 was appointed sub-chief of the Turkish General Staff. Went to Bucharest and Belgrade in November 1935 to take part in consultations regarding military commitments arising out of the Balkan Pact.

General Asim is a tall, dark man of slight build and has a very pleasant manner. He has the reputation of being hard-working, strict, accurate and given to great financial economy. He got on well with his German superiors during the war, speaks German well, and knows some French. He is known to be obstinately Germanophile.

12. *Behiç (Erkin).*

Born about 1880. An ex-colonel. In 1924 was chief administrator of the Anatolian Railway, a post in which he showed considerable ability and energy In December 1925 became a Deputy for Constantinople and a month later Minister of Public Works. As a Minister he was a pronounced success, and showed great capacity in organising the existing railways and in dealing with the somewhat grandiose construction schemes of the Government. Resigned October 1928, nominally on grounds of ill-health, and was immediately afterwards appointed Minister at Budapest.

13. *Cafer Tayar (Eğilmez), General.*

Born in 1883 at Prishtina, of poor parents. Educated by the charity of an Albanian, who sent him to the military school. Saw service in Macedonia, and in 1907 became a member of the Committee of Union and Progress. Served at the Dardanelles, and in 1918 had command of the forces in Northern Caucasus. Early in the armistice he showed himself violently anti-British, and formed a military organisation at Adrianople, with which, in 1920, he threatened to resist the occupation of the town by the Greek army. From then onwards was known as the hero of Adrianople, for which, since 1920, he had been the senior Deputy In 1924 he commanded the troops in the Eastern vilayets, but his enthusiasm for Mustafa Kemal began to cool, and in October he resigned his military duties to take up those of a Deputy. In July 1926, along with Ali Fuat, Refet and Kâzim Karabekir Pashas, was arrested and tried at Smyrna for participation

in the alleged plot against Mustafa Kemal, but was acquitted, largely, it is understood, owing to the fear of the authorities of his influence with the army. Ceased to be a Deputy in September 1927, and since then has been little heard of. Was sharply attacked in the Gazi's lengthy review of the revolution in 1927. After the death of Atatürk, he returned to public life, and was appointed a member of the council of the Denizbank in March 1939, shortly before the bank was dissolved.

Cafer Tayar is a strong patriot, just and honest, and, as a result of his Adrianople experiences, became violently Græcophobe.

14. *Cavat, Ahmet (Ostün).*

A diplomat *de carrière*, born about 1887. After serving in London, Vienna and elsewhere, became a Director in the Fourth Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at the end of 1926. Appointed Chargé d'Affaires at Prague a year later. Counsellor, and Director-General of the Second Department of the Ministry, in 1929. Accompanied the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the European Union Conferences at Geneva in 1931, and in August of that year became Director-General of the First (British) Department of the Ministry. Was Acting Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in December 1931 and January 1932. In 1933 accompanied Saracoğlu Şükrü to Paris for public debt and Ottoman Bank concession negotiations. Appointed Minister at Vienna in the autumn of 1934. Transferred to The Hague in April 1938.

Ahmet Cavat, though insignificant in appearance and possessed of a squeaky voice, is a first-class man professionally, and has always shown himself friendly to His Majesty's Embassy. His wife, who is from Smyrna, speaks English fluently.

15. *Celâl (Bayar).*

Born about 1880. Before the War of Independence was cashier in the Brusa branch of the Deutsche Orient Bank. Joined Mustafa Kemal at an early stage, and served with distinction in the Nationalist Army. In 1923 was elected Deputy for Smyrna, which he has represented ever since, and was appointed Minister of National Economy the same year. In March 1924 became Minister of Reconstruction (for the settlement of refugees) in Ismet Pasha's second Cabinet, but resigned in July to become Director-General of the Iş Bankasi on the recommendation of the Gazi. In August 1928 went on a tour of the Turkish Black Sea ports to study the possibilities of that region and investigate the causes of its poverty. In November 1928 was elected member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Grand National Assembly, and again in November 1930. In December 1931 was elected vice-president of the Supreme Economic Council, and in January 1932 accompanied the Minister for Foreign Affairs to Tehran, to study Persian economic conditions with a view to the establishment of a branch of the Iş Bankasi. In September 1932, at the height of the financial and economic crisis, finding his bank's operations hampered by the Government's exaggerated policy of State control of trade and industry, Celal went direct to the Gazi, with the result that he was appointed Minister of National Economy (a post of much greater importance than in 1923), in succession to Mustafa Şeref, to the great relief of the local business world, but the expectations then raised were not fulfilled, least of all where British trade was concerned. Went to Athens with Numan in May 1933, to negotiate commercial agreement (signed the 9th May) and establish cordial relations with Tsaldaris Government. In June accompanied Tevfik Rüştü to London as "second head" of the Turkish delegation to the Economic Conference. On this occasion visited also Paris and Berlin and negotiated "clearing" agreements with French and German Governments. In September 1937 he became Acting Prime Minister to allow Ismet Inönü a period of rest. The following month Ismet resigned, and Celal became Prime Minister (the 25th October). In November he accompanied the President on a tour of the Eastern provinces and in April 1938 paid an official visit to Greece. He formed his second Cabinet after the election of Ismet Inönü as President in November 1938, but it was short-lived; Celâl resigned unexpectedly in January 1939, at a time when several serious financial scandals, notably the "Impeks" affair and the Denizbank case, were being investigated. His resignation, and the circumstances attending it, caused a great deal of uneasiness in official and commercial circles, and a reluctance to accept any form of responsibility, which made it almost impossible, during the following two or three months, to secure an official

decision in any outstanding question. No stigma of direct responsibility for the scandals exposed attached itself to Celâl personally, and he was re-elected Deputy for Smyrna in March 1939.

Celal, who is married, has a straightforward and earnest character. He is generally reputed to be a man who may be relied on to carry out his undertakings, a reputation which can be fully endorsed by the Embassy's experience of him. A hard worker and abstemious, he prefers to spend his leisure out of doors, riding in Angora, or sailing in the Marmara, and is president of the virtually Anglo-Turkish Moda Yacht Club. He is an experienced banker and economist, but has little experience of foreign affairs. A bureaucrat rather than a politician, he enjoys nothing like the prestige of Ismet in the country. He was always very close to Atatürk, and fulfilled faithfully the rôle of eyes and ears of the great man. His qualities are not those of a great leader, but rather of a faithful subordinate; he was hardly long enough in office to reveal whether he had the personality to manage a possibly unruly Cabinet, but the least that may be said of him is that his premiership, much of which coincided with the period of Atatürk's last illness, and enforced abstention from affairs of State, passed tranquilly without a whisper of dissension among his colleagues.

16. *Celal Nuri.*

Born about 1880. A journalist; manager of a Young Turk newspaper in Constantinople in 1908. Expelled shortly after, and only returned after the Constitution, when he began to publish his paper, *Ileri*, which continued to appear till 1925. Was subventioned by the Germans during the war. In the early armistice ran his paper as a Kemalist organ until he was deported to Malta in March 1920. Shortly before, he had been elected Deputy for Gallipoli. Was released in March 1921 and at once took his seat in the Angora Assembly. Has since been a member of the Constitutional Commission of the Assembly, in 1922 being president, reporter in 1923 and secretary in 1930. During the constitutional crisis in March 1924 he was a warm supporter of the proposal to accord dissolution and veto powers to the President of the Republic, but the proposal was defeated. In September 1927 was elected Deputy for Tekirdağ (Rodosto) and in November, while still retaining membership of the Constitutional Commission, became reporter of the Drafts Commission of the Assembly. Re-elected Deputy for Tekirdağ in April 1931. Founded the *Yilmaz* newspaper, but disclaimed responsibility for it when it began attacking the Government in June 1931 and was subsequently closed down. Not re-elected Deputy in the general election of 1935.

Celal Nuri is something of an intellectual, clever and an intriguer. He is supposed to have Communist leanings, but was for some time chiefly active in an anti-Greek campaign nominally on behalf of Turkish non-exchangeables.

17. *Cemal Hüsnü (Taray).*

Born about 1887. An ex-officer. Was Deputy for Gümüşane 1925–30. 1927–28 was reporter of Assembly Commerce Commission, and became a member of the Foreign Affairs Commission. In March 1928 became chief Turkish delegate for the exchange of populations, and in November of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Assembly. Appointed Minister of Education in April 1929, and Minister at Berne in September 1930, when he resigned his deputyship. Was member of Turkish delegation to Disarmament Conference in January 1932, and on subsequent occasions. In 1936 he resigned from his post at Berne, and it was believed that his Government disapproved of his conduct at the meeting of the representatives of the Little and Balkan *Ententes* at Geneva in March. He was elected deputy for Bolu, and in October he left for Tehran as head of a Turkish mission to discuss matters of residence, frontiers, customs and extradition, which resulted in the conclusion of eleven treaties and conventions after more than six months' negotiations. Appointed Minister at Brussels in January 1938, and resigned his seat in the Assembly.

Cemal Hüsnü is pleasant to talk to, speaks fair French and plays a fair game of bridge. He is, however, very impetuous, and on several occasions nearly torpedoed the Greco-Turkish negotiations. Is unmarried.

18. *Cevit (Oğuzdan).*

Born about 1885. Has followed a military career. About 1906 was commandant of the garrison at Salonica, and at that time saved Mustafa Kemal from arrest by Abdulhamit's secret police. During the armistice, when he held

the rank of staff lieutenant-colonel, was in command of the defence forces against the Greeks at Catalca. In July 1923 elected Deputy for Tekirdağ (Rodosto). In May 1924 appointed general secretary of the People's party, and in January 1925 became Minister of the Interior. Though for a time he did well and exercised considerable influence, his position became weakened early in 1927 owing to alleged irregularities in connexion with Government contracts, and, though re-elected Deputy in September, he ceased to hold ministerial rank on the reconstruction of Ismet Pasha's Cabinet in November 1927. In the same month he became a member of the Foreign Affairs Commission. Re-elected Deputy for Tekirdağ in February 1935 and again in March 1939. Has been president of the Internal Affairs Committee of the Assembly since 1928.

Cemil is reserved and intelligent, and speaks only a little French.

19. *Cemil (Bilsel), Professor.*

Born about 1889. Has followed a legal career and specialises in international law, on which he is now the recognised Turkish authority. Was chief adviser to the Turkish delegation before The Hague Tribunal in 1927 in connexion with the "Lotus" incident, in which judgment was given in favour of Turkey. From 1922 to 1924 was one of the chief movers in a Turkish association for supporting the League of Nations, and in October 1924 attended the congress of League of Nations Societies in London. In 1931 was appointed member of the Permanent Conciliation Commission formed in accordance with the arbitration treaty with Germany of 1929. Was also appointed member of The Hague International Permanent Arbitration Court. At the end of 1932 took a leading part in founding the Turkish branch of the League of Nations Union. Appointed rector of Istanbul University in summer of 1934.

Professor Cemil is quiet, reserved and almost entirely absorbed in his studies. His family have received a European education. Is a keen gardener. Somewhat brusque of manner. Speaks French.

20. *Cevat Abbas (Gürer).*

Born about 1890. Early in 1919 became aide-de-camp to Mustafa Kemal, and at the same time was elected Deputy for Bolu. Had control over the activities of the Nationalist secret agents throughout 1920. In July 1921 went on a mission to Bulgaria with a view to organising trouble in Thrace, and in December became unofficial Kemalist representative at Sofia. He returned to Angora early in 1922, and in the autumn was one of the instigators of the Turkish insurrectionist movement in Western Thrace directed against Greek rule. In 1923 was re-elected Deputy for Bolu, and at the end of the year there was much talk and intrigue in regard to his proposed definite appointment as Turkish Minister at Sofia. In 1924 was president of the Turkish Aeroplane Association, in the interest of which he showed great activity. Was re-elected Deputy in September 1927, April 1931 and February 1935, and since November 1927 has been a member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Assembly. In December 1931 became deputy chairman of board of directors of Turkish company exploiting notorious drug factory, since closed down, at Kuzguncuk on the Bosphorus. Was chosen to convey Atatürk's wedding gifts to King Farouk in January 1938. Following the death of Atatürk, he shared the fate of several of the former President's intimate friends, and was not re-elected to the Assembly in the elections of March 1939.

21. *Cezmi (Erçin).*

Born about 1885, a native of Istanbul. Graduated in political science at the Istanbul Mülkiye. Became Director of Revenue of the Ministry of Finance. In May 1931 he was attached to the Turkish delegation at the Angora Bondholders' Conference. Member of the Turkish delegation to the London Economic Conference in June 1933. In November 1933 he became president of the Inspection Department of the Ministry of Finance, and later became Assistant Director-General of the Agricultural Bank. Elected Deputy for Antalya in December 1938, and re-elected in March 1939. In April 1939 he was appointed Minister of Commerce on the creation of that office.

Cezmi Erçin, who speaks French, is said to be an authority on the legal aspect of taxation.

22. *Edip (Tor).*

Born at Constantinople in 1879. Son of Servet Pasha. Left the military college in 1898. Served with the Salonica army and in Thrace till he entered the

Staff College in 1909. In 1911 was attached to the Yanina Regiment, and in 1913 promoted major. Held a staff appointment during the Balkan war, and was on the military staff of the Turkish delegation to the 1913 Peace Conference in London. Later in the year was for a few months chief aide-de-camp to the heir apparent. Served during the Great War at the Dardanelles, in the Caucasus and in Palestine, and in 1917 was director of the Military Press Bureau. In March 1918 was a member of the Turkish mission sent to Roumania to conclude peace. During the armistice was a member of the Armistice Commission and director of Prisoners of War Section, and joined Mustafa Kemal in June 1920. Was afterwards chiefly engaged in arranging the supply of munitions, and in 1922 was for a time member of the Turco-Syrian Frontier Delimitation Commission. In November became Military Commandant of Constantinople and Acting Governor of Pera. In November 1925 became Deputy for Constantinople. In 1926 he represented Turkey at the Islamic Congress at Mecca, and made history by appearing in a bowler hat. In 1927 was a member of the Foreign Affairs Commission, and is now a member of that for Economic Affairs. Elected member for Gümüşane, May 1931, and re-elected in February 1935 and March 1939. In April 1939 was Turkish delegate to the International Parliamentary Economic Conference at Rome. Is a leading member of the board of the Iş Bankasi and Balya Karaydin Company, and was grand master of the Angora Lodge of Freemasons until the suppression of freemasonry in Turkey in 1935.

Edip is short, stout and jovial, with a face like the rising sun. On the rare occasions when, in the early hours, it has approached its zenith, he shows a taste for opera and old Turkish songs, and has a good voice. Though not involved so deeply in politics as are his companions, he is in great favour with the President of the Republic, and influential. Is an intimate friend of Saffet (*q.v.*). While not appearing bright, he is shrewd and sharp, and probably does more hard thinking than any of the coterie. Speaks French, Italian, Russian and German. Is hospitable, with a naïve courtliness of manner and a passion for doing things right and urging his friends to do likewise. Is perhaps the most popular Turk in Angora.

23. *Enis, Mehmet (Akaygen).*

Born about 1887. From 1907 until the Great War was an official of the Ministry of Interior. Became vice-consul at Ancona during the war, and in 1925 was counsellor at Moscow. In 1926 became Director-General of Political Affairs at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in October was given the rank of Minister and in November 1927 became Under- Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Appointed Minister at Athens in 1929 and Ambassador at Tehran in the summer of 1934.

Enis is pleasant and capable. In spite of indifferent health, he for some time carried the entire burden of the Foreign Ministry, and was universally liked by all who came in contact with him. Is straightforward and honest. The organisation of the Foreign Ministry out of complete chaos was due almost entirely to him, and his departure was generally regretted by the foreign diplomats at Angora.

24. *Ercüment Ekrem.*

Born about 1888, the son of Recai Ercüment Bey, the Turkish poet. Appointed secretary at the Turkish Legation at Athens. Was recalled by Abdulhamit on suspicion of intriguing with disloyal elements. Later appointed to Bucharest. Was Mayor of Pera during the armistice. In 1923–24 was Director of Press in Angora. In March 1924 became private secretary to President of Republic, but fell foul of the President's wife, and in April became Assistant Prefect of Constantinople. Was dismissed in August, and remained unemployed till September 1927, when he again became Director of Press at Angora until appointed (July 1931) counsellor at Warsaw, to act temporarily as Chargé d'Affaires.

Ercüment Ekrem is a short, stout man of a disagreeable type. He is certainly clever, but not at all to be trusted. Speaks fair English.

25. *Esma (Naşmun), Mme.*

Born about 1902. Deputy for Adana and one of the seventeen women members of the Grand National Assembly. Is married to a Turkish business man and combines an evidently harmonious domesticity with the political activity expected by modern Turkey of its feminine parliamentarians. She was an active member on committees of the Assembly, and has accompanied the Minister for Foreign Affairs on missions abroad. Not re-elected Deputy in March 1939.

With considerable charm of manner, an entirely emancipated outlook, wide culture and a command of the chief European languages, Esma Nayman is an excellent representative of the new Turkish woman of the ruling class.

26. *Fahrettin (Altay), General.*

Born at Constantinople in 1881. Educated at the military school, where he was a class-mate of Enver Pasha. 1909 in command of troops against the Kurds, near Dersim. Later became an active Committee of Union and Progress adherent and in 1910 chief aide-de-camp to the War Office. Held various staff appointments before becoming Under-Secretary for War in 1915. In 1916 commanded the Turkish division in Galicia, and in 1918 served on the Palestine front. In 1920 was a colonel in command of the Imperial troops at Konya. Joined the Nationalist cause in the summer of that year. Later in 1920 secured the command of the XIIth Army Corps, which he retained until the final success of the Turks over the Greeks. In 1923 was elected Deputy for Smyrna and became commander of the Vth Army Corps. In October 1924 resigned his deputyship on opting for military duties. In November 1924, on the resignation of Ali Fuat Pasha, became one of the three military inspectors-general, and in August 1926 was promoted divisional-general of the first-class, thus holding a higher rank than any of the Opposition Pashas. Was attached to the King of Afghanistan during the latter's visit to Angora in May 1928. On the 1st January, 1931, was appointed military commander of the district (Manisa and Balikesir) placed under martial law in consequence of the reactionary incident at Menemen. In June 1934 met Shah of Persia and accompanied him to Angora, and in October went to Persia as head of a mission to arbitrate on Perso-Afghan frontier dispute. Was attached to His Majesty King Edward VIII as guide to the Gallipoli battle-fields in September 1936.

General Fahrettin is a tall, well-built man and a good type. He has been described as a rough diamond, but is honest, and, next to Marshal Fevzi, probably carries most weight in Turkish military circles.

27. *Faik (Kurtoğlu).*

Born about 1895. Formerly Turkish commercial representative in London and Brussels. In June 1933 he was a member of the Turkish delegation to the London Economic Conference. Became president of the Turkofis in 1934, and in November of that year Under-Secretary at the Ministry of National Economy. In January 1935 he was a member of the Turkish delegation to the Balkan Economic Conference, and in August 1936 he headed the Economic Mission to London which negotiated the Anglo-Turkish Trade and Payments Agreement. In the summer of 1937 he negotiated a new commercial agreement with Germany, and in December he led a Turkish delegation to Bucharest, resulting in a new commercial agreement with Roumania. Elected Deputy for Manisa in March 1938, and appointed Minister of Agriculture the following month. He retained the post in Celâl Bayar's second Cabinet (November 1938), but lost it on the formation of Dr. Saydam's Cabinet in January 1939, owing, it was said, to the unpopularity of his policy among the peasants. He was, however, re-elected Deputy for Manisa in March 1939.

Faik Kurtoğlu is knowledgeable, energetic and forceful, and apparently sincerely Anglophil. His judgment is sometimes warped by over-impulsiveness and a tendency to self-glorification. His faculty for expressing himself and his ideas is rather deficient. This makes him seem sometimes more bone-headed than probably he actually is.

28. *Faik (Oztrak).*

Born at Malkara (Thrace) in 1882. Studied at the School of Political Science. Held provincial posts under the Ministry of the Interior, and became Director-General of Inspection in that Ministry. Elected Deputy for Tekirdag in 1923, and has been re-elected at all subsequent elections, serving continuously on the Assembly committee of Internal Affairs, of which he was for many years vice-president. Appointed Minister of the Interior *vice* Dr. Refik Saydam in January 1939 on the promotion of the latter to the post of Prime Minister

29. ***Falih Rifki** (Atay).*

Born in 1894 at Constantinople and educated at Galata Saray College, where he was later a teacher. Was secretary to Cemal Pasha in Syria during the war, after which he took up journalism and for a time wrote articles for the *Ententist Aksam*. In 1920 joined Mustafa Kemal and wrote for the Nationalist press.

Deputy for Bolu 1923–35, and in the 1923–27 Assembly was secretary of the Foreign Affairs Commission. In the summer of 1927 he went to Rio de Janeiro as chief Turkish delegate at the International Parliamentary Congress, and returned deeply impressed by the advantages to be derived from an Anglo-Saxon, as opposed to a Latin, education. Throughout 1928 he continued to be in great favour, and in May was one of the Turkish delegates to the International Press Congress at Cologne. On his return he became president of the Commission for the Reform of the Turkish Alphabet, and, after the Gazi, has probably done more than anyone else to secure the general adoption of the new script. He was a former director of the Anatolian Agency. In September 1930 visited Moscow in the company of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and in April 1931 went to Albania on a mission connected with Balkan Union. In 1933 was member of Turkish delegations to Disarmament Conference in Geneva and Economic Conference in London. Is one of the leading exponents of "new Turkish," in which he habitually contributes leading articles to the semi-official *Ulus*, of which he is editor. Elected Deputy for Angora in February 1935, and re-elected in March 1939. In June 1939 he visited the United Kingdom among a group of six Turkish journalists at the invitation of the British Council.

Falih Rifki is frank, has a fair knowledge of French, and is an ardent Westerner. Has tremendous driving power, but is a heavy drinker, and this and other excesses are unfortunately already beginning to tell their tale. An excellent bridge player.

30. *Ferit, Ahmet.*

Born at Brusa in 1875. Passed through Harbiye Military College in 1898 with rank of captain. Later went to Paris and studied at School of Political Science. Only returned to Turkey after 1908. Joined the Committee of Union and Progress and became Deputy for Kütahya. In 1910 joined the *Entente* libérale party, and was exiled by the Committee of Union and Progress in 1913 to Tripoli, where he met his future wife. He made his peace with Talat Pasha in 1915 and became consul-general at Kiev in November 1917. Recalled in December 1918, he resumed attacks on the Committee of Union and Progress. In 1919 was Minister of Public Works and of Finance under Damat Ferit Pasha. He resigned in July owing to his desire to reach an understanding with Mustafa Kemal. Joined the Nationalist cause in April 1920, was immediately elected a Deputy in the Angora Assembly, and soon afterwards became Minister of Finance. In September 1920 attended the Baku Congress and soon afterwards appeared rather pro-Bolshevik. In November 1921 was appointed representative of the Angora Government at Paris, which post he held till February 1923, when he was recalled because of certain offensive remarks made regarding the Allies. In spite of opposition in the Assembly, he became Minister of the Interior in October 1923. Was the subject of many attacks both in the Assembly and the press, but continued to hold the post till May 1924. Appointed Ambassador at London in June 1925. Was summoned to Angora in December 1930, with his colleagues at Paris and Berlin, to consult with the Government and the Gazi on the financial and general situation when it was rumoured that he would be appointed Minister of Finance in place of Saracoglu Şükrü Bey. This, however, did not materialise. Unexpectedly transferred to Warsaw in May 1932.

Ferit speaks good French and Arabic and a little English. A thorough opportunist and rather unscrupulous. Wife is attractive and helped him to make something of a success of the London Embassy.

31. *Fethi (Okyar).*

Born at Ohrid, Macedonia, in 1877. Graduated from military school in Constantinople in 1903 and saw service in Macedonia. Became an ardent Committee of Union and Progress adherent and took charge of Abdulhamit on the expulsion of the latter to Salonica. 1910–13, military attaché at Sofia, and 1913–17, Minister there. Was for a short time Minister of the Interior in autumn of 1918, and soon after was deported to Malta for political reasons. Released in April 1921 he proceeded at once to Anatolia and became Minister of the Interior. In July–August 1922 proceeded on a mission to Paris and London. In 1923 elected Deputy for Constantinople, and during two months was President of the Council of Ministers, which post he resigned on emergence of republican issue. In November became first President of the Assembly. In March 1924 was regarded as being identified with the Opposition when the question of the President's powers was under consideration. In May chief Turkish delegate

for Mosul discussions in Constantinople. Represented Turkey before the League of Nations in September and later proceeded to Brussels again in connexion with the Mosul question. Became President of the Council for the second time, and in November also held the portfolio of Defence. His period of office was marked by moderation, and he had the support of the Oppositionist Progressive party. In March 1925, on the outbreak of the Kurdish revolt, his Government fell because of his alleged lukewarmness in dealing with the rebels, and in the same month he was appointed Turkish Ambassador in Paris. There is evidence that even from Paris he exercised no little influence at Angora, and a visit which he paid to the capital in 1928 had much to do with the Turkish acceptance of the Ottoman debt settlement. Resigned his post in August 1930, when he reappeared in Turkey as the founder of a new political party—the Liberal Republican—with the full approval of the Gazi, probably even by his order. To facilitate his entry into the Assembly, was returned unopposed as Deputy for Gümüşane. Was obliged, by failure of presidential support, to dissolve his party in November, but retained the Gazi's friendship, and they were much together during the annual festivities at Angora, October–November 1931 and on subsequent occasions. Did not stand for re-election at the general election of 1931, and was living in retirement at Constantinople when, in March 1934, he was appointed Ambassador in London on the personal initiative of the President of the Republic. When in the summer of 1938 it became clear that Atatürk had not long to live, Fethi was generally considered as one of the three most likely candidates for election as his successor, particularly when he remained in Turkey after the termination of his normal period of leave of absence from London. His election would in fact have been unconstitutional, as he was not a member of the Assembly, though he could doubtless have become such at short notice. He returned to London the day after Ismet's election, and it is possible that he remained in Turkey only to be at the deathbed of his old friend. There was little doubt then that he would soon return to political life in Turkey. He was elected Deputy for Bolu in December, while still at his post in London, and returned to Turkey shortly afterwards. He was re-elected for Bolu at the March 1939 elections, and became president of the Constitutional Committee of the Assembly. In May he was appointed Minister of Justice. In June he paid a brief visit to the United Kingdom to receive an honorary degree at St. Andrew's University.

Fethi has Mongol features. He is pleasant to talk to, speaks good French and some English, and is essentially a moderate. He has an attractive English-speaking wife, and they were popular members of London society during the five years of his successful and important mission. His daughter is being educated at Oxford and his son at Cambridge.

32. *Fevzi* (*Çakmak*). *Field-Marshal.*

Born in Constantinople in 1874. Graduated from the military college in 1898. Saw service in Macedonia. From then until 1913 held numerous staff appointments. During the war fought at Gallipoli, in the Caucasus and in Palestine, and was Chief of the General Staff 1918–19. In November 1919 was sent on a mission to Anatolia by the Constantinople Government and established relations with Mustafa Kemal. Held the portfolio of War in Constantinople Government during February and March 1920. He was throughout in close touch with Mustafa Kemal, and on his resignation he went to Anatolia and was at once appointed Minister for National Defence. Played a large part in building up the Kemalist army and in organising transport and the production of ammunition. In 1921 he became, for a time, a back number, but later re-established his position and became Chief of Staff. In 1923 was elected Deputy for Constantinople, and since then has been annually reappointed Chief of Staff. Resigned his deputyship in October 1924 on opting for military duties. In the autumn of 1927 was suffering from diabetes and went to Europe for a cure. Since then his health has much improved. As Chief of the General Staff he went to Bucharest in November 1936 for the council meetings of the General Staffs of the Balkan *Entente*. During the last illness of Atatürk he was considered to have a strong chance of election as his successor, but he may well have been unwilling to accept the task, and, as he was not a Deputy, he could not have been elected constitutionally.

Fevzi Pasha had the confidence of Enver Pasha during the Great War, and later of Mustafa Kemal. Reputed to be a capable officer, especially in matters relating to administration. Regarded by Halide Hanim as a good soldier, but nothing more. Has considerable influence with the army. Was in his time a pan-Turanian as well as a pan-Islamist, and on the abolition of the Caliphate was regarded as the only rival of Mustafa Kemal, of whose manner of life he was understood strongly to disapprove. Was regarded as the leader of the war party at Angora during the Mosul crisis. Is somewhat old-fashioned and keeps his womenfolk secluded, but he is now seen more in public than formerly. Speaks a little French and is pleasant to talk to.

33. *Fuat* (*Algali*).

A son of Ethem Efendi, a former defterdar of Adrianople Vilayet. Was a finance official by profession and a keen Unionist in politics. Elected Deputy for Constantinople in 1926 and 1927. In November 1927 elected member of Finance Committee of Assembly, and a year later vice-chairman of Budget Committee. Resigned this position in January 1929 on appointment to presidency of Cour des Comptes. In November 1929 elected chairman of Budget Committee and member of executive bureau of People's party. Did not stand at the general election of 1931, but was returned at a by-election as Deputy for Elazig in October 1933, and was appointed Minister of Public Works shortly afterwards. Became Minister of Finance in February 1934 and has retained his post, in spite of numerous reshuffles of the Cabinet in 1938 and the spring of 1939. Little is known of Fuat's personal characteristics, and even since his promotion to Cabinet rank he remains practically unknown to Angora society.

34. *Hakki Sinasi, General.*

Born at Constantinople in 1868, the son of a Foreign Ministry official. Studied first at the naval, and afterwards at the medical, school. Followed medical courses at Berlin, Heidelberg and Munich. While a doctor at the Hamidiye Hospital in 1904 was expelled to Anatolia. On his return in 1906 was reinstated with rank of colonel, and later promoted general. Retired in 1918, and from then till 1924 occupied himself with municipal affairs. In November 1924 became a Deputy for Constantinople, and was in 1927–28 chairman of the Public Health Commission of the Assembly. In September 1925 was Turkish Red Crescent delegate at the International Red Cross Conference at Geneva. In March 1928 became chief inspector of the People's party for Constantinople, and in the late summer mediated successfully in a Constantinople tramway strike. Elected a Deputy for Erzerum in April 1931, and for Constantinople in February 1935. Re-elected Deputy in March 1939.

35. *Hamdi, Mehmet* (*Apak*).

Born about 1880. During the armistice was head of the Refugee Section of the Ministry of Interior in Constantinople. In 1923 was elected Deputy for Erzincan. In 1924 was assistant Turkish delegate for the exchange of Turco-Greek populations, and in 1923 became chief delegate on the appointment of Tevfik Rüştü Bey as Minister for Foreign Affairs. Negotiated the Turco-Greek Agreement of 1925, and in June was appointed Minister at Vienna. Transferred to Berlin as Ambassador in May 1934. Short and stoutish, Hamdi speaks French fairly well and is intelligent and moderate.

36. *Hamdullah Suphi* (*Tanriöver*).

Born at Constantinople in 1881. Educated at Galata Saray College. In 1901 entered Ministry for Foreign Affairs as a clerk. Remained there till 1908, occupying himself in writing poetry. After the Constitution continued his literary efforts, and was the founder of a society of young poets which developed into the Turkish Ojaks. In 1910 appointed Professor of Turkish Literature at the Constantinople University. Was for a time in opposition to the Committee of Union and Progress, but after the Balkan war was on good terms with the Unionists. Later became the leading propagandist of pan-Turanianism. Travelled in Germany during the war. In the early armistice was anti-British and pro-Italian. In April 1920 joined Mustafa Kemal at Angora. Later in the year was for a time head of the Kemalist Intelligence Service. January–April 1921, Minister of Public Instruction. In April became Vice-President of the Assembly, and occupied himself chiefly with the pan-Islamic Congress, then held in Angora. Was again Minister of Public Instruction during the latter

half of 1921, and was one of the first of the Angora leaders to make a speech against the Sultan. In 1923 was elected Deputy for Constantinople and later president of the Turkish Ojaks, to which he devoted most of his time and energy. During 1923 was president of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Assembly, and from March till December 1925 was again Minister of Public Instruction, resigning finally on grounds of ill-health. September 1927 re-elected for Constantinople, and became a member of the Constitutional Commission of the Assembly. In October 1930 went to Athens as a member of the Turkish delegation to the Balkan Congress. Early in 1931 the Turkish Ojak organisation was merged in that of the Popular party, to his great grief, and in April, not having been re-elected Deputy, he was appointed Minister at Bucharest. Promoted ambassador on the raising of the Turkish Legation at Bucharest to an embassy.

Hamdullah Suphi is an idealist of the pan-Turanian school, and was the moving spirit of the Turkish Ojaks until their suppression. He is a keen moderniser. Is not possessed of means, and his honesty is above reproach.

37. *Hasan Ali (Yücel).*

Born at Istanbul in 1897. Graduated in the Arts Faculty of Istanbul University. Teacher at Istanbul and Izmir lycées in 1924–25. Appointed Inspector-General under the Ministry of Public Instruction and Directory of Secondary Education. Elected Deputy for Izmir in February 1935. Appointed Minister of Public Works in December 1938, and retained his post in Dr. Saydam's Cabinet (January 1939). Re-elected Deputy for Izmir in March 1939.

Little has been seen as yet of Hasan Ali in Angora. He is a member of the Turkish Historical Association, and has published works on philosophy and literature. He is said to speak fluent French and to be a gifted and intellectual man.

38. *Hasan (Saka).*

Born in Trebizond in 1884. Said to be of Laz origin. Educated at Constantinople and in Paris, where, from 1909–14, he studied at the School of Political Science. During the war was head of the Economic Section of the Food Supplies Directorate, and in December 1919 became Deputy for Trebizond. Joined the Kemalist movement in March 1920, and in May 1921 became Minister of Finance, holding the post until April 1922. By this time he was apparently very pro-Bolshevik in sympathy. From May till July 1922 Minister of Economics and Public Works. In November was appointed member of the Turkish delegation to the Lausanne Conference, when he acted as financial expert. In September 1923 was again Minister of Economics. In March 1924 Minister of Commerce, and in March 1925 again Minister of Finance, resigning in July 1926, ostensibly on grounds of ill-health. Continued, however, to play an important part in Turkish financial matters. Was re-elected Deputy in September 1927, and in November, when it was rumoured that he would re-enter the Ministry, he became first Vice-President of the Assembly. Was president of the Turkish delegation to the Balkan Congress at Athens, October 1930. In May 1931 went with the Minister for Foreign Affairs to Geneva to attend the European Union Conference, and while there attended also the International Conference for the Limitation of Dangerous Drugs. In October was president of the Second Balkan Conference, held at Constantinople, and in December was elected president of the Supreme Economic Council. Led the Turkish delegation to the Third and Fourth Balkan Conferences at Bucharest and Salonica in 1932 and 1933 respectively. In May 1934 headed delegation of Turkish Deputies to Budapest to return visit of Hungarian Deputies to Angora in October 1933. Re-elected one of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly in November 1935, when he was also elected chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Assembly. Headed the Turkish delegation to the Balkan Economic Conference at Athens in March 1937, and was elected vice-president of the Interparliamentary Conference held at Paris in September 1937. Presided at Oriental Tobacco Congress (Istanbul, January 1938). Led Turkish delegation to the Balkan Economic Conference (Istanbul, March 1938). Re-elected Deputy for Trebizond in March 1939, and re-elected Vice-President of the Assembly. In May 1939 he led the Turkish delegation to the Economic Conference of the Balkan *Entente* at Bucharest.

Hasan fancies himself as an expert in matters pertaining to finance. Knows French fairly well; is a man of private means, wily and has a sense of humour. Not attractive personality. Probably a bully, has been described as something of an "apache," and most nearly answers the description when playing bridge, which he does very well. Has a young and not unattractive wife.

39. *Hasan Fehmi (Ataç).*

Born at Gümüşane in 1877. Educated at Constantinople, and from 1902 to 1910 held various posts in the Turkish Civil Service. In 1910 Governor of Gireson (Kerasund), and in 1912 of Komotini (Gümülcina), 1913–18 Deputy for Gümüşane. Joined Musta'a Kemal in April 1919. In 1920 Vice-President of the Assembly. In April 1922 was Minister of Finance. In 1923 elected Deputy for Gümüşane. August 1923 till January 1924 again Minister of Finance, resigning because of a dispute over the Anatolian Railway question. November 1924 till March 1925, Minister of Agriculture. December 1925, became one of the Government delegates on the board of the Ottoman Bank. Was re-elected Deputy in September 1927. In November of that year became chairman of the Finance Commission, and in November 1928 a member of the Constitutional Commission. Re-elected Deputy for Gümüşane in April 1931, and elected chairman of the Budget Commission in May. Elected President of Finance Commission in November 1933 and again in November 1934, but not in November 1935. Re-elected Deputy for Gümüşane in March 1939.

Hasan Fehmi is not regarded as a strong man, and during his occupation of ministerial posts was little more than a nominee of Mustafa Kemal.

40. *Haydar, Ali (Ataç).*

Born at Philippopolis about 1885. Having completed his studies at Galata Saray College, he entered the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and remained there till 1911, when he became second secretary at Sofia. Attended the London Peace Conference in 1913 and then remained at Sofia until February 1919, when he returned to the Ministry. June–December 1919 was Director of Press, and in May 1920 became private secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, retaining the post till the fall of the Constantinople Government in November 1922. Was a member of Turkish peace delegation to London in February 1921 and March 1922. Early in 1924 was a Turkish delegate for exchange of populations, and in August became first secretary in Berlin. In August 1925 was appointed Chargé d'Affaires at Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen. In November 1928 was appointed Minister at Belgrade, and in the autumn of 1931 acted as Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the place of Numan Bey. He returned to Belgrade in December 1931 and is still at that post.

Haydar is something of an intriguer and rather an opportunist, having tacked fairly successfully to the varying winds which have blown in Turkey during the last generation. He is, however, amiable and good-mannered, as well as able and intelligent. Strongly favours a close Bulgaro-Turkish friendship.

41. *Hikmet, Yusuf (Bayur).*

Born in Constantinople about 1882. Educated at the Galata Saray College. Entered the Turkish Diplomatic Service and served as a secretary at Paris and Berlin. Returned to the Sublime Porte early in the armistice, but in 1920 went to Angora, where he at once became Political Director at the Foreign Ministry, and accompanied the Nationalist mission to Europe in 1922. In 1924 was counsellor in London, and in January 1925 again became head of the Political Section of the Foreign Ministry. In the summer of 1925 he became Minister at Belgrade, holding the post till November 1927, when he became private secretary to the President of the Republic. In July 1928 was appointed Ambassador at Kabul, where he has not been a success, but his position was made very difficult by the collapse of Amanullah and the consequent eclipse of Turkish influence. In 1930–31 went on tour in India, and on his return treated His Majesty's Minister at Kabul to animadversions on the laxity of British rule in that country. Became secretary general to the Presidency of the Republic in the spring of 1932, and on resigning the post in October 1933 was elected Deputy for Manisa and soon afterwards appointed Minister of Education. Resigned this post in July 1934, ostensibly in order to devote himself to historical studies. Re-elected Deputy for Manisa in 1935, and again in 1939 (March).

Yusuf Hikmet is short, dark, and somewhat insignificant in appearance. He is, however, intelligent. He has agreeable manners, and, in spite of slight deafness, was generally popular in Belgrade, where His Majesty's Minister found him pleasant to deal with. He might, nevertheless, turn out to be something of a mischief-maker. Is said to be a voracious reader and collector of news, without, however, the capacity of digesting or even appraising his material. Is now Professor in the History Faculty at Angora University, and a member of the Turkish Historical Society.

42. *Hilmi (Uran).*

Early history unknown. Appointed Vali of Adana in 1925, and was soon afterwards fined by the Angora Independence Tribunal for failure to send certain witnesses from Adana to the capital. Later became local Popular party inspector. In September 1927 was elected Deputy for Adana, in October became a member of the executive bureau of the Popular party, and in November a member of the Internal Affairs Commission of the Assembly. Elected vice-president of this commission in 1928, reporter in 1929, and again vice-president in November 1930. In December 1930 succeeded Zekâi Bey as Minister of Public Works, and retained his portfolio in Ismet Pasha's new Cabinet, May 1931. Resigned on account of ill-health in October 1933. Re-elected to Commission of Internal Affairs in 1934. Re-elected Deputy for Seyhan (Adana) in February 1935. Appointed a Vice-President of the Assembly in March 1937 and re-elected in October 1937. Is also president of a committee for spreading Turkish culture among the Arabic-speaking population of the Adana region. Appointed Minister of Justice in November 1938, but resigned two months later to become vice-president of the parliamentary group of the People's party. Re-elected Deputy for Seyhan in March 1939.

43. *Hulusi (Alatas). Dr.*

Was for many years Mayor of Smyrna. In January 1936 he was elected Deputy for Aydin, and in March 1937 was appointed Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Health. On the formation of Celal Bayar's Cabinet in October 1937 he became Minister for Health in the place of Dr. Refik Saydam, and has retained his post in succeeding Cabinets. Re-elected Deputy for Aydin in March 1939.

At Smyrna successive British consuls-general found him somewhat unbending and inclined to xenophobia in all questions at issue between him and them, and especially in the matter of the site of the consular premises in Smyrna. Dr. Alatas later became head of the Smyrna Port Monopoly, where British merchants, at least, found him helpful, although he did not please his own compatriots. He is a hard worker and has somewhat mellowed with time and the acquisition of higher dignities.

44. *Hulusi Foat (Tugay).*

Born in 1885 at Constantinople. Member of the Turkish Diplomatic Service. Was employed at Berlin and Vienna during the war, and in Christiania in 1923, when he received an appointment in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Angora. May 1924 became "chef du cabinet" of Adnan Bey, delegate at Constantinople of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In October went to London as a member of the Turkish delegation in the Congress of the League of Nations Societies. Resigned in March 1925 for reasons unknown, though it was suggested that (1) he had outshone Nusret Bey, (2) he was not fully sympathetic with Angora. In May appointed Chargé d'Affaires at Tokyo. In September 1928 was transferred in the same capacity to Nanking, whence he was recalled to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in August 1931, to become Director-General of the VIth Department, and subsequently of the IIIrd Department, with the rank of permanent Chargé d'Affaires. He was a member of Turkish delegation to London in July 1936 for the discussions leading up to the signature of the Anglo-Turkish Trade and Clearing Agreement. Appointed head of the IInd Department of the Ministry in April 1937, and subsequently became Political Counsellor at the Ministry (November), a revival of a post which had been in abeyance. In February 1938 he was appointed Minister to Albania, and remained in Tirana until the Italian occupation in April 1939, after which he returned to Angora.

Hulusi Foat, or Foat-Tugay, as he has begun to call himself, is a son of "Deli" Fuat Pasha, and his wife, who is a pleasant woman and an excellent linguist, is a daughter of the late Muhmut Muhtar Pasha and a cousin of the late

King of Egypt on her mother's side. He is pleasant to deal with, accustomed to European ways, enjoys a good cigar, not very clever, and believed to be fairly straight. Knows English and speaks excellent French.

45. *Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçin).*

Born at Constantinople in 1876. Took up the teaching profession, but in 1908 went over to journalism and became, till 1912, editor and part proprietor of the *Tanin*, the official organ of the Committee of Union and Progress. From 1908 was one of the Constantinople Deputies in the Chamber, of which he became one of the vice-presidents during the war. Before the war was representative of the Turkish bondholders on the Public Debt. Played no great political part during the war, but at the armistice was arrested and deported to Malta. Released in April 1921, he spent the following year in Europe. On his return to Constantinople, he recommenced publication of the *Tanin*, and, for a time, supported the Kemalist régime. Nevertheless, he kept in close touch with the surviving Committee of Union and Progress leaders, and gradually began to take a more independent line in his writings. By 1923 the *Tanin* had become the chief organ of the Opposition, and in December Cahit was tried and acquitted for the publication of the Aga Khan letter. In April 1925 he was again arrested for his publications, the *Tanin* was suppressed and Cahit Bey was sentenced by the Independence Tribunal to a life-time confinement in a fortress (Çorum). He was again brought before the tribunal in August 1926 for alleged participation in the Smyrna plot, but was acquitted and soon afterwards released. In 1930 became chairman of the board of directors of the Bank of Industries and Mines. In September 1932, created a sensation at the First Turkish Linguistic Congress by calling in question the Gazi's favourite linguistic theories, and opposing the wholesale elimination of words of foreign origin. He was one of several persons who had incurred Atatürk's displeasure, and who returned to political life immediately after his death, though he had been allowed to resume his journalistic activities some six months earlier. In December 1938 he was elected Deputy for Çankiri, and re-elected in March 1939. In May 1939 he visited the United Kingdom with a group of six Turkish journalists at the invitation of the British Council.

Tall and slight, Cahit was remarkable for his biting satire, and was feared by his enemies. Has written several poems and produced a number of scholastic books. His former power was doubtless derived partly from his association with Cavit and the Government seem to have brought him to terms.

46. *Hüseyin Rağip.*

Born about 1885 in Rhodes. A brother of the late Reşit Galip, ex-Minister of Education (1932–33). In 1923 was appointed Turkish representative in Paris. Transferred to Bucharest in April 1925. Appointed Ambassador at Moscow in January 1929. Transferred to Rome in July 1934.

Is of pleasant address, unmarried, speaks good French, and is well looked upon in the highest Angora circles. Possibly the best Turkish Ambassador to Russia since the war. Keeps an open mind about the Soviet régime and endeavours to judge it without bias. Entertains generously and with good taste.

47. *Hüsnü (Çakir).*

Born at Hopa in 1892. Educated at the School of Political Science, Istanbul. Participated in the Nationalist movement in Asia Minor. Served as kaimakam at Tirebolu, Gaziantep, Ordu, Yozgat and Tokat. Director-General of Monopolies. Elected Deputy for Smyrna in 1931, and re-elected in 1935. Member of the Accounts Commission of the Assembly. In December 1938 he was elected to the Council of the Popular party and appointed Minister of National Economy the same month, retaining his post in Dr. Saydam's Cabinet formed in January 1939. Re-elected Deputy in March 1939, but for Samsun.

As far as can at present be judged, he is distinguished neither by intelligence, ability nor the social graces.

48. *Hüsrev (Gerede).*

Born about 1884. A soldier *de carrière;* was military attaché at Athens at the outbreak of the Great War, and later served on the staff of the Caucasus Army as an intelligence officer. During the early part of the Nationalist struggle was private secretary to Mustafa Kemal Pasha. In February 1921 was a member of Bekir Sami Bey's mission to Paris, London and Rome. In July 1923 was elected Deputy for Urfa. In May 1924 became Minister at Budapest. Later

resigned his deputyship on opting for his Legation. In August 1926 was appointed Minister at Sofia. In July 1930 was appointed Ambassador at Warsaw, but did not proceed, and the following month was appointed Ambassador at Tehran, where he became increasingly unpopular, making no secret of his disgust for all things Persian. In 1931 the Persian New Year arrangements were altered to prevent his making a speech as doyen of the Diplomatic Corps. Resigned, ostensibly on ground of ill-health, in June 1934, to make way for Enis (*q.v.*). In January 1936 he was appointed Ambassador at Tokyo.

Hüsrev is tall and good-looking, and was a friend of Atatürk.

49. *Ibrahim Tali* (*Ongören*).

Born about 1885. An ex-army doctor by profession, and served in that capacity during the Great War. Came under the Gazi's notice at Diarbekir in 1916 or 1917. Later became Turkish consul at Batum. In February 1924 it was rumoured that he would succeed Adnan Bey as representative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Constantinople, but instead, he went to Salonica to investigate alleged abuses on the part of the Turkish consul there. In April was appointed Minister at Warsaw. January 1926 elected Deputy for Diarbekir, and returned to Angora in the following month. In May became inspector-general of the People's party in Constantinople, and, as such, had very extensive powers. Took a prominent part in the 1927 elections and was himself again returned for Diarbekir. In October became vice-president of the Executive Council of the People's party, and in November a member of the Assembly Foreign Affairs Commission. In December resigned his deputyship on being appointed inspector-general of the Eastern Provinces, with extensive powers. Has had considerable success in modernising the backward districts under his jurisdiction. Resigned post and elected Deputy for Constantinople in December 1932. Resigned Deputyship in April 1934 to take up new post of Inspector-General of Thrace, but resigned it in August 1935 on the ground of ill-health. Elected Deputy for Diarbekir in January 1936, and re-elected in March 1939.

Ibrahim Tali is a short, bullet-headed man and wears heavy glasses. He speaks French and a little English, and is cultured. Is pleasant in conversation, genial, tactful and broad-minded. Has been to Bombay, studies Anglo-Indian administration and, at least while in charge of the Eastern Provinces, made his officials start work at 7·30 and stop at 1.

50. *Ihsan* (*Sökmen*), *General*.

Born about 1875 at Constantinople. Left military college as a staff captain in 1896. 1900–06 military attaché at Athens. Joined the General Staff as lieutenant-colonel in 1906. From 1908 to 1911 he served on the staff of the VIIth Army, being then appointed its chief. Later, recalled to the Imperial General Staff, was placed in command of Edremit Division in 1912, and in 1914 was transferred with rank of brigadier-general to the 34th Division at Erzerum. Was captured after the battle of Sarikamiş in January 1915 and sent as a prisoner to Siberia, whence he escaped in December, making his way on foot to China, and from there returning by way of America to Constantinople. On his return he was placed on the retired list by Enver and took up the post of mayor at Yeniköy, on the Bosphorus. Brought back after the armistice, and became in 1919 a member of the Military Court of Constantinople, in 1920 Inspector of Prisoners of War and in 1921 Director of the War Department. This brought him in close touch with the Angora Government, and in December he became superintendent of their organisations in Constantinople. Though officially unemployed from November 1922, he was charged with the defence of Constantinople in the event of war between Turkey and the Allies. In July 1924 became Vali of Smyrna, in 1926 Deputy for Constantinople and since 1927 has been a member of the National Defence Commission of the Assembly. (President 1932–35). Elected Deputy for Giresun (Kerasund) in April 1931, and member of the executive bureau of the People's party in November 1933; both again in 1935, when he was also elected chairman of the Petitions Commission of the Assembly. Was a member of the Turkish delegation to the Parliamentary Economic Conference in Paris in May 1937. Re-elected Deputy for Giresun in March 1939. In April he was elected a member of the administrative council of the parliamentary group of the People's party, and re-elected president of the Petitions Committee of the Assembly

General Ihsan is a thin, short man with ape-like features. He is something of an opportunist. He is married, and has an American-educated English-speaking daughter, who is married to Emin Ali, legal adviser at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He has published an account of his escape from Siberia.

51. *Ismet* (*Inönü*), *General*.

Born in 1880 at Smyrna, where his father was a small landed proprietor. Educated at the military college, and from 1906–12 saw service in Thrace and the Yemen. Joined the General Staff in 1914. 1915–16 Chief of Staff of the Caucasus army. 1917–18 in Palestine, and became Under-Secretary for War in the autumn in 1918. Early showed Nationalist sympathies, and joined Mustafa Kemal in March 1920, at once becoming Chief of Staff of the Nationalist forces. Assumed command of the Western Army in December 1920, and was chief Turkish delegate at the Mudanya Conference in October 1922. In the same month was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, and in November went to Lausanne as chief Turkish delegate. Signed the Treaty of Lausanne on behalf of Turkey in July 1923, and in October became Prime Minister, retaining the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. At the same time Mustafa Kemal delegated to him the functions of president of the People's party. During 1924, owing to his ill-health, his administration became more and more unpopular, and he resigned in November. On the outbreak of the Kurdish revolt in March 1925 he was again summoned to power by Mustafa Kemal, and remained Prime Minister until October 1937, though, in August 1925, it was rumoured that his relations with the Gazi had become strained owing to his opposition to the divorce of Latife Hanim. This rumour proved unfounded, and his position remained as strong as ever. In August 1926 he was promoted general of the first class, and in November 1927, after the general election, at which he was re-elected for Malatya, he reconstructed his Cabinet on more moderate lines. In 1930 his health was not good, and he was subjected to much criticism, but defended himself strongly on formation of Liberal party in August. His triumph was again complete when Fethi Bey was forced to dissolve that party in November. Re-elected for Malatya in April 1931, and soon after again became Prime Minister with the same colleagues as before. Paid official visits to Moscow and Rome in the spring of 1932 and to Sofia in September 1933. Given the surname of Inönü (the scene of his principal victory over the Greeks) by the President of the Republic in 1934. Again Prime Minister after the general election of February 1935. Toured the Eastern Provinces with the Minister for Foreign Affairs during the summer of that year. In April 1937 he paid an official visit to Belgrade, and in May represented the President of the Republic at the Coronation of His Majesty King George VI. In September it was announced that he would take six weeks' holiday; all rumours of a disagreement between him and the President were consistently denied, but in October he finally resigned and Celal Bayar became Prime Minister. Ismet retained his seat as Deputy for Malatya. During the following twelve months he did not leave Angora, though he frequently appeared in public and seemed to have lost none of his popularity. It was said that he was never called to Atatürk's bedside during his last illness. He was usually considered the most likely candidate for the presidency, his only possible rivals being Fethi Okyar and Marshal Fevzi Çakmak. His election did not therefore cause surprise, but rather admiration for the rapidity and orderliness with which it was effected, and the scrupulous adherence shown to the terms of the Constitution. He showed no inclination to conciliate the more turbulent element among Atatürk's entourage, such as Şükrü Kaya, who was immediately ejected from the Cabinet after holding the post of Minister of the Interior since 1927, and also that of secretary-general of the People's party; a number of Atatürk's boon companions also lost their seats at the elections which followed in March 1939. To Ismet's desire to rid the Administration of corruption was attributed the revelation of a number of grave financial scandals in January and February 1939, which resulted in the resignation of Celal Bayar and other Cabinet Ministers, and the dismissal of a number of lesser Government officials. No personal animosity against Ismet seemed to have been aroused, however, and in June 1939 he reverted to a scheme which Atatürk had attempted with results dangerous to his own position—the creation of an Opposition in the Assembly. Ismet's Opposition was, however, on a modest scale, and consisted of members of the People's party, who were chosen to form an independent group within the party.

Ismet in his army days was regarded as an exceptionally capable staff officer, an indefatigable worker, and was, to a large extent, responsible for the final Nationalist success against the Greeks in 1922. At Lausanne he showed himself a stubborn but able negotiator. Is courteous and never shows signs of being ruffled, but suffers from deafness, which, however, he probably finds convenient at times. According to Halide Hanim (July 1926): "He subordinates himself entirely to the Gazi and only wants to hang everybody." Though this estimate is undoubtedly overcoloured, there is certainly a hard strain in Ismet's character, while, as regards the Gazi, it is probably truer to say that they made an admirable combination, Ismet not always being merely the organ of execution of reforms, but sometimes, at any rate, being even more thorough-going than his chief. Became a zealous student of English in the autumn of 1935, taking lessons from an American Rhodes scholar, and in 1936 from an Englishman at Angora University.

52. *Izzettin, General.*

Early history unknown. Commanded the Ist Army Corps at the Sakarya battles, 1922. In July 1923 was elected Deputy for Aydin, but resigned his seat in October 1924 on opting for military duties. In June 1925 became Inspector-General of the IIIrd Army. In August 1926 was promoted general of division and in 1930 full general. Is a member of the Supreme War Council. In November 1933 accompanied the Voroshiloff–Karakhan delegation (which had visited Angora for the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic) back to Odessa, where he was fêted and gave public expression to Russophil sentiments.

53. *Kâzim (Özalp), General.*

Born at Veles (Köprülü) about 1884. Has followed a military career, and was early a staunch adherent of the Committee of Union and Progress. Held various commands in the eastern vilayets, and during the war was Director-General of Administration to Ali Fuat Pasha. In July 1919 was in command of troops at Balikesir, and there worked for the Nationalist cause. In the autumn raised irregular bands round Bandirma to support Mustafa Kemal, who appointed him Governor of the Balikesir area in January 1920. In June was given command on the northern front, and, after the battle of the Sakarya, was promoted Pasha, becoming, in the following month, January 1922, Minister of National Defence. Held this post till November 1924, when he became President of the Assembly. In August 1926 was promoted to be divisional general of the first class. Following the general election in September 1927, at which he was again returned for Karasi (Balikesir), he was, in November, re-elected President of the Assembly. Was president of the Turkish Linguistic Congress at Constantinople in the autumn of 1932. Not elected President of the Fifth Grand National Assembly, March 1935, but made Minister of National Defence, a position which he retained on the formation of Celal Bayar's Cabinet in October 1937. He held the post until January 1939, when he resigned. The official reason given was that he wished to facilitate investigations into a scandal connected with a bogus purchase of aeroplanes from a Canadian company, in the course of which transaction his signature was alleged to have been forged on a vital document. He retained his seat in the Assembly, and was re-elected for Balikesir in March 1939.

General Özalp Kâzim is fairly well educated, and speaks a little French. He is considered to be tenacious though reasonable, but he does not strike one as a strong character. Has poor health. Is probably anti-German, and possibly still anti-Bolshevik, and during the Nationalist struggle made it clear that he was anti-Greek as distinct from anti-Ally. Is influential, but not an attractive personality. A keen poker player. His honesty is not above suspicion.

54. *Kâzim (Orbay), General.*

Born about 1883. Fought in Turco-Italian and Balkan Wars, also in Great War in Austria (commanded a brigade against the Russians at Przemysl), at Gallipoli and Erzerum. At the armistice was Chief of Staff of IXth (Caucasus) Army. Was in charge of the division which captured General Tricoupis in the War of Independence. In 1925 he became Sub-Chief of the Turkish General Staff. Was promoted general of division in 1926, and in November 1928 was chief of the Turkish military mission then sent to Afghanistan, but the mission

came to nothing owing to the collapse of Amanullah. Given command of IVth Army Corps in June 1929. Later Inspector-General of Gendarmerie. Became Inspector of Third Army Area in September 1935. Accompanied Ismet Inönü as one of the three members of the Turkish Mission to the Coronation of His Majesty King George VI in May 1937, and was again in London in the spring of 1939 as leader of a military mission for the purchase of armaments.

General Kâzim has a precise manner of speaking, but is pleasant and reasonable. He is married to a sister of the late Enver Pasha. Probably anti-Russian and pro-German. A great friend of the late Kemalettin Sami Pasha, Turkish Ambassador at Berlin.

55. *Kâzim (Karabekir), General.*

Born at Bitolj (Monastir) in 1878 of poor parents. Has throughout his life followed a military career. Held numerous staff appointments during the war. Immediately after the armistice was given command of the XVth Army Corps at Erzerum, where, in 1919, he established contact with Mustafa Kemal, definitely joining the latter in September. In 1919–20 was responsible for the consolidation of the Nationalist position in the eastern vilayets and for the repression of the Armenians. At the same time, was closely in touch with Bolshevik agents. Was throughout inclined to act independently of Angora, and for a time his relations with Mustafa Kemal were strained. In September 1921 represented Turkey at the Kars Conference, when he incurred the displeasure of Angora by adopting too conciliatory an attitude towards the Bolsheviks, and also, probably, because of his great influence in the eastern provinces. In 1922 was given full powers there, and for a time was in touch with Enver Pasha. Finally arrived at Angora in October 1922, and, after being for a time unemployed, probably owing to the jealousy of Mustafa Kemal, became one of the military inspectors. Elected Deputy for Constantinople in 1923, he resigned his military duties in October 1924. Joined the Opposition, resigned from the People's party in November, when he became president of the new Progressive party, which was suppressed in March 1925. He continued his opposition activities, and in July 1926 was arrested and tried at Smyrna for participation in the alleged plot against the Gazi, but was acquitted, probably owing to his influence with the army, which it was later stated wished to make him leader of an opposition movement. Ceased to be a Deputy in September 1927, and was severely criticised in the Gazi's lengthy review of the revolution in October 1927. Since then little has been heard of him, though his influence, particularly with the army, still remains considerable. Was proposed as an Independent candidate for Istanbul in 1931, but not elected, as his candidature was vetoed by the Popular party. In May 1933, in a letter to a newspaper, claimed the credit of having started the Nationalist movement before Mustafa Kemal. This caused an uproar in the press, which made much of the Gazi's comment that Kâzim Karabekir was a case for the mental specialists. Among others who had not enjoyed Atatürk's favour in recent years, he returned to political life immediately after Atatürk's death; in December 1938 he was received by Ismet and was elected Deputy for Istanbul shortly afterwards. Re-elected for Istanbul in March 1939.

Colonel Rawlinson says: "Kâzim Karabekir Pasha is the best example of a first-class Turkish officer that I have met. Any army under him will be well commanded." Possessed of a naturally quick and bright intelligence, he is master of every branch of his profession, and most conscientious in the performance of his duties. Is straightforward, and much of the Nationalist success was due to his competent handling of the Eastern Army.

56. *Kâzim (Sevüktekin), General.*

Born about 1880 and educated at the Military School. Was in command of troops (8th Division) at Angora 1925–27. In January 1928 became Deputy for Diarbekir and resigned his military appointment. Has remained Deputy for Diarbekir ever since and member of the National Defence Commission of the Grand National Assembly since November 1928. In April 1939 he became President of the National Defence Commission.

General Kâzim, nick-named "Benli" (from "ben," a mole on the face), used to be described as a disagreeable type, ill-mannered, a bully and a drinker; but in recent years, at any rate, he has always seemed the soul of good nature and has shown himself particularly friendly to members of His Majesty's Embassy. He and his extremely plain wife are familiar and popular figures at the principal Angora "crushes."

57. *Kiliç Ali.*

Born about 1882. Before and during the war was a non-commissioned officer. In 1919 he organised a tough lot of bashi-bozuks at Balikesir. Next heard of in Cilicia in 1920–21, when he acted with great energy against the Armenians, thereby earning the sobriquet of "Kiliç" (sword). At the same time changed his name from Asaf to Ali, and became Deputy for Ayintap, which he still represents in the Assembly. In July 1924 assaulted Celal Nuri Bey with impunity in his office, and two months later accompanied Mustafa Kemal on his tour of the eastern provinces, an association much criticised at the time. Continued, however, to be one of the chief associates of the Gazi, and in March 1925 became a member of the Angora Independence Tribunal. In February 1927 wounded Salih Bey in a brawl arising out the Swedish railway contract. The independence tribunals having been suppressed in March, Kiliç Ali devoted himself to his numerous commercial activities till the summer, when he was in attendance on the Gazi at Constantinople. In November was a member of the Turkish mission sent to Moscow in connexion with the Russian revolution anniversary celebrations, and in the same month became a member of the executive bureau of the People's party and of the Defence Commission of the Assembly. Is a member of the board of the Iş Bankasi.

Kiliç Ali's character is clear from his record. He is a brute and a bully, with no apparent compensating features. Owing to his friendship with the former President, he had a certain influence, but this ceased on Atatürk's death. He lost his seat in the elections of March 1939, and appears to have retired from public life.

58. *Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt).*

Born at Smyrna in 1886. Studied law in Constantinople and Switzerland, obtaining his degree in Fribourg in 1911. In 1912 established himself in Smyrna as a lawyer, and remained obscurely there till 1919. In May 1920 went to Angora, and in the following month was appointed Deputy for Smyrna and still retains this seat. In May 1922 published a violent article against the Sublime Porte and the Sultan, and in June became secretary of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Assembly. In July became Minister of Economics, holding the post till September 1923, when he retired to Smyrna and was understood to have become an oppositionist. In March 1924 opposed the grant of veto and dissolution powers to the President of the Republic. In November became Minister of Justice, retaining this portfolio when Ismet Pasha reconstructed his Cabinet in November 1927. In August September 1926 Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs during the absence of Tevfik Rüstü Bey at Geneva. In 1926 and 1927 he made several visits to Europe in connexion with the "Lotus" question, and was chief Turkish delegate before The Hague Tribunal in the summer of 1927, when the Turkish case was upheld. In 1930 became increasingly unpopular, and was accused of influencing the course of justice. His position became gradually weaker during the summer, and he was one of the chief objects of attack of Fethi Bey and the new Liberal party. Was not included in Ismet Pasha's Cabinet as reformed in September 1930 and in May 1931. In October 1931 published in a Smyrna newspaper a series of violent articles against freemasonry. Re-elected Deputy for Smyrna in 1935, and again in 1939.

Mahmut Esat speaks French and German as well as Turkish and Greek. He is considered to be one of the best Turkish specialists in Constitutional Law. He showed great energy in the introduction of Criminal and Civil Codes based on Western models, of which the last named has revolutionised Turkish family life.

50. *Mehmet Esat (Atmer).*

Born in 1886, a diplomat *de carrière*. Director of the first branch of Political Affairs at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1924, then appointed Chargé d'Affaires at The Hague. He served at Vienna and Stockholm and returned to Angora in 1928 as Director-General of the Second Department of the Ministry. In 1929 he was transferred to the First Department. In August 1931 he was appointed second Turkish delegate on the Exchange Commission, which was certainly not promotion, and he was believed to have incurred the disapproval of Ismet Inönü. In 1936 he was promoted to the post of head of the new Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs which deals with questions

arising from the application of the new Straits Convention. On the reorganisation of the Ministry in April 1937 he became head of the IIIrd Department.

A very European Turk, he speaks excellent French, and goes about a good deal in society. He is efficient and helpful.

60. *Memduh Şevket (Esendal).*

Early history unknown. Appointed Turkish Minister at Tehran in August 1925, and rather more than a year later returned to Angora with Teymourtache, via Moscow. Was said to be associated with schemes for an Asiatic League of Nations. Resigned his post in August 1930, nominally on grounds of ill-health, and was elected Deputy for Elaziz in April 1931. In October was a member of the Turkish delegation to the Second Balkan Conference at Constantinople. Elected member of the Constitution Committee of the Assembly in November 1932. Was also a member of the executive bureau of the People's party. Appointed Ambassador at Kabul in January 1933, and, after resigning his deputyship, left to take up his post in October.

Memduh Şevket had at one time the reputation of being very Asiatic and practically ignorant of Western Europe. At Tehran, however, he learned to speak French fluently, and was very friendly towards His Majesty's Legation. Is understood to have wide interests, especially historical.

61. *Mahlis (Erkmen).*

Born in Brusa in 1891. Graduate of Halkali Agricultural School in 1911. Taught there 1911–16. Sent by Turkish Government to Germany for special course of study, and on his return resumed position as teacher at Halkali School. Was employed for a time as adviser in Ministry of National Economy, returning later to the agricultural school, where he specialised in the subject of milk. Still later became rector of the school, and was Under-Secretary for Agriculture in 1926 and 1927. In the latter year was elected Deputy for Brusa and member of the Budget Commission of the Assembly, of which he became *rapporteur* in 1928. In 1931 was elected Deputy for Kütahya and secretary of the Budget Commission. In December 1931 was appointed to the newly-created post of Minister of Agriculture. Is friendly and popular. Known to the Diplomatic Corps chiefly in connexion with the Angora Riding Club, of which he is an active member. In June 1937 he resigned from the Ministry of Agriculture on grounds of ill-health. In December 1938 he was elected to the Council of the Popular party and shortly afterwards reappointed Minister of Agriculture in place of Faik Kurtoglu. Re-elected Deputy for Kutahya in March 1939.

62. *Münür, Mehmet (Ertegün).*

Born about 1875. Educated at the Mülkiye College and Law School at Constantinople. After obtaining his diploma of doctor of law, was appointed one of the assistant legal advisers of the Sublime Porte, holding this post till 1916, when he became chief legal adviser. As such attended the conference of Brzesć (Brest-Litovsk). Accompanied Izzet Pasha on the reconciliation mission to Anatolia in December 1920. At once placed his services at the disposal of the Nationalist Government, and became legal adviser. Was Turkish legal adviser at the Lausanne Conference, and returned to hold the post at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs till February 1925, when he was appointed Turkish Minister at Berne. Became Ambassador at Paris in August 1930. Transferred to London in May 1932 and to Washington in March 1934. He was the Turkish Government's candidate for a vacant judgeship on the Permanent Court of International Justice, The Hague, in 1936 and again in 1939.

Münür is a pretty good lawyer and rather the simple old-fashioned kind of Turkish official. He has a reputation for honesty, and created a good impression on the British delegates at the Lausanne Conference.

63. *Nuri (Ekinci), General.*

Born at Bitolj (Monastir). Passed out of Constantinople Military School with rank of second lieutenant of infantry in 1893, and went to Germany for a course of military studies. Teacher of military manœuvres from 1897 to 1909. Commanded school for reserve officers at Beylerbey until its suppression in 1912. In February 1913 appointed director of studies at the Constantinople Military School. In February 1915 was made director of the training camp at Erzerum,

and in 1917 joined the General Staff of the Caucasus armies. In July 1918 appointed personal A.D.C. to the Sultan (Mehmet VI, Vahidettin), and retained the post until April 1920, though in sympathy with the Nationalist movement, for which reason he fell foul of the Grand Vizier Damat Ferit. Accompanied Salih Pasha on his mission to Anatolia, and joined Mustafa Kemal. In 1924 was head of a military mission to Britain, France and Poland. In May–June 1925 was in command of the Government forces at Diyarbekir for the repression of the Kurdish revolt of Sheikh Said. In 1927 commanded the Vth Army Corps at Konya and was promoted Divisional General. In 1928 made the arrangements for King Amanullah's visit to Angora, and was to have gone to Afghanistan as military adviser, but Kâzim Pasha was sent instead. Thereupon resigned from the army, and was elected Deputy for Cebelibereket. Was president of the National Defence Commission of the Assembly from November 1928 to November 1930, and is a member of the same commission since the latter date. Elected Deputy for Seyhan (Adana) in February 1935. Led the Turkish delegation at the Parliamentary Commercial Conference at Paris in May 1937. Re-elected Deputy for Seyhan in March 1939.

General Naci is short, very dapper, possessed of pleasant but very formal manners, a refined and charming wife and an attractive daughter, who spent some months at Exeter College in 1937. Speaks French and excellent German.

64. *Naci (Tinaz), General.*

A former Under-Secretary of State for War. Promoted major-general in 1926, and lieutenant-general in 1930, when he was in command of the IVth Army Corps at Eskisehir. In December 1938 he was elected Deputy for Brusa, and in January 1939 appointed Minister of National Defence on the resignation of General Kâzim Ozalp. Re-elected Deputy for Brusa in March 1939.

General Naci Tinaz has a somewhat grim manner, but appears efficient and has a reputation for incorruptibility.

65. *Necmettin Sadik.*

Born about 1890. Owner and chief editor of the *Akşam* newspaper, published at Constantinople. Elected Deputy for Sivas in September 1927, and member of the Public Instruction Commission of the Assembly in November. Was one of the Turkish delegates to the International Press Conference at Cologne in May 1928, and in November was elected member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Assembly, a position which he still retains. Early in 1929 his paper published an attack on His Majesty's Ambassador on account of sympathy shown with the sufferers from a fire at Kurtuluş (Tatavla), a Greek quarter of Constantinople, but later gave equal publicity to an explanation by Sir George Clerk. In November 1930 he accompanied, as journalist, the Turkish delegation to the preliminary Disarmament Conference at Geneva. Accompanied Ismet Pasha and Tevfik Rüştü Bey on their official visit to Athens, October 1931, and on his return was one of the Turkish delegates at the Second Balkan Conference, held at Constantinople. Member of Turkish delegation to Inter-Parliamentary Congress at Geneva, July 1932, and to the Disarmament Conference in January 1933. Was commissioned by the Gazi to reply to accusations contained in Harold Armstrong's *Grey Wolf*, which he did in a series of articles in the *Akşam* containing violent personal attacks on that author. Elected Secretary-General of "Franco-Turkish Friendship" group of Grand National Assembly in March 1934, and, in November, *rapporteur* of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly. Re-elected in 1935. In January 1935 and September 1936 he accompanied the Turkish delegations to Geneva, where he is now permanent Turkish delegate. Re-elected Deputy for Sivas in March 1939.

Necmettin Sadik speaks French and has pleasant manners.

66. *Numan (Menemencioğlu).*

Born in 1890, a son of Menemenli Zade Rifat Bey, ex-president of the Ottoman Senate, and on his mother's side a relative of the poet Namik Kemal Bey. After passing through Galata Saray College, went to Switzerland in 1913 to study jurisprudence. On the outbreak of war entered the Harbiye College as a cadet, but through his father's influence obtained in February 1915 the post of third secretary at the Turkish Embassy in Vienna. Transferred in 1916 to Berne, where he remained till transferred to The Hague some years after the war. Appointed first secretary at Athens in 1926, and in August transferred to Budapest as Chargé d'Affaires. After serving for a time as consul-general at

Beirut, was in June 1928 appointed Director-General of the First Division at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Appointed Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in June 1929, in which post he completed the work of reorganisation initiated by his predecessor, Ennis Bey. Was in Germany for treatment during greater part of 1931. In May 1933 accompanied Minister of National Economy to Athens for commercial negotiations and cultivation of cordial relations with Tsaldaris Government. In June was promoted to rank of Ambassador and appointed Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, a new post. In December led a delegation to Rome to negotiate a new commercial treaty, and to Berlin in March 1935. In December 1936 he accompanied Dr. Aras to Geneva to discuss the Alexandretta question, and led the Turkish delegation for the subsequent discussions in February and March 1937. In March also he was elected Deputy for Gazi Ayintah in order to fill the newly created post of Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—a post which was abolished in November 1937, when he resigned his seat in the Assembly and returned to the Ministry as Secretary-General. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in June and September 1937. Visited Beirut officially in November. Went to Geneva in March 1938 for discussions concerning the Sanjak of Alexandretta, and headed a delegation to Berlin to negotiate a new commercial agreement. He was again in Berlin in January 1939 when he signed the Turco-German Credit Agreement.

Numan is stout, somewhat stooped, dark-haired and sallow-complexioned. Has very indifferent health. Quiet and retiring, but very intelligent and efficient, friendly-mannered. Speaks excellent French, and plays a good game of bridge. Married a French Swiss lady, now deceased. He is very deaf.

67. *Nuri (Batu).*

Early history unknown. Was in 1924 member of staff of Foreign Affairs delegation in Constantinople. Later appointed Turkish consul at Tiflis. In December 1926 became head of Consular Section of Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and in March 1928 Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, chiefly in connexion with legal matters. Appointed Director-General of the Third (Balkan) Department in June 1928, and Chargé d'Affaires at The Hague in August 1931. In June 1933 was appointed Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in succession to Numan Bey, but never took up his duties, it was said because the Gazi considered him unsuitable. In July appointed first Turkish Minister at Tirana since recognition of King Zog by the Gazi, but for some mysterious reason did not proceed. Appointed Minister at Riga, July 1935.

68. *Nusret.*

Born about 1878 of South Albanian origin. Educated at the Mülkiye College at Constantinople, after which he followed a course of jurisprudence at the law school. In 1903 became a clerk in the Legal Adviser's Department at the Sublime Porte. In 1916 became director of this department. In 1921 accompanied Tevfik Pasha's delegation to London in the capacity of legal adviser. Was in the Turkish delegation at Lausanne. Continued to share with Münür Bey the duties of legal adviser of the Angora Government until 1924, when he was appointed representative in Constantinople of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. As such he was always ready to take reasonable views, and in so far as his limited powers allowed him, he was helpful. In June 1927 he resigned his Constantinople appointment on being appointed President of the newly constituted Council of State.

Nusret gives lectures at the law school on international law, on which he is regarded as something of an authority. Is of a very quiet and studious disposition, and his chief pleasure consists in the perusal of legal works in French. Is personable and courteous, but in Constantinople his bugbear was social functions in Pera.

69. *Nusret Sadullah.*

Born about 1875, the son of Sadullah Pasha, at one time Ambassador and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Studied at the Galata Seray College, Constantinople, and at Vienna. Entered the diplomatic service, and served at Berlin and Vienna, until about 1900, when he became assistant legal adviser to the Sublime Porte. Owing to bad health was for some years unemployed, but in July 1913, after having been a Deputy for a few months, he became Minister in Belgium and afterwards at The Hague, where he remained until 1923. In 1925

he became head of the Political Section of the Foreign Ministry, but resigned in 1926 for reasons of health. In September 1927 became Deputy for Samsun, and two months later member of the Assembly Foreign Affairs Commission. Appointed Minister at Belgrade in February 1928, he resigned his deputyship, but was re-elected in October, ill-health having made it impossible for him to take up his new diplomatic post. Re-elected member of Foreign Affairs Commission of the Assembly in November 1930. Not re-elected to the Assembly in April 1931.

Nusret Sadullah is cultured and very popular, both in European and Turkish circles. He is also capable, but his poor health—a hereditary weakness, both his father and brother having committed suicide during fits of temporary insanity—has prevented him from attaining the distinction to which he would otherwise appear entitled. Was married to an Egyptian princess, now deceased, the daughter of the late Abbas Halim Pasha. Subsequently married an attractive Turkish lady, very much younger than himself. Is not a politician. Is now engaged in commerce and lives at Constantinople.

70. *Rağip (Kaisersli).*

Born in 1874, the son of Raif Pasha. Entered Turkish Foreign Office in 1897, went to London in 1901 and later to Berne, Brussels, Washington and again London, where he was counsellor in 1914. Remained in Europe during the war, and after it was Minister at Madrid. In 1927 became political adviser at Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and in January 1929 was appointed Chargé d'Affaires at Stockholm, Oslo, Copenhagen and Helsingfors. Appointed Chargé d'Affaires at Tokyo in July 1931, but did not proceed. Presented his credentials to the King of Sweden as Minister Plenipotentiary November 1933. Left Stockholm in 1938, and retired from the diplomatic service in 1939 on a pension.

Rağip shows distinct traces of Arab blood, and has a somewhat coarse appearance. Speaks English well, and is a good talker, but is addicted to drink, and when in liquor often indulges in indiscretions, which are generally amusing and sometimes interesting.

71. *Rahmi (Koken).*

Born about 1880 at Smyrna. Nothing known of his early history, except that for a time he was a finance official. Since 1923 has been a Deputy for Smyrna. Became Minister of Commerce in May 1926, and in November 1927, on the reconstruction of Ismet Pasha's Cabinet, retained that portfolio, combining with it that of Agriculture. Was not a success in this post, owing to complete lack of business capacity. Resigned on grounds of ill-health in May 1929. Elected member of the Economic Affairs and Accounts Committees of the Assembly in November 1930, and chairman of former committee in November 1931. Became president of Agricultural Committee in November 1932. Re-elected president of the Agricultural Committee in November 1935 and April 1939.

Rahmi is a big, burly man, who speaks nothing but Turkish. He rarely shows himself in public, but officially is courteous and helpful.

72. *Raif (Karadeniz).*

A native of Vakfikebir in the Vilayet of Trebizond, where he was established for many years as a lawyer. Elected Deputy for Trebizond in 1931. Appointed a member of the Judicial Committee of the Assembly in November 1932, and secretary of that committee in 1933 and 1934. Re-elected Deputy for Trebizond in 1935 and 1939. In May 1939 he was appointed to succeed Ali Rana Tarhan as Minister for Customs and Monopolies, a promotion presumably due to his friendship with Ismet Inönü.

73. *Rana (Tarhan).*

Born in 1883 at Constantinople and educated at Galata Saray School. Studied wireless telegraphy in Europe, and was employed in the Directorate of Posts and Telegraphs until 1920, subsequently taking up private commercial and agricultural work. Was one of the founders of a modern cotton factory in Turkey. In 1926 was a member of the Constantinople Municipal Council, and in September 1927 was elected Deputy for Samsun, becoming in November a member of the Internal Affairs Commission of the Assembly. In June 1928 he was one of the Turkish delegates to the Inter-Parliamentary Congress at Paris, was in November elected president of the Finance Commission of the Assembly, and about the same time became a member of the Executive Bureau of the People's party. In the summer of 1929 he represented Turkey at the Universal Postal Congress held in London, and during his stay in England visited several

Manchester cotton mills under the auspices of the Department of Oversea Trade. Having been returned as Deputy for Constantinople in April 1931, he was soon afterwards elected vice-president of the Budget Commission of the Assembly, and in October was a member of the Turkish delegation at the Second Balkan Conference, held at Constantinople. At the end of December he was appointed to the newly-created post of Minister of Customs and Monopolies, which he retained on the formation of Celal Bayar's Cabinet in October 1937. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in March 1939. Re-elected Deputy for Istanbul (March 1939). Headed Turkish delegation to the wedding of the Crown Prince of Iran at Tehran (April 1939). In May he resigned from the Ministry of Customs to devote himself to party work, and in June he became vice-president of the newly created independent group of the People's party.

Rana, who speaks a little English, harbours grateful memories of the numerous official attentions which he received during his visit to London in 1929.

74. *Recep (Peker).*

Born about 1880. An ex-army officer. In 1922 became secretary-general of the People's party, and as such had considerable power. July 1923 Deputy for Kütahya. May 1924 became Minister of Interior and resigned from the secretaryship of the People's party. In the autumn of 1924 was considered one of the leading men of Ismet Pasha's Cabinet and a likely candidate for the premiership, but was maintained in his post on Fethi Bey becoming Prime Minister in November. In January 1925 resigned owing to his objections to the Cabinet proposal to appoint prefects by election, and resumed his post as secretary-general of the People's party until, in March, on the return of Ismet Pasha to power, he became Minister for National Defence. Early in 1927 his influence was said to be on the wane. He was re-elected Deputy for Kütahya in 1927 (again in 1931), but ceased to hold ministerial rank when Ismet Pasha reconstructed his Cabinet in November, and a few days later became chairman of the Defence Commission of the Assembly. October 1928 became Minister of Public Works, but was not reappointed on re-formation of Ismet Pasha's Cabinet in September 1930. In March 1931 again became secretary-general of the People's party. Went on a prolonged tour of European countries, including Spain and Norway, in 1932. In 1935 he was re-elected Deputy for Kütahya. In June 1936 he suddenly lost the President's favour, and was dismissed from the position of Secretary-General of the People's party, while retaining his seat in the Assembly. Re-elected Deputy for Kütahya in 1939.

Recep was unknown until the later years of the Nationalist struggle, and owed his position to his friendship with the President of the Republic. A big, burly figure, he is said to be ambitious, with a perpetual desire to become Prime Minister. He is, however, something of an extremist.

75. *Refet, General (Bele).*

Born in 1877 at Trnovo. 1898–1908 was employed in the gendarmerie in Macedonia. Commanded the gendarmerie battalion of the Army of Liberation in 1908. Went to the staff school in 1911, and was sent to Damascus in 1912. Became famous as the defender of Gaza in 1916, and 1918 received the command of the XXIIIrd Army Corps in Palestine. At the armistice was appointed commander-in-chief of the gendarmerie, and in May 1919 commander of the IIIrd Army Corps at Sivas. Landed at Samsun with Mustafa Kemal, and immediately became one of the latter's chief lieutenants. In September commanded the Nationalist forces at Konya, and in March 1920 was appointed commander on the Aydin front. In September was appointed Minister of the Interior, holding the post till April 1921. After holding various commands, was Minister of National Defence from July 1921 to January 1922. After the Mudanya Conference was appointed Governor of Thrace, but remained in Constantinople, where he rapidly overthrew the Sultan's Government and established Nationalist authority. In July 1923 elected Deputy for Constantinople, and soon afterwards resigned his appointment, which no longer had any *raison d'être*. In the autumn began to show Opposition tendencies over the proclamation of the republic, and was in close touch with the Caliph and Rauf Bey. Resigned his deputyship in May 1924 and thereafter lived quietly in Constantinople, though maintaining close touch with Rauf and other Opposition leaders. In October withdrew his resignation of deputyship, publicly joined forces with the Oppositionists, resigned from the People's party and became one

of the leaders of the new Progressive party. In July 1926 was tried at Angora for participation in the alleged plot against the life of the President of the Republic, but was acquitted, supposedly because of his prestige with the army. In October he announced his abandonment of political life, and in November finally resigned his deputyship. In 1931 he visited Angora, and it was rumoured that he was to return to political life. Later he was put forward as independent candidate for Istanbul at the parliamentary elections, but his candidature was vetoed by the Popular party and came to nothing. He was, however, returned as an independent Deputy for Constantinople in February 1935. Re-elected Deputy in March 1939, but as People's party representative.

General Refet is one of the most able of the Nationalist leaders and of considerable political ability. In 1922, at Constantinople, showed himself to be an extremely keen and clever tactician. Though his private life is not above reproach, he can hardly fail to play a prominent part in any future Opposition movement in Turkey.

76. *Refik (Saydam), Dr.*

Born about 1878. Studied at Stambul Medical School and in Germany, and later practised medicine. Was an early supporter of Mustafa Kemal, and from 1921 to 1923 was Deputy for Boyazit in the first Angora Assembly. Since 1923 has been one of the Deputies for Constantinople. Except for the period November 1924 to March 1925, when Fethi Bey was Prime Minister, Dr. Refik was Minister of Health from October 1923 to October 1937. He discharged the duties of his post with marked ability, and the great improvement in Turkish sanitary conditions and the successful draining of the Angora marshes are outstanding tributes to his ability and energy. His Ministry was easily the most efficient of all the Turkish official Departments. Paid official visits to the United States of America and London in 1929. In October 1931 was Acting Prime Minister during Ismet Pasha's official visit to Athens and Budapest. Was Acting Minister of Finance and of Education in 1933. In 1937 he was Acting Prime Minister during Ismet's absence in London. On the formation of Celal Bayar's Cabinet in October 1937 he resigned on grounds of ill-health, and underwent treatment in Europe. He became Minister of the Interior in Celal Bayar's second Cabinet (November 1938) and at the same time Secretary-General of the People's party; his appointment was followed by numerous changes in the staff of the Ministry and in the vilayets—the elimination of Sükrü Kaya's protégés. Elected to the council of the party in December. In January 1939 he was appointed Prime Minister on the resignation of Celal Bayar; he ceased at the same time to be secretary-general of the party. Re-elected deputy for Istanbul in March 1939.

Dr. Refik is rotund and beaming behind his enormous spectacles, and is universally popular. He is particularly fond of bridge, at which he is an indifferent player. Speaks fair French. He is unmarried. He is an intimate friend of Ismet, with the vicissitudes of whose career his own career has coincided exactly, the only periods when he has been out of office since 1923 being the short periods when Ismet himself was in disfavour with Atatürk.

77. *Reşit Saffet.*

Born at Constantinople about 1883. Began life as translator in the Tobacco Régie. Later entered the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and was secretary in the Legations at Bucharest, Washington, Madrid and Tehran. During this period became a member of the C.U.P. On the outbreak of the revolution of 1908 was appointed Director of the Private Council of the Ministry of Finance, and became secretary to the Minister, Cavit Bey, who, at various times, sent him as propagandist agent to London, Paris, Rome, and, particularly during the Great War, Vienna and Berlin. On the signature of the armistice in 1918 became counsellor of the Turkish Legation at Berne, where he engaged in pan-Islamic agitation and wrote anti-British articles in the local press. On his return to Constantinople in October 1919 opened a branch of the Swiss Society for the Defence of Ottoman Rights, and became one of the directors of pan-Islamic activity. Later he turned to pan-Turanianism, and became one of the most indefatigable discoverers of affinities between the Turkish race and the principal civilised peoples of the world. Worked for the extreme wing of the Nationalist party, but in 1921 lost the favour of Mustafa Kemal for a time. In October 1922 was appointed secretary-general of the Turkish Peace Delegation at Lausanne.

In 1925 was adviser to Turkish delegate for the liquidation of the International Board of Health, and showed himself pugnacious and occasionally insolent. Made grave accusations against the British delegate, and was obliged to resign. Elected Deputy for Izmit in September 1927, and member of the Commerce Committee of the Assembly in November. In June 1928 was one of the Turkish delegates to the International Inter-Parliamentary Congress at Paris, and visited Russia in 1929, returning much impressed by his experiences. In October 1930 he went as member of the Turkish delegation to the Balkan Congress at Athens, and in January 1931 to the Balkan Conference at Salonica. Is president of the Turkish Touring Club, in which capacity he has done much to secure the abolition of some of the more troublesome restrictions on the movement of foreigners, and, since November 1930, a member of the Finance Commission of the Assembly. In the autumn of 1931 represented Turkey at Orientalists' Congress at Leyden, and Parliamentary Congress at Bucharest, and was one of the Turkish delegates at the Second Balkan Conference, held in Constantinople. Elected member of Accounts Committee of Assembly in November 1932. Represented Turkey at International Touristic Congress at Cairo in February 1933, and was a delegate to Fourth Balkan Conference at Salonica in November. Not re-elected Deputy at the general election of February 1935.

Reşit Saffet speaks French and understands German. Is well versed in finance and very ambitious. Has been described as a man of no character, and is not above making improper advances, when under the influence of liquor, to distinguished female visitors.

78. *Ruşen Eşref (Unaydin).*

Born in 1893 at Constantinople. Before the war taught in the English boys' school in Constantinople. Was associated with Mustafa Kemal from the inception of the Nationalist movement, and was a member of the first Angora Assembly. Has been a Deputy for Afyon Karahisar since 1923. Has never occupied any prominent official position, but has for some years been one of the Gazi's most intimate friends. 1925–27, was secretary of the Assembly Foreign Affairs Commission, and for the last four years has been the chief secretary of the Assembly. In the summer of 1927 he represented the Turkish press at an international congress in London, whence he returned deeply impressed by English education, industry and culture. In June 1928 was a delegate to the International Parliamentary Congress in Paris, and on his return took a prominent part in the campaign for the reform of the alphabet. Was one of the Turkish delegates at the Balkan Congress at Athens in October 1930, and secretary of the Balkan Conference at Constantinople a year later. Took prominent part in organisation of First Turkish Linguistic Congress at Constantinople in September 1933. Member of Turkish delegation to Third Balkan Conference at Bucharest in October 1932. Appointed Secretary-General to the Presidency of the Republic October 1933, when he resigned his deputyship. Fell suddenly, in March 1934, from the President's favour, in consequence, it is believed, of a quarrel with Recep, and was sent soon afterwards, practically in disgrace, as Minister to Albania. In October, however, was appointed Minister to Athens, a post for which, in view of his great interest in the classics (though innocent of either Latin or Greek) he is particularly suited.

Ruşen Eşref is an attractive personality. He is cultured and speaks remarkably well. Has read extensively and is extremely intelligent, but is probably constitutionally lazy, and, though fond of writing and gifted with great fluency, tends to work in spurts. Has lately been engaged on translating standard Western authors. While accused by some of insincerity, he is excellent company, is very fond of bridge, and has a pleasant wife, whose comparative good looks and other attractions placed her in the forefront of the ladies in Angora society.

79. *Saffet (Arikan).*

Born about 1885. A former staff colonel. Was on the staff of Izzet Pasha in the Yemen in 1912. During the war served at Gallipoli and in Mesopotamia. In 1920 was military attaché at Moscow. In July 1923 elected Deputy for Izmit. From March 1925 until March 1931 was secretary-general of the People's party, and as such exercised much power and influence. He had complete control over the party, and was responsible for the arrangements for the complete success of the Kemalist nominees in the general election of September 1927, he himself being returned for Erzincan. In November 1927 he became president of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Assembly, and in the same month he headed a Turkish

mission to Moscow for the celebrations in connexion with the tenth anniversary of the Soviet revolution. From there went on to Paris and London. In the autumn of 1930 and winter of 1931 was busily engaged in reorganising the Popular party. Appointed head of Department in Council of State in 1931. Elected secretary of the National Defence Committee of the Grand National Assembly in November 1933. In March 1934 was elected Vice-President of the "Franco-Turkish Friendship" group of the Grand National Assembly. Became president of the parliamentary group of the People's party in March 1935, and was appointed Minister of Education in June, a post which he retained in Celal Bayar's Cabinet (October 1937). He was reappointed Minister of Education in November 1938, but resigned the following month on grounds of ill-health. Re-elected Deputy for Erzincan in March 1939, and again became president of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly.

Saffet is probably a dönme (Islamised Jew), and is extremely capable, but is possibly just as untrustworthy. He is, however, friendly and sociable and a good bridge player. He was a close friend of Atatürk, but was not considered a suitable appointment at the Ministry of Education.

80. *Salih (Bozok)*.

Born in 1881. Passed through the military school and was a great friend of Mustafa Kemal, both then and after. Was with him at Tripoli in 1911. Joined the Nationalist movement at the outset and became chief A.D.C. to the President. In 1923 was elected Deputy for Yozgat, and continued to be one of the Gazi's boon companions. In 1926 began to show nervousness regarding the future. In March 1927 was involved in a brawl with Kiliç Ali Bey, arising out of baksheesh for Swedish railway concession, and was shot in the leg. By this time his influence was on the wane. In June he suddenly returned to favour and was in close attendance on the Gazi at Constantinople during the summer, as also during the summer of 1928. Re-elected Deputy for Yozgat in September 1927, and since November of that year has been a member of the National Defence Commission of the Assembly. In April 1931 elected Deputy for Bilecik, and again in February 1935 and in March 1939.

Salih speaks only Turkish, but is pleasant to talk to. Is a hard drinker. He was constantly at Atatürk's bedside during his last illness, and having apparently sworn not to survive him, shot himself a few minutes after the President's death. The wound did not, however, prove to be mortal.

81. *Suat (Darnz)*.

Born in 1878. Studied law in Paris, and in 1912 became secretary at the Sublime Porte. Was a protégé of Talat Pasha, and quickly became head of the Consular and Commercial Department. During the armistice was Director-General of Administration at the Porte, but resigned on the fall of Ferit Pasha. In 1923 became Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs at Angora, and in 1924 representative at Rome. Appointed Ambassador there in April 1925, and was always on good terms with His Majesty's Ambassador. Transferred to Paris in May 1932.

Suat has at Angora the reputation of being a somewhat aggressive and tiresome person to deal with.

82. *Şakir (Kesebir)*.

Born at Veles (Macedonia) about 1882. Educated at Constantinople, and early entered the service of the Ministry of Interior. Was for a time secretary of the Adrianople Vilayet and later became Kaïmakam of Ardahan. Became Deputy for Gallipoli in 1920, and throughout the armistice was one of the moving spirits of the Kemalist movement in Thrace. In 1921 was the unofficial Kemalist agent in Sofia, but continued to devote most of his attention to the Thracian movement. In October 1922 he was appointed Vali of Adrianople and established the Kemalist Administration there. Early in the following year he transferred his activities to Constantinople, of which he was for a time Vali. He is a member of the executive bureau of the People's party. In May 1929 became Minister of National Economy, but lost the appointment on the re-formation of Ismet Pasha's Cabinet in September 1930. Chairman of the Economic Committee of the Grand National Assembly since November 1932. Elected Deputy for Tekirdag in February 1935. On the resignation of Muhlis Erkmen in June 1937 he became Minister of Agriculture, and in October became Minister of National Economy, retaining at the same time the Ministry of Agriculture, in Celal Bayar's Cabinet.

When Faïk Kurtoğlu became Minister of Agriculture in 1938 (April), Şakir remained at the Ministry of National Economy and held the post on the formation of Celal Bayar's second Cabinet in November 1938. The following month, however, he resigned on grounds of ill-health, and was not re-elected Deputy in the elections of March 1939.

Şakir is a man of wide education, speaks several European languages and has travelled much in Europe. He has some reputation as an administrator, and for the last few years has taken a prominent part in Turkish financial and economic matters, being connected with the Alpullu sugar refinery.

83. *Şevki (Berker)*.

Born in Constantinople about 1884, the son of a major-domo of Tevfik Pasha, who saw to the education of his retainer's son at the Galata Saray College, and in 1905 secured him a post in the Foreign Ministry. Accompanied Tevfik Pasha on a mission to Vienna, Berlin and St. Petersburg in 1909. Returned to the Ministry and in 1914 became private secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, holding this post throughout the war. Accompanied Tevfik Pasha to the Paris Peace Conference in 1920 and was later in the year appointed Minister at Stockholm. In 1922 was Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs under Izzet Pasha in the last Constantinople Government till the collapse of the latter in November. Angora having need of his services, he was summoned to the capital; in 1925 was head of the Commercial Section of the Foreign Ministry, and in August 1926 became Under-Secretary, holding this post till September 1927, when he was elected Deputy for Tokat. In November he became a member of the Budget Commission of the Assembly. For the last few years he has been chief Turkish delegate for the negotiation of commercial and consular conventions with foreign States. Was not re-elected Deputy in the general election of April 1931, and was soon after appointed chief Turkish delegate on the Græco-Turkish Mixed Exchange Commission. Appointed Minister at Madrid in January 1933. Transferred to Sofia in April 1934.

As his record shows, Şevki owes everything to his venerable patron, Tevfik Pasha. He is short and uninspiring, but has a certain capacity. Became much more expansive and affable after his election as a Deputy. Enjoys imperfect health.

84. *Şevki, Mehmet Ali (Ulken)*.

A grandson of Gazi Muhtar Pasha, who was Turkish High Commissioner in Egypt before the war. Served in the Turkish Embassy in London, as secretary and counsellor, for about eleven years. In December 1930 was transferred to Angora as Director of the Second Section of the First Department which dealt with British Empire affairs. Went to Cairo as Chargé d'Affaires in 1931, and appointed Minister there in January 1933.

Şevki was made a pasha by Abdul Hamid at a very early age, in order to console him for the breaking off of his engagement to a Turkish princess. Is fair and English looking, has good manners and speaks English exceedingly well. Is unmarried and of a retiring disposition, but was much liked in London. Plays golf, and is generally very English in his tastes and general outlook.

85. *Şükrü, (Saracoğlu)*.

Born about 1885. Nothing known of his early history. Since July 1923 has been a Deputy for Smyrna. December 1923 became president of Foreign Affairs Commission of Assembly. November 1924 to March 1925 was Minister of Public Instruction in Fethi Bey's Cabinet. In July 1925 became chief Turkish delegate on the Commission for the Exchange of Populations. In this capacity visited Geneva in December 1926, and in the same month signed the Turco-Greek Convention. In May 1927 he was given charge of negotiations for purchase of Anatolian Railway, which was concluded in December 1928, and in November, when Ismet Pasha reconstructed his Cabinet, he became Minister of Finance. As such he was intimately concerned in the Ottoman Public Debt settlement of 1928. In 1930 he came in for much criticism in connexion with the Turkish financial crisis, and one of Fethi Bey's principal objects in founding the new Liberal party was to get rid of him as Minister of Finance. In this he failed, but Şükrü Bey resigned in December on account of ill-health. In October 1931 was sent on a special mission to the United States of America ostensibly to get into touch with American business circles, but really in the hope of obtaining American financial co-operation in Turkish public works. Early in 1932 resumed

in Paris negotiations with bondholders in consequence of Turkey's inability to continue payments agreed on in 1928, and in April 1933 signed a new agreement more favourable to Turkey. Appointed Minister of Justice in May 1933, and remained at that post until November 1938; on several occasions he was Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs during Dr. Aras's frequent journeys abroad. Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in November 1938. Visited Bucharest for a meeting of the Council of the Balkan *Entente* in March 1939, and returned via Athens.

Şükrü Saracoğlu is youthful and somewhat delicate in appearance; he has a genial character and is popular in Angora. He is believed to be a very capable official with plenty of drive, and he has a refreshingly direct manner of dealing with official business. He is married to an attractive Turkish lady, who unfortunately speaks no language but her own, and that only on the rarest occasions.

86. *Şükrü Kaya.*

Born about 1884 at Kos, where he still owns property. Before the war was an official of the Ministry of Justice, and in 1914, as a civil inspector, accompanied the Embassies' delegates who enquired into the Greek deportations around Smyrna. Was then of advanced ideas and a protégé of Talat Pasha. Was deported to Malta in the early armistice, and on his liberation identified himself with Mustafa Kemal. Was a member of the Turkish delegation to the first Lausanne Conference. Mayor of Smyrna in 1923, when he was a failure. In July 1923 elected Deputy for Mentese, which he still represents. In March 1924 charged with deposit of the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty, and went to Paris and Berne. In the same month became president of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Assembly. In August became Minister of Agriculture, and in November Minister for Foreign Affairs. Resigned in March 1925 and was reappointed president of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Assembly, holding this post till the autumn of 1927. During this period he exercised considerable influence over Turkish foreign policy. In November 1927, on the reconstruction of Ismet Pasha's Cabinet, he became Minister of Interior, and quickly effected drastic administrative changes, more particularly in the eastern provinces, where he caused the military régime to be suppressed in December. Was under a cloud for a time in consequence of the Prime Minister's tour of the Eastern Provinces in the summer of 1935, when numerous abuses were brought to light. Appointed Secretary-General of the People's party in June 1936, in succession to Receb Peker. Visited Moscow in July 1937. Retained the Ministry of the Interior in Celal Bayar's Cabinet (October 1937). Though he apparently retained the confidence of Atatürk until his death, he clearly failed to redeem himself in the eyes of Ismet, and he was not included in Celâl Bayar's second Cabinet (November 1938); he ceased at the same time to be Secretary-General of the People's party, and was not re-elected to the Assembly in March 1939.

Şükrü Kaya is a coarse but vigorous personality, and is by no means unintelligent. He is a hard drinker, and was an intimate friend of Atatürk. He is still seen in Angora, but the prospects for his future career are not promising under the present régime.

87. *Şükrü Nayli (Gökberk), General.*

Early history unknown. Elected Deputy for Kirklareli (Kirk Kilise) in 1923. In October of that year was in command of the Turkish troops which entered Constantinople after the Allied evacuation, and remained in command of the IIIrd Army Corps stationed at Constantinople. In October 1924 resigned his deputyship on opting for military duties. Promoted Divisional General in August 1926. Was transferred to the Balikesir command in 1934, but resigned before the end of the year. Elected Deputy for Istanbul in February 1935, and in November chairman of the National Defence Committee of the Assembly.

General Şükrü Nayli had the reputation of being an intelligent and up-to-date soldier, with pleasant manners and a European outlook.

88. *Tewfik, Colonel.*

Born about 1880. Mother a Bagdadi, father a Turk. Left the military school in 1908 and, in view of his marked intelligence, proceeded direct to the Staff College, whence he graduated in 1912. In 1914 he was appointed to the staff of the 19th Division, where he served under Mustafa Kemal. Later, he

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served in the Caucasus, and was on the staff of Ismet Pasha in Palestine. Joined the Nationalist movement at the beginning, and was appointed to the General Staff of the Ministry of National Defence, with rank of colonel. Was Turkish military adviser at the Lausanne Conference 1922–23. In June 1924 became secretary to the President of the Republic, and held this post till November 1927 in spite of Ismet Pasha's efforts to appoint him to various missions abroad. He represented Turkey at the Arms Traffic Conference at Geneva in the early summer of 1925. In November 1927 was appointed Ambassador in Moscow, but only remained there till May 1928, when he was at Angora in attendance on the King of Afghanistan, whom he accompanied to Tehran. He there signed the Turco-Persian Neutrality Protocol, and on his return resumed his duties as private secretary to the President, who refused to be without him. In November 1930 he was a member of the Turkish delegation at the Geneva Preparatory Disarmament Conference, and again in February 1932. Suddenly fell from favour in March after mysterious quarrel with the Gazi, and has since been living in disgrace at Constantinople.

Colonel Tevfik is tall, fat and pleasant, and was, until his fall, completely identified with Mustafa Kemal. He speaks German, Russian and French. Always affable, his relations with the British delegates at Lausanne were very cordial. He is married.

89. *Tevfik, Fikret (Silay).*

Early history unknown. Elected Deputy for Konya in 1923 and has retained the seat in all subsequent Assemblies in which he has served on the judicial committee. In November 1930 he was elected one of the three vice-presidents of the Assembly, and re-elected in 1937 and 1938. In January 1939 he was appointed Minister of Justice in succession to Hilmi Uran, but he resigned in May to devote himself to the work of the People's party organisation, in which he specialises. He has since been appointed People's party inspector for the Istanbul district.

90. *Tevfik Kâmil.*

Born in 1889 at Salonica and educated there. A career diplomat. Studied law in Paris until 1911, and entered diplomacy after teaching for some time at Stambul University. He was second secretary to the Turkish delegation at the Second Lausanne Conference in 1923, and on his return to Angora became Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. As such he was charged with the negotiations of friendship treaties with several foreign countries, and gradually exercised increasing influence. Resigned in October 1925 on his election as Deputy for Constantinople. In 1926 he became a member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Assembly, and by his expert knowledge made his influence felt. In 1927 he was responsible for the drafting of a new and very important law on Turkish nationality. Represented Turkey at an International Cattle Plague Conference at Adana in November 1927. Elected one of the quæstors of the Assembly a year later. Soon afterwards succeeded Cemal Hüsnü Bey as chief Turkish delegate on the Mixed Exchange Commission, where he was a great improvement on his predecessor. Is a hard worker, and a tower of strength to the Foreign Ministry, with which he is always in close contact. In April 1931 was appointed Minister at Sofia, where, according to the Turkish press, he was active in prosecuting local Turkish journalists for anti-Kemalist publications. In October 1933 he confided to His Majesty's Minister that he was practically in exile at Sofia, and that he was thoroughly disgusted with Mustafa Kemal and his régime. Transferred to Madrid, as Minister to Spain and Portugal, in April 1934. Was employed at the Ministry in Angora during 1938 and 1939.

Tevfik Kâmil is without doubt very capable. He is, however, shy and reserved, but when better known is pleasant in conversation and ready freely to express his views on questions which interest him. He is married.

91. *Tewfik Rüştü (Aras), Dr.*

Born about 1885. Doctor in the sanitary service. In 1909 was secretary-general of the Committee of Union and Progress Congress then held. Served as a doctor during the Balkan War, and was made prisoner by the Serbs. In 1920 was a member of a mission to Russia, and later, during the Nationalist movement, was the director of an Angora newspaper. Elected Deputy for Smyrna in July 1923, was secretary of the Foreign Affairs Commission which considered the

Lausanne Treaty. Later in the year was appointed president of the Turkish Commission for the Exchange of Populations, and early incurred criticism because of his alleged failure adequately to protect Turkish interests. Resigned in September 1924 over the "établis" issue, but subsequently withdrew his resignation and resumed negotiations for the conclusion of a Turco-Greek agreement. In March 1925 became Minister for Foreign Affairs. Proceeded to Europe on various missions, particularly in connexion with the Mosul question, and signed the Angora Treaty in June 1926. During the summer of 1926 his position was weakened owing to his relationship (brother-in-law) with the late Dr. Nazim, whose death sentence he endeavoured to have commuted, but this effect was apparently only temporary, and he again seemed fairly established when he met M. Chicherin at Odessa in November. During the following months rumours of his impending resignation were current, but these proved unfounded, and he retained his portfolio when Ismet Pasha reconstructed his Cabinet in November 1927. In March 1928 attended the Preparatory Disarmament Conference at Geneva, and during the year his position seemed to become steadily stronger. In September 1930 paid an official visit to Moscow. In November headed the Turkish delegation to the Preparatory Disarmament Conference at Geneva, and in December visited Signor Mussolini at Rome and was received by the King. Was the moving spirit on the Turkish side in the Græco-Turkish rapprochement which led to M. Veniselos's visit to Angora in October 1930, when the treaties were signed, and his own and the Prime Minister's return visit to Athens in October 1931. In January 1932 went to Tehran to sign frontier agreement, and in February led Turkish delegation to Disarmament Conference at Geneva. Was elected vice-president of Naval Commission of conference. In April and May paid official visits to Moscow and Rome with Ismet Pasha. Again led Turkish delegation to Disarmament Conference in January and April 1933, and to Economic Conference at London in June. Displayed great political activity during 1934, chiefly in connexion with the Balkan Pact, which he signed on behalf of Turkey at Athens on the 9th February. Was President of the Council of the League of Nations early in 1935, presiding over its eighty-fourth and eighty-fifth sessions in January and April; and was member of the Committee of Five which submitted proposals for a solution of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict in September. He won a great personal success as leader of the Turkish delegation to Montreux which secured the signature of the new Straits Convention in July 1936. He also led the Turkish delegation to Geneva in December 1936 when the question of Alexandretta was discussed. Accompanied Ismet Inönü to Belgrade in April 1937. In July he paid official visits to Bagdad, Tehran (for signature of the Pact of Sadabad) and Moscow. In September he was at Geneva, when Turkey failed to secure re-election to the Council, but rumours that he had earned the President's disapproval for his conduct of the affair were proved unfounded by his retention in Celal Bayar's Cabinet October 1937. In March 1938 he paid an official visit to Egypt, and in April accompanied Celal Bayar to Athens. In July he represented the Turkish Government at the funeral of Queen Marie of Roumania. Following the death of Atatürk, Dr. Aras, with Şükrü Kaya, was omitted from the new Cabinet: the reason was unknown, but Dr. Aras said himself that he was anxious for a rest. In January 1939 he was appointed ambassador in London.

Tevfik Rüştü is dishevelled in appearance and veils his features behind monumental dark glasses. He is so volatile and voluble that he appears inane. Has an unattractive wife, who has succeeded in learning a little French, and a pleasant, though very strictly brought-up, daughter, who is married to a junior member of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

92. *Yakup Kadri* (*Karaosmanoğlu*).

Born about 1880. A journalist by profession, and the author of a number of novels. Elected Deputy for Maraş in 1923 and for Mardin in 1927. In the same year he was elected a member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Assembly, and his influence at Angora, until then slight, began to increase. Was one of the Turkish delegates to the Inter-Parliamentary Congress at Paris in June 1928, and to the (first) Balkan Conference at Athens in October 1930. In April 1931 was elected Deputy for Manisa, and in October was one of the Turkish delegates to the (second) Balkan Conference at Constantinople. Was one of two Turkish delegates to Journalists' Congress at Moscow in the summer of 1934,

and in October resigned his deputyship on being appointed Minister to Albania. Transferred as Minister to Prague in March 1936.

Yakup Kadri is small and undistinguished in appearance, and of a delicate constitution. His wife is pleasant, and speaks English.

93. *Yunus Nadi*.

Born in 1878. Educated in Rhodes. Became a protégé of Abdin Pasha Dino, who put him in charge of his farms, but dismissed him after two years because of abuses. Emerged from obscurity in 1908 and became one of the Committee of Union and Progress members for Smyrna in the Chamber of Deputies. In 1911 became editor of the Committee of Union and Progress *Tasviri Efkâr*, and in 1910 started the *Yeni Gün*. In 1908 received LT. 30,000 from the secret Committee of Union and Progress funds. Was imprisoned soon after the armistice, but was soon released, and published attacks on the Allies in his newspaper. On occupation of Constantinople in March 1920 he escaped to Angora, having for some time previously been in touch with Mustafa Kemal. Began publishing his paper there, and became Deputy for Smyrna. In February 1921 was a member of the Angora peace delegation to Rome, Paris and London. In the autumn he fell foul of Mustafa Kemal because of his sympathy with Enver, but in 1922 was received back into the fold, and for some time was president of the Foreign Affairs Commission. Throughout this period he wrote many Russophil articles, and was a bitter Anglophobe. Has been Deputy for Menteşe (Muğla) since 1923. In 1924 started the *Cümhuriyet* in Constantinople, and soon after the *Yeni Gün* ceased publication. Since 1923 has been president of the Constitution Commission of the Assembly, and, 1926–27, was also a member of the Foreign Affairs Commission. In 1927–28 took the leading part in an enquiry into the peculations of the former Ministers of Marine and Commerce—a curious selection. Spent the summer of 1928 in Russia and Germany, and, on his return, markedly displayed his Russophil sentiments. In November became member of executive bureau of Popular party. In 1929 again visited Germany several times. During the summer of 1931 engaged in the scurrilous press controversy with journalists of the Opposition, which led to the stringent press law of the 24th July, directed against the latter. Accompanied Ismet Pasha and Tevfik Rüştü Bey on their official visit to Athens in October. In December 1931 became chairman of the board of directors of notorious drug factory at Constantinople, since suppressed as part of anti-narcotic campaign instituted by the Gazi.

Yunus Nadi is short and stout and wears pince-nez. He is intelligent and Turkey's best leader-writer, but is ready to tack to any wind; is an excessive drinker and an unscrupulous scoundrel, whose general behaviour disgusts even the Turks.

94. *Yusuf Kemal* (*Tengirşenk*).

Born in 1878 at Sinop. Entered the military school, but transferred in 1901 to the school of law, from which he graduated in 1905. Practised in Constantinople and was for a short time Deputy for Kastamoni, but in 1909 joined the Opposition. In 1910 resigned his seat and spent the following two years in Paris studying law. Throughout the war practised as a barrister in Constantinople. October to December 1919 was Under-Secretary for Justice, and on being sent on a mission of reconciliation to Anatolia, was won over to the Nationalist cause and did not return to Constantinople. Became Minister of Economics early in 1920. In 1920–21 proceeded on mission to Moscow and Tiflis and attended the Baku Congress. Became Minister for Foreign Affairs in May 1921, and throughout his tenure of office was in close touch with Moscow. Proceeded to Paris and London as head of the Angora peace delegation in March 1922. Resigned in October, nominally on grounds of ill-health. In July 1923 was elected Deputy for Sinop, and in the following month was president of the Foreign Affairs Commission, which examined the Lausanne Treaty. In January 1924 became Turkish Ambassador in London, but resigned in May on opting for his deputyship. In November was a rival candidate to Kâzim Pasha for the presidency for the Assembly, but was defeated, and for a time took no prominent part in political life, being understood to be out of sympathy with the President of the Republic. From 1925–27 he was, however, reporter of the Justice Commission of the Assembly, and in 1927 accompanied the Minister of Justice to The Hague in connexion with the "Lotus" affair. He was re-elected Deputy in September and became a member of the Economic Commission of the Assembly.

In September 1930 became Minister of Justice in Ismet Pasha's new Cabinet, and again in May 1931. Resigned office in May 1933, ostensibly for reasons of health, but really, according to rumour, owing to dissatisfaction at non-removal of Court of Appeal from Eskisehir to Angora. Re-elected Deputy for Sinop in 1935 and 1939.

Yusuf Kemal is a good speaker and nourishes Bolshevik sympathies, but only in so far as these do not clash with his ideals of Turkish nationalism.

95. *Zekâi (Aydin).*

Born in Bosnia in 1878. A graduate of the Mülkiye School and became kaïmakam and mutessarif. Was Deputy for Adana in the first Angora Assembly, and in 1921 was a member of Bekir Sami Bey's peace delegation to London In the following year Turkish economic expert at the Lausanne Conference. Was a member of the Independence Tribunal.

Elected Deputy for Aydin in July 1923, he became Minister for Agriculture in March 1924. In September was appointed Ambassador to London, but was recalled early in 1925 owing to his having, on his own account, proposed a direct deal over Mosul, which he was instructed by Angora to withdraw. In May was appointed Ambassador at Moscow, and in November 1926 was present at Odessa at the interview between M. Chicherin and the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. Resigned in September 1927 on his election—possibly not of his own volition—as Deputy for Diyarbekir. A member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Assembly. In 1929, when all Powers were obliged by the denunciation of the Commercial Treaty of Lausanne to negotiate fresh treaties, was appointed chief of the delegation for the negotiation of commercial treaties. Appointed Minister of Public Works in Ismet Pasha's new Cabinet, September 1930, and Minister of National Defence in December 1930 and again in May 1931. Resigned in March 1935 to make way for Kâzim Özalp, and appointed Ambassador at Moscow, for the second time, in June.

Zekâi carries under a mop of grey hair a perpetual expression of puzzled benignity. He is an industrious worker and a good chief, but of so narrow an outlook as to drive his subordinates to the verge of despair. He has been reported as being anti-British in sympathy in the past, and when in London alienated Turkish sympathisers by his lack of courtesy towards them. During the negotiation of the Anglo-Turkish Commercial Treaty he was, though slow in the uptake, friendly and helpful in finding the way of compromise. Is no conversationalist.

96. *Zeki Mesut (Alsan).*

Born at Aydin in 1889. Graduated from the Constantinople Mülkiye (Civil) College in 1910. Was employed in various financial capacities and twice went to Europe as a student inspector. In 1926 became member of the Council of Education, and in 1927 director of the Mülkiye College. In September of that year was elected Deputy for Adrianople, and in November secretary of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Assembly, of which commission he is still a member. In 1929 took an increasingly prominent part in the discussion of foreign affairs, on which subject he contributed numerous articles to the semi-official press. Was a member of the Turkish delegation to the Balkan Congress at Athens in October 1930. Elected Deputy for Diyarbekir in April 1931 and again in February 1935 and March 1939. In June 1939 he became a member of the newly created Independent Group of the People's party.

Zeki Mesut wears behind his glasses the strained expression of a short-sighted man who refuses to wear any. He is friendly, but not unduly communicative. He speaks good French.

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Annex.

List of New Surnames.

8. Afet, Mlle.
33. Agrali, Fuat.
23. Akaygen, Mehmet Enis.
10. Akbaytugan, Ali Sait, General.
40. Alatas, Hulusi, Dr.
64. Alban, Mehmed Ali Sevki.
96. Alsan, Zeki Mesut.
26. Altay, Fahrettin, General.
35. Apak, Mehmed Hamdi.
95. Aydin, Zekâi.
91. Aras, Tevfik Rüstu.
70. Arikan, Saffet.
30. Atay, Hasan Fehmi.
29. Atay, Falih Rifki
40. Atkay, Ali Haydar.
59. Atamer, Mehmet Emin.
67. Batu, Nuri.
15. Bayar, Celal
41. Bayur, Yusuf Hikmet.
75. Bele, Refet, General
83. Berker, Sevki
18. Bilsel, Cemil, Professor.
58. Bozkurt, Mahmut Esat.
80. Bozok, Salih.
9. Cebesoy, Ali Fuat, General.
47. Çakir, Hasan
32. Çakmak, Fevzi, Field-Marshal.
6. Çetinkaya, Ali.
81. Davaz, Sunt.
13. Eğilmez, Cafer Tayar, General.
53. Eldeniz, Naci, General.
21. Engin, Cevdet.
12. Erkin, Behiç.
61. Erkmen, Mahir.
62. Ertegun, Mehmet Münir.
60. Esenbel, Memduh Şevket
5. Esmer, Ahmet Şükrü.
48. Gerede, Hüsnü.
87. Giskinsik, Şükrü Naili, General.
11. Gündüz, Asim, General.
20. Güret, Cevat Abbas.
61. Inönü, Ismet, General.
55. Karabekir, Kâzim, General.
72. Karadeniz, Rauf.
92. Karinsmanoğlu, Yakub Kadri.
80. Kaya, Şükrü.
82. Kesebekir, Şakir.
71. Köken, Rahmi.
27. Kortoğlu, Faik.
66. Memduhoğlu, Numan.
25. Nayman, Esma (Mme.).
81. Okyar, Fethi.
54. Orbay, Kâzim, General.
49. Öngören, Ibrahim Tali.
53. Özalp, Kâzim, General
2. Oznon, Abidin.
28. Öztrak, Faik.
74. Peker, Recep.
1. Reuda, Abdulhalik.
38. Sülo, Hasan
85. Saracoğlu, Şukrü.
76. Saydam, Refik, Dr
56. Sevdikokin, Kâzim, General
89. Sibay, Tevfik Fikret
50. Sökmen, Hasan, General
94. Tangriyenk, Yusuf Kemal
30. Tanriover, Hamdullah Suphi
17. Tarey, Cemal Hasan
73. Turhan, Rana.
84. Tinaz, Naci, General.
23. Tör, Edip Servet.
44. Togay, Halûki Fuat
7. Türkgeldi, Ali
4. Tuzer, Ahmet Fikri.
78. Uraydin, Refyet Ekrem
43. Uran, Hilmi.
18. Uybadin, Cemil.
14. Üstün, Ahmet Cavit.
16. Yalçin, Hüseyin Cahit
37. Yücel, Hasan Ali

Obituary.

Ahmet Agaoglu.
General Cevat.
Fast Sagay.
Kemal Atatürk.
General Kâzim Inanç.
Mustafa Seref Ozkan.
Sabri Toprak.

[E 6150/43/44] No. 58.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen (Angora)

(No. 303.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 1, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 360 [of 30th August: Financial and economic assistance for Turkey].

Please explain to Minister for Foreign Affairs that the position as regards the points referred to in your telegram No. 12 from Istanbul [of 14th July] is as follows:

Point 1.—[Credit of £35 million for armaments.]

(*a*) His Majesty's Government are giving Turkey £10 milion credit for purchase of armaments in United Kingdom. This sum covers whole amount of material available in reasonably near future, and even if His Majesty's Government were able to increase it, this would not be of practical assistance to Turkey.

(*b*) His Majesty's Government cannot, unfortunately, meet the Turkish Government's requests for credits to purchase arms in other countries. They have lost large amounts of gold and foreign exchange in recent months, and are bound to do everything possible to reserve their resources.

(*c*) His Majesty's Government understand, however, that the French Government are ready to supply considerable quantites of armaments to Turkey on credit, shipments starting at once. Turkish Government, no doubt, have details of what is available from this source. (In point of fact, I believe material amounts to 100 million francs for immediate shipment, and 465 million francs by March 1940.)

Points 2 *and* 3.—[Bullion loan of £15 million as cover for Turkish currency and to place Turkish finance and economy on a healthy basis, and £10 million credit for urgent armament requirements under point 1 and for liquidation of all frozen balances now standing to the credit of free currency countries.]

His Majesty's Government are ready to lend £3 million sterling to facilitate the liberation of the gold pledged by the Central Bank, on conditions explained in my telegram No. 284 [of 29th August]; and to grant a loan of approximately £2 million for liquidation of Anglo-Turkish clearing arrears. I am glad to note that these proposals would be a great help.

Point 4.—[Credits under points 1 and 3 to be long-term loans on the same conditions as those for British loans.]

This is, in fact, met by present proposals, since twenty years' repayment and 5 per cent. interest for the £10 million arms credits have been accepted by Turkish Government.

Point 5.—[Turkish Government to have the option of meeting the service on the £15 million bullion loan by deliveries of tobacco.]

This is only point on which I cannot give an immediate answer, but I will telegraph as soon as I can.

Point 6.—[Statement by Turkish Government that, as credits and loans asked for under points 2 and 3 would be provided to place the financial situation on a healthy basis, to adjust prices, play off blocked balances, and thus to normalise commercial exchanges between Turkey and free currency countries, the Turkish Government could easily meet the annual service on sums mentioned by them under points 1 and 3 (*i.e.*, £35 million credit and £10 million credit), just as they were previously able to ensure equal or even larger payments to Germany for requirements of the same kind; these payments being charge on ordinary budget and largely covered by surplus of Turkish exports to Germany]; and

Point 7. [Request for further help if Turkish proposals prove to be inadequate.]

These points in original communication seem to be only explanatory.

Point 8.—[Suggestion that His Majesty's Government and French Government should together agree how best to meet Turkish requirements, which are addressed to both Governments jointly.]

For your own information, French Government have been approached, but have declined to associate themselves in joint financial assistance to Turkey. The utmost which they are prepared to do is to provide armaments on credit as mentioned under point 1.

2. It will be seen from the foregoing that His Majesty's Government are ready to go a long way towards meeting Turkish requirements on all points. They have not gone the whole way, but that would be financially impossible; and, as it is, their present offers involve a serious sacrifice, both financially and as regards the fulfilment of their own armament requirements. Their offers should be considered in conjunction with the reorganisation of Anglo-Turkish trade, which it is hoped will result from the discussions now going on with the Turkish Economic Delegation in London, and the assistance forthcoming from the French Government referred to under point 1. His Majesty's Government consider that all these measures together should enable Turkey to fulfil in a large measure the two aims which she had in mind in putting forward her proposals, namely, to obtain her essential armament requirements and to place her financial and economic situation on a healthy basis.

3. As regards *venue* of discussions, His Majesty's Government entirely agree that all matters of principle must be discussed and settled in Angora. At the same time, it would be a great convenience if once the questions of principles have been settled, the mission now in London could be authorised to settle the details.

4. Meanwhile, the discussions for the revision of the clearing, which the

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delegation have come to London expressly to deal with, are bound to come to a standstill until a decision is reached on the question of the liquidation of the arrears. This depends on the decision which the Turkish Government take whether or not to accept a loan to deal with this problem.

5. In view of importance of political agreement, you should report reactions of Minister for Foreign Affairs to these explanations at earliest possible moment.

[E 6150/43/44] No. 57.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 304.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 1, 1939.

MY telegram No. 305 [of 31st August: Financial and economic assistance for Turkey], point 5.

His Majesty's Government are ready to forgo all payments on loan of £3 million for a maximum period of one year, and thereafter to accept service of loan in Turkish pounds, which shall be available to them for purchase of tobacco if no other more comprehensive arrangements in regard to increasing purchases of Turkish tobacco have in the meanwhile been found possible.

2. They propose that they should have the right at any time (including the first year) to obtain from the Turkish Government Turkish pounds up to full amount of loan then outstanding, and use these Turkish pounds for purchase of tobacco, or, by agreement, other Turkish commodities. In that event, corresponding part of sterling obligations of Turkey would be discharged.

3. His Majesty's Government suggest that loan should carry interest at 5 per cent. and be repayable in fifteen years, subject to conditions already stated in my telegram No. 284 [of 29th August] and to above conditions.

[E 6150/43/44] No. 58.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora)

(No. 309.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 1, 1939.

MY telegram No. 304 [of 1st September: Anglo-Turkish financial negotiations].

In paragraph 1, for "£3 million" read "£5 million." Proposal is intended to apply to loan for wiping off clearing arrears as well as loan for liberation of gold reserve.

[E 6246/297/44] No. 59.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 373.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September* 1, 1939.

PRESIDENT of the Republic received me with the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon for forty minutes. They [group omitted] very friendly.

2. I gave His Majesty's message, to which he replied (see your [*sic*] telegram No. 371). I have since been consulted and have agreed as to publication.

3. He expressed strong condemnation of German action and also of the folly of it from Germany's own point of view. He showed anxiety as to the possible joint action against Poland by Germany and Russia, but seemed inclined to discount this. He agreed with me that the Balkan *Entente* was now firmer, and he thought Bulgaria would remain neutral as long as possible.

4. I based my replies mainly on your telegram No. 91.

5. The President and Minister for Foreign Affairs paid great attention to Italy. Would she remain neutral, and, if so, would her attitude be dictated by her own or by German interests? I said that Signor Mussolini had no doubt had contacts with both sides, and that our view was that in Italy's own interest he wanted peace. He had stated this during the Prime Minister's visit to Rome, and subsequent statements bore it out. There was, however, always a

possibility of [group undecypherable] with Germany. The President and Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed of the opinion that Italian neutrality was desirable, at all events at the outset.

6. They were evidently very anxious to be absolutely certain of British attitude to to-day's developments. I told them of the announcements which had been made on this subject.

7. There was no mention of our treaty negotiations.

8. I got the impression, though perfectly [sound ?] on all the main issues, they were a little guarded on two points:—

(1) *Italy.*—They may be suspicious lest there is something going on between Italy and ourselves. I confined myself to statement reported in paragraph 4.

(2) They seemed to have expected a more rapid reaction on our part to German attack on Poland.

9. These two points, coupled with present position of treaty and economic negotiations, gave me an impression of slight hesitation on their part. I think, however, that this is only due to uncertainties which will very soon be cleared up

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[E 6230/143/44] No. 60.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 313.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 2, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 369 [of 1st September: Signature of Military Convention].

Notwithstanding earlier instructions to effect that Political Agreement and Military Convention should, if possible, be signed by different persons, I should, in the ordinary way, have preferred you yourself to sign convention, whether in Heads of State or Governmental form.

2. But I understand that General Weygand is to proceed from Syria to Angora to sign, on behalf of French Government, and no doubt Marshal Çakmak or some other high Turkish officer will sign for Turkish Government.

3. In these circumstances, arrangements are being made for Sir A. Wavell to proceed from Cairo to sign under full powers from King or Government of United Kingdom as the case may be.

4. If, however, it should for any reason prove impossible for Sir A. Wavell (or some other officer of high rank) to reach Angora in time, I should prefer convention to be signed by you rather than by military attaché, especially if in Heads of State form. I would, however, agree to this if the Turkish Government insist that a military signature is essential, as indicating representation of British General Staff. Such insistence would really be meaningless in view of the full powers, but I realise that Turkish Government may, nevertheless, think point important.

5. Main consideration is that you should be able to let convention be signed as soon as possible after Political Agreement, and you are therefore authorised to agree to any arrangement which meets the wishes of the other two parties. As soon as information is received from you regarding date of signature, and arrangement adopted, I will telegraph suitable full powers.

6. In order to save time, it would be as well if you were, if necessary, to warn Sir A. Wavell direct. He may be able to arrive by air.

(Repeated to Paris. No. 526, Saving (by bag).)

[C 12832/3356/18] No. 61.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (*Received September 3.*)

(No. 379. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September 2, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 114 from Istanbul, paragraph 4.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has now communicated to me for my personal information his replies to Russian Embassy.

2. Following is translation:—

"As we have explained to M. Potemkin and to Soviet Ambassador, Turco-Soviet Pact must have effect within a limited compass and therefore have a limited responsibility.

"The Defensive Pact to be concluded can be based on a wide conception of aggression.

"Pact can as well be independent of the two tripartite pacts (Anglo-Franco-Turkish and Anglo-Franco-Soviet) as in liaison with them, but even in the latter case it is necessary for the Turco-Soviet Pact to be in harmony with the provision for creation of the tripartite pacts.

"Having in view the limited extent and responsibilities referred to in the first paragraph, the assistance can cover naval and land wars.

"Always within the same limits the pact can also be extended to cover wars resulting from respective engagements of the two parties.

"At present Turkey's engagements are confined to the two Anglo-Turkish and Franco-Turkish declarations and the Balkan Pact.

"It is evident that, subject to reservation formulated in the first paragraph, these engagements should bring Turco-Soviet Pact into force.

"Definite tripartite Anglo-Franco-Turkish Pact and the further engagements of Turkey, subject to their having been accepted by Soviet Government, would be applicable [two groups undecypherable] added to present engagements would have the same effect. It would be the same as regards engagements of a similar nature contracted by Soviets."

(Repeated to Moscow.)

[R 7039/661/67] No. 62.

Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (*Received September 3.*)

(No. 382.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September 2, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 380, paragraph 2.

We negotiated with Secretary-General.

2. My immediately following telegram contains French text of article 3, article 4 and article 5, which have now been agreed.

3. As regards remainder, position is as follows:—

Preamble.—The Turks want to omit reference to League of Nations.

Article 1.—They insist on retaining some provision as to suitable additions, but have undertaken to propose a modified text.

Article 2.—They want to water down paragraph 2.

Article 6.—We agreed that provision that Military Convention will be an integral part of the treaty should be inserted in convention and not in the treaty, the Secretary-General [two groups undecypherable] refer to Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Article 7 is to be redrafted less clumsily.

Article 8.—I hoped to get this settled to-night or to-morrow, but I am still awaiting Minister for Foreign Affairs' reply to representations reported in my telegram No. 367.

4. Secretary-General objected strongly to protocol (see my telegram No. 380). He suggested some text modelled on Montreux Convention and will submit a draft.

5. It is agreed that treaty shall be in French alone. Do you wish me to telegraph full text of preamble?

6. As regards exchange of letters discussed in your telegram No. 307, this is to be between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and us. I proposed your two alternatives. Secretary-General saw some difficulty in providing for question how, if German troops reached Bulgaria, it could be decided whether they intended to attack Turkey or only Bulgaria. He is preparing draft.

7. We had to listen to outspoken remarks as to delay in provision of war material and in financial and economic assistance. I will telegraph later on the latter point.

[R 7092/661/67] No. 63.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 383.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September 2, 1939.*

FOLLOWING is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

"**Aussi longtemps que demeureront en vigueur les garanties données par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni et le Gouvernement français à la Grèce et la Roumanie par leurs déclarations respectives du 13 avril 1939, le** Gouvernement turc coopérera effectivement avec le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni et le Gouvernement français et leur prêtera toute l'aide et **toute l'assistance en son pouvoir, dans le cas où le Royaume-Uni et la France** seraient engagés dans des hostilités du fait d'une ou de l'autre des garanties susmentionnées.

"Article 4. Sans préjudice des dispositions d'article 3 ci-dessus dans le cas:

"**1° Soit d'une agression commise par une Puissance européenne contre un autre Etat européen dont le Gouvernement d'une des hautes parties contractantes se serait avec l'approbation dudit Etat, engagé à aider à maintenir l'indépendance ou la neutralité contre une telle agression;**

"2° Soit d'une agression commise par une Puissance européenne, agression qui, bien que contre un autre Etat européen, constituerait dans l'opinion du Gouvernement d'une des hautes parties contractantes une menace à sa sécurité propre.

"Les hautes parties contractantes se consulteront immédiatement en vue d'entreprendre toute action commune qui serait reconnue efficace.

"Article 5. Le présent traité n'est dirigé contre aucun pays, mais il a pour but d'assurer à la Turquie, à la France et au Royaume Uni une aide et **une assistance mutuelles pour résister à l'agression si la nécessité s'en** présentait."

[E 6270/9/44] No. 64.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (Received September 4.)

(No. 387.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September 3, 1939.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs informs me that German-Turkish Commercial Treaty, which expired on 31st August, has not been renewed, and that he has informed the German Ambassador that German purchases in Turkey must now be paid for in gold.

[R 7059/661/67] No. 65.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 317.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 4, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 382 [of 2nd September: Negotiations with Turkey].

Paragraph 3.—I agree to proposed omission in preamble and to a watering-down of article 2 (2). I continue, however, to attach greatest importance to retention of original wording of article 1. Not only is it redundant to repeat in article 1 an obligation which, so far as Turkey is concerned, is already fully provided for in article 2 (1) (which promises assistance to Turkey in the event of aggression by *any* European Power), but any additional form of words on the lines proposed is redundant in article 1 itself.

2. Though I have not yet received the latest Turkish redraft, I feel that any addition to article 1, however worded, cannot fail to arouse suspicions and misunderstanding. For your own information, it would clearly be the height

of folly to annoy the Italian Government by any change (in a clause to which they have already grown accustomed) which they could not do otherwise than consider as being deliberately and provocatively aimed at them.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 533, Saving.)

[E 6284/43/44] No. 66.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 324.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 6, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 321 [of 6th September: Anglo-Turkish negotiations].

Turkish Economic Mission now here are making tobacco purchases by this country a *sine qua non* for new trade agreement.

2. We feel this question must be settled at Angora and not in London, for, if Turkish Government propose that service of cash loan should be paid in tobacco (see your telegram No. 12 [of 14th July], point 5) and you accept that proposal under general authority conveyed to you in paragraph 6 of my telegram under reference, this in itself means large and regular purchases of Turkish tobacco by His Majesty's Government. For example, service of a loan of £6 million at 5 per cent., repayable in fifteen years, amounts to £600,000 a year, and if amount of loan is greater, service of loan is correspondingly greater.

3. We cannot explain position to Turkish Mission here, and hope you will, if necessary, explain why trade negotiations cannot cover this point, at any rate, till we hear further from you. It is clearly useless to attempt to discuss same point in two places.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 548, Saving.)

[E 6355/43/44] No. 67.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 402.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September 6, 1939.*

MY despatch No. 119.

I learn the Turkish Government are about to introduce legislation covering three points raised in your confidential despatch No. 31 of 19th January.

2. This legislation will subject all export trade to a licensing system and will prohibit export of certain commodities. Re-export trade is also to be controlled.

3. With reference to Germany, Turkish Government have refused to renew Commercial Agreement which was in force until 31st August, and have since that date placed Germany under article 4 of Decree No. 2705 of 1937, which means that all trade must be conducted on a compensation basis (see my telegram No. 387). Goods which may be exported from Germany are those which figure on Annex 2 of decree, and are virtually restricted to colonial products, of which Germany, of course, has none available for export. This will mean that Turco-German commercial relations are brought to a standstill.

4. Minister of Commerce informed commercial secretary that Turkish Government were fully aware of possibilities of Italy being used as a corridor for entry of goods into Germany, and they propose to take steps to prevent this.

5. Turkish Government are expressing certain apprehensions regarding disposal of their exportable commodities, since Germany has been eliminated from this market. These apprehensions have, as you know, been continually expressed in connexion with treaty negotiations. Turks expect their prospective allies, *i.e.*, Great Britain and France, to step into the breach.

6. A list of surplus Turkish products available for export was forwarded to Department of Overseas Trade in O.T.B. No. 264 of 18th August.

7. It appears to me that we now have an excellent opportunity of [group omitted] Turkey with many of her requirements in the way of military factors, armaments, &c., without depleting our sterling resources by granting heavy credits requested by her. We could purchase considerable part of her exportable surplus,

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Such commodities as raisins, figs, hazel-nuts, wool, cotton, mohair and certain minerals can no doubt find a ready market in the United Kingdom, and first three commodities mentioned are excellent food-stuffs (see my telegram No. 393, paragraph 4).

8. A decision by His Majesty's Government to purchase quantities of these commodities in immediate future would go far to ensure strict application of legislation which is about to be introduced by Turkish Government. Failing such action on the part of His Majesty's Government, I have no doubt that Turkish Government will do their best to dispose of their surpluses in the interests of their own economy, and I fear that quantities of these commodities which have always been bought on a large scale by Germany may find their way to that country either through Italy or via the Danube and Balkan States. It has always been Turkish Government's claim that His Majesty's Government or French Government should supplant Germany on Turkish market, and if we cannot go far in the case of tobacco, much can be done in the case of other commodities mentioned, and payment by war supplies would help to meet Turkish Government's demands for war materials and at the same time conserve our sterling resources.

[Instructions to treat this telegram—especially paragraphs 7 and 8—as "most immediate" received 1·15 P.M.]

[C 13247/8356/18] No. 68.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 413.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September 8, 1939.*

FOLLOWING is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram :—

1. In the case of an aggression by a European Power directed in the area of the Black Sea, including the Straits, against Turkey or the U.S.S.R., high contracting parties will effectively co-operate and send each other all aid and all assistance in their power.

2. In the case of an aggression by a European Power against Turkey or against the U.S.S.R. in the Balkan area, high contracting parties will effectively co-operate and will lend each other all aid and all assistance in their power.

3. The engagements by Turkey in virtue of articles 1 and 2 of the above cannot force that country to an action having for effect or leading to the consequence of putting it in armed conflict with Great Britain and France.

4. Suggested treaty fifteen years, with tacit renewal five years.

(Repeated to Moscow.)

[R 7293/661/67] No. 69.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 415.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September 9, 1939.*

FOLLOWING is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram :—

"Le Président de la République française, Sa Majesté le Roi de Grande-Bretagne, d'Irlande et des territoires britanniques au delà des mers, Empereur des Indes (en ce qui concerne le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord) et le Président de la République turque;

"Désirant conclure un traité de caractère réciproque dans l'intérêt de leur sécurité nationale et de s'assurer une assistance mutuelle pour résister à l'agression, ont nommé comme leurs plénipotentiaires, &c.

"*Article* 6.—Une convention militaire sera conclue dans le délai le plus bref.

"*Article* 7.—Les dispositions du présent traité sont également valables comme engagements bilatéraux entre la Turquie et chacune des deux autres Etats contractants.

"*Article* 8.—Le présent traité sera ratifié et les instruments de ratification seront échangés à Ankara aussitôt qu'il se pourra. Il entrera en vigueur à la date de l'échange de ratifications.

"Le présent traité est conclu pour une durée de quinze ans. Si aucun des Etats contractants n'a notifié aux deux autres son intention d'y mettre fin six mois avant l'expiration de ladite période, le traité se trouvera renouvelé par tacite reconduction pour une nouvelle période de cinq ans, et ainsi de suite, en foi de quoi les soussignés, dûment autorisés à cet effet, ont signé ce présent traité."

[R 7272/661/67] No. 70.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 416.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September 9, 1939.*

FOLLOWING is the French text of the protocol :—

"En attendant la ratification du Traité de l'Assistance mutuelle signé aujourd'hui, les plénipotentiaires soussignés se sont mis d'accord pour que ledit traité soit considéré comme étant entré en vigueur à partir de la date de sa signature."

[R 7275/7213/44] No. 71.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 10.)

(No. 421.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September 9, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 414, last paragraph.

Position is that comprehensive proposals handed to us yesterday by Minister for Foreign Affairs included completely new draft of a "special agreement" covering financial and economic points. This draft detailed all Turkish requirements as stated in my telegram No. 12 from Istanbul, with the exception of point 5 (tobacco). No modifications had been introduced in spite of our urgent representations based on your recent instructions. In fact, under point 1 in my telegram No. 12 new draft proposed only £17½ million out of a total of £35 million should be repayable. In addition to this, draft contained both in preamble and in one of its articles provision whereby Turkey would not be called to fulfil her obligations under treaty until all of these financial and economic needs had been met.

2. My French colleague and I told the Minister for Foreign Affairs that it was impossible for us to transmit this draft to you in view of deplorable impression which it would create. After a conversation in which we repeated all we had said on previous occasions, it was arranged that we should furnish a counter-proposal.

3. This counter-proposal has now been prepared and is being sent to-night to the Minister for Foreign Affairs with a covering letter explaining our own views and position of our Governments. I have spoken to the Minister for Foreign Affairs by telephone and urged him to receive us as soon as he had studied letter and counter-proposal.

4. Substance of counter-proposal is briefly as follows, taking points as indicated in paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 12 :—

Point 1.—(*a*) His Majesty's Government have already given credit of £10 million and the French Government of 400 million francs for immediate supplies of war material, and these sums cover all material available in near future.

(*b*) As regards further supplies, without prejudice to any arrangements which may be come to between the Governments as regards financing, the two Governments will endeavour to increase ("*s'efforceront à accroître*") within limit of possibility, their purchases of Turkish produce

Point 2.—We have offered £10 million for support of currency without conditions (your telegram No. 321). Service to be arranged by purchase of tobacco.

Point 3.—His Majesty's Government offer approximately £2 million for deblocking of British credit "to cover expenses necessitated by early realisation of needs" indicated in point 1 is quite impossible.

Point 4.—These loans to be on basis of 5 per cent. and twenty years.

Point 5.—See point 2 above.

5. We hope to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-morrow. We are not in the least inclined to think that his draft was put up for obstructive or destructive purposes, but consider it to be merely an attempt for hard bargaining. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, in conversation last night (see paragraph 2 above), spoke all through as if the Turkish Government had no thought of modifying their present policy.

6. It may be necessary for me to offer the further £5 million on point 2. If so, I would propose to take the line that you are prepared to consider further financial assistance up to that amount, and to ask [group undecypherable] of points he would prefer [group undecypherable]. I should be very glad of your views as to this.

7. I should add that, irrespective of conversation mentioned in paragraph 2 above, Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed to drop preamble thesis of the draft.

[R 7275/7213/44] No. 72.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 338.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 421 [of 10th September: Financial assistance for Turkey].

1. I approve your action.

2. *Paragraph* 4, *Point* 5.—In negotiations with Turkish commercial delegation here we have agreed to accept, in Turkish pounds (to be employed in purchases of tobacco and opium), service of £2 million loan for liquidating trade debts to United Kingdom. This for your information.

3. *Paragraph* 6.—You already have authority to increase offer of free cash loan from £10 million to £15 million as a last resort. We cannot see how any alternative proposal could be more attractive to Turkey. You should not therefore invite alternative suggestions, but if any are made, should report them to me.

4. I need not repeat that we rely on you not to increase the £10 million cash loan unless you judge it absolutely necessary.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 582, Saving.)

[C 13322/1110/65] No. 73.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 340. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1939.

HIS Majesty's Government learn from British Military Mission in Poland that Polish forces are in desperate need of light and heavy machine guns and ammunition.

2. In this connexion two suggestions have been made:—

3. First, that the Turkish Government should be asked whether they could possibly approach the Soviet Government and try to persuade the latter to send a certain quantity of light and heavy machine guns and ammunition to Poland. There is no limit to the quantity of which Polish forces could make use of if available, and any quantity, however small, would be welcome.

4. Secondly, that the Turkish Government themselves might possibly feel disposed themselves to send some light and heavy machine guns and ammunition to Poland through Roumania, if it were understood that their deficiencies would at once be made good by His Majesty's Government from some other source.

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5. As regards the first suggestion, I realise that Turkish Government might well hesitate to undertake this invidious task, although it is clearly to their interest that Poland should not be overwhelmed, while if any Power is in a position to make a friendly enquiry of the Soviet Government at this time, it is clearly Turkey.

6. I should accordingly be grateful if you would consider putting this suggestion to the Turkish Government. I realise that this cannot be done without revealing the fact that Polish forces *are* in desperate need, although Turkish Government doubtless know this already from their own information. You may therefore feel that such an approach might render them disinclined to proceed to a speedy conclusion of negotiations. If, nothwithstanding these difficulties, you feel able to make an approach, please do so.

7. Second proposal raises even greater difficulties. It would be impossible for His Majesty's Government to replace rifles, light and heavy machine guns and ammunition from this country, and, in any case, they would presumably be of wrong calibre. Arrangements could possibly be made for Turkish Government to buy replacements in other countries with funds placed at their disposal over and above what His Majesty's Government are already offering, but I have not yet approached my colleagues with a suggestion to this effect.

8. If, notwithstanding there difficulties, you feel able to make a tentative enquiry of Turkish Government as to whether they would release some arms for the use of the Polish forces, please do so.

9. I have no illusion about prospects of success of approaches, if any, you feel able to make, but in view of Polish military situation I feel bound to put these possibilities to you.

[R 7338/661/67] No. 74.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 426.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September* 10, 1939.

MY immediately preceding telegram. Following are texts of the new articles 1, 2 and 4:—

"*Article* 1".—Dans le cas où la Turquie serait dans les hostilités avec une Puissance européenne à la suite d'une agression commise par cette Puissance contre la Turquie, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni et le Gouvernement français coopéreront effectivement avec le Gouvernement turc et lui prêteront toute l'aide et toute l'assistance en leur pouvoir.

"*Article* 2.—(1) Dans le cas d'un acte d'agression commis par une Puissance européenne et conduisant dans la zone méditerranéenne à une guerre où le Royaume-Uni et la France seraient impliqués, le Gouvernement turc collaborera effectivement avec le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni et le Gouvernement français et leur prêtera toute l'aide et toute l'assistance en son pouvoir.

"(2) Dans le cas d'un acte d'agression commis par une Puissance européenne et conduisant dans la Méditerranée à une guerre où la Turquie serait impliquée, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni et le Gouvernement français collaboreront effectivement avec le Gouvernement turc et lui prêteront toute l'aide et toute l'assistance en leur pouvoir.

"*Article* 4.—Dans le cas où le Royaume-Uni et la France seraient engagés dans les hostilités avec une Puissance européenne à la suite d'une agression commise par cette Puissance contre l'un et l'autre de ces Etats, la Turquie observera dans le conflit ainsi provoqué une neutralité bienveillante à l'égard du Royaume-Uni et de la France."

(Repeated to Rome.)

[R 7478/7213/44] No. 75.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 526.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 12, 1939.*

THE Turkish Ambassador came to see me to-day, on his return from leave. I asked his Excellency how we stood as regards the Anglo-Turkish negotiations. He said that, as far as the political agreement was concerned, we had, to all intents and purposes, eliminated all points of difference. The economic and financial questions remained, however, to be settled.

2. I said that I was frankly disappointed at the manner in which the negotiations were dragging on owing to inability to reach agreement over financial and economic questions. A few days ago your Excellency had submitted to the Turkish Government comprehensive proposals of His Majesty's Government in this connexion, which showed that His Majesty's Government had done their best to meet the Turkish desiderata both as regards the furnishing of credits and of free exchange. I had, however, to-day received a telegram from your Excellency reporting a conversation with the Secretary-General at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in which the latter described the Turkish Government as being seriously dissatisfied with His Majesty's Government's proposals in this respect and particularly in regard to the supply of war material. I said that as regards the supply of war material, a certain quantity was already on its way to Turkey, and His Majesty's Government had promised to do what they could as regards further supplies. It was most regrettable that the conclusion of the political agreement should still be held up owing to these other questions. Speaking quite frankly I considered it most important that the political agreement should be signed at the earliest possible moment in order that the world might see where our countries stood. I should be very grateful for any help which his Excellency might be able to give towards this end.

3. Dr. Aras said that it was not the habit of Turkey to go back on her undertakings. But she stood in real need of financial assistance, and these questions were very serious for her. He did not, however, know exactly what had happened since he left Turkey, and he would take steps to find out the present position from the competent official in this department. He would naturally be glad to do anything possible to help.

4. Dr. Aras then asked me what I thought of the present political situation in Europe generally. I said that Marshal Göring's recent speech led us to expect that, if Germany had further rapid successes in Poland, Herr Hitler might come forward with certain peace proposals. Our reply would naturally be that it was impossible to discuss peace with a Government in whose word we could place no confidence, and while Polish soil was occupied by German troops. His Excellency would have seen from a recent decision of the War Cabinet that His Majesty's Government were preparing for the eventuality of the war lasting for three years. The war machine was being put in movement. Public opinion was united.

5. In reply to an enquiry from his Excellency about the position of Italy, I said that I felt sure that Signor Mussolini knew Italian public opinion well enough not to want to be engaged in a war with us in the Mediterranean. We were, however, obliged now to broach with Italy the difficult question of economic warfare against Germany. It remained to be seen whether Italy would show willingness to conform with our requirements in this respect. The present position of Italy was clearly one of transition and needed to be carefully watched. Dr. Aras agreed that it was in the interests of both our countries that, for the present at any rate, Italy should remain neutral.

6. Dr. Aras said that if it had not been for the Russo-German Pact Europe would not have been faced with the present situation. He agreed with me, however, in thinking that in the long run the pact would bring Germany more loss than gain. In reply to my enquiry, his Excellency said that the Turco-Russian Agreement remained intact. Steps were being taken to strengthen the agreement, but strictly within the framework of the contemplated Anglo-Franco-Turkish Alliance. Dr. Aras said he felt sure that a strengthening of the Turco-Russian Agreement would weaken the effects of the Russo-German Pact and reassure the Balkan countries.

7. I asked Dr. Aras whether he thought that there was any likelihood of Yugoslavia, Roumania, Hungary and Bulgaria making a common declaration of neutrality. Dr. Aras said that he thought there was little chance of this. The policy of Hungary was an important indication of the trend of events in Europe. On the one hand Hungarian policy reflected the policy of Italy, on whom Hungary still relied for advice and support; on the other it reflected the measure of confidence felt by Germany in her power to push measures to extremes. He felt confident that Yugoslavia and Roumania would either remain neutral or work in active collaboration with Turkey.

8. In conclusion Dr. Aras said that much depended on whether the Poles were able to stem the German advance and form a line of resistance. If they were able to do this, there was a possibility of surprising developments in the European situation. If, however, the Polish resistance collapsed, there might be equally surprising consequences, though of a different sort.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome and His Majesty's representatives at Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia and Budapest.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[R 7614/7213/44] No. 76.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 453.)

(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September 15, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 448.

We saw Minister for Foreign Affairs on 15th September, but were unable to make much progress, as his Excellency could not produce list (1) mentioned in paragraph 4 of my telegram.

2. Present position can be summarised as follows :—

(*a*) £35 million for war material. We have already arranged credit for £10 million and the French for £4 million. List (1) mentioned above covers a further £11 million, making total of £25 million (but see paragraph 5 below). The remaining £10 million to be allocated later and not essential to the conclusion of the agreement.

(*b*) Cash loan. We have offered £10 million. I am still holding up further £5 million, making total £15 million asked for.

(*c*) £10 million for various expenses and for deblocking (point 3 of my telegram No. 12 from Istanbul). We have offered £2 million for deblocking.

(*d*) As regards interest rates, &c., Minister for Foreign Affairs confirms his acceptance of 5 per cent. twenty years for our credit of £10 million under (*a*) above (see my telegram No. 111), but he will hold out for lower rate of funds, loans or credits.

3. You will see there still exists between us a gap as follows :—

(*a*) £11 million.
(*b*) £5 million (though I can give them this when the moment seems favourable).
(*c*) £8 million.

Calculating that (*b*) is as good as granted, we are still left with a margin of £19 million between what we have to make allowance for and what they require, and this does not take into account the above-mentioned £10 million, bringing the £35 million under (*a*).

4. This furnishes material for reply to enquiry in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 354. I do not exclude the possibility of beating them down a little either on (*a*) or on (*c*), but in their present state of mind it is impossible to guarantee anything.

5. After leaving the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning we were handed list (1) (see paragraph 2 (*a*) above). This is being sent to you by bag leaving 16th September. Preliminary examination by service attachés indicates

that it is completely impracticable. Although it purports to represent only £11 million worth of materials (land, sea and air), it is so extensive that the war material involved must be far more. In addition, some of the items are quite impracticable (*e.g.*, 2,000 shells for Krupp guns). In any case, it can only be dealt with in London, which means more delay. The service attachés and their French colleagues are to go through the list with the General Staff on 16th September, after which my French colleague and I will take the matter up with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. We hope then to arrive at a final estimate of Turkish demands.

6. The present list perhaps is disconcerting. It is so absurd as to suggest that it is put up to confront us with an insuperable obstacle. But I still do not hold this view. I am rather inclined to attribute it to muddle and ignorance on the part of departments concerned and complete inability to realise our own limitations as to possibilities of supply. But it should be possible to let you know after our next interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[R 7517/7213/44] No. 77.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 369.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 16, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 448 [of 15th September: Financial and economic assistance for Turkey].

Paragraph 7 seems to suggest that political treaty will not be signed until armaments to be purchased under credits have been actually delivered. This, of course, would hold up signature indefinitely, since some of the supplies (*e.g.*, naval material) covered by our offer of £10 million for export credits guarantee cannot be available till late in 1940. What exactly does Minister for Foreign Affairs mean by words "entirely executed"?

2. I am much concerned by the attitude which the Turkish Government are adopting over the treaty. Their tactics are becoming disquietingly reminiscent of those employed by M. Molotov, and I am beginning to wonder if they still want to conclude a treaty at all. They argue that from the outset they have made it perfectly clear that the conclusion of the treaty is dependent on the fulfilment of their financial and economic demands. But for some time they have known that we were unable to meet these demands in full, and they must surely recognise that the help which His Majesty's Government are now offering them goes a very long way to meet them. And yet the only answer which the Turkish Government have made to this offer is to ignore entirely the immense difficulties of His Majesty's Government and repeat their original demands, which His Majesty's Government have done their utmost to satisfy, and the complete fulfilment of which His Majesty's Government have already declared to be absolutely impossible at the present juncture.

3. In these circumstances I am obliged to ask whether the Turkish Government's desire for the treaty has for some reason or another possibly waned. Otherwise, how is it that in the light of present developments in Poland they do not realise that it is as much in their interests as ours that our two Governments should, without loss of time, collaborate together with the French in order to be ready to deal with a possible German attack through Roumania to the Black Sea and the consequent German penetration into the Balkans. In a word, does Turkey wish to conclude a treaty against these dangerous eventualities while there is still time?

4. Unless you see objection, I feel the moment has come to speak frankly to Minister for Foreign Affairs on the foregoing lines. You need not necessarily act in concert with your French colleague, though you should let him know of your instructions.

5. My immediately preceding telegram contains information about shipments of armaments, which may be useful for you to have when talking to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 624, Saving (*en clair*, by bag).)

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[R 7437/7213/44] No. 78.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 374.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Foreign Office, September* 16, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 437 [of 13th September: Purchase of sultanas and figs from Turkey].

Please inform Turkish Government as follows:—

2. Ministry of Food are prepared to purchase 11,000 tons Smyrna sultanas of official standards and gradings. Basis: 23*s.* eights, 24*s.* nines, 27*s.* tens per cwt. f.o.b. Smyrna. Packing in usual-sized cases. Ministry will undertake shipping and insurance after f.o.b. payments, 75 per cent. on consular certificate of shipment. Balance after inspection and approval on arrival in the United Kingdom. Shipment as soon as Ministry make freight available.

3. Ministry are ready to consider purchase of further quantities on the same basis, in which case quantities of each grade must be stated in offer.

4. Ministry are prepared to negotiate purchase of 5,000 to 7,000 tons figs, mainly bags of good genuines, but must first know quantities and gradings and how they are packed.

5. If terms offered by Ministry are acceptable to organisations concerned, latter should at once get into touch direct with the Ministry (telegraphic address: Ministry of Food, London).

6. Allocation of resultant sterling should be on basis of existing agreements. Any other basis of allocation would require Treasury order, involving delay. On existing basis, excess over £322,000 f.o.b. would be transferred by Clearing Office to Anglo Turkish Commodities (Limited).

7. Regarding allocation of £322,000, it should be noted that, if raisins and figs to this value are sent here in compensation, only 20 per cent., or £64,400, would be available for liquidation of arrears. As intimated in my telegram No. 347 [of 11th September], a larger amount should be forthcoming for this purpose in order to reduce the sum which the Turkish Government would otherwise have to borrow. Non-compensatory export from Turkey is still permissible, and division might be: (1) £200,000 by compensation, producing 20 per cent., or £40,000, for arrears, 20 per cent., or £40,000, for Central Bank, and 60 per cent., or £120,000, for United Kingdom compensation exports; (2) £122,000 by non-compensation, producing 70 per cent., or £85,400, for arrears and 30 per cent., or £36,600, for Central Bank.

8. Final allocation would thus be: £125,400 for arrears, £76,600 for Central Bank, £120,000 for United Kingdom compensation exports and any excess for Anglo-Turkish Commodities (Limited).

9. Any questions arising out of paragraphs 6–9 above should be dealt with through official channels.

[R 7668/7213/44] No. 79.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 461.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September* 17, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 369.

The anxieties expressed in the last paragraph of your telegram under reference have been in my mind all along. I am, however, satisfied that they are unfounded, and that there is no change in Turkish policy. My service attachés tell me that the attitude of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the marshal fully confirms my views, that the difficulties are due to three things:—

(*a*) Delays, of which I have spoken before.

(*b*) Anxiety aroused in the mind of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs by German gains in Poland, which have brought home to them that they are still quite inadequately equipped to meet attack by [? modern] mechanised forces.

(*c*) Considerable confusion as regards the list referred to in paragraph 6 of my telegram No. 543.

3. (*a*) has created an undercurrent of discontent. (*b*) is a new factor and must, I submit, be taken very seriously as much in our own interests as in palliation of Turks.

4. As regards (*c*), the position has cleared considerably. My French colleague and I pointed out the absurdities of this list. These absurdities became more evident when the list was examined by the service attachés and representatives of the Ministry of Defence. The result has been that General Staff, though maintaining that the list represented their ultimate requirements for completion of equipment, now asks that they may be despatched as rapidly as possible with such of the material as can be shipped. Most urgent requirements are anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns and equipment.

5. I pointed out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the list represented far more than the £11 million which it purported to represent. He agreed, and stated that what was wanted was £11 million worth of material off the list as soon as possible. My French colleague and I suggested that the best solution would be for our two Governments to accept the principle that the material would be supplied up to £11 million, as the result of this would be over and above delivery of the materials represented by the first £14 million (see paragraph 2 (*a*) of my telegram No. 453), and that the Turkish Government should appoint representatives who could remain in London or Paris as a permanent commission to deal with orders and deliveries.

6. The Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that he does not mean that it should be a precondition that these orders should "entirely be executed," and he is distinctly apologetic for the confusion which has occurred over the list.

7. The Minister for Foreign Affairs came here last night and I was able to have some private conversation with him. The occasion was not favourable for an exhaustive examination, but I am trying to arrange another early interview, when I will go over the ground more fully. I have not yet informed my French colleague. I should, therefore, be glad if following could be regarded as confidential until I telegraph again. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, when alone with me, was somewhat outspoken about the small contribution hitherto made by the French. I spoke to the latter on the lines of second paragraph of your telegram No. 369, omitting [group undecypherable], and I think I made him understand, but there will be a margin of possibility on our side which could not be exceeded, however legitimate Turkish requirements might be. I then offered him the extra £5 million cash loan, and said that against this he must [? drop] the £8 million remaining over under (*c*) in the second paragraph of my telegram No. 453 after we had given the £2 million for deblocking.

9. I have some hope that it may be possible to settle on this basis, viz., the full £15 million loan and £2 million for deblocking as already offered, but, in addition, it will be absolutely necessary to come to terms over the fourth million pounds' worth of material mentioned in paragraph 5 above in addition to the £14 million already accorded. I see no way out of this, as it represents an urgent and quite reasonable need of Turkish Government, which it is entirely in our interests to provide to the utmost degree possible. I presume there will inevitably be a time-lag before this material can be provided, but I consider it absolutely essential that we and the French should give an undertaking to supply it as soon as possible. I have spoken to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense of your telegram No. 354, paragraph 3, which seems to cover the case.

10. I think that the final £10 million of the £35 million (paragraph 2 (*a*) of my telegram No. 453) can for the present be left to look after itself. It does not appear to be the intention of the Turkish Government to link it with the signature of the treaty.

11. I should add that my French colleague and I had a final conversation with the Secretary-General on 16th September in regard to the treaty and its annexes, other than the financial one. We reached agreement, which has since been approved by Minister for Foreign Affairs, and I will telegraph the texts of the articles and letters concerned as soon as possible. I hope that you will find these satisfactory. The only point on which I have failed to move them is the text of letter in my telegram No. 427.

[R 7644/7213/44] No. 80.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 465.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September 17, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 461.

I have now informed my French colleague and have since, with his consent, seen the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Secretary-General alone to carry on last night's conversation.

2. I ascertained that they agreed with me in principle that, in view of Russian developments and early visit of Minister for Foreign Affairs to Moscow, it would be desirable that the treaty should be signed before the Minister for Foreign Affairs departs.

3. I proceeded to examine conditions required by them before signing.

4. I do not wish to guarantee it definitely as yet, but I think they will drop other points in Minister for Foreign Affairs' proposed special agreement on finance, and agree to (*a*) £25 million for war material, (*b*) £15 million cash loan, and (*c*) £2 million for deblocking, but main difficulty lies in their contention that Turkey cannot go to war until she is adequately equipped to do so. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said he would be pepared to sign the treaty now provided there were some provision in the financial agreement whereby Turkey would not be obliged to go to war until she was adequately supplied.

5. I pointed out that it was impossible to deal with the actual requirements of specific materials elsewhere than in London, and suggested that the best method would be to send a Turkish representative to London at the proper moment (see end of paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 461). The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he would be prepared to do this. I went on to say that all we could do here, or undertake in a financial agreement, was to make the necessary arrangements as regards £11 million credit and give undertaking to furnish, with the least possible delay, such materials as we could provide. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said he did not in the least wish to insist on any particular type of armament; if we could not provide what he asked, he would be content with the next best substitute.

6. We finally agreed that he should produce an amended formula for the clause referred to in paragraph 7 of my telegram No. 448 and I will telegraph again as soon as I receive it.

7. I fear you will consider I have gone far in agreeing even to discuss the possibility of £11 million credit for war material over and above the £10 million already granted, but I can assure you that there is no way out.

8. Most essential is rapid arrival of anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns and equipment; as a temporary measure, they would propose anti-tank rifles. If these could be sent at once either by us or the French, it would have an excellent effect. If necessary, could they be held in store here as our property?

[R 7714/661/67] No. 81.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 469.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September 18, 1930.*

MY telegram No. 461, paragraph 11.

My immediately following telegram contains the amended text of article 4.

This was the furthest to which we could induce the Turkish Government to go to meet the wishes expressed in your telegrams Nos. 349 (paragraph 2) and 353.

2. Article 7 (Military Convention) is dropped altogether.

3. Article 8 becomes article 7.

4. New article covering a separate peace is inserted as article 8. My French colleague has proposed an amended version at the last moment. I will telegraph the text as soon as possible.

5. See my telegram No. 442. A revised text of a protocol providing for the immediate entry into force is given in my telegram No. 471.

6. The text of the protocol exempting Turkey from hostilities against Russia is given in my telegram No. 472, containing amendments required by the first paragraph in your telegram No. 342, have been introduced. There are three other purely verbal amendments not worth telegraphing.

7. Words "duly authorised to that effect"* in the final article have been dropped (see my telegram No. 415, last paragraph), as this appears to be covered in the preamble.

8. The text of the letter given in my telegram No. 427 remains unaltered (see last sentence of my telegram No. 461). Letter will be kept confidential.

* N.B.—These words are given as "to be translated into French."

[R 7781/7213/44] No. 82.

Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps (Paris).

(No. 2352.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 19, 1939.

THE French Ambassador called this afternoon in order to enquire as to the latest developments in the negotiations with Turkey. I explained to him that I thought we had reached a point where it was reasonable to expect early agreement on financial matters; I mentioned that we had made it plain to the Turkish Government that all our concessions in this matter were conditional on the conclusion of the political agreement.

2. The Ambassador said that his impression was that the position was that the remaining financial differences only involved a few million pounds. He added that the French Government were ready to take their share. What they urgently hoped was that the discussions would not be prolonged too long. I said that this was exactly our view.

3. M. Corbin went on to refer to the question of the supply of war material for Turkey, pointing out that this was not so clear an issue as we did not even now know exactly what the Turkish Government wanted. He suggested that some of the armaments which had been sent to Roumania with the intention that they should be forwarded to Poland might be stopped. I assured him that so far as British supplies for Poland were concerned we had already taken this step. Only this morning a ship with such supplies had arrived at Istanbul, and we had telegraphed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora authorising him, if he thought it would help him to reach a settlement, to hold out to the Turkish Government the possibility that His Majesty's Government might be prepared to transfer to them the material in question. M. Corbin said that the French Government had taken the same step in connexion with French aircraft destined for Poland. He went on to say that it appeared that the material most desired by the Turkish Government was anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. He felt that the French Government might perhaps be able to do something as regards the former, and indeed they had already made certain promises to the Turkish Government.

4. The Ambassador said that the Turkish Government naturally did not wish to find themselves in the same situation as Poland, and it was essential that the French and ourselves should do everything possible. If there was any doubt at all on the question of what either the French or ourselves could supply to Turkey, this must form the subject of discussion. Quite apart from the question of Turkey, the French Prime Minister was of the opinion that the United Kingdom and France must introduce proper co-ordination in this matter, both as regards the question of supplies of armaments for neutral countries and as regards our own production. His Excellency said that he would speak to Lord Chatfield on the subject.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[R 7437/7213/44] No. 83.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 391.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Foreign Office, September* 19, 1939.

MY telegram No. 374 [of 16th September: Purchase of sultanas and figs from Turkey].

For paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 please substitute the following:—

"6. Allocation of resultant sterling should be on basis of existing agreements. Any other basis of allocation would require Treasury order, involving delay. On existing basis excess over £322,000 f.o.b. in full calendar year would be transferred by Clearing Office to Anglo-Turkish Commodities (Limited).

"7. Regarding allocation of £322,000, it should be noted that, if raisins and figs to this value are sent here in compensation, only 20 per cent., or £64,400, would be available for liquidation of arrears. As intimated in my telegram No. 347 [of 11th September], a larger amount should be forthcoming for this purpose in order to reduce the sum which the Turkish Government would otherwise have to borrow. Non-compensatory export from Turkey is still permissible and division might be: (1) £122,000 by non-compensation, producing 70 per cent., or £85,400, for arrears and 30 per cent., or £36,600, for Central Bank; (2) balance, up to the point at which Clearing Account has in the full calendar year received £322,000 from raisins and figs exported under this purchase or under compensation permits already issued to private traders, would be divided on ordinary compensation basis, namely, 20 per cent. for arrears, 20 per cent. for Central Bank, and 60 per cent. for United Kingdom compensation exports.

"8. Final allocation over whole calendar year would thus be £125,400 for arrears, £76,600 for Central Bank, £120,000 for United Kingdom compensation exports and any excess for Anglo-Turkish Commodities (Limited)."

[R 7790/7213/44] No. 84.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (*Received September* 20.)

(No. 480.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September* 20, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 374.

The local co-operative society of Smyrna is prepared to accept an order for 11,000 tons of sultanas for the following prices:—

Grade.	*Per kilogramme. Piastres.*	*Per cwt. s. d.*	
8	12	23 6	(quantities as above).
9	13	25 5	
10	15½	30 3	

He suggests that the order should be divided as follows: 50 per cent. nines, 30 per cent. eights, 20 per cent. tens.

2. He offers deliveries as follows (in tons per month): 1,000 in September, 2,600 in October, 2,600 in November, 2,800 in December, 2,000 in January.

Payment on 80 per cent. of the shipment and 20 per cent. on approval in United Kingdom.

3. The Director-General assures me that these prices are lower than those ruling on the Smyrna market to-day, and this would appear to be borne out from enquiries which I have made from other exporters.

4. With reference to your enquiry regarding figs, the following prices are quoted by the same co-operative:—

Grade	*Per cwt. Piastres*	*f.o., s.*	*d.*
Genuine	590	22	8
Superior Imperial	640	24	7
Ne plus ultra	725	28	0

The figs are packed in bags of 13 to 15 kilog. and deliveries can be effected as follows: Until 7th October, 1,000 tons; during October, 3,000 tons, during November, 3,000 tons.

These figs have all been fumigated and are guaranteed free of worm.

5. The above fig and sultana prices are inclusive of compensation, which is approximately 40 per cent. at the present time, and may be ready [group undecypherable] either local to the Turkish importers or to United Kingdom exporters in respect of British exports to Turkey.

6. I have secured an option on the above prices until Friday, 22nd September.

7. As the Turkish Government have agreed to accept a loan of approximately £2 million sterling to pay off the arrears in the Anglo-Turkish clearing account, I made no mention of the proposals in paragraphs 7 and 8 of your telegram, since, had I done so, you would have lost the value of the compensation premium, which is included in the above prices.

8. The co-operative insists on all contracts being made in Turkish currency owing to [group undecypherable] fluctuation in sterling.

9. Without compensation the above prices would be reduced by 35 to 40 per cent.

[R 7855/7213/44] No. 85.

Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (*Received September 21.*)

(No. 488.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September 20, 1939.*

(R.) MY telegram No. 480.

Ministry of Commerce to-day complained to the commercial secretary that the prices quoted to him by the Director-General of Sultanas and Figs Co-operative for supply of raisins and figs were not remunerative to the growers, and that the Government had or were about to guarantee growers a minimum price of 10 piastres per kilogramme for No. 9 and other grades proportionately. Ministry added that the prices quoted were 50 per cent. less than [two groups undecypherable] prices for Australian sultanas, taking compensation for premium into consideration.

2. If the original prices were adhered to, officials of the Ministry stated that the Government would be obliged to make up the difference or lay themselves and co-operative supporters open to censure at the hands of the growers.

3. The Ministry also stated that no transfer of compensation by the Co-operative to His Majesty's Government was possible, as the Co-operative was obliged to sell all compensation to newly-created Takas (Limited). Therefore, the prices would have to be without compensation, which made them ridiculously low. Compensation for to-day is 72 per cent., which would mean that the prices would [two groups undecypherable] :—

Grade 8: 13*s.* 6*d.* per cwt.
Grade 9: 14*s.* 5*d.* per cwt.
Grade 10: 17*s.* 3*d.* per cwt.

(End of R.)

4. The Ministry stated that there was no question of withdrawing the prices offered, but they requested that His Majesty's Government would consider the possibility of assisting the Government and growers alike by accepting a deduction of 30 or 35 per cent. compensation off the original prices instead of 43·2 per cent., the rate to-day—*i.e.*, 72 per cent. of 60 per cent. of the value of the transaction.

5. This would bring f.o.b. prices to the following levels at 30 per cent. deduction :—

Grade 8: 8·40 piastres per kilogramme (16*s.* 6*d.* per cwt.).
Grade 9: 9·10 piastres per kilogramme (18*s.* per cwt.).
Grade 10: 10·85 piastres per kilogramme (21*s.* per cwt.).

[Group undecypherable] 35 per cent. deduction :

Grade 8: 7·80 piastres per kilogramme (15*s.* 3*d.* per cwt.).
Grade 9: 8·45 piastres per kilogramme (16*s.* 6*d.* per cwt.).
Grade 10: 10·07 piastres per kilogramme (19*s.* 6½*d.* per cwt.)

The prices of figs would be similarly reduced.

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6. I venture to suggest that in view of the extremely low level of the ruling prices His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom should agree to a premium deduction of 30 per cent. off sultanas on prices quoted by Co-operative, which are below those of private exporter, and of 35 per cent. off the figures, which are slightly above ruling prices in Smyrna.

7. In view of the delay caused by this request the Co-operative has agreed to extend the option to 23rd September.

[R 7820/661/67] No. 86.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (*Received September 21.*)

(No. 490.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September 20, 1939.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 387 and 390, paragraph 1.

My French colleague and I had conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Secretary-General on 20th September.

2. Complete agreement exists as to the text of the treaty and its annexes and as to the military convention.

3. As regards the financial and economic points, the Minister for Foreign Affairs returned to his requirement that certain necessary war material must be in the possession of Turkey before they can go to war.

4. It appeared that there were two alternative courses, namely :—

(1) Not to sign the treaty until these minimum requirements were satisfied—this would involve the despatch of a mission to London, the discussion of the list and presumably the delivery of the material on these; or

(2) To sign very shortly, subject to a "suspensive clause," in the sense of paragraph 3 above.

5. Neither the Minister for Foreign Affairs nor the Secretary-General appeared to intend to be unreasonable about these requirements. I pointed out that there was a definite danger that Turkey might refuse to carry out her obligations because we had failed to supply certain requirements which it was, in fact, impossible to supply. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Secretary-General both deprecated this and protested that they would be reasonable. They explained that their hands were being forced by the General Staff, who, in the light of the former delay in delivery of materials to Poland, were really alarmed as to possibilities of adequate defence, especially in Thrace.

6. My French colleague and I both thought that, of the two alternatives, it would be better to sign at an early date, with a suspensive clause, rather than to postpone the signature until the minimum necessities had been provided.

7. It was agreed that we should discuss with the Secretary-General the drafting of an agreement, including a suspensive clause, while our service attachés should see the General Staff in order to arrive as near as possible to an accurate estimate of what the immediate needs would be (see paragraph 8 of my telegram No. 405).

8. My French colleague and I subsequently saw the Secretary-General. I communicated to him the draft of the financial and economic [? group omitted], including the suspensive clause, which would be signed simultaneously with treaty and be an integral part of it, but which would not be published. This draft is an attempt at a compromise between the draft enclosed in my despatch No. 522. The Secretary-General will no doubt revise it. We are to discuss it again on 21st September.

9. Both the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Secretary-General raised certain points, apart from the suspensive clause, namely :—

(*a*) As regards the £10 million (point (*c*) of my telegram No. 453), they pressed first for a sum over and above the £2 million already given for deblocking. As to this, my French colleague offered, with evident pain, a further £1 million. He is being hard pressed for another £1 million, but has not yet surrendered. I refused to budge.

(*b*) That sum allowed for deblocking should not necessarily be devoted to that purpose. After some argument, we agreed that, as regards the £2 million offered by His Majesty's Government, priority should be given to deblocking.

10. I hope you will agree with our view that it is better to come to an understanding now rather than to wait until provision of the necessary material has taken place. The Turkish Government propose to send a military representative at once to London to discuss list and to decide what materials are immediately necessary. My French colleague and the service attachés agree that there is reason in the Turkish argument, that they are not at present fit to face an attack by a fully-equipped modern army.

11. In paragraph 10 I have used the expression "come to an understanding" for the following reason: The Secretary-General asked whether we thought it wiser for the Minister for Foreign Affairs to go to Moscow, having signed an agreement, or with the information that the agreement had been decided on and would not be altered, but without, in the circumstances, presenting the Soviet Government with a *fait accompli*. We informed the Turkish Government that our Governments thought that it was better that the agreement should be signed before the Minister for Foreign Affairs reached Moscow. Nevertheless, we thought that, in the present situation and in view of possible danger of provoking the Soviet Government or of giving them a chance to be objectionable, it might be better that the Minister for Foreign Affairs should be able to say that the agreement had been finally and unalterably decided on, but had not been actually signed. The Secretary-General pointed out again that the whole basis of Turkish policy rested on Anglo-French-Turkish Alliance, and that there is no question of the Minister for Foreign Affairs yielding on any point in Moscow as regards the modification of the terms of the present treaty. Both my French colleague and I think that these assurances can be relied on, and in the circumstances you may think it better to adopt the Secretary-General's policy of having the agreement cut and dried without its being actually signed. An alternative might be to have it initialled, but, in any case, the proposal here is to make no public announcement as regards the conclusion of the agreement pending the Minister for Foreign Affairs' visit to Moscow.

12. I will telegraph again after our next interview with the Secretary-General. Meanwhile, I should be grateful for your views urgently on paragraph 10.

13. Minister for Foreign Affairs leaves for Moscow on night of 21st September, but can hardly arrive until 25th or 26th September.

[R 7973/7213/44] No. 87.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received September* 24.)

(No. 500.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September* 23, 1939.

M.Y. telegram No. 497.

My immediately following telegram contains the text of special agreement covering financial and economic points, which has now been agreed upon, *ad referendum*, between Secretary-General, my French colleague and myself.

2. There are four points still outstanding, viz.:—

(*a*) Article 1, paragraph 3. I have proposed 4 per cent. interest for the whole amount (see my telegram No. 497, paragraph 3).

(*b*) Article 4, last part of first sentence. I hope you will be able to give me early reply to paragraph 2 (*a*) of my telegram No. 497.

(*c*) Also in article 4, paragraph 1, Turks have provided for 3 per cent. and twenty years. I pressed for 4 per cent., but with no success. I said that I must refer to you, but in view of paragraph 6 of your telegram No. 321 I hope that you will agree to 3 per cent.

(*d*) Article 5, paragraph 1. Turks have inserted a total figure of £4 million. This includes our £2 million. Secretary-General and my French colleague are still haggling over the remainder. My French colleague has offered £1 million and Secretary-General is pressing for at least £1,500,000. Possibly a word in Paris might help my French colleague, as it seems a pity now that we have got so far to let this become a serious stumbling-block.

3. I beg for very early instructions on (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*) in the preceding paragraph.

4. Article 6 is suspensive clause. We have had much difficulty in getting the Secretary-General down to the present text. Our object has been to draw it so that, in combination with article 2, it can be interpreted as applying only to urgently required material for Thracian front, *i.e.*, military, naval and air.

5. Secretary-General is now submitting text to the Prime Minister. Subject to final acceptance, he is ready to initial the treaty, military convention and special agreement without delay. He renewed verbal assurances to me that the whole treaty would be signed on the Minister for Foreign Affairs' return from Moscow, and said that it might be possible to sign it sooner if the Minister for Foreign Affairs consented.

6. Pending final signature, Turkish Government attach the utmost importance to complete secrecy.

[R 7992/7213/44] No. 88.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received September* 24.)

(No. 501.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September* 23, 1939.

M.Y. immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text of special agreement:

"Les Gouvernements de la République française, du Royaume-Uni, et de la République turque, désireux de régler, en connexion avec le traité d'assistance mutuelle conclu entre les trois pays, certaines questions d'ordre financier, économique et de fournitures de matériel de guerre intéressant la Turquie, ont décidé de conclure un accord spécial et ont nommé à cet effet leurs plénipotentiaires, à savoir:

(Noms de plénipotentiaires.)

"Lesquels, après avoir présenté leurs pleins pouvoirs reconnus en bonne et due forme, [group undecypherable] convenus donne [group undecypherable] suivant:

"*Article* 1.—Les Gouvernements du Royaume-Uni, de la République française ouvrent à la Turquie un crédit de livres sterling vingt-cinq millions pour couvrir les fournitures prévues à l'article 2 ci dessous.

"[? Dans le] montant sont compris lecrédit de livres sterling dix millions ainsi que celui de quatre cent soixante millions de francs que les Gouvernements britannique et français ont [group undecypherable] mettre à la disposition de la Turquie pour le même but. Leur crédit susvisé sera remboursable en vingt ans; il portera pour la première tranche de livres sterling dix millions un intérêt de cinq pour cent et pour le reliquat un intérêt de trois pour cent.

"Il est convenu que les conditions de remboursement de ce crédit seront ultérieurement déterminées sans que la [group undecypherable] ation de l'accord cependant puisse ralentir les envois du matériel prévu à l'article 2 ci-dessous.

"*Article* 2.—Le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni assureront à la Turquie, dans le plus bref délai possible, la fourniture des matériels qui font l'objet de l'ouverture des crédits stipulés à l'article 1, et pour laquelle des contrats sont déjà intervenus jusqu'à concurrence de dix millions de livres et quatre cent soixante millions de francs.

"Une commission des représentants qualifiés des trois Gouvernements se réunira dans le plus bref délai à Paris ou à Londres, pour arrêter le programme de fournitures correspondant au surplus du crédit ci-dessus visé.

"Sans attendre la mise au point de ce programme, la commission déterminera les matériels dont la livraison devra avoir lieu de toute urgence. A cet effet elle tiendra compte de la nécessité de mettre sans retard la Turquie en état de résister aussitôt à une attaque qui pourrait être dirigée à bref délai contre ses frontières en Europe, elle tiendra compte également des [possibilités ?] immédiates des Gouvernements français et britannique

"*Article* 3.—Les stipulations des articles un et deux ci-dessus ne préjugent pas des [group undecypherable] qui pourraient intervenir entre les trois Gouvernements au cas où ils se trouveraient engagés en commun dans des hostilités en exécution du traité d'assistance mutuelle en date de ce jour pour fournir à la Turquie le matériel qui serait reconnu nécessaire.

"*Article* 4.—Un emprunt de quinze millions de livres sera accordé à la Turquie par le Royaume-Uni et la France et la contre-valeur en or de ce montant lui sera délivrée sans délai. Cet emprunt sera conclu à la même condition [group undecypherable] durée que pour le crédit de fournitures visé à l'article 1 ci-dessus et il portera un intérêt de trois pour cent. Les Gouvernements du Royaume-Uni et de la France acceptent que le service et l'amortissement de cet emprunt soient faits en livres turques qui seront utilisées pour les achats de tabacs ou, après accord, d'autres produits turcs.

"*Article* 5.—Les Gouvernements du Royaume-Uni et de la République française mettront à la disposition du Gouvernement turc un crédit de quatre millions de livres sterling. Le Gouvernement turc s'engage sur ce montant à accorder la priorité au déblocage des créances commerciales britanniques actuelles jusqu'à concurrence de deux millions sterling et à celui des créances commerciales françaises [group undecypherable] concurrence du reliquat de deux millions sterling.

"*Article* 6.—Les Gouvernements français et britannique acceptent que la Turquie ne soit tenue de remplir les engagements contractés par elle en vertu du traité d'assistance mutuelle en date de ce jour que lorsque auront été mis à sa disposition les matériels visés au dernier alinéa de l'article 2 [group undecypherable] après exécution des engagements stipulés au premier alinéa de l'article 4, et au premier alinéa de l'article 5 ci-dessus.

"*Article* 7.—Le présent accord fait partie intégrante du traité d'assistance mutuelle conclu en date de ce jour entre la Turquie, le Royaume-Uni et la France. Il entrera en vigueur en même temps et dans les mêmes conditions que le traité susvisé."

[R 8043/7378/44] No. 89.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 418.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 24, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 495.

1. From your telegrams Nos. 495, 496 and 497 it looks as though the Turkish Government are playing for time pending development of the Turco-Russian negotiations. We still naturally attach very great importance to securing the treaty, even if its full effect is retarded by the suspense clause. On the other hand, I am not in favour of giving the Turkish Government the impression that we are running after them because we are in a panic. On the contrary, the prospect of our requiring Turkish aid under the treaty does not seem to be as imminent as it was a short time ago when the German attack on Roumania seemed to be a matter of days. While, therefore, keeping up a steady pressure in your negotiations with the Secretary-General, I would not wish you at this stage to offer any further concessions.

2. I am dealing in a separate telegram with the financial questions raised in your telegram No. 497. Meanwhile, we shall, of course, welcome the visit of General Orbay to London, as reported in your telegram No. 496, and in preparing for discussions with him will bear in mind the points you make in the latter telegram. To save time and overlapping we are trying to arrange that General Orbay should, when here, deal simultaneously with both French and British experts.

3. I am glad to be assured by the Secretary-General once again that there is no intention whatever on the part of the Turkish Government to change their policy. I received yesterday a similar assurance from the Turkish Ambassador. Although I do not for a moment wish to call this in question, I cannot help feeling that the Secretary-General's counter-arguments reveals a dangerous misconception of the relative positions of Turkey on the one hand and Great Britain and France on the other. I am ready to accept the Secretary-General's view that our

present difficulties are entirely a matter of war material, and I fully appreciate Turkey's anxiety on this score. But I cannot agree that any analogy can be established between the cases of Turkey and Poland in this respect. Poland was attacked by Germany, and was by the nature of things bound to be in the fore-front of the battle from the outset. Turkey, on the other hand, is in no danger of being attacked by Germany, and the evolution of Italy is such that the chances of Turkey being attacked by Italy have diminished considerably since our treaty negotiations were started, and these chances are still diminishing. Likewise, the prospects of Germany attacking Roumania have decreased since the Soviet forces hold the whole of the Polono-Roumanian frontier and since the Soviet Government have placed themselves in a position to prevent German forces from reaching the Black Sea and the mouth of the Danube. It is by no means impossible therefore that Turkey, even if she signs her treaty with us and brings it into force, will be able to remain neutral throughout the war. It is therefore unreasonable for Turkey—and contrary to her own real interests—to ask that we and France, who are already engaged in a life-and-death struggle with Germany, should forthwith denude ourselves of our armaments to the extent of crippling our offensive and even endangering our defensive operations merely in order to supply Turkey at this present highly critical moment with such war material as she considers would be necessary to her in the hypothetical case of her becoming involved at some future date in war with Germany or Italy as a result of her treaty commitments.

4. You may use this argument with the Secretary-General as and when you think fit. For your own information, the situation would, of course, be different if Turkey, on receipt of the war material which she now demands were to declare war on Germany immediately, or were to undertake to send troops to Roumania if and when attacked. But I do not wish you to make this point to the Turkish Government at the present juncture.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 488 *(en clair,* by bag).)

[R 7092/7218/44] No. 90.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 426.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 27, 1939.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 500 and 501 [of 23rd September: Financial and economic assistance for Turkey].

I concur in text of draft special agreement as given in your telegram No. 501, subject to following amendments:—

2. For "Government of the United Kingdom" in the preamble read "Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland." Wherever else His Majesty's Government is cited, form should be "Government of the United Kingdom."

3. *Article* 1, *paragraph* 2.—In the last sentence, after "ten millions" insert "and of 460 million francs."

4. *Article* 2, *paragraph* 1.—The meaning of this paragraph is not clear. If it is intended to imply that contracts have already been placed up to £10 million and 460 million francs, this is not the case, and words "and for which contracts have already been concluded" should be omitted. If it is intended only to mean that there shall be no delay in the supply of those materials for which contracts have already been placed, this should be made clearer.

5. *Article* 4.—For "without delay" read "on the entry into force of the treaty." The furnishing of the gold is included in the suspensive clause, and His Majesty's Government will not be prepared to hand it over until the material mentioned in the last paragraph of article 2 has been supplied and accepted by the Turkish Government as fulfilling the conditions of article 6; that is to say, they will make this loan immediately before the treaty comes into force. You should make this clear to the Turkish Government.

6. It would be advisable to make it clear also that our obligation is to deliver gold at Angora. It will not be difficult to send gold to Angora. But although this is what they want at present, the Turkish Government might at a later date want us to hand over to them gold in New York, which we cannot undertake to do. We could deliver gold in London or Paris, if the Turks so wish.

7. The first sentence of article 4 should therefore read as follows: "The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the French Republic

will advance to the Government of the Turkish Republic by way of loan the sum of £15 million. Gold to the value of this amount will be delivered to the Government of the Turkish Republic, at Angora, by the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the French Republic on the entry into force of the treaty."

8. *Article* 5.—This article should start as follows: "The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the French Republic will advance to the Government of the Turkish Republic by way of loan the sums of £2 million and million francs respectively." It is not clear whether the French Government have as yet agreed to advance as much as £2 million, but if they do not, the total amount will have to be reduced accordingly.

9. The article contains no provision for the service of this loan; the following sentence should be added: "These advances will be subject to the same conditions as regards interest and repayment as the loan envisaged in article 4."

10. It will be necessary to conclude subsidiary agreements for the service and utilisation of the various credits envisaged; these points can only conveniently be settled in London and Paris. It would therefore be advisable, though it is not essential, to add a clause in the following terms: "The application of this agreement shall be the subject of further agreements to be concluded as soon as possible, between the Government of the United Kingdom, the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Turkish Republic, in London and Paris, as the case may be."

11. If Turkish Government accept proposed amendments, please arrange for treaty, military convention and special agreement to be initialled forthwith.

12. I hope that initialling will be followed as soon as possible by signature. Please ascertain from Turkish Government earliest date on which they would be ready to sign. General Wavell is at present in Algeria, but arrangements could probably be made for him to reach Angora early next week. Military convention could be *initialled* by military attaché.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 711, Saving (*en clair*, by bag).)

[R 8144/661/67] No. 91.

Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps (Paris).

(No. 2413.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 28, 1939.

M. CORBIN called this morning to inform me that M. Daladier had telephoned to him and expressed his anxiety at the delay in initialling the treaty with Turkey. He had emphasised the danger of M. Saracoğlu being subjected to pressure while in Moscow both from the Russians and from Herr von Ribbentrop. The French Ambassador at Angora had reported that there were still one or two difficulties which were holding up the initialling of the treaty, of which the most important concerned the handing over of the gold. The object of his visit was therefore to suggest that Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen should be given latitude to initial the treaty at once and to leave points of detail to be cleared up later. He thought this was most important from the psychological point of view since there was a danger that the Turks might think that we were now inclined to hold back.

2. I read to M. Corbin extracts from our latest telegrams from Angora which did not give the impression that there was any particular difficulty about gold. I thought, however, that it was clear that the actual handing over of the gold must be made dependent on the coming into force of the treaty. I would, however, look into the matter, and, if necessary, consult the Chancellor of the Exchequer as to the exact wording which might be used in order to avoid any possibility of causing offence to the Turks.

3. In conclusion M. Corbin insisted that M. Daladier had no intention of suggesting that the gold should be handed over before the coming into force of the treaty. All he asked was that Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen should be given some latitude immediately as regards the actual wording to be used.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[R 8160/661/67] No. 92.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 29.)

(No. 525.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September* 28, 1939.

MY telegram No. 521.

Treaty, Military Convention and Financial and Economic Agreement were initialled this evening.

(Repeated to Rome.)

[R 8187/7213/44] No. 93.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 29.)

(No. 528.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September* 28, 1939.

MY telegram No. 527.

Following is text of article 4:—

"Le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni et le Gouvernement français accorderont au Gouvernement de la République turque un emprunt de quinze millions de livres sterling. La contre-valeur en or de ce montant sera remise au Gouvernement de la République turque à Ankara par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni et par le Gouvernement français. Cet emprunt sera remboursable dans les mêmes délais que le crédit de fournitures visé à l'article 1er ci-dessus; il portera intérêt à trois pour cent."

Last sentence of article 4 remains as given in my telegram No. 501.

[R 8191/7213/44] No. 94.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 29.)

(No. 529.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September* 28, 1939.

MY telegram No. 527.

Following is text of article 5:—

"Le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni et le Gouvernement français mettront à la disposition du Gouvernement turc un emprunt de deux millions de livres sterling et de la contre-valeur en francs français à la date de ce jour d'un million cinq cent mille livres sterling."

Remaining paragraph of this article, which governs disposal of British and French credits respectively as already arranged, seems unnecessary to telegraph.

There is a final paragraph providing for same conditions of interest and repayment as in article 4 (see my immediately preceding telegram).

[R 8281/7378/44] No. 95.

Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 535.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September* 30, 1939.

MY telegram No. 502.

I have now heard from Secretary-General as follows:—

2. Steamship *Lassell*. Turkish Government will be delighted to receive materials on board this vessel, and to consider them as part of materials under £11 million credit on basis of General Orbay's list. Nevertheless, as regards the seven Battles on board steamship *Lassell* and also the fifteen Battles on board steamship *Clan Menzies*, it is proposed that they should be included in order for thirty Battles already provided for in the first credit of £10 million.

3. I am instructing His Majesty's Consul-General at Istanbul to allow the steamship *Lassell* to unload at once on above basis, and also to allow off-loading of fifteen Battles *ex* steamship *Clan Menzies*, in addition to cargo actually consigned to Turkey.

4. I presume that it will be possible to stop shipment from England of corresponding number of Battles, viz., seven *ex* steamship *Lassell* and fifteen *ex* steamship *Clan Menzies*.

5. As regards the other cargo in *Clan Menzies*, Minister of Defence asks for specifications of 5,000 Hotchkiss guns, and will give their reply when these particulars have been received.

6. They further remark that in list of materials covered by French credit of 460 million francs, there is included provision for 400,000 gas masks. These have not yet been despatched. Minister of Defence would be ready to accept gas masks in *Clan Menzies* on condition that these are considered as replacing masks to be furnished by French, and therefore forming part of French credit of 160 million francs.

[R 8429/661/67] No. 96.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 557.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, October 4, 1939.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I informed Secretary-General of your telegram No. 277 to Moscow, and said that you were seriously concerned about the effect of proposed modification on our treaty.

Secretary-General expressed himself in favour of accepting Stalin's modifications. He gave following reasons:—

(*a*) Diplomatic situation is changing very quickly, and it is impossible to forecast what may turn up next.

(*b*) Ribbentrop had informed Greek Minister in Moscow that conclusion of any treaty between Soviet Government and Turkey would be irreconcilable with Soviet-German Treaty, and that Germany would agree to no such treaty. This appeared to Secretary-General a good reason for concluding Turco-Soviet Treaty.

(*c*) Turkey's refusal to accept Russian proposals would be to drive Soviet Government further into the arms of Germany.

(*d*) On the other hand, by coming to terms it might be possible to create [? group omitted: trouble] for Germany.

(*e*) [? His Excellency] reminded me we had originally left it to Turkish Government to draft their own clause about exemption from hostilities with Russia (see your despatch No. 441 and your telegram No. 52 to Istanbul, last paragraph).

(*f*) As regards clause 3 of our treaty, he thought Stalin's proposed modification would make no difference where Greece was concerned. As regards Roumania, Turkey had always made reservations regarding attack by Russia, and an attack by Germany or Italy now seemed a remote possibility.

(*g*) He also said that there were signs of closer relations between the Soviets and Bulgaria, which made an early understanding with the Soviets the more desirable. On this point I should mention that, in the course of conversation reported in my telegram No. 550, he had pointed out that, in the event of Russia attacking Roumania, Turkey would, anyway, be bound under the Balkan Pact to come in if Bulgaria attacked Roumania.

(*h*) Secretary-General also read to me a telegram from Minister for Foreign Affairs, of which substance is embodied in my telegram No. 559.

See also by immediately following telegram.
(Repeated to Moscow.)

[R 8434/661/67] No. 97.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 559. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, October 4, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 557, paragraph 2 (*h*).

Following is substance of telegram from Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to:—

2. Minister for Foreign Affairs holds the view that His Majesty's Government and France should not reject Soviet's proposals, and that it is, in particular, important to avoid delay, owing to the rapidity with which the situation develops.

3. Our treaty already contains a sufficiently clear reservation clause. Addition asked for by the Soviets amounts to no more than a precision applying to a concrete case. It introduces no modification into the actual conception of the Tripartite Treaty.

4. As regards Greece, substitution of consultation on model of article 5 for assistance as provided for under article 3 in no way diminishes the value of collaboration. The Mediterranean clause, if it came into play, would cover the case of Greece in the same conditions and in the same way, whether it were a question of assistance or of consultation.

5. Nor does the case of Roumania undergo modification in consequence of this change. The reservation clause regarding hostilities with Soviets as at present drafted makes it possible for Soviets to prevent Turkish participation. Moreover, in a communication from Bucharest, the view had been stated on the point of a Soviet attack on Roumania, which would necessarily bring into play Turkish reservation in regard to Soviets (see my telegram No. 557, paragraph 2 (*c*)).

6. Therefore, proposed modifications introduce no new factor and admit of an early settlement which Minister for Foreign Affairs considers to be in common interest.

7. (Wording is, I fear, vague in places, but Minister for Foreign Affairs is himself not always very precise, and is based on a French translation of a Turkish official communication.)

(Repeated to Moscow.)

[R 8435/661/67] No. 98.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 562.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, October 4, 1939.*

MY telegrams Nos. 557 to 560.

Secretary-General sent for my French colleague and myself this evening.

2. He had had a telegram from Turkish Ambassador in Paris, who had been informed by M. Daladier that French Government could not accept proposed modifications.

3. Secretary-General again urged arguments in favour of acceptance as outlined in my telegrams Nos. 557 and 559. These were based (*a*) on actual interpretation of treaty, if modified, as requested by Stalin; and (*b*) on considerations of high policy.

4. As to (*a*), he expressed view that, in practice, modifications made little difference. As regards article 3, he pointed out that Stalin had agreed to form of consultation provided for in article 5 of our treaty: viz., immediate consultation "in order to undertake whatever joint action shall be recognised as efficacious." This did not preclude Turkey from ultimately carrying out obligations under article 3 in its original form. As regards protocol exempting Turkey from hostilities with Russia, he pointed out that suspension of treaty could not preclude Turkey from defending her own interests. If Germany and Russia came to an understanding for partition of the Balkans, any attempt to carry out such a policy would be a direct threat to Turkey, and she would fight, treaty or no treaty. In any event, Turkey's interests were linked, first, with those of

Great Britain, and, secondly, with those of France and her connexion with ourselves, and France would always take precedence over her connexion with Russia. Only possibility left was that of Russian attack in the Balkans. From the beginning of our negotiations Turkish Government had postulated that they should not be involved in hostilities with Russia. But even so, if Russia threatened Turkey's interests, Turkey would resist.

5. As to (*b*), Secretary-General argued in present circumstances that it was essential to look at the problem from the point of view of general policy. There was a serious danger of giving Russia a pretext for closer co-operation with Germany. The question at issue was whether it was better to avoid this danger by enabling Turkey to conclude pacts both with Russia and with ourselves, or by insisting on original wording of treaty to compel Turkey to break off her present negotiations with the Soviets. On this point, paragraph 3 of your despatch No. 2355 to Paris seems apposite. If we finally refused to agree to modifications, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs would be instructed to leave Moscow. Turkey would certainly stick to her undertakings with us in preference to reaching an understanding with Soviets if we faced her with the choice. But he thought however cynical Russian policy might be, most important thing at the moment was to keep Soviet Government in good relations with Turkey, and thus in contact with ourselves and less inclined towards Germany. It was possible that later on a Russian threat might arise, but in that case Turkey's interests were clear and nothing would prevent her from acting in their defence.

6. After an hour's discussion, in which we went over all the pros and cons, my French colleague and I agreed together that Secretary-General's arguments were sound, and that the balance of advantage lay in securing Turco-Soviet Pact, even at the expense of Stalin's proposals rather than in maintaining original text, with consequent bad effect on Turco-Soviet relations. We said that Stalin's proposed modifications must be read in the light of his proposals for Turco-Soviet Pact. It is true that we only know the outline of this latter pact as given in my telegram No. 550, but I understand, as Sir W. Seeds has reported, Soviet Government have not seen the text of our treaty but have only been informed of its substance.

7. My French colleague and I agreed to report to our Governments as in first sentence of preceding paragraph.

8. Secretary-General is telegraphing to Paris in reply to telegram referred to in paragraph 2 and repeating it to London.

Please inform Paris.

[R 8431/661/67] No. 99.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (*Received October 5.*)

(No. 563.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, October 4, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 560.

I ascertained from Secretary-General to-night that the exact wording of Stalin's proposal, as given by Secretary-General in French, is that, in the circumstances contemplated, Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty "Restera sans action."

(Repeated to Moscow.)

[R 8494/7705/44] No. 100.

Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps (*Paris*).

(No. 2458.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 5, 1939.*

DURING the course of a conversation with the French Ambassador this afternoon, his Excellency referred to Turkey, and said that the French took a very grave view of the attempts that were being made by the Soviet Government to induce the Turkish Government to abandon their treaty with us. It did not seem to M. Daladier tolerable that we should give our guarantees to Turkey and furnish her with generous financial help and receive nothing in return. He

thought that we ought to have our eyes very wide open to the possibility of some arrangement between Germany and Russia, by which German encouragement might be given to Russian intrigues in Iran, Afghanistan and other places, and, if this were in the programme, it was clearly very much to Germany's interest, if possible, to keep Turkey neutral. I told M. Corbin that our apprehensions were not less than those of the French Government, and that, although we had not discussed the matter as yet in detail pending fuller information, our first reactions to the telegrams of which he had spoken was to feel that we should be well advised to hold the Turks as closely as possible to their bargain with us.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[R 8578/661/67] No. 101.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (*Angora*).

(No. 495.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 6, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 573 [of 6th October: Negotiations with Turkey].

Turkish Ambassador informed me on 6th October that he had been instructed to assure me that if the proposed changes were made in the treaty, they would not, in practice, involve any change in the scope and sense of the undertakings between our Governments.

2. He expressed the personal view that the real cause of Russia's demands was pressure from Germany with a view to diverting Turkey from her present policy of co-operation with the United Kingdom and France. If this was really the case, he felt that the appropriate answer was that the treaty in its modified form should be concluded as quickly as possible, so as to give the Turkish Government an opportunity of proving by their subsequent attitude that their policy was unchanged. He urged that complete faith should be put in the assurances of the Turkish Government.

3. I thanked the ambassador and told him that I agreed that it was highly desirable that the treaty should be concluded without delay. As I had said in my speech on the 5th October, I considered that it ought not to be impossible to reconcile the mutual obligations which the United Kingdom and Turkey proposed to undertake with those which Turkey might undertake with Russia.

4. In reply to an enquiry, his Excellency assured me emphatically that even if the treaty became suspended as the result of Russia becoming belligerent, Turkey would still reserve full liberty to defend her interests, not under the obligations provided for in the treaty, but on the grounds that her interests were being threatened. This would apply in the case of Italy going to war in the Mediterranean.

5. The ambassador then referred to the protocol to the Turco-Russian Treaty of 1929. This pledged Russia not to enter into any arrangements with Turkey's neighbours without the Turkish Government's previous consent. For this purpose Bulgaria and Italy were both considered neighbours of Turkey, and, therefore, if Russia did agree with Italy to come into the war, she would either have to obtain Turkey's previous consent (which would be refused) or else violate the protocol, in which case Turkey would be free to act as she thought fit. It was suggested to Dr. Aras that Russia might enter the war without having made any direct agreement with Italy. In reply, his Excellency maintained that even an indirect agreement through the intermediary of Germany would be contrary to the protocol. The ambassador's argument is not very plain, and I am not convinced that there is anything substantial in it.

6. I warned the ambassador that, in any event, we should want to see the terms of the Turco-Soviet Treaty before we could decide how to deal with the new situation created by the request for the modification of our treaty.

(Repeated to Moscow, No. 290, and Paris, No. 789, Saving (by bag).)

[R 8629/661/67] No. 102.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 511.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 10, 1939.

MY telegram No. 504 [of 10th October: Negotiations with Turkey].

You will see from my telegram No. 298 to Sir W. Seeds that I have instructed him, in concert with his French colleague, to put forward to M. Sarajoglu the proposals of which a summary is contained in my telegram under reference.

Please concert with your French colleague to put forward these proposals at once to the Turkish Government as well. The French Government have agreed that if these proposals are not accepted by the Turkish Government, and if the latter themselves make no alternative proposal such as that suggested in Angora telegram No. 582, then they will be prepared to accept, as we are, the modifications of article 3 of our treaty and the addition to protocol originally put forward by the Turkish Government, and reproduced in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 550, subject always to our being satisfied as to the terms of the Russo-Turkish Pact (see paragraph 2 of Moscow telegram No. 372).

(Repeated to Moscow, No. 299, and Paris, No. 811, Saving.)

[R 8802/7218/44] No. 103.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (*Received October* 13.)

(No. 596.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, October* 12, 1939.

MY telegram No. 424.

I fear grave embarrassment and dissatisfaction in commercial and Government circles at the failure of His Majesty's Government to replace Germany in some beneficial measure on Turkish markets. This, incidentally, is an excellent opportunity for extremely active German propaganda, inducing this country to draw disparaging comparisons between the commercial value to Turkey of the friendship of Germany and Great Britain.

2. Germany's purchases of Turkish products in 1938 amounted to £10 million, and in seven months of this year to £6 million, while His Majesty's Government's purchases since the outbreak of war and in the height of the Turkish export season have only amounted to some £300,000 for raisins and figs.

3. I have submitted the list of exportable commodities and approximate price in my telegram No. 585, and I feel that, if we are to avoid a serious reaction, we must make immediate purchases of Turkish export products on an extensive scale.

4. I regret the decision of the Ministry of Food to effect no further, or only limited, purchases of Turkish raisins. The prices at which the first order was placed were extremely advantageous in the Ministry and below the cost of production, quite apart from the political aspect of the matter.

5. I submit that this question is of the first importance, and I should be grateful for instructions as soon as possible.

[R 8954/328/37] No. 104.

Sir R. Hoare to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received October* 18.)

(No. 612.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, October* 17, 1939.

IF my Turkish colleague is correct, Russo-Turkish negotiations have broken down because Turkish Government have refused to tear up agreements with us and the French.

2. If he in any way reflects the mind of his Government, they will, at the first available opportunity, make manifest to us their profound resentment at the insolence of the Russian demand.

3. That resentment might well be formulated in an enquiry something to the following effect:—

> "Soviet Government has had cheap triumphs in Poland and the Baltic, but has been severely rebuffed by Finns and ourselves. It may well try to wipe out these two rebuffs by seeking a cheap success in Bessarabia. We are inclined to tell the Roumanians that, if they resist, we will render all possible support. That support could not be effective without British and French co-operation, and failing that, support would not be successful. We therefore ask whether you are not prepared to co-operate with us in resisting a Russian advance. Do not forget that it is highly probable that if the Russians enter Bessarabia, Germans will decide to participate via Hungary. If you refuse to resist the Russians, we must obviously re-examine the whole position."

4. My premises may be wrong, but if they are right, the quicker His Majesty's Government take their decision the less risk of their being defeated by the time-factor, which has so frequently been their undoing. It cannot be wise tactics to refuse examination of hypothetical issues.

(Repeated to Angora and Moscow.)

[R 9046/661/67] No. 105.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 589.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 18, 1939.

I ASKED the Turkish Ambassador to come to see me to-day in order to discuss the general situation created by the breakdown of negotiations between the Turkish Government and the Soviet Government. I took the opportunity also of expressing my gratification that the Turkish Government were now ready to sign the treaty with Great Britain and France.

2. Dr. Aras explained that the Moscow negotiations had broken down because the Soviet Government made demands which ran counter to the two fundamental rules which the Turkish Government had laid down, namely, that Turkey should not in any way interfere with the normal working of the Montreux Convention, and that she should agree to nothing which would weaken the operation of the treaty which she contemplated with Great Britain and France. The Turkish Government, he added, would continue to keep up the appearance of negotiations with Russia, and although he evidently did not hope for any results he declared that he was not in the least disturbed by the breakdown which had occurred. Moreover, he was satisfied that this breakdown would not affect relations between the two countries, since it was not the result of any fundamental disagreement between Russia and Turkey, but was due to the pressure exercised on the Soviet Government by the German Government, the Soviet Government having felt themselves obliged, in the interests of Germany, to put forward the demands which the Turkish Government had not been able to accept.

3. As regards the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty, M. Aras expressed the view that even if, owing to the suspense clause, it did not come at once into operation, this would not affect the policy of Turkey, which was laid down in the Anglo-Turkish and Franco-Turkish declarations of last June. These declarations had been approved by the Turkish Chamber and had therefore the force of law.

4. I asked Dr. Aras whether the insistence of the Soviet Government on excluding from the proposed treaty all possibility of a conflict between Russia and Germany meant that there was now agreement between Germany and Russia as regards their future policy in the Balkans, and, more particularly, whether we must now anticipate joint action of these two Powers against Roumania. Dr. Aras doubted whether there was any definite agreement between Germany and Russia as regards the Balkans, but he recognised that it was possible that in favourable circumstances they might decide on joint action against Roumania. But he doubted whether this would happen so long as Germany was occupied in the west and Russia was occupied in the Baltic and Central Asia.

5. I then took the opportunity of sounding Dr. Aras as to the possibility of the Turkish Government taking up again the question of organising a Balkan *bloc*. To this Dr. Aras replied that any success on these lines was now dependent upon the attitude of Italy in this matter. The Balkan States would require to know how far they could count on Italy before they embarked upon a policy which might bring them into trouble with Germany and Russia. Dr. Aras considered, however, that it ought to be the task of our three Governments during the coming winter to consolidate the position, both in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean on parallel lines. The attitude of the Ambassador in relation to the possibility of Italian co-operation was interesting, and, if it correctly reflects the way that his own Government are thinking, goes to show that the views of the Turkish Government and of His Majesty's Government may be moving on very similar lines.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[R 8954/328/37] No. 106.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Hoare (Bucharest).

(No. 584.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 18, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 612 [of 17th October: Negotiations with Turkey].

I agree that the refusal of the Turkish Government to accept conditions in Moscow, which could not be reconciled with points in the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty, is most satisfactory. But I do not consider that there is any likelihood of the Turkish Government expressing their resentment at the attitude adopted by the Soviet Government on the lines suggested in paragraph 3 of your telegram.

2. Turkish Government have from the outset made it plain that they would undertake no obligation which might lead to hostilities between Turkey and the U.S.S.R., and, indeed, a protocol to this effect still forms an integral part of the treaty. I see no reason to suppose that recent developments have led to a change of attitude in this respect.

(Repeated to Moscow, No. 315, and Angora, No. 547.)

[R 8984/661/67] No. 107.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 550.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 19, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 624 [of 18th October: Negotiations with Turkey].

Please convey to Turkish Prime Minister the following message from the Prime Minister:—

"I would like to convey to your Excellency a personal message of good wishes and congratulations on the conclusion between our two countries and France of the treaty of mutual assistance which has been signed to-day.

"I welcome this additional proof of the resolve of our three countries to collaborate in furthering our common interests and I look forward to the continuance of this co-operation in pursuing the policy laid down in the treaty we have just signed."

(Repeated to Paris, No. 395.)

[R 9050/7937/44] No. 108.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (Received October 20.)

(No. 628.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, October* 19, 1939.

SECRETARY-GENERAL informs me that the Central Bank of Turkey require £300,000 sterling immediately.

2. It appears that this amount and even a larger sum was put at its disposal by Bank for International Settlements against gold deposited with it.

3. Central Bank has now been informed, however, that Bank for International Settlements cannot renew the credit. It has therefore been liquidated, and the Central Bank requires sterling urgently to meet obligations in free exchange.

4. It suggests that Bank of England should request Bank for International Settlements to renew Central Bank's credits for £300,000 or open a credit for that amount, when the Central Bank will transfer equivalent gold to the name of the Bank of England in Switzerland.

5. In the latter case, Central Bank would not object to the Bank of England selling gold in exchange and holding an equivalent amount in pledge for the Central Bank in London.

6. I am given to understand that sterling is required to pay salaries and expenses of Turkish representatives abroad and to meet similar expenses.

7. In view of signature of Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which takes place to-day, I should be glad if it could be found possible to comply with the Secretary-General's request.

[R 9052/661/67] No. 109.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (Received October 20.)

(No. 631.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, October* 19, 1939.

ANGLO-French-Turkish Treaty.

Treaty was signed in the presence of press representatives at 4·30 P.M. G.M.T. this afternoon: viz., treaty and protocols 1 and 2.

2. Other documents annexed to the treaty and also Military Convention and special agreement were signed separately and secretly beforehand.

(Repeated to Rome, Moscow, Bagdad, Cairo, Bucharest, Athens, Sofia and Belgrade.)

[R 9047/661/67] No. 110.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 554.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 20, 1939.

NOW that with the signature of our treaty with Turkey your labours have at length been crowned with success, I wish once again to send to you—and also to your staff—a personal message of warm congratulations and thanks on the skill and patience with which you have conducted these long and at times difficult negotiations to their present successful conclusion.

[R 9050/7937/44] No. 111.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 566.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 24, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 628 [of 20th October: Central Bank's need of £300,000 sterling].

Bank of England would in principle be prepared to open a credit to the Central Bank for £300,000 against gold (to be shipped to Paris or London) or alternatively to buy gold spot from the Central Bank and sell it to them forward.

2. Bank of England point out that they have no account open in the Central Bank's name. It would be necessary to open an account before a credit could be arranged, and Central Bank should approach Bank of England.

3. The sterling would only be available within the sterling area, but if the Central Bank wishes it, the Bank of England would be prepared to sell other currencies to the Central Bank against part of the proceeds of the credit, on the understanding that such currencies would be resold to the Bank of England on the maturity of the credit.

[R 9051/7218/44] No. 112.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 567.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 24, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 629 [of 19th October: Wish of Central Bank to have rate of exchange guaranteed at 521 piastres to £1].

I am afraid that His Majesty's Government cannot agree to guarantee the rate of 521 piastres as requested. There is no power to do so under the existing agreement, and it would conflict with the policy which His Majesty's Government have carried through all their clearing agreements to guarantee a fixed rate of exchange.

2. His Majesty's Government regret that they are unable to meet the wishes of the Central Bank in this respect, but they are anxious to explore with the Turkish Government all possible means of developing Anglo-Turkish trade. It appears to them, in any case, that a possible variation in the official rate is only one factor in the variations of the return to the Turkish exporter. A much more important element is the premium which in the past has varied very widely in response to supply and demand.

3. You might take this opportunity of pointing out that the rigidity of premium at present high level is prejudicing Turkish imports from the United Kingdom and consequent possibility of liquidating the blockage in Sub-Account C. A fluctuating return, within reasonable limits, is the proper aim of a compensation system, in order to balance trade at the highest possible level, and the present Turkish policy of stabilising the return to the exporter would not appear in the long run to be to the advantage of either country. Their present proposal, though much less important in this respect than the rigidity of the premium rate, would reinforce the existing tendency.

[C 17316/4074/18] No. 113.

Speech by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, October 26, 1939.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Chamberlain): During the past week there have been no operations of importance on the Western Front. Minor adjustments in the positions occupied have been made, and the general result is that the French and German forces are now on the line of the common frontier. The steady stream of reinforcements and reserves of material for the British Expeditionary Force continues, and the defences in the British sector are being continually strengthened.

In the air, aircraft of the Fighter Command have again been in action. The House is already aware of the attempted attacks by German bombers on the east coast convoy on the 21st October. In the morning attack, delivered by six bombers, it is probable that two of the enemy aircraft were destroyed, and in the afternoon attempt, made by two formations of nine and twelve bombers respectively, it is certain that four and probable that five were destroyed. On the following day one of two bombers was shot down into the sea near a convoy off St. Abb's Head. None of the ships or escorts in the convoys suffered hurt, nor did any of the Royal Air Force aircraft engaged. The work of the units of the Coastal Command is almost continuous. Occasionally it is spectacular and attracts attention, but more often it is of a routine kind, and, though no less effective, passes unnoticed.

This week there are certain successes to report. Mines in the path of convoys have been detected from the air in time to save the ships in the convoy from danger, and seven U-boats have been sighted. Of those sighted, four have been attacked. There is good reason to believe that at least one of those attacked was severely damaged, and that another was destroyed by naval vessels directed to the scene by the attacking aircraft.

I should like also to mention the admirable work of the anti-aircraft gunners, who have been continuously at their posts from a date before the war began. It is now known that in the raids on Rosyth and Scapa Flow they brought down two German bombers, and there is reason to think that they caused such damage to others as to prevent their reaching home.

In the war at sea there has been an intensification of the German submarine campaign. This intensification we have always expected; but I can assure the House with confidence that the situation is well in hand. In spite of one or two strokes of good fortune, the enemy have not been able to attain the rate of sinking which they attained at the beginning of the war. Their submarines have been driven to operate further and further from their bases and further and further from the focal points where trade is bound to congregate. Finally, the destruction of enemy submarines is being maintained at a sufficiently high rate to encourage us to believe that this menace to our trade will eventually be overcome.

Hon. members may, indeed, have seen that during the last few days the sinking of five British ships has been announced. One of these ships, *Stonegate*, was sunk by the German raider *Deutschland* some time ago, but information of this loss has only just reached us. Together these ships aggregated 22,715 tons. On the other hand, a number of enemy ships have been arrested and brought in by our blockading squadrons for adjudication in the regular way. These ships are the *Phœbus*, of 8,863 tons, the *Gloria*, of 5,896 tons, the *Bianca*, of 1,375 tons, the *Poseidon*, of 5,864 tons, and the *Biscaya*, of 6,369 tons, all of which are now in our control, totalling 28,367 tons. In addition to these, the *Gonzeinheim*, of 4,574 tons, was intercepted and scuttled herself to avoid capture. There is, therefore, a loss to the enemy of some 33,000 tons and a net gain to us of nearly 6,000 tons. These figures are, however, subject to the decision of the Prize Court.

One feature of the enemy's U-boat campaign to which I must call attention is their growing lawlessness. It seems now to have become the rule for merchant ships to be sunk without warning. Frequently passengers and crew have been turned adrift in small open boats in stormy seas to suffer from cold and exposure. In the case of the steamship *Yorkshire* in particular, there was a deplorable loss of life amongst the wives and children of soldiers returning home from the East. Another flagrant instance was the sinking of the French ship *Bretagne*, carrying a large number of women and children. This ship was sunk miles from land by gunfire and torpedo without warning. Fourteen of those on board are missing. No words are strong enough to express our detestation of this cowardly form of warfare.

The outstanding event in foreign affairs since my last statement to the House was made has been the signature of the treaty with Turkey. The treaty has been received with profound satisfaction throughout the Empire and in France, and it is a great encouragement to us to know that it has been widely welcomed in many other parts of the world. That is doubtless because the world sees in it a guarantee for the maintenance of peace in at least one region of the world. It is a purely defensive instrument, threatening no one and designed only to oppose resistance to aggression. We are proud to feel that, under its provisions, we now share mutual responsibilities with the Turkish people, for whose patriotism, probity and valour we have long cherished a high regard.

I should like to take this opportunity of informing the House that His Majesty's Government and the French and Turkish Governments have been discussing for some time the question of financial and economic assistance for Turkey. The assistance to be given relates particularly to the supply of war material. Conversations on this subject have been taking place in London with a Turkish Military Mission, and it has been a great pleasure to us to welcome the mission and its distinguished leader, General Orbay, to this country. The conversations have been conducted in a spirit of frankness and cordiality and are now nearing completion. I am confident that they will lead to useful and practical results.

A week ago I informed the House that there had been no indication from Berlin of the views of the German Government upon the issues which I sought to define in my statement of the 12th October. In the last few days reports have come from Berlin of lengthy consultations among the Nazi leaders. It may be that the speech made at Danzig on the 24th October by the German Foreign Minister is the result of these consultations.

I do not propose to waste the time of the House by commenting on the many details of this performance. No one in this country will be deceived by its distortions of the truth, and there is already abundant evidence that Herr von Ribbentrop has been no more successful in his attempt to mislead impartial observers in other parts of the world. Indeed I even cherish the hope

that, despite all suppressions and falsifications, there are still some in Germany itself who see where the real truth lies.

The main thesis of the speech is that it was England and not Germany who desired and plotted for war. The whole world knows that this is not true. The whole world knows that no Government ever sought more ardently to avoid war or took greater risks to preserve peace than did the Government of this country. We have already published with complete frankness all the essential documents relating to the causes of the war. We are content to be judged by the facts and to know that the verdict of the great majority of neutral observers is in our favour.

In his final report on his mission to Berlin, Sir Nevile Henderson referred to the encouragement given to Herr Hitler in his designs on Poland by Herr von Ribbentrop, who apparently advised him up to the last moment that Britain would not fight. Yet this is the man who now asserts that the whole object of British policy since 1933 has been to concert war against Germany. One of the questions which the historians of the future will have to consider is how far the great tragedy of our times was due to the failure of Herr von Ribbentrop to comprehend either the policy or the character of the British people.

I will make one other comment upon the German Foreign Minister's speech. He desires, it seems, to invite the Soviet Union to join in a crusade against the British Empire. Why, what a change is here! Let me read two sentences from Herr von Ribbentrop's address to the press when he first came to England in 1936.

This is the quotation :—

> "Germany wants to be friends with Great Britain, and I think the British people also wish for German friendship. The Führer is convinced that there is only one real danger to Europe and to the British Empire as well, that is the spreading further of communism, this most terrible of all diseases—terrible because people generally seem to realise its danger only when it is too late."

The positive conclusion which we are, apparently, asked to draw from the German Foreign Minister's speech is that the German Government have made the choice which, as I stated on the 12th October, lay before them. He has announced their intention of seeing the struggle through with all their energy and strength. If that is, indeed, their decision, there can be but one reply, and we are prepared to give it. But it is not England that has challenged Germany. It is the German Government who, by their persistent acts of aggression, pursued in face of our repeated warnings, have forced us at last reluctantly to take up arms. It is the German Government who, by their reckless disregard of their pledged word and of the rights and liberties of other peoples, must bear the responsibility for this war and for all its consequences.

[C 17316/4075/18] No. 114.

Speech by Viscount Halifax in the House of Lords, October 26, 1939.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Viscount Halifax): My Lords, the weekly statement that my noble friend reads to the House has this afternoon given the opportunity for several speeches that have touched upon matters of great importance on which it is my duty to say a word or two. Those weekly statements that record the progress or the passage of events in the great struggle in which France and the British Empire stand side by side will prove their usefulness, I think, if from time to time they do afford the opportunity of such a review as we have had this afternoon. A reference was made—and I only make this added reference in passing—to the speech made by my opposite number in Germany, Herr von Ribbentrop, and the reflection that I made upon that which did not find place in the statement was that I had never seen an attempt more clumsy, if one may speak of an international colleague in these terms, to divide England and France, for that seemed to me to be the plain purpose of the speech. It left on my mind—I suppose that never has confidence between France and

ourselves been more complete and more intimate than it is to-day—the conviction that, however unsuccessful Herr von Ribbentrop might have been in understanding the British people in peace, he was not less unsuccessful in understanding the joint mind of Great Britain and France. For the rest the picture which I think the noble Lord, Lord Snell, had in his mind—Germany threatened by the danger of attack by Poland only a short time ago, by the danger of an attack by Czecho-Slovakia, the victim of sinister plotting by this country—if the whole matter was serious, that indeed would be a spectacle to bring smiles to the lips of gods and men. That, however, is by the way.

During the speeches that have been made, several matters of importance have been raised, and perhaps I might begin with the matter that was raised last by Lord Listowel before I come to the speech of my noble friend Lord Snell. Lord Listowel had a great deal to say to us in regard to what he deemed to be the general policy of Russia and to the opportunities that that policy afforded, in his view, for the improvement of relations between the Soviet Government and ourselves. In many ways, I have not, I suppose, the knowledge of some of these things that perhaps is in the possession of Lord Listowel, but perhaps also I have other knowledge that is not in his possession, and I am bound to say that, while I hope I do not underrate the importance of the considerations that he urged, I think that, if your Lordships are to have a balanced picture of the whole situation in mind, it is necessary to remember that the recent Soviet action in regard to the Baltic States has caused anxiety not only in quarters immediately concerned, and that the situation that has been created is not by any means wholly clear. It is certainly by no means clear at present what is the precise position of the negotiations in progress between the Soviet Government and Finland, and I would here say no word to make those negotiations more difficult; but it is certainly not clear what the reaction in certain circumstances would be in Scandinavian countries, and indeed outside, if deadlock in those negotiations should be reached. There should, as far as we are aware, be no conflict of interest between the Soviet and Finland that is not capable of adjustment, and for all reasons His Majesty's Government hope that the discussions now proceeding between those two countries may be brought to a reasonable conclusion.

The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, started a topic that brought the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, to his feet; and the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, having started it, was good enough to say that he would leave the further development of the case to the Foreign Secretary. As the debate proceeded between him and Lord Mottistone, I found myself, as is not infrequently the case, reflecting that they were not perhaps arguing on exactly the same point, and that what had begun by being a matter of rather academic historical accuracy was developing into a contest and controversy of high principle in which their passions might easily become warmly engaged. I do not wish to enter into that passionate struggle, but I can perhaps say a word upon what I had thought had been the issue—namely, that of historical accuracy. I understood the noble Earl opposite to say—and he referred to the statement which was repeated on the subject in another place by my honourable friend, the Under-Secretary—that, in our discussions with Poland and with Colonel Beck, it had always been understood that the purpose of those discussions, and the sole purpose of those discussions, was to provide against a case of aggression by Germany. In making that statement I am not saying anything that would not carry the whole-hearted assent of the Polish Government, past and present. But when the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, suggests that it would be the policy of this Government, or of any other Government that might fill our places, to recoil from pledges that they had given and from the understanding that those pledges carried, he will, I am sure, allow me to say, and I am sure that he will agree, that no Government holding our place would ever ask our country to do any such thing.

It is quite true, of course, as he says, that it makes no difference to the Poles whether they are invaded from east or west; and nobody who has any information as to what is now going on in the several parts of Poland can feel any other than a sense of the complete and utter tragedy of the suffering and want which, as he truly says, is going to grow much worse this winter and of which even to-day we have the most distressful reports. The last thing I would wish to do in this matter is to defend the action of the Soviet Government at the particular time at which they took it. But it is right to remember two things: Firstly, that they would never have taken that action if the German Government had not

started it and set the example that they did set when they invaded Poland without any declaration of war. In the second place, it is perhaps, as a matter of historical interest, worth recalling that the action of the Soviet Government has been to advance the Russian boundary to what was substantially the boundary recommended at the time of the Versailles Conference by the noble Marquess who used to lead the House, Lord Curzon, and who was then Foreign Secretary.

Lord Mottistone: May I intervene, as the matter is of such vital importance? Is it not the fact that the Polish Government had a sure guarantee from the Soviet Government, under the Pact of Non-Aggression which they had with the Soviet Government at the outbreak of war, that their eastern boundary should remain intact so that, whatever happened, the advance to the Curzon line or any other line was a breach of faith?

Viscount Halifax: I said I was not concerned to defend the action of the Soviet Government, or, indeed, of any other Government except my own. I was only stating historical facts, and I think that the historical facts as I have stated them are not capable of dispute. Then the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, led us a little bit into the sphere of economics, and it is, I think, true, as he said, that the Soviet Government, though their previous declarations of economic solidarity with Germany might have seemed to render it doubtful, do now appear willing to trade impartially with all the belligerents, and His Majesty's Government have, as the House knows, already taken advantage of this attitude by the conclusion of the recent agreement for the exchange of timber against rubber and tin. We are now examining the possibility of doing further trade with advantage to this country, as I hope, and without incurring the risks to which Lord Listowel referred, on the same basis of barter, which is the only basis possible in present circumstances. If we are able to do that, I think—at least I hope—that it will be of commercial value to us and may have something of the wider valuable consequences that the noble Lord had in mind.

Not quite unconnected with all that subject is the attention that is given to the question of the relations of the Soviet with Turkey. It is quite true that the visit of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to Moscow has apparently produced no definite result, but, none the less, your Lordships will not have failed, I hope, to observe that, after those conversations were concluded, both Governments were at pains to show that their traditional friendship and their general relations remained unaffected by their failure to achieve final agreement at that stage. That, as I ventured to say a week or two ago in reply to something that had fallen from the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, is a matter of great satisfaction to His Majesty's Government, who welcome and wish to see maintained good relations between those two great neighbours, Turkey and Russia. We wish that all the more, now that we have concluded the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Agreement, which has put us in a special relationship with the Turkish Government and to which the noble Lord opposite referred in terms so generous.

Although that agreement does, in fact, little more than commit to paper the pre-existing will to collaboration between Great Britain and Turkey which has, as we all know, existed over a number of years, it does, as I think was said in my noble friend's statement, constitute a pretty firm guarantee against aggression in that part of the world, and, as he emphasised, like the other arrangements entered into by His Majesty's Government, it is purely defensive, it is aimed against no Power and it threatens the legitimate interest of no Power, and it can only be called into operation by aggression. The terms of it are, I have no doubt, sufficiently in your Lordships' memories to spare me from the necessity of repeating them. I will only here emphasise the essentially mutual character of them. Turkey and Great Britain make this agreement as two countries meeting together on equal terms for purposes in which they have a common and identical interest, and your Lordships will observe that the statement was made in another place that, while it is usual that treaties should be laid before the House for twenty-one days before ratification, in view of the exceptional circumstances of the present case, it was desired that the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty should be ratified as soon as possible. It is therefore proposed to submit the treaty for His Majesty's signature at once and to arrange for the instruments of ratification to reach Angora next week. I believe that is, from the parliamentary point of view, slightly irregular, but I have no doubt that in this House, as in another, there will be a general feeling that it was right to lose no time in making progress.

As my noble friend said, in connexion with this treaty arrangements have been under discussion for the granting of certain financial and economic assistance to Turkey, particularly in regard to the supply of war material, and I would like to add my word to his in the sense of saying how great has been our pleasure at welcoming General Orbay to this country as a collaborator and of saying how much we have been impressed with the wise appreciation of all the issues with which we are dealing that he and others working with him have shown. The noble Lord, Lord Snell, was good enough to tender a word of personal congratulation to myself in this matter, but let me assure him that that is really quite undeserved, for, if it is true, as it is true, to say that it takes two to make a quarrel, it certainly takes two to make an agreement, and we could never have made this agreement with Turkey unless throughout all our conversations we had been assured and felt assured at all points of their loyal co-operation in the common service, as I said just now, of interests that they, with us, felt to be exactly common between us.

It is true, I think, that the conclusion of this treaty has been very warmly welcomed both in this country and very far outside it, and that is one evidence of the place that Turkey holds in the opinions of the people of this country and the finest proof of the great value which this country attaches to the friendship of Turkey. The foundations for that friendship were, as the noble Lord said, laid by the master hand of Kemel Ataturk and have been constantly developed under the distinguished guidance of his successor, President General Inönü. We have all watched with deep admiration the progress that Turkey has made in recent years and we have all, without distinction of party, welcomed the important position that by merit is hers among the Powers of the world. Our people certainly have every cause fully to appreciate the high qualities and the character of the Turkish race, and it gives to all of us the greatest satisfaction that the relations between our two countries are now once more, as we hope, set on a footing of lasting friendship. That I have no doubt will redound to the permanent durable advantage of both countries.

It is interesting to recall the fact that it was an alliance with Turkey that formed the basis of Anglo-Turkish relations during the 19th century, and for historical students it is interesting to note that that treaty, the origin of those relations, was signed in the first week of the year 1799 and contained, if you make the comparison, noteworthy points of similarity with our present treaty. This in itself is further proof, if proof were needed, that in the treaty which we have just succeeded in making we are acting in harmony with our traditions and she with hers, and so I hope it may continue to be for many years to come, because it is true of countries, as it is true of individuals, that nations and men do their best when they are true to their own traditions. As I have said, the treaty is directed against no other Power, and implies no change in our desire to continue to collaborate on all possible occasions with other Governments which have interests in the areas which come within the scope of the provisions of the treaty that we have just signed. I hope, indeed, that the noble Lord, Lord Snell, was not drawing a bow too widely removed from the truth when he hoped that the treaty might in truth be the parent stock of many other benefits to the world that might gradually accrue from it.

[R 9349/7870/44] No. 115.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 607 E.)

My Lord, *Angora, October 21, 1939.*

WITH reference to Mr. Morgan's despatch No. 489 E. of the 28th September, 1938, regarding the final figures for the 1936–37 Turkish budget, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship the accompanying copy of a memorandum prepared by my commercial secretary showing the final accounts of the Turkish budget for the fiscal year 1937–38, ended the 30th June, 1938.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

HUGHE M. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

Enclosure in No. 115.

Memorandum respecting the Final Accounts of the Turkish Budget.

THE final Turkish budget accounts for the fiscal year 1937–38 ended the 30th June, 1938, are made up as follows:—

	£T.
Receipts—	
Ordinary	260,171,104
Extraordinary	43,225,730
Sundry	1,902,478
Treasury refunds	8,871,438
	314,170,810
Expenditure	
Disbursed during the year...	287,460,758
Carried forward for payments in the following year	16,086,674
	303,547,432

or an apparent surplus of £T. 10,623,378.

The ordinary receipts figuring above are those set out in the general budget, while the extraordinary receipts are made up as follows:—

	£T.
(1) Carried forward from previous year ...	7,242,260
(2) Minting of silver money	2,660,377
(3) Product of 5½ per cent. bonds (against bankers' deposits)	3,746,085
(4) Product of nine-month bonds	22,168,077
(5) Sivas-Erzerum loan	4,140,000
(6) Bonds mortgaged	1,056,743
(7) Sale of bonds	2,021,299
(8) Product of taxation for preservation of wheat	190,889
	43,225,730

The remaining receipts have been realised as a result of special laws and decrees.

Of the above receipts Nos. (3), (4), (5) and (6) have been realised from loans and amount to £T. 31,110,905.

Deduction of this sum from the apparent budgetary surplus of £T. 10,623,378 would show a budgetary deficit of £T. 20,487,527.

Against this deficit, however, Treasury credits amount to £T. 31,911,354 and are more than sufficient to cover the loans concluded during 1937–38. These credits are made up as follows:—

	£T.
(1) The surplus remaining from loans concluded during 1937–38	10,623,378
(2) Credits in the State coffers at the end of 1936–37 carried forward to next year	21,287,976
	31,911,354

The effective budgetary surplus for the fiscal year 1937–38 is, therefore, £T. 11,423,827.

[R 9432/7937/44] No. 116.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 677.)

(Telegraphic.) *Angora, October 26, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 566.

The Central Bank of Turkey is grateful for the facilities in respect of a grant of a £300,000 credit against gold. It points out, however, that the transfer of gold from Switzerland to Paris or London is an extremely expensive proceeding which it is anxious to avoid, if possible. It appears that the Central Bank has approximately 1,200 kilog. of gold pledged in London in the name of the Bank of International Settlements. This gold is stored in the Bank of England, and the Central Bank have now approached the Bank of International Settlements with a request that they should release this gold against a similar amount which is held by the Central Bank in Switzerland, thus obviating the expenses incurred in transferring gold in Switzerland, which has recently been released to Paris and London.

2. The bank also states that it would be glad of facilities in respect of two further credits which have been accorded to it by the Bank of International Settlements, one for $4,250,000 maturing on [? 3rd June] and one for £200,000 maturing on 9th November, 1939. Gold pledged in respect of these credits is already, for the most part, in the Banque nationale suisse at Berne, and the Central Bank would be prepared for kilogrammes of gold transferred from Switzerland to the Bank of England at its own expense if the Bank of England would be good enough to grant credits for the amounts mentioned.

3. The bank does, however, [? group omitted] that some arrangement would be necessary in respect of the transfer of this gold, as the Bank of International Settlements would not be prepared to allow its transfer until the credit had been liquidated. On the one hand, the Bank of England would require gold before granting the necessary credits. I concur [with] bank that, in order to overcome this difficulty, it would no doubt be possible for the Bank of England to make an arrangement with the Bank of International Settlements.

4. As an alternative, the Central Bank suggests that it might be possible for the Bank of England to suggest to the Bank of International Settlements that the credits accorded to Turkey for the above amounts might be renewed, which would avoid the necessity for transferring these credits from the Bank of International Settlements to the Bank of England and also the necessity of transferring gold from Switzerland to England.

5. The Central Bank of Turkey and the Turkish Government are hard pressed at present to find free exchange, and this condition is likely to continue for some months until the United States of America commence selling dollars in payment for Turkish exports to that country.

6. This, however, will be only a temporary alleviation, and I doubt if Turkey will escape in any large measure from her present coin embarrassment until she receives a loan of £15 million gold, envisaged under the commercial and economic agreement recently concluded. I feel, however, that it would be in our best interests generally to assist her in her present difficulties as far as possible, and I would point out that the transfer of gold at present in Switzerland to England ought to appear to possess certain advantages, as London would thereby replace Berne as the Turkish banking centre.

7. I attach the greatest political importance to any assistance, without undue risk, which we can accord to Turkey at the present time, and I should be glad if the specified bank's request could receive sympathetic consideration.

[R 9521/7705/44] No. 117.

Sir W. Seeds to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 300.)

My Lord, *Moscow, October 20, 1939.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs left Moscow at midnight of the 17th–18th October for Sebastopol, whence, I understood, he would be conveyed through the Black Sea in a Soviet warship. The Soviet Ambassador at Angora travelled with him. M. Sarajoglu was seen

off at the station by M. Potemkin and other officials; a guard of honour was provided, with a band which played the Turkish national anthem followed by the "Internationale," the latter, for reasons unknown, being suddenly cut off after comparatively few bars of that rather dismal psalmody had been performed.

2. In view of the fact that I had seen so much of M. Sarajoglu during his three weeks' stay, and that he clearly expected it of me, I attended at the station. The French Embassy—in the continued absence of the ambassador and owing to the prostration of the Chargé d'Affaires by scarlet fever—was represented by a young secretary and the military attaché. In what I might call the "general attendance," namely the Balkan and Near Eastern representatives and minor Soviet officials, there reigned an atmosphere of uneasy constraint owing to doubts as to what had actually occurred, and as to the exact state of Turco-Soviet relations.

3. Previous to M. Sarajoglu's departure, agreement had been reached on a communiqué, of which the terms had been proposed by the Russians, stressing the amicable exchange of views which had taken place during the conversations. This was duly published in the Moscow press the next morning, but I have searched in vain for any publication of the very different statement by the Turkish Prime Minister, which the Anatolian Agency issued in Angora on the same day.

4. I have the honour to enclose herein translation of the telegrams(1) exchanged between M. Sarajoglu and M. Molotov, which were published in this morning's press. It is evident from these that the latter has found it difficult to maintain the show of cordiality which circumstances require.

5. During his journey to Angora M. Sarajoglu will doubtless be able to come to a considered opinion as to the larger results of his visit to Moscow. On the day of his actual departure, I feel that his visit must have seemed to him at any rate successful in so far as it had cleared up two points which at the outset he had expounded to me as his main objectives. Firstly, what hand could the Russians be induced to disclose, and, secondly, would it be possible for Turkey to become a sort of bridge between the U.S.S.R. and the Western Powers?

6. On the first point, he may well think that he has succeeded in seeing the Soviet hand. For it seems that at the end of the three weeks the Russian proposals were much the same as they had been at the beginning, and were, in fact, not changed—as he expected they might be—when he produced our conditional consent to the use of the reserve formula, which he had originally worked out with Stalin. I say advisedly "it seems," for the reason that, with all his directness and frankness, which I have so greatly appreciated in this place where such qualities are unknown, M. Sarajoglu is not very precise in his statements. He does not appear to possess the sort of mind which revels in, and works on the lines of, formulæ. Moreover, he has apparently a strong reluctance on principle to communicate texts of documents or proposals. (Hence, incidentally, some of the discrepancies between Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen's and my telegrams.)

7. In any case, the impression he finally produced on me was that, at nearly all the conversations, the Soviet negotiators had reverted again and again to the self-same points, but with a civility and an apparent readiness on each occasion to accept his refusals that led him to think those particular demands would not be brought up again. This applies specially to his interview when M. Stalin was present. I could have, from sad experience, put M. Sarajoglu right where Molotovian methods were concerned, but in the case of M. Stalin I could only try to make myself believe in M. Sarajoglu's favourable impression of the Soviet dictator.

8. M. Sarajoglu was greatly struck by the intimate knowledge of affairs evinced by M. Stalin, who in addition displayed a calm reasonableness and a desire to meet the other party's points of view, by *inter alia* brushing aside the pettifogging obstructions of M. Molotov. (This impression of M. Stalin was fully shared by one of the Baltic representatives, who spoke to me in the same sense.) Largely basing himself on the dictator's apparent moderation, M. Sarajoglu remained, up to the end, optimistic in the sense that the Russians would not insist on the demands which finally brought the conversations to a close.

9. M. Sarajoglu's hopes as to reaching an agreement with the Soviet Government, in consequence of which Anglo-Russian relations might be eased through the Turkish Government as an intermediary, were, of course finally shattered.

(1) Not printed.

His optimism in this respect was never shared by me, who always remember the consistent belief expressed at Angora that the Soviet Government were in earnest over the Anglo-Franco-Russian pact negotiations last summer. I would add, however, that if I felt more than doubtful as to the existence of any foundation for M. Sarajoglu's unduly favourable estimate of the Russian attitude, I never had the slightest fear that he could be led into concessions to the detriment of our interests. From the outset I learnt to appreciate what seemed to me a strength of character to which I would pay a high and appreciative tribute.

I have, &c.
WILLIAM SEEDS.

[R 9801/7201/44] No. 118.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received November* 2.)

(No. 701.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Angora, November* 1, 1939.

REFERRING to foreign affairs in speech to-day at opening of Grand National Assembly, President of the Republic said:—

"Efforts of Government during development of crisis in Europe have been consistently directed towards cause of peace. Results of these efforts were the Anglo-Turkish declarations of 12th May and Turco-French declarations of 23rd June. Treaty signed on 19th October, which will be presented to you this week for approval, is not directed against any State, but aims at assuring our security while serving the cause of international peace and security—at least in the zone in which we can exercise influence. The ideal of safeguarding peace moves each country to take measures which differ according to geographical situation, capacities or constitution of each.

"Turkey believes its greatest contribution to the cause of peace is to define its attitude clearly and sincerely in advance. By this treaty we aim at preventing the extension of the tragedy of war by creating a zone of security in war-stricken Europe. Unless there exist those who wish to trample on this legitimate aspiration, the treaty does not come into operation. Apart from this eventuality, our ties with the Allies and our co-operation in pursuit of our lofty ideals are not such as to injure our normal and friendly relations with other States. We earnestly desire to keep our country from war on condition our security is not thereby compromised and that we do not violate our engagements.

"Our Minister for Foreign Affairs was engaged in negotiations in Moscow for some three weeks. We hoped that negotiations would result in an agreement that would make still closer the happy relations uniting us to-day to our old friend the U.S.S.R. Despite all our efforts, which at one moment we thought would be crowned with success, it was not this time possible to reach the result which we believe is as much in the interest of the other party as in ours. Nevertheless, you know that the friendship between our two countries stands on solid foundations. Circumstances and impossibilities arising from temporary necessities of the present day should not injure this friendship. As in the past, we will in the future follow with sincerity a friendly course of Turco-Soviet relations.

"Concluding, it may be said that the Turks are faithful to their friends and to their engagements. These qualities have obtained for the policy of our Government general confidence. In the future, as in the past, friends who are faithful to us may expect from us nothing but upright dealing, goodwill and conduct like their own."

[R 9626/7703/44] No. 119.

Sir W. Seeds to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received November* 2.)

(No. 436.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Moscow, November* 1, 1939.

FOLLOWING is summary of section of Molotov's speech dealing with Turkish negotiations:—

After describing as fabrications and lies stories concerning transfer of Ardagan and Kurs areas, and alteration of Montreux Convention with priority

rights for Soviet Union in Straits question, Molotov stated actual question discussed was conclusion of bilateral mutual assistance pact, confined to Black Sea and Straits areas. In the first place, Soviet Union considered such pact should not lead it to actions involving it in hostilities with Germany, and, in the second place, that Soviet Union should be given guarantee that, in view of threat of war, Turkey should not admit warships of non-Black Sea Powers to pass through Bosphorus to Black Sea. Turkey declined both reservations and thereby rendered impossible conclusion of pact. Nevertheless, negotiations contributed to clarify certain political questions interesting the Soviet Union. In the present international situation it was particularly important to know real aims and policy of States whose relations with Soviet Union were really significant. Much had become clearer to Soviet Union in Turkish policy both as result of negotiations and of recent acts of Turkish Government.

It was now known that Turkish Government had preferred to join its fate to definite group of European Powers participating in war. They had concluded a mutual assistance pact with England and France, who had already for two months been at war with Germany. Thus Turkey had definitely thrown overboard the careful policy of neutrality and entered the orbit of European war. This had given great satisfaction in England and France, who wished to involve in the sphere of war as many neutral countries as possible. "We will not guess whether Turkey will not live to regret it. We can only take note of these new steps in the foreign policy of our neighbour and follow attentively the progress of events."

"If Turkey has, to a certain extent, now bound her hands and inclined to a policy, risky for her, of supporting one of warring parties, it is clear Turkish Government recognises responsibility they have thereby assumed." But this was not the foreign policy followed by Soviet Union, thanks to which it had already made sure of not a few successes. Soviet Union preferred to retain freedom of action in future as well and to apply consistently its policy of neutrality, not only by not co-operating in extension of war, but by co-operation in strengthening existing tendencies to restore peace. Soviet Union was confident that the peace policy it had undeviatingly pursued gave better prospects for future also. This policy, too, would be followed in Black Sea area.

Please repeat to Ministry of Information, No. 35.
(Repeated to Angora, No. 40 of 1st November.)

[R 9657/9657/44] No. 120.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 620.)
My Lord, *Angora, October 25, 1939.*

WITH reference to Sir Percy Loraine's despatch No. 758 of the 28th December, 1937, regarding the settlement in Turkey of emigrants of Turkish race from other Balkan countries, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that, according to announcements which appear from time to time in the Turkish press, the transplanting of these people has been proceeding regularly during the past two years.

2. In November 1938 it was announced that 15,500 immigrants had arrived in the course of the year, and that another 3,500 were expected before the year closed. From earlier statements it appears that the majority were from Roumania and the rest from Bulgaria. As in previous years, some of the immigrants were settled in Thrace and others were sent to the interior of Anatolia; Nigde and Yozgad were mentioned as districts in which they were being established.

3. It is not yet known how many immigrants have reached Turkey this year, but the press announced in July last that 12,000 were expected from Bulgaria and 3,400 from Roumania; some of those who have already arrived have been sent to Smyrna and others to Diyarbakir. The indications are that, in general, only immigrants from Roumania are settled in Thrace, those from Bulgaria being sent to Anatolia; this would be explained by apprehensions lest the latter be tempted to engage in espionage.

4. Though at one time it was understood that arrangements had been made between the Turkish and Bulgarian Governments to facilitate the liquidation of the property of Bulgarian emigrants, there are still complaints in the Turkish press that, owing to local obstructiveness, these unfortunate people are barely able to obtain sufficient funds from the sale of their property to cover arrears of taxation claimed from them. It is also reported that the Roumanian Government are to refund to the Turkish Government the value of properties liquidated by the exportation of oil and timber.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ministers at Bucharest and Sofia.

I have, &c.
H. M. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN

[R 9742/328/37] No. 121.

Sir R. Hoare to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 686.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, November 4, 1939.*

AFTER we had dealt with other business yesterday, the Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to the French Ambassador and me about Germany and Russia.

2. He said that the German Air Attaché, who is regarded as a political personage of considerable importance enjoying General Göring's confidence, was at pains to convince the Roumanian Government that, while Roumania was possibly entitled to attach some value to the Anglo-French-Turkish guarantee as against Germany, her only safeguard against Russia was Germany, and if she wished to enjoy it she must earn it.

3. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said he intended to tell the German Minister that the air attaché's statement did not correspond with the facts as he knew them, and that Roumania [group undecypherable] count on Anglo-French support. On 30th October the Roumanian Ambassador in Paris had reported, according to M. Coustru[rz ?], that British and French fleets would pass through the Dardanelles to defend Roumania in the event of a Russian attack. Furthermore, the Roumanian Minister at Rome had reported on the same day that the French Ambassador "interpreted the Anglo-French-Turkish guarantees in the sense that, if any State committed aggression against a Balkan State, the Anglo-French-Turkish guarantees would immediately come into force."

Finally, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated to the Roumanian Ambassador that "in the present circumstances a Soviet attack against Roumania would concern not only Roumania and Russia, but the other Balkan States, including Turkey. In such an event Turkey would take the measures required by her interests with a view to the defence of her integrity, acting in agreement with France and Great Britain."

4. I replied that, while I did not question the desirability of his speaking to the German Minister in the sense which he contemplated, I was bound to say that the instructions which I had received from you made it plain that neither His Majesty's Government nor the French Government believed it to be possible for them to intervene actively in the defence of Roumania against Russia and I promised the Minister for Foreign Affairs to inform him precisely of the views of His Majesty's Government (as indicated in your despatch No. 5[76 ?]).

5. I should add that I had not acted before on your instructions contained in your telegram No. 611 partly because I was convinced that the Minister for Foreign Affairs realised from my failure to reply to his original enquiry and from the negative language [group undecypherable] to the Roumanian Minister in London that, if he pressed for the answer sent to me, it would be a negative one, partly because I anticipated it would be possible to convey your point of view to the Minister for Foreign Affairs without spontaneously raising the subject.

(Repeated to Angora.)

[R 9931/661/67] No. 122.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 717.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Angora, November 8, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 716.

Grand National Assembly to-day ratified the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance and annexes signed on 19th October.

2. Minister in his speech thanked the French Ambassador and myself for our collaboration, described the treaty as a turning-point in world history, and emphasised that it made for peace.

The treaty was not merely a military and diplomatic document, but marked the beginning of a new and fruitful era in social, economic, political and military spheres.

3. The two greatest and most civilised nations in the world no longer regarded Turkey with hostility or indifference, but considered it indispensable for civilisation and humanity as well as being of the greatest value for their own existence.

4. Turkey at one bound had emerged from the darkness and corruption of the Sultanic régime. The work of the makers of the republic entitled Turkey to take her place along the side of the most advanced and civilised nations. The treaty consecrated this right.

5. The Minister emphasised that the second protocol constituted a mark of friendliness towards Russia.

6. He concluded by saying that Great Britain and France and Turkey had since the Great War been more and more mutually attracted, as a result of frequent contacts in all spheres and the discovery of identity of outlook in all questions. The treaty was not the result of temporary causes, but the natural outcome of long-standing community of views recorded in the document. It was like the English common-law, which is based on tradition and custom, and, being a culmination of a slow growth, is more durable than any written law.

[R 9747/328/37] No. 123.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 609.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Foreign Office, November* 10, 1939.

BUCHAREST telegram No. 686 [of the 4th November]: Assistance for Roumania in event of a Soviet attack.

I should be glad of your views on paragraph 4: [Statement by Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs that a Soviet attack against Roumania would concern also the other Balkan States and Turkey].

(Repeated to Bucharest, No. 647, and to Paris, No. 953, Saving (*en clair*, by bag).)

[R 9915/328/37] No. 124.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 622.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November* 14, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 702 [of 2nd November: Confidential communication to Turkish Government of the attitude of His Majesty's Government and the French Government as regards the validity of the British guarantee to Roumania in the event of an attack by the Soviet Union].

I agree that we should take the Turkish Government into our confidence, and you should speak to them on the first suitable occasion in the following sense:—

2. You should first inform the Turkish Government of the Roumanian Minister's approach to me on 17th October and the answer I then returned (see paragraph 3 of my despatch to Bucharest, No. 501—"Southern" Confidential print, October 17, Section 2). You may then say that, in giving this answer, we had in mind not only the fact that our guarantee was originally intended to deter Germany, but also that in our negotiations with the Turkish Government the latter made it plain that in no circumstances could they contemplate hostilities with the Soviet Union. This meant that, were we to attempt to go to the help of Roumania in the case of Soviet aggression, we could not count upon the use of the Straits in bringing aid and assistance to the Roumanian Government.

3. You should add that Sir Reginald Hoare has been instructed to speak privately to M. Gafencu in the same sense as I have spoken to Roumanian Minister (first sentence of paragraph 2 above).

4. The French Government agree.
(Repeated to Bucharest, No. 660.)

[R 10183/328/37] No. 125.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 786.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, November* 14, 1939.

YOUR telegram No. 609 asks for my views on paragraph 4 of Sir R. Hoare's telegram No. 686. If I understand rightly, you require my views on a decision to inform the Roumanian Government that it would be impossible to intervene actively on their behalf in the event of a Russian attack.

2. As regards the probable attitude of Turkey in the event of a Russian attack on Roumania, I agree with your views expressed to the Roumanian Minister (see paragraph 11 your despatch No. 526 to Bucharest). Beyond the Turkish promise to the King of Roumania to mobilise in the event of an attack (my telegram No. 74 from Istanbul), and the statement repeated to me more than once by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the course of conversations throughout the summer that Turkey could not send troops to Roumania, I know of nothing which throws light on the problem, and even these statements referred to a German attack and not a Russian attack.

3. As regards a Russian attack, I am convinced that only two eventualities would induce Turkey to move: (*a*) any development amounting to a direct threat to her interests, or (*b*) a Bulgarian move against Roumania. The Turkish attitude would depend very largely on the circumstances of the moment, and it has to be borne in mind that the Turkish Government are exceedingly anxious not to be involved against Russia.

4. This last consideration would be one which would influence them in dealing with any request for the passage of His Majesty's ships through the Straits—I doubt whether they would agree to such a request unless, or until, they were convinced that war between themselves and Russia was inevitable, or at least essential to their own safety. A Russian seizure of Bessarabia, with or without Roumanian acquiescence, would, I think, leave the Turks fairly calm. But if Russia were to go further, these problems would at once present themselves. They would, moreover, present themselves quite independently of any previous statement by ourselves, and [group undecypherable] as regards inaction in the event of a Russian attack on Roumania, and the problem which would arise would be one of action in defence of Turkey herself. It might then be possible to deal with it under article 5 (2) of the Tripartite Treaty.

5. As regards (*b*) in paragraph 3, Turkey might be able to carry out her Balkan Pact obligations against Bulgaria without coming into conflict with Russia.

6. In my telegram No. 702 I expressed the view that knowledge of our decision as regards a Russian attack on Roumania would affect the Turkish attitude in any further negotiations with the Soviet Government. What I had in mind was that it would seem slightly unfair on the Turkish Government, in the event of a resumption of negotiations with the Soviet Government, to leave them in ignorance of that decision. Ignorance might make things more difficult for them, whereas if they knew that a Russian attack on Roumania would not be followed by a request for passage of the Straits (at all events until such an attack developed into a real threat to Turkey herself), it might be easier for them to settle things with Russia. It might also be easier for them to indicate to the Soviet Government exactly at what point they would encounter Turkish opposition, though this would carry with it the risk of encouraging the Soviet Government to go ahead up to that point. From that point of view, therefore, there is much to be said for the Minister for Foreign Affairs' present policy of keeping the Soviet Government guessing.

7. I have endeavoured to deal with paragraph 4 of Bucharest telegram in isolation from the rest of that telegram. It is not easy to sum up, but I should say the ultimate direct assistance to Roumania against Russia depends on passage of Straits, and such assistance could only be given if our action were in defence of Turkey as much as of Roumania.

(Repeated to Bucharest.)

[R 10281/7213/44] No. 126.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 632.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 18, 1939.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 745, 746 and 747 [of 16th November: Purchase of Turkish commodities].

We recognise the desirability of diverting Turkish trade from Germany to this country as far as possible, but—and you may, if necessary, explain this to Turkish Government—(1) there are limits to the financial assistance we can give to Turkey, besides whom there are other claimants and to whom we have already given large subsidies; and (2) we cannot hope to provide markets for all Turkish produce previously sent to Germany. We may therefore have to agree to the export by Turkey to Germany of commodities which are not of vital importance to the latter.

2. On the other hand, we feel that Turkey as an Ally has a moral obligation not to supply vital commodities such as chrome and cotton to Germany, especially where, as in the case of chrome, we are prepared to offer her a guarantee at a fixed price of sale of her present output—an arrangement which is in itself extremely advantageous to her. You should, if necessary, point this out to Turkish Government, and should press for immediate conclusion of agreement on the lines of paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 746, subject to modification that we could not agree that Turkish Government should increase production above 200,000 tons a year as long as we are buying any part of their output under the guarantee.

3. As regards cotton, we understand that purchase may be made by the French Government, with whom we are discussing the matter.

4. In order to assist you in concluding an arrangement regarding chrome, Minister of Food would be prepared to make some further purchases of raisins and figs, but this will be conditional on agreement being reached on price on the lines of his telegram No. X 99.

5. Unless Turkish Government prefer to leave discussion of purchases of commodities other than chrome and dried fruits to be conducted by the Secretary-General of Ministry for Foreign Affairs in London (paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 739), we would propose to send an economic expert to Turkey for the purpose. I cannot promise you yet that he would be able to discuss purchase of tobacco. The question, however, is again being studied. In general, we cannot make extensive purchases unless they can be paid for by the export of British goods, *i.e.*, through the Clearing Office, and, in any case, amount of purchases must be influenced by prices at which goods are made available.

[R 10402/7213/44] No. 127.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 758.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, November 19, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 632.

I should be reluctant at present juncture to speak to the Turkish Government in the sense of paragraph 1, as to do so would certainly give them encouragement to come to an arrangement with Germany. If we are unable to arrange purchases of Turkish produce in quantities large enough to satisfy the Turkish Government, this fact will emerge in due course, and I think the later it emerges the better, especially as I hope that no conclusion will be reached with Germany pending result of Secretary-General's visit to London.

2. As regards paragraph 2, I doubt advisability of speaking to the Turkish Government quite so categorically as is suggested in first sentence, as it might draw the reply that moral obligation alluded to would only be incumbent on a belligerent ally, which Turkey is not, and it might create a suspicion that we are trying to force the pace. On the other hand, I think it unlikely, in fact, that they will commit themselves to Germany as regards chrome at present, and the commercial secretary is strongly of the opinion that increased output of over 200,000 tons is in practice out of the question.

3. The difficulty as regard our Chrome Agreement is, as already stated, that the Turks are now showing an inclination to make it dependent on purchase by us of other produce.

4. I am instructing the commercial secretary to see the Minister of Commerce on the 20th November and endeavour to secure acceptance of Chrome Agreement as outlined in paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 746, with modification mentioned at the end of paragraph 2 of your telegram. If he is unsuccessful, he will endeavour to secure acceptance in principle, subject to what may be arranged in London regarding purchases of other Turkish produce. He will make use of paragraph 4 of your telegram and also of your telegram No. 627. I will also speak to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

5. As regards paragraph 5 of your telegram, I am of the opinion, having gone as far as it will be possible in regard to chrome and dried fruits on the basis of your telegrams Nos. 627 and 632, it will be best to leave further negotiations to be conducted in London during the Secretary-General's visit, and I propose to suggest that to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. In that case it will not be necessary to send an economic expert to Turkey.

6. As regards latter part of paragraph 5 of your telegram, it appears there may be some misapprehension in regard to details of recently concluded arrangements concerning (*a*) financial assistance to Turkey, (*b*) the Commercial Agreement initialled in London.

7. Under (*a*), we have agreed to accept service and amortisation of the two loans of £15 million sterling at any time, and the £2 million sterling in Turkish pounds with which we have undertaken to purchase Turkish tobacco. These loans have not yet been granted, but the Turkish Government, in order to assist us to enter this season into the tobacco market—which has just been opened—has agreed that all sterling in respect of logical purchases of tobacco should be held in a blocked account in London in the name of the Central Bank, and eventually used for service loans mentioned above when due. Thus there is no question of sterling paid for tobacco being available for payment of United Kingdom exports to Turkey.

8. Under (*b*), the "clearing" system comes to an end on 30th November, when all Anglo-Turkish commercial exchanges are confirmed on present temporary arrangement of private compensation.

9. I should state that the Secretary-General, during his forthcoming visit to the United Kingdom, will endeavour to obtain immediate grant of above two loans, and, if successful, Turkey will probably place all trade on a free exchange basis and abolish or considerably modify her clearing and compensation agreements. At present it is possible for United Kingdom and other foreign importers to purchase Turkish goods at prices below ruling prices, and this has led to a considerable amount of dissatisfaction.

10. The difficulty regarding the purchase of raisins and figs by the Ministry of Food is entirely due to this state of affairs. The Turkish Government [group undecypherable] ample justification that compensation premiums are a matter of purely internal politics, and have been adopted to promote a means of subsidising the Turkish exporter at the cost of the Turkish consumer, and they see no reason why the United Kingdom importers, officially or privately, should be enabled thereby to purchase Turkish commodities at less than ruling world prices.

[R 10456/7881/44] No. 128.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 762.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, November 20, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 758.

I informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning that Commercial Secretary would endeavour to arrange purchase of chrome on lines indicated in my telegram No. 746 with modification mentioned at end of the second paragraph of your telegram No. 632. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he had already given instructions for minerals to be taken out of the list of commodities which Turkey could offer Germany, and that he was awaiting a protest from

German Ambassador. I went on to say that I had received an expression of your views as stated in the second paragraph of your telegram No. 632. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, as our Ally, he had no objection to this suggestion, nor did he object to its implication of belligerency. The difficulty was that he was faced with a demand to find a market for dried fruits, &c., and if Germany offered to buy these provided she could also take some chrome, he would be in a very awkward position. However, as a result of our negotiations, I feel confident that, in fact, no chrome will be allowed to go to Germany. He said he presumed that, if we could not buy sufficient quantities of figs, raisins, &c., we should not object to some of these being sold to Germany. I replied in accordance with point (2) of the first paragraph of your telegram No. 632.

2. I also informed him that the commercial secretary would discuss the purchase of 5,000 tons of raisins as indicated in your telegram No. 621, and that the Ministry of Food were prepared to make further purchases of figs and raisins as shown in paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 632. I suggest that, if the arrangement could be reached here as regards the chrome and the 5,000 tons of figs, it would be best to leave other matters [? to be] dealt with by Secretary-General in London.

3. I reminded his Excellency that we had undertaken vast obligations under special agreement, and that we were confronted with urgent calls from many quarters to buy the output for which other markets could not be found.

4. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was in general not dissatisfied with the position, but he urged that we might purchase further figs and raisins without awaiting the arrival of the Secretary-General in London. He mentioned 5,000 tons [group omitted] [at] least. I am sure it would create an excellent effect if it could be done.

5. I will report the result of [group undecypherable] action as soon as possible.

[R 10479/7213/44] No. 129.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 767.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, November 21, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 762.

Commercial secretary discussed Chrome Agreement with Director-General of Commercial Department of Turkish Foreign Office yesterday afternoon, and it would appear from this discussion that Turkish Government are prepared to accept our proposal in principle, but are likely to insist on their right to export chrome in excess of 200,000 tons produced by them during any one year and to demand some modification in relation to payments to Anglo-Turkish commodities [*sic*].

2. This latter point will be raised, I am informed, by the Secretary-General during his conversations in London, when the question of service and amortisation of our various loans to Turkey is to form an important part of his negotiations.

3. Referring to Turkish desire to export chrome in excess of 200,000 tons, Director-General pointed out that, so long as Turkey guaranteed that none of it would be exported to Germany or to countries from which it might reach Germany indirectly, it would not affect His Majesty's Government's obligations under the agreement. Should world demand for chrome increase and Turkey export more than 200,000 tons, no obligation would be assumed by Great Britain, and it might well be that, by limiting Turkish production, we may be limiting Great Britain's or the Allies' supplies of ferro-chrome from foreign countries. The claim to export more than 200,000 tons of produce would therefore be of assistance to His Majesty's Government and in no sense a liability.

4. I consider this point largely academic, especially in view of what Minister for Foreign Affairs said to me, as reported in my telegram above referred to, and I regard it as a sop to bargaining instincts of Turks. Since production is not, in fact, likely to exceed 200,000 tons, and Ministry insist on

adverse political effect which limitation of export of Turkey's most valuable asset at present might have on public opinion, I suggest that we might give way on this point.

5. I should add that Director-General at first showed some disinclination to discuss Chrome Agreement, stating that it would be taken up in London by Secretary-General with other questions. When he was informed of the authority for purchase of raisins contained in your telegram No. 627 and further purchases envisaged in third paragraph of your telegram No. 632, he became more amenable.

[R 10943/7213/44] No. 130.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 674.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 29, 1939.*

DURING his visit to me this afternoon the Turkish Secretary-General first broached the question of the supply of armaments to Turkey. His Excellency pointed out that two points were still outstanding, namely, the supply of anti-tank guns and of anti-aircraft guns. As regards the anti-aircraft guns, the Turkish Government recognised that His Majesty's Government, by agreeing to supply a certain number themselves and arranging for the transfer to Turkey of a certain number of Bofors guns, which had been under order in Sweden, had made a maximum effort in this direction. General Orbay was working on the question in Paris and hoped to obtain some solution. M. Menemencioglu, however, was not entirely optimistic in this regard, and asked that His Majesty's Government would bear the difficulty in mind.

2. As regards the anti-tank guns, M. Menemencioglu said that it was quite clear from the conversation on the subject which he had had in Paris with M. Daladier and M. Léger that the French Government, despite promises to do their best, would be able to supply only 200 guns by the end of February, although this figure possibly could be increased at the expense of orders already given by His Majesty's Government. The Turkish Government, said M. Menemencioglu, needed 1,000 anti-tank guns by the end of February. This figure represented their absolutely essential requirements in order to put the Thracian frontier into a proper state of defence, and in order to prevent any possibility of attack in the Caucasus. Eight hundred guns were required for Thrace and 200 for the Caucasus front. M. Menemencioglu drew attention to the fact that the country on the Thracian frontier was particularly favourable for attack by tanks, and the front, moreover, was very shallow. These two factors made it absolutely essential that the defending army should be fully supplied with anti-tank guns. These guns were necessary for the collective security of the Allies. Turkey must be strong in order to keep the Balkans firm. In the opinion of the Turkish Government, the Thracian front was as important as—if not even more important than—the Maginot Line. M. Menemencioglu asked that the question of the supply of these guns should be studied by His Majesty's Government as one of the greatest urgency, and that every effort should be made to find some solution of the difficulty of supplying them, even if it meant furnishing Turkey with the necessary funds with which to buy them in the United States of America. The Turkish Government had already instructed their embassy at Washington to ascertain the date by which guns could be delivered, and they were expecting the reply at any moment.

3. I said that the question of supplying these guns had been exhaustively examined with General Orbay. His Majesty's Government were far from underestimating the importance of the matter, either from the strategical or the political point of view, but so far it had not been found possible to meet the Turkish requirements. I thought it would be best if M. Menemencioglu were to explore the position in detail with Lord Chatfield, who was fully cognisant of the matter. I undertook to inform Lord Chatfield beforehand of the importance which the Turkish Government attached to the question.

4. I said that His Majesty's Government regarded it as most important that the Suspense Clause should be removed as soon as possible and the treaty enter into force. This would have a very valuable political effect and at the same time Turkey would thereby obtain her £15 million gold loan. M. Menemencioglu said that he entirely shared this view. He had come with full powers in his

pocket ready to sign a protocol bringing the Suspense Clause to an end. He felt it necessary, however, to make it quite clear from the outset that the cancellation of the Suspense Clause was conditional on some solution of the question of the supply of the anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns. He had received categorical instructions that some solution of these two points must at all costs be found.

5. M. Menemencioglu then referred to the commercial aspect of Anglo-Turkish relations. He said that in April the Turco-German Commercial Agreement had come to an end. Germany had been ready to renew the agreement on condition that Turkish orders for war material were regarded as cancelled. Turkey had refused this condition and the agreement had not been renewed. As a result, commercial exchanges between Turkey and Germany had been reduced to negligible quantities in spite of the fact that in the previous year Turkey had exported goods to Germany to a value of £T. 62 million and imported goods from Germany to the value of £T. 71 million. Almost daily the German Government were asking the Turkish Government's intentions regarding the renewal of the agreement. Turkey had all along insisted on the fulfilment of her armament orders. Now Germany had declared her readiness to carry out some of, if not all, these orders. But she had refused to make bulk purchases of Turkish commodities unless those commodities included such items as chrome and olive oil. The export season was about to start, and Turkey was in a very awkward predicament. His Majesty's Government had made certain purchases of sultanas and figs, but these represented only a small proportion of the quantities which Turkey normally sold to Germany. Moreover, as regards tobacco, owing to the abstention of the Germans, the Americans were now the only buyers in the market, and this was having a most disastrous effect on prices. Here, then, was the essence of the matter. If Germany was to be deprived of Turkish chrome, Turkey must find a market in Great Britain and France for her other exports. If Great Britain and France could not provide the necessary markets it would be necessary to consider some arrangement whereby a certain quantity of chrome should be allowed to go to Germany. A further difficulty in the way of Turkey freeing herself entirely from German markets was that her industries were equipped with German machinery, and it was only in Germany that spare parts could be readily obtained.

6. M. Menemencioglu then emphasised the importance which Turkey attached to obtaining a market for her tobacco. He referred very cursorily to an arrangement which the Turkish Government proposed to put forward for the purchase of tobacco by Great Britain and France. It appeared from what M. Menemencioglu said that the Turkish proposal followed much the same lines as the arrangement agreed on at the recent meeting of the Ministerial Sub-Committee on Economic Warfare, whereby the tobacco would be purchased with Turkish pounds advanced by the Turkish Government in anticipation of the service of the gold loan and the loan for liquidating frozen balances in the clearing. I suggested that M. Menemencioglu should broach this question with the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

7. As regards the detailed arrangements to be reached in connexion with the service of the armaments credit, the gold loan and the "deblocking" loan, M. Menemencioglu did not foresee that there would be any difficulties, since the main questions in this connexion had already been settled.

8. On leaving, M. Menemencioglu said that he had been instructed to finish his negotiations here and in Paris, and be back in Turkey within a fortnight. He thought that he might not be able to abide quite by the letter of these instructions, but he hoped, nevertheless, to finish his work in London in a week.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

NOTE.—M. Menemencioglu later saw Sir Orme Sargent, who took the opportunity of pointing out that the Suspense Clause referred only to the necessity of supplying Turkey with the material required for the defence of her Thracian frontier. No mention was made of her Caucasian frontier, nor had the question of the defence of this frontier ever entered into any discussions in connexion with the treaty. M. Menemencioglu admitted that this was the case, but urged the importance of strengthening the Caucasian front in the case of Russia adopting a threatening attitude.

[R 10884/7201/44] No. 131.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 681.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 1, 1939.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 674 of the 29th November regarding my conversation with the Turkish Secretary-General on the 29th November, I transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy of the record by Sir Alexander Cadogan of the conversation he had with M. Menemencioğlu the same afternoon.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Rome and Moscow and His Majesty's Ministers at Bucharest, Belgrade, Athens and Sofia.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

Enclosure in No. 131.

Note by Sir A. Cadogan.

THE Turkish Ambassador called upon me this evening, bringing with him M. Numan, the Secretary-General of the Turkish Foreign Office. M. Numan told me he had already been able to discuss certain matters with the Secretary of State, who had referred him to me for discussion of political questions, and he enquired of me what particular points I should like to raise.

I said, in the first place, that I should be very interested to hear if he could tell me anything about Turco-Italian relations. In reply, M. Numan said that these were at present correct: the Turkish Government had found the Italian Government polite and not unfriendly, though there had been no definite development. On their side the Turkish Government had tried in small ways to show the correctness of their attitude and to improve relations between the two countries. For instance, the Italian Government had recently requested Turkish help in supplying the Dodecanese Islands. Supplies for the Dodecanese had normally come almost entirely from Turkey, and many of these had come under a general prohibition of export. The Turkish Government had now agreed to allow certain produce to go forward to the islands. They were also endeavouring to develop commercial exchanges with Italy, which should be of benefit to both countries.

M. Numan then diverged to a discussion of the recent Roumanian proposals. He said that his Government had found these rather vague and impracticable, and did not seem to profess any faith in their realisation. Objection had been taken in certain quarters, and notably in Paris, to the idea of the association of Italy with a Balkan *bloc*. For their part the Turkish Government would have little apprehension on that score, and would not be afraid that Italy could exercise a preponderant position in the Balkans. He referred to the doubts which the Soviet Government had expressed on the subject, and he said that the Soviet Government had consulted the German Government, who, in turn, were in touch with Rome. The attitude of the German Government had been that they were quite in favour of the idea of a neutral Balkan *bloc* provided Turkey were not included in it. M. Numan had reproached Herr von Papen for this attitude on the part of the German Government, but Herr von Papen had simply replied that Germany and Turkey had enough to reproach each other for: let them get on with the negotiation of the commercial agreement.

I referred with satisfaction to the recent Bulgarian-Turkish *détente*, which had been produced by the arrangement for the withdrawal of troops on both sides of the frontier. M. Numan said that his Government were satisfied that this had been beneficial: they knew, as a matter of fact, that the maintenance of a considerable number of troops on the Balkan side of the frontier was causing grave embarrassment, financial and other, to the Bulgarian Government, who were only too anxious to withdraw them. The Turkish Government were glad to

facilitate this and at the same time to bring about an improvement in the relations between the two countries. I took the opportunity to ask M. Numan, seeing that he had emphasised the need for improving Turkish-Bulgarian relations, whether, on the analogy of what had been done recently by Italy and Greece, it might be possible to exchange notes with the Bulgarian Government on the subject of the mutual withdrawal. M. Numan at first said that the cases were not analogous, that Italy had demanded a renewal of the Italo-Greek Agreement, which was nearing expiry, and the Greek Government had been disinclined to comply. Two months later the Italian Government had raised the matter again, and in face of this persistence M. Metaxas had agreed at least on an exchange of notes regarding the withdrawal of troops. Moreover, there already existed a Turkish-Bulgarian Treaty, and M. Numan feared that an exchange of notes such as I had suggested might be held to detract from the force of that treaty. I said that it seemed to me that, provided the exchange of notes went no further than recording the fact of the withdrawal, I did not see that it would be open to this latter objection. M. Numan said that he certainly did not reject the idea, and he took note of it and said that he would reflect upon it.

M. Numan then asked if I could tell him anything about our relations with Russia. I told him that in general we desired to keep these on as good a footing as might be possible, but I had to confess that that did not always seem very easy. In an attempt to improve and develop relations we had, about a month ago, given M. Maisky certain proposals for a special economic agreement, but we were still awaiting a reply from the Soviet Government. In the meanwhile, Soviet propaganda had latterly become bitterly hostile to this country to such a point that the Secretary of State had felt impelled to draw the attention of the Soviet Ambassador to the matter and to beg him to do what might be possible in Moscow.

M. Numan said that, as we knew, the relations between the Soviet and the Turkish Government had been fairly close for a number of years, and that the Turkish Government for their part did not wish to alter that situation. They had hoped recently that they might have played a useful part in serving as a bridge between us and the Soviet; unfortunately they had so far been disappointed in this, but they hoped that a moment might come when they might play a useful part in that respect.

Finally, M. Numan referred to the communication recently made to General Orbay by the First Lord of the Admiralty, which, as we knew, had given rise to some slight misunderstanding at Angora, the Turkish Government having seen in it a possible diminution of the obligations devolving upon us under article 1 of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement. I gave to M. Numan the text of the message which we had authorised His Majesty's Ambassador in Angora to give to the Turkish Government, assuring the latter that under article 1 of the treaty we recognised that we were bound to come to the assistance of Turkey in the event of her being involved in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression by that Power, and that no reservation was made or implied in the case of aggression by the Soviet Union. We had not hitherto defined the nature of the assistance which we should afford Turkey in the event of an attack by the Soviet Union, and the communication made to General Orbay by the First Lord was merely an indication of the nature of the assistance we were prepared to render. This communication did not and could not affect the terms of the treaty. I found that this explanation did not entirely satisfy M. Numan, and I think I see his difficulty. He pointed out that the assistance contemplated in the communication made by the First Lord of the Admiralty was hedged round by various reservations in regard to the Mediterranean situation and to the attitude of Italy. This was all right if that communication referred only to a case where there was a threat of a war from Russia and not to a case where hostilities had already broken out. The explanation which we had authorised Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen to give seemed to show that the assistance contemplated in Mr. Churchill's communication was the assistance which we should give in the event of hostilities. In such a case the Turkish Government felt that we were bound to lend all aid and assistance in our power, and he felt that the communication was of rather too restrictive a nature. If, however, it referred solely to the event of a threat of war by Russia, he had nothing further to say on the subject. I promised M. Numan to study the matter further and to discuss it with him again.

On looking at the text of the communication made by Mr. Churchill, it certainly appears to me to refer only to the case of threat of war. The communication begins with the words: "In the event of Turkey being menaced by Russia." Later appears the phrase: "However, if Turkey felt herself in danger and asked for British naval assistance."

A. C.

November 29, 1939.

[R 10949/2613/67] No. 132.

Sir P. Loraine to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received December* 2.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 366. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Rome, November* 29, 1939.

ON 26th November, on my way through Paris, I was able to see M. Numan Menemencioğlu, the Secretary-General of the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, with whom, during my term of office in Angora, I constantly collaborated, as your Lordship will recollect, in the frankest and friendliest manner.

2. M. Numan Menemencioğlu will no doubt have reached London by the time this telegram comes under your Lordship's attention, and will have explained to you the ideas of his Government about the present situation in the Balkans. It may, nevertheless, be of advantage to summarise the conversation which I had with his Excellency on the subject.

3. M. Numan Menemencioğlu seemed to me definitely of the opinion that territorial changes in the Balkans must in present circumstances be eschewed, although every effort should, nevertheless, be made to improve and strengthen relationships and to act in a conciliatory way towards Bulgaria.

4. As regards Bulgaria, he did not believe that this country was by any means won over to the German cause, and in his opinion the alleged swing of Bulgarian opinion in a sympathetic direction towards Russia had been a good deal exaggerated. He, at all events, felt certain that the Bulgarian Government was by no means anxious for a rapprochement with the Soviets. He had had in Sofia a long conversation with Mr. Rendel. He had given Mr. Rendel a free hand to do what he could to promote and foster the betterment of Turco-Bulgarian relations. Mr. Rendel had appeared to be in favour of a Belgrade–Sofia–Angora axis. I would realise from my experience in Angora, M. Numan Menemencioğlu said, that this suggestion could hardly accord with Turkish views. Such an alignment was bound to have a bad reception in Bucharest and Athens. Bucharest was certainly the most difficult and weakest point to-day in the Balkans; Roumanian displeasure might, perhaps, be faced with a certain equanimity, but the Turkish Government would be most unwilling to alienate Greek sympathies. On this point, therefore, he had not been able to fall in with Mr. Rendel's views, although he did not fail to appreciate their value and sincerity.

5. The Roumanian proposals for the formation of a neutral *bloc* in the Balkans comprising Italy were, in his opinion, dead. The Turkish Government, in virtue of their relations with the Soviets, and in view of Russian situation, had had to inform Moscow, and, although M. Molotov had undertaken to give the matter his careful consideration, no definite Russian reaction had been obtained, and Russia's response must therefore be regarded as negative. M. Numan Menemencioğlu was bound to infer that Moscow had placed itself in communication with Berlin, and he presumed that Rome had been informed through Berlin and maybe from other quarters also. He surmised that there was an exchange of views on the subject between Moscow and Berlin and between Berlin and Rome. The reactions of London and Paris were clear, tangible, and, on the whole, quite favourable to the exploration of the Roumanian thesis. Before long there would be a meeting of the Balkan States to consider the situation resulting from the reaction of the Great Powers, and his forecast was that the Roumanian proposal would have to be dropped, although that did not necessarily exclude the formulation of other proposals for a similar purpose.

6. In the meanwhile, Turkey's outlook towards Italy had definitely changed. No one was better aware than I of the reserved attitude towards Italy which Turkey had been obliged for some years past to adopt. But the position was now

changed, and he was able to tell me that his Government were now quite willing for friendlier and closer relations with Italy, a statement which it would have been impossible for him to make to me three or four months ago; and if in Rome, acting under your instructions, I could be instrumental in furthering this rapprochement, I should have a free field so far as Turkey herself was concerned. He believed that when I saw my Turkish colleague in Rome I should find that he had already received instructions to this effect from Angora. It was an undeniable fact that Italy had established herself as a Balkan Power, and that she had an important stake and interest in the Balkans. There was, therefore, nothing illogical, and there might well be advantage in recognising that situation of fact, if not under the formula suggested by the Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, at any rate by some other method of a similar nature. It was, of course, Italy's abstention from the present hostilities, her decision not to fight on the German side, and the more conciliatory attitude which she had recently adopted, *e.g.*, *vis-à-vis* Greece, that had been the principal factors in the change of situation. Turkey was therefore willing for a rapprochement with Italy, the more so as she was now the ally of England and France, and felt that such a rapprochement would be consonant with the wishes and interests of the two Western Powers. There was one point, however, which he would like to make plain, though it did not detract from the statement he had just made. It was that when the time came for a general settlement Turkey would trust to England and France to find some means of removing the open sore which Turkey still felt that the fortified base in the Dodecanese still represented in Turco-Italian relations. He foresaw that it would require a great deal of skill and persistence on the part of the Western Powers to heal this sore, but he wished to make the point now and hoped that it might be borne steadfastly in mind.

7. I told M. Numan Menemencioğlu that I fully appreciated the importance of his statement, and that I myself was confident that it would be very welcome to His Majesty's Government. He was no doubt aware that, since undertaking my duties in Rome, I had been particularly careful not to prejudice by anything that I might say the attitude of the Turkish Government towards Italy, on the one hand, by not giving the Italian Government any reason to suppose that a more forthcoming attitude towards Italy could be expected on the part of Turkey, and, on the other hand, by not recommending to you any advances to the Italian Government which the Turkish Government might conceivably have regarded as detrimental to their interests. M. Numan Menemencioğlu said that he and his Government were well aware of the attitude that I had taken up in Rome, and that there had been nothing in it of which they could not approve.

8. I told M. Numan Menemencioğlu that I had been recently consulted by you (and I hope your Lordship would feel that I was justified in so doing) as regards the desirability of ascertaining whether any Anglo-Italian co-operation would be possible and useful as regards the formation of a neutral *bloc* in the Balkans, and I gave him a brief outline of the reasons which seemed to me to render this course undesirable. I told him I had further expressed the view that, if co-operation in a Balkan policy with Italy was a desirable thing—and in certain conditions it obviously might be—I thought that the initiative should come rather from the East than from the West, and that matters would be on a surer basis if England and France were requested by the Balkan *Entente* States to use their good offices in the matter, after themselves ascertaining the bases on which some settlement with Italy could be found.

9. M. Numan Menemencioğlu said that he recognised the logic, as well as the loyalty to his own country and their Balkan partners, of this point of view. But it had one defect. If, after the rather chequered history of relations between the Balkan States and Italy, and especially between Turkey and Italy, of the last years, a direct approach was made by them or by Turkey on their behalf to Rome, the Italians would really have gained their main point, for the Balkan *Entente* would then appear at Rome in the guise of a suppliant for Italian favour.

10. I said that I, in my turn, appreciated the force of his arguments. It seemed, however, that the gap between his project and the one that I had outlined was by no means unbridgeable; and that the formula then should be that any instructions which I or I and my French colleague were to receive with a view to drawing Italy and the Balkan *Entente* States closer together, and harmonising Anglo-French with Italian policy towards the Balkans, should be concerted

between Turkey, with the knowledge and consent of her Balkan partners, and the British and French Governments. This ought to ensure that everybody's views were taken into full account, and guarantee us, so far as was humanly possible, against any misunderstanding. M. Numan Menemencioğlu cordially agreed that this method ought to succeed in reconciling the difference between our two theses. I added that, of course, no steps in this direction could usefully be considered until after the inter-Balkan consultation, and in this he likewise concurred.

11. M. Numan Menemencioğlu's frank statement of the evolution of his Government's attitude towards Italy was impressive. But I was also struck by two other things which seemed to be in his mind: Firstly, uncertainty about the evolution of Russian policy, and to that I think must be largely attributable the change of attitude towards Italy; secondly, a sort of resignation to the possible collapse of Roumania, and, if that collapse could not be avoided, a casting about to see what means there were of making the best of a bad job. My mental inference was that Turkey would do everything she could to assist Roumania in maintaining her integrity and independence by political means, but was not prepared to use her military forces in the direct defence of Roumanian territory. It will be interesting to know whether the conversations that M. Numan Menemencioğlu may have with your Lordship and the members of your Department during his visit to London tend to confirm this inference.

[R 11081/7717/44] No. 133.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 735.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, December 4, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 748, paragraph 4, and my telegram No. 767.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me this morning to tell me that the German Ambassador continued to press for chrome. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was now contemplating making to Herr von Papen a proposal whereby, if Germany agreed to deliver to Turkey all outstanding orders of war material, including heavy artillery, Turkey would be prepared to supply up to 30,000 tons of chrome after German deliveries to Turkey had been completed. (Particulars of war material concerned are given in my immediately following telegram.)

2. In mentioning the figure 30,000, the Minister for Foreign Affairs again said something about "a promise" made by the Secretary-General. When I pressed him, he said it was not a definite promise, but rather a promise in principle. (As to this, see my telegram No. 725, paragraphs 5 and 6) He added, as he did on the occasion reported in my telegram No. 748, that he was certain that the total chrome production could be brought up to 230,000 tons.

3. In reply to a request for my views, I said, as I understood it, you would regard the governing consideration to be the essential importance of ensuring that Germany obtained no chrome whatever. I said, however, that I would ascertain your views.

4. The Minister for Foreign Affairs' own view is that Germany is eventually 100 per cent. certain to refuse his proposal, as she could not spare the material (as to this, see my telegram No. 748, paragraph (3), and my telegram No. 725, paragraph (2)). He thinks, however, that there is just a possibility she might accept, in order to create difficulties for Turkey with ourselves and France and to make play with her success in securing such an arrangement. In any case, the offer would be made with the intention of securing its refusal and thereby putting an end to German pressure for chrome.

5. The Minister for Foreign Affairs does not propose to say anything to the German Ambassador until he has consulted the Prime Minister; so there may be a short delay.

6. I cannot altogether escape from the impression that the Minister for Foreign Affairs' remarks to me were partly designed as a means of pressure to hasten a favourable settlement of the chrome negotiations in London. Nevertheless, it cannot be overlooked that the prospect of securing war materials on the list in my immediately following telegram, especially the anti-tank guns, is very attractive to Turkey, and the whole business gives the German Ambassador an opportunity for mischief.

[R 11091/7717/44] No. 134.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received December* 5.)

(No. 796.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, December* 4, 1939.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Following is the list of materials referred to:—

A. 10 24 centim. guns.
B. 12 21 centim. guns.
C. 19 15 centim. [? 10·5] howitzers.
D. 68 aeroplanes (fighters and bombers).
E. 1 submarine.
F. 60 7·5 centim. anti-aircraft guns.
G. 280 anti-tank guns.
H. 108 7·5 centim. guns.
I. 3,300 light machine guns.
J. 580 heavy machine guns.
K. 33 locomotives.
L. Optical and other instruments.

2. Of above, delivery of items A. to F. inclusive was refused by Germany before the war broke out; the remainder since.

[R 11082/7717/44] No. 135.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received December* 6.)

(No. 799.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, December* 5, 1939.

MY telegram No. 795.

I have since written to Minister for Foreign Affairs drawing his attention to the fact that our negotiations regarding chrome had already reached the point where understanding had been reached, that no Turkish chrome should be sent to Germany either directly or indirectly.

[R 11081/7717/44] No. 136.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 657.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 7, 1939.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 795 and 796 [of 4th December], and No. 799 [of 5th December: Chrome].

Unless you see objection, please point out to Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government would regard it as a serious breach of faith if Turkish Government reached an agreement regarding chrome with the German Government while negotiations on the subject are proceeding with the Secretary-General here. His Majesty's Government cannot believe that the Turkish Government contemplate such action.

[R 11308/7717/44] No. 137.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received December* 9.)

(No. 811.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Angora, December* 8, 1939.

MY telegram No. 687, paragraph 6.

Following a fruitless attempt to induce the Anatolian Agency to publish in its news bulletin a translation of the *Pravda* article of 14th November attacking the Turkish newspaper *Tan*, Deutsches Nachrichten-Büro proceeded to insert the translation in the German Embassy organ *Turkische Post* of Istanbul

Large numbers of copies of a Turkish translation can then be distributed throughout the country in envelopes marked: "German Embassy 'German Press Service.'"

The action of the German Embassy officially disseminating an attack on a Turkish newspaper has roused a storm of indignation in the press and amongst all shades of public opinion. *Yeni Sabah*, issued yesterday, published an article entitled: "Supreme Insolence," by Hussein Cahid, bitterly assailing the German Ambassador and Embassy for their insolence and lack of tact, and threatening, if German propaganda did not cease forthwith, to publish a translation of the *Dark Invader*.

Tan, commenting on the incident, enquires whether the German Information Bureau is attempting to embroil Turkey with Russia.

Translations of his press articles on the subject by bag.

[R 11301/7201/44] No. 138.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 667.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 9, 1939.

I HAD a long conversation with the Turkish Secretary-General yesterday, a full record of which will go to you by bag. The following are the salient points arising from the Secretary General's remarks concerning: (*a*) the present position of Roumania, and (*b*) Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union:-

As regards (*a*):—

2. Turkey, whose policy as a Power athwart the Straits is to refrain from taking definite sides between Russia on the one hand and Great Britain and France on the other, will not go to war for Bessarabia. In the Secretary-General's personal opinion, a Soviet invasion of Bessarabia would be less dangerous than war between Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

3. Whether or not Turkey would consider a Soviet attack on Bessarabia to be an occasion for consultation with Great Britain and France under article 5 of the treaty would depend on the circumstances at the moment.

4. Turkey would not expect the Soviet Union to consult her before attacking Bessarabia.

5. The possibility of a Soviet attack on Bessarabia is not to be excluded. The Soviet Union would probably wish to ensure that her action did not entail awkward complications. For this reason she would probably confine her attack to Bessarabia. She would be unlikely to go further unless she were aiming ultimately at the Straits and were prepared for a war with Great Britain and France. It is in Germany's interests to urge the Soviet Union to undertake aggressive action in the Balkans in order to embroil her with the Allies.

6. The Roumanian Minister's recent representations with a view to obtaining the extension of the Allied guarantee to Roumania to include an attack by Soviet Russia is tantamount to a request for a new guarantee. The moment is badly chosen. A declaration on the lines suggested by the Roumanian Minister would be highly provocative to the Soviet Union and add nothing to Roumania's security.

7. In the event of a Soviet attack on Bessarabia, Roumania's resistance would probably be perfunctory if she was satisfied that the attack would be confined to Bessarabia. If she thought that the attack would go further than Bessarabia, she would be likely to resist with all her power.

8. If a Soviet attack on Bessarabia were followed up by penetration into the Danube delta and across the Danube into the Dobruja and Bulgaria, Turkey's action would depend largely on the attitude of Bulgaria; but whatever Bulgaria's attitude, Turkey would regard any Russian advance across the Danube as a menace to her vital interests.

As regards (*b*):—

9. The Secretary-General thought it still possible that Turkey might be the means of building a bridge between Great Britain and France on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other. He was not convinced that agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union was necessarily complete

10. His impression was that, after some further noisy complaints, the Soviet Union would resume conversations with Turkey.

See my two immediately following telegrams.

(Repeated to Moscow, No. 348; Bucharest, No. 763; Sofia, No. 315; and Geneva, League of Nations, No. 29.)

[R 11361/7201/44] No. 139.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 668.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 9, 1939.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

The following are the salient points arising from the Turkish Secretary-General's remarks regarding Turkey's relations with Bulgaria, made during his conversation with me yesterday :—

2. The Secretary-General proposes to discuss with Mr. Rendel, during his passage through Sofia on his return to Turkey, Turco-Bulgarian relations in general, and in particular the question whether the recent mutual withdrawal of troops from the Turco-Bulgarian frontier might be embodied in an exchange of notes.

3. The Secretary-General thought it would be very useful if something could be done on the lines of the suggestion that the agreement regarding the withdrawal of troops should be followed up by the Turkish Government proposing to the Bulgarian Government that, if the latter received demands of a threatening nature from the Soviet Union, they would undertake to consult the Turkish Government before returning any reply.

(Repeated to Sofia, No. 316, and Moscow, No. 340.)

[R 11304/7213/44] No. 140

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 817.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, December 9, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 813.

I was unable to see Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday to act on your telegram No. 657, but I saw him this morning and pointed out that his proposal regarding chrome, reported in my telegram No. 795, had produced a very strong reaction on your part, and that I had been instructed to point out that we had understood from him that no arrangement would be made regarding chrome for Germany so long as discussions were going on with Secretary-General in London. I said you even feared that he was going back on his undertaking.

2. Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had opened our conversation by remarking that things were going badly in London, pointed out he had, indeed, said that no arrangement would be made with Germany during Secretary-General's visit, but that he had at the same time pressed for increased purchases of figs and raisins. (This is perfectly true, as is shown by paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 752.) He went on to say that Turkey might in three or four months find herself at war with Germany or Russia or both. It would be very difficult for her to face such a situation without necessary supplies of anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, and with her internal economy and her public opinion impaired by failure to dispose of her products. He was perfectly prepared at any time to face a "rupture" with Germany, but he must look to his Allies to help him out of these difficulties. I asked whether by "rupture" he meant commercial "rupture" only or also diplomatic "rupture." He said he was prepared to face both. In reply to my remark that we had already done a great deal, he said he admitted this readily, but the dangers and difficulties to which he had alluded remained. He urged that the question of purchase of Turkish products should not be dealt with on a purely commercial basis.

3. In addition to question of guns, figs and raisins, he said he was encountering great obstacles in securing certain exports from the United Kingdom, especially tin and also spare parts for factory machinery. There were a number of factories supplied with German machinery; he must either get spare parts from England or Germany or close down the factories. He suggested that a British expert should visit these factories and see what could be done to meet these needs.

4. He mentioned a suggestion which I had not heard, namely, some form of Anglo-French-Turkish Agreement which should include (it was understood) a general export prohibition from Turkey. He seemed to think this impossible unless he could sell on a large scale to the Allies. He seemed, however, willing, in certain circumstances, to contemplate prohibition of exports to Germany. He is, however, replying shortly to Secretary-General on these points.

5. In general, he was distinctly perturbed by the turn things seemed to be taking, and it seemed to me that unless we are able to give him some satisfaction, dangers referred to in my telegrams Nos. 695, 724 and 747 will become immediate.

[R 11365/7717/44] No. 141

Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 818. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, December 9, 1939.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Actual position between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the German Ambassador regarding chrome is that the Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for the German Ambassador a day or two ago and made a strong protest in connexion with the incident reported in my telegram No. 811. I am reporting further on this in my immediately following telegram. Having dealt with that subject, the Minister for Foreign Affairs informed German Ambassador that, in present circumstances, it was quite impossible to continue talking about chrome. The German Ambassador was exceedingly depressed by this.

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me of the above in strictest confidence, and at first asked me not to pass it on. He subsequently agreed to my doing so.

3. He also stated that German Ambassador had made very severe threats as to the consequence of refusal by the Turkish Government to sell chrome to Germany, even, as I understood, severance of diplomatic relations.

[R 11309/7378/44] No. 142.

Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen to Viscount Halifax. (Received December 10.)

(No. 821.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, December 9, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 813 and my telegram No. 817.

1. General Orbay, who returned to-day, sent for my military attaché this afternoon.

2. Following is the report of what General Orbay said :—

In his last interview with General Ironside the latter had promised, providing the situation was quiet on the Western Front, he would let Turkey purchase what war material, additional to that mentioned in the report of the Larden [*sic*: ? London] conversations, could be made available for Turkey now; [? group omitted] whether time of delivery of the material already promised could be shortened, and what fresh material could now be promised in view of 1940 production forecasts. The situation on the Western Front was quiet, but no information had yet arrived. General Orbay had had a similar promise from General Gamelin and expected an answer from him by 17th December. He was aware that the situation in the Middle East had been discussed at the inter-Allied meeting last week, and that he awaited the promised information with impatience.

3. He had explained to many British and French high authorities that it was improbable that Germany could attack on the Western Front and that the principal danger lay in a combined Russo-German descent on the Balkans. Both British and French Chiefs of Staff had agreed with him as to that and yet nothing was being done to implement this agreement. The time to prepare was now and we were already well into the winter. Neither the marshal nor General Orbay could understand the delay. Either he had failed to make his case clear or the Allies did not trust Turkey, or they were so obsessed with the Western Front that they could not regard the Allied war problem in a large way. He did not [? group omitted: think] he had failed to state his case. Turkey's actions through 1939 were sure proof of her good faith.

4. He realised the difficulties of production, but surely two immense empires like France and Britain could somehow produce the necessary anti-tank guns. He had had offers for supply from abroad, even through British agents in the United Kingdom (he mentioned Norman Cooper), but British Treasury was adamant. After a great struggle, he had obtained leave to pay for twenty-four anti-aircraft guns in Sweden with British credits, but now, owing to the situation in Finland, Swedish Government would not release them. Could not even this credit be transferred elsewhere? What was the good of equipping French and British forces behind the Maginot Line to 100 per cent. if they were never attacked, while meanwhile Turkey might be overrun by German and Russian combination? It was better to equip the forces in the west to 75 per cent. and Turkey to 25 per cent.

5. In the event of an attack on the Balkans, General Gamelin had promised five Allied divisions. What was the good of five divisions, especially of the quality of those in Syria. They would, in any case, probably arrive too late. Turks had ample divisions to meet all-comers, but must have modern material. Anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns and light machine guns were their main need, especially the first. Turks had cut their demand from 2,500 to 1,000, which was the minimum for safety. His inability to make the Allied commanders realise how vital the situation was worried him. It was like a curtain of misunderstanding. German and Turkish Ministers had never understood each other and had never co-operated freely in the Great War. It would be terrible if a similar misunderstanding of each other's vital necessities occurred with the Allies.

6. Shipment of raw material was also question of vital necessity and much time had already been wasted.

7. General Orbay was always optimistic that, with goodwill and understanding, more material could be supplied, and he knew from his stay in England that goodwill existed; did understanding, especially of the time factor?

8. He concluded with an official request from the marshal that the military attaché should at once telegraph requesting promised reply from General Ironside, and that both he and the marshal felt and prayed that it could not be unfavourable.

[R 11361/7201/44] No. 143.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 669.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 10, 1939.

MY immediately preceding telegrams.

In the course of a long conversation with me yesterday on questions of common political interest the Turkish Secretary-General said that Turkey would not object to the association of Italy in the formation of a Balkan *bloc*. His impression was that Italy would like to collaborate in this work. In his opinion, however, the Italian tendency in this direction should be allowed to manifest itself and be given encouragement, but that it would be a mistake to force the pace.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 717; Bucharest, No. 764; Belgrade, No. 434; Sofia, No. 317; Athens, No. 530; and Geneva, League of Nations, No. 30.)

[R 11361/7201/44] No. 144.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 702.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 13, 1939.

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 667, 668 and 669 of the 9th December, I transmit to you the accompanying record of my conversation with the Turkish Secretary-General on the 8th December.

2. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Rome and Moscow and His Majesty's Ministers at Bucharest, Budapest, Belgrade, Athens and Sofia.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

Enclosure in No. 144.

Record of a Conversation between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Secretary-General on December 8, 1939.

Lord Halifax said that he wished to take advantage of M. Menemencioğlu's visit in order to have a frank exchange of views on certain questions of common political interest. The first subject he would like to discuss was the series of problems arising from the present position of Roumania. Roumania was apprehensive of an attack by Soviet Russia and anxious that the Allied guarantee should be extended to apply to that eventuality. The attitude of His Majesty's Government was that the guarantee, though given in general terms, had been intended to refer to the possibility of an attack by Germany. Any action, therefore, which His Majesty's Government might eventually take in the event of an attack by Russia would naturally depend first of all on the attitude of Turkey—quite apart from another important factor, namely, the attitude of Italy. Lord Halifax therefore asked M. Menemencioğlu what would be the attitude of Turkey in the event of a Soviet attack on Bessarabia.

M. Menemencioğlu said that the Soviet Government had recently also asked what would be the attitude of Turkey in the event of hostilities between the Soviet Union and Roumania. In spite of the insistence of the Soviet Government, the Turkish Government had replied that they could not say what their attitude would be in such an event. As regards Lord Halifax's enquiry, M. Menemencioğlu said that he was not fully acquainted with all the most recent developments. But it was obvious that one of two things might happen. The question could be settled either pacifically or by force. If it were settled pacifically, this would be the best solution both for Turkey and for the Allies. If it were settled by force, the question arose whether the Roumanians would resist or not. The Roumanian Minister in London had given him to understand last night that Roumania would resist an attack in any circumstances and at whatever cost. He himself thought that if the Roumanians could be sure that an attack would stop on the borders of Bessarabia, their resistance would be perfunctory. If, however, they thought that the attack was likely to go further, they would resist and would start such resistance in Bessarabia.

As regards the attitude of Turkey, M. Menemencioğlu pointed out that a Power situated astride the Dardanelles must always, as far as possible, refrain from taking definite sides between the biggest Power of the Black Sea and the Powers of the Mediterranean. For this reason Turkey had always tried to remain a bridge between Great Britain and France on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other. Even now, he did not exclude the possibility that Turkey would be the means of building such a bridge. He was not convinced that agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union was necessarily complete. For this reason he did not think that a Soviet attack on Bessarabia would necessarily result in Turkey opening the Straits, for the Straits could be opened only if Turkey went to war, and for Turkey to go to war over Bessarabia would be contrary to the fundamental principles of her policy.

Lord Halifax expressed his appreciation of the frankness with which M. Menemencioğlu had answered his question. He fully understood that the

deciding factor would be the effect which any action by Soviet Russia would have on the vital interests of Turkey. There were two further questions in this connexion which he would like to put to M. Menemencioğlu. Firstly, supposing that the Bessarabian question arose as a result of an attack by Soviet Russia, would Turkey consider that to be an occasion for consultation with Great Britain and France, under article 5 of the treaty; and, secondly, would Turkey expect that the Soviet Union would consult her before taking action?

Answering the second of the two questions first, *M. Menemencioğlu* said that he thought it most unlikely that the Soviet Union would consult Turkey before deciding to commit an act of aggression. As regards the first question, he said that, although protocol 2 of the treaty applied to the whole treaty, the point whether it would be invoked in regard to the consultation article had purposely been left by the Turkish Government undefined. The question whether the three Governments should consult together would have to be decided when the occasion arose and in the light of the circumstances obtaining at the moment.

Lord Halifax then asked M. Menemencioğlu whether he thought it likely that a Soviet attack on Bessarabia would take place, and, if so, whether such an attack would be likely to be confined to Bessarabia or go further.

M. Menemencioğlu said that this was an extremely difficult question to answer. He himself did not exclude the possibility of a Soviet attack on Bessarabia. He thought it probable, however, that the Soviet Union would try to ensure that their action did not entail awkward complications, and, if this was true, it seemed probable that the attack would be limited to Bessarabia. It was obvious that an attack beyond the borders of Bessarabia would have serious repercussions throughout the Balkans and throughout Europe. It was, therefore, unlikely that they would resort to such an attack unless they had decided on hostilities with the Allies. In short, it was unlikely that the Soviet Union would advance further than Bessarabia unless they had already made up their minds to establish themselves on the Dardanelles.

Lord Halifax asked M. Menemencioğlu what importance he attached to the recent attacks on Roumania in the Soviet press and the similarity of these attacks with those that had been directed against the Baltic States.

M. Menemencioğlu said that he was without all the elements to form a proper appreciation of the situation. The previous evening the Roumanian Minister had told him that his Government were anxious that Great Britain and France should now make an explanatory declaration to the effect that their guarantee referred to the possibility of an attack by the Soviet Union. M. Menemencioğlu had told M. Tilea that, in his opinion, the moment for such a declaration was badly chosen, that it would be highly provocative to the Soviet Union, and would add nothing to Roumania's security.

Lord Halifax remarked that, in conversation with him yesterday, M. Tilea had said that such a redefinition of the Allied guarantee would have the effect of dissuading Roumania from evoking the help of Germany against Soviet Russia. Lord Halifax had replied that this view left aside other important factors. M. Menemencioğlu here asked whether the Roumanian Government had been told of the view of His Majesty's Government and the French Government regarding their guarantee. Lord Halifax replied that they had been told, some time ago, that, although given in general terms, the guarantee had been meant to apply to the possibility of an attack by Germany, in which case it would have been possible for Great Britain and France to render effective assistance to Roumania. It had been pointed out that the guarantee had never been intended to apply to the possibility of an attack by Soviet Russia, where the question of assistance raised much more difficult problems. The Roumanian Government had therefore been told that it was hoped that they would not raise the question whether the guarantee applied to Soviet Russia, since, if they did so, the answer would probably be in the negative. M. Menemencioğlu said that, in view of this explanation, it was quite clear that the Roumanian Government's present request was tantamount to a request for a new guarantee. M. Tilea had told him that Germany had offered to assist Roumania against the Soviet Union. M. Menemencioğlu's reply to this was that the Roumanian Government should ask for some guarantee to this effect in writing. The existence of such a written guarantee would be very useful to us all. To sum up, his personal view was that

a Soviet invasion of Bessarabia was less dangerous for us all and for Roumania herself than a war between Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

Lord Halifax then asked what would be the attitude of the Turkish Government if a Soviet attack on Bessarabia was followed up by penetration into the delta of the Danube and across the Danube into the Dobruja and Bulgaria.

M. Menemencioğlu said that such an attack would become a Balkan question and the attitude of the Turkish Government would depend on the attitude of Bulgaria, the attitude of Italy and the attitude of Yugoslavia. Most important would be the attitude of Bulgaria. As he had already said, he did not think that the Soviet Union would invade Roumania proper unless already determined to fight Great Britain and France. At the same time, it was quite clear that Germany was doing her best to urge the Soviet Union to involve herself in a Balkan war in order that she should become embroiled with the Allies. When the danger arrived, Turkey's attitude would depend largely on whether or not Bulgaria was ready to resist or decided to remain neutral. He thought it unlikely that the Bulgarians would allow Soviet troops through Bulgaria without resistance, since it was quite obvious that, once the Russians were established on the Dardanelles, it would be essential for them to occupy the European hinterland, and Bulgaria would be reduced to the position of a vassal State. The peasant population of Bulgaria were well balanced, and he did not attach undue importance to the danger of Communist propaganda among them. In reply to a question from Lord Halifax, M. Menemencioğlu said that, whatever the attitude of Bulgaria, Turkey would regard any Russian advance across the Danube as a menace to her vital interests.

Passing to the subject of Bulgaria, M. Menemencioğlu, in reply to an enquiry from Lord Halifax, said that he found it difficult to give a definite answer to the question put to him a few days ago by Sir Alexander Cadogan, whether it would not be possible to incorporate the recent mutual withdrawal of troops from the Turco-Bulgarian frontier in an exchange of notes. He hoped, on his return, to have a conversation with Mr. Rendel at Sofia on the general subject of Turco-Bulgarian relations, and he would study the question further at Angora. Lord Halifax then suggested that it might be possible to follow up the recent agreement regarding the reduction of troops by the Turkish Government proposing to the Bulgarian Government that, if the latter received demands of a threatening nature from the Soviet Union, they would undertake to consult the Turkish Government before returning a reply. M. Menemencioğlu entirely agreed that it would be very useful if something could be done on these lines.

Lord Halifax then mentioned a reference which had been made to him by M. Tilea to certain articles which had recently appeared in the Turkish press, urging the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between Turkey and Roumania directed against Soviet Russia. M. Menemencioğlu said that the point had been mentioned to him also by M. Tilea. He said that the Turkish press were entirely free to publish what they liked, and that they very often published nonsense.

Lord Halifax then asked M. Menemencioğlu whether an early resumption of conversations was likely between Moscow and Angora.

M. Menemencioğlu said that his impression was that the Soviet Union could not easily maintain an officially hostile attitude towards Turkey. It was more in her interest to keep in good relations with Turkey than in the interests of Turkey to keep in good relations with her. His instinctive feeling was that, after a little more noisy complaining, the Soviet Government would resume conversations. The main concern of the Soviet Government was that Turkey should not, either as a result of her treaty with Great Britain and France or of the Montreux Convention, make the Black Sea into a war area. Turkey had made it perfectly clear that she had no wish to bring the war into the Black Sea if Soviet Russia did not bring the war into the Mediterranean.

Passing to the subject of Italy, *Lord Halifax* recalled that, in conversation with Sir Alexander Cadogan, M. Menemencioğlu had said that Turkey would not object to the association of Italy in the formation of a Balkan *bloc*. He understood, moreover, that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had recently told the Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Turkey would be ready to collaborate with Italy in that direction. Did M. Menemencioğlu think it

possible, he asked, to associate Italy with that work, did he think that any action by the Allies at Rome would be useful in this respect, and what importance did he attach to the mistrust felt by Yugoslavia and Greece as regards the possibility of Italian leadership in the Balkans?

In reply *M. Menemencioğlu* proceeded to explain the change in Turkey's attitude towards Italy. When Italy entered Albania, he said, it was clear that she regarded it as a bridgehead for further action. Turkey had therefore taken up a very clearly defined attitude. Since then, the position had changed as a result of the war and Italy's neutrality. Now other Powers besides Italy were casting covetous eyes on the Balkans, and, moreover, as a result of the Anglo-Turkish Treaty, the strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean had entirely changed. M. Menemencioğlu's impression was that Italy would like to collaborate in the formation of a Balkan *bloc*. Turkey would have no objection to such collaboration, but in the opinion of the Turkish Government it was necessary to let the tendency manifest itself and to try to encourage it. It would be a mistake to force the pace.

In conclusion *Lord Halifax* said that he looked forward to having another opportunity of discussing any outstanding points with M. Menemencioğlu. The latter then expressed himself as somewhat disheartened by the slow progress of his negotiations on financial and economic matters. He was afraid that he would return to Turkey without having accomplished the objects of his visit. Lord Halifax said that he fully realised that, on some important points, His Majesty's Government had not been able to meet the Turkish Government's requirements. He hoped, however, that as the result of further conversations with the Ministers concerned, it would be found possible to reach satisfactory agreements. He hoped that M. Menemencioğlu would be able to leave his experts in London in order to clear up any points which might be outstanding on his departure.

Foreign Office, December 8, 1939.

[R 11567/7717/44] No. 145.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 711.)

My Lord, *Angora, December* 9, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that press and public opinion in this country has been considerably aroused by a fresh manifestation of German tactlessness and lack of elementary psychology.

2. The circumstances have been briefly recorded in my telegram No. 811. In amplification I have the honour to state that the Deutsches Nachrichten-Büro recently asked the Anatolian Agency, the Turkish Official News Agency, to reproduce in its news bulletin a translation of an article published by the Soviet newspaper *Pravda* of the 14th November, in which, as reported in paragraph 6 of my despatch No. 687 of the 24th November, the Turkish newspaper *Tan* was severely taken to task.

3. The Anatolian Agency declined to give publicity in this country to the *Pravda's* comments, which could not but have an adverse effect on Turkish feelings for the Soviet Union. A German translation of the *Pravda* article was thereupon published in the *Türkische Post* of Istanbul which, as your Lordship is aware, is the organ of German interests in this country, while a Turkish translation was printed and circulated throughout Turkey in envelopes bearing the legend, "German Embassy—Press Service."

4. The first reactions to the latter move were immediate and violent. The degree of resentment felt may be gathered from the accompanying translations or summaries(1) of four articles from the newspapers *Yeni Sabah, Tan, Vakit* and

(1) Not printed.

Haber. Indeed, the last-mentioned paper, in its issue of the 7th December, reports that an enquiry has been opened and that the Public Prosecutor, who has been seized of the matter, declared to the press that "The matter is being examined and such legal steps as may be necessary will be taken." The *Haber* adds that endeavours are being made to identify the press responsible for printing the pamphlet, which appears to have been circulated not merely to the newspapers but to other addresses as well. The comments of the Director-General of the Anatolian Agency, in conversation with the counsellor of this embassy yesterday, are also indicative of what is felt in official circles. After recounting the particulars detailed in the second and third paragraphs of the present despatch, M. Muvaffak Menemencioğlu went on to say that doubtless the reason why the Deutsches Nachrichten-Büro wished the translation of the *Pravda* article to appear in the Anatolian Agency bulletin, was that they should be in a position to reproduce it as having appeared with the full authority of that agency. He added that the Germans had again given proof of their absolute lack of tact. They seemed to see no incongruity in asking the agency to insert a Russian attack on an organ of the Turkish press, and nothing wrong in the German Embassy officially disseminating that attack.

5. Although there has been little time for opinions to crystallise, I may add that the view is held in some quarters that the idea underlying the dissemination of the article was to create bad blood between Turkish public opinion and the Soviet Union. This opinion is, indeed, voiced by the *Tan* in the enclosure referred to above. If so, this hope is not realised; the hostile Soviet article has been relegated to the background, and Turkish anger is focused entirely on the lengths to which German insolence is prepared to go. What is, moreover, of considerable importance from the Allied point of view is the loudly-voiced demand in the press for prompt Government measures to stamp out all forms of German propaganda in this country. In this connexion, I would venture to draw your Lordship's attention to the threat, contained in M. Huseyin Cahid Yalçin's article in the *Yeni Sabah*, to publish a translation of Captain von Rintelen's memoirs *The Dark Invader*, should the activities of the German Embassy in the field of propaganda continue to manifest themselves.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister of Information and to His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow.

I have, &c.

H. M. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

[R 11644/7378/44] No. 146.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. H. Campbell (Paris).

(No. 3003.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 16, 1939.

I TOOK occasion to remark to the French Ambassador to-day that I understood that M. Menemencioğlu was leaving London for Paris to-morrow and that he was going in good heart. If the French Government could see their way to treat him as kindly as we had done in the matter of anti-tank guns, he would be a reasonably happy man. M. Corbin asked whether we had been as kind to him in the matter of anti-aircraft guns, and I was bound to admit that we had found this more difficult. We had told him that we would give him 100 anti-tank guns which the French were holding for us, and I hoped that the French Government would see their way to do what was necessary on their side. We had also agreed to buy from Turkey a large quantity of sultanas, figs and nuts which we did not require, and we trusted that the French would follow our good example.

I am, &c.

HALIFAX.

[R 11695/2618/67] No. 147.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 836. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, December 16, 1939.*

YOUR telegram No. 677.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me he has no proof of collaboration between the U.S.S.R. and the German Government for common action in the Balkans. He says that the evidence is contradictory, and cited the following points:—

2.—(*a*) Germans are known to be arming the Roumanians against Russia. He mentioned this in strict confidence, but I have also been informed of it by a Turkish official, who had learned it from a member of the commercial staff of the German Embassy (a strong Nazi).

(*b*) The Russians are educating children in part of Poland under Soviet occupation *against Germany*.

(*c*) The Turkish Ambassador at Bucharest has been informed by M. Argetoianu that the Soviet Government recently requested the Roumanian Government to allow a number of Czechs who had been taken prisoners in Poland to migrate through Roumania to France in civilian clothes, as they desired to join the Czech force in France. The Roumanian Government had agreed to allow them to proceed in small numbers at a time.

(*d*) The German Ambassador has made use of language to the Minister for Foreign Affairs antagonistic to Russia, saying, for example, that Russia was now established along the Northern Roumanian frontier, but that if Germany had not been engaged in war in the west, it would have been impossible. The Minister for Foreign Affairs notices a sustained effort on the part of the German Ambassador to embroil him against Russia.

3. Summing up the circumstances, the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed the view that there was a fundamental hatred between Germany and Russia, but that their present circumstances might force them to sink their differences for the time being.

4. I told the Minister for Foreign Affairs that your information regarding possible Soviet-German co-operation came from the French Government, who had, I thought, received it from the Turkish General Staff. Naturally, the Turkish General Staff were right to prepare for all eventualities, but the impression my own service attachés had was that the Turkish General Staff had no definite information of this kind. The Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed that there was no definite proof.

5. My own impression is that either the Turkish General Staff have exaggerated the matter in order to emphasise the importance of supplies of war material, or that the French Government have done so in order to emphasise the importance of early preparations against attack in the Balkans.

6. I am sending by to-day's bag (in my despatch No. 729) a report by the military attaché, which shows that the Turkish General Staff are creating two army corps in Eastern Turkey, and are taking very definite steps to increase their defences on the Russian frontier.

7. Nevertheless, though it is clear that the Turkish General Staff hold the opinion that some movement by Russia will take place in the spring either in the Balkans or into Iran, there seems to be no confirmation of an actual joint Russo-German planning for such a move. The General Staff are even inclined to go so far as to think Russia will make no serious move till Germany is deeply engaged in the west, and that for this very reason both the Allies and Germany are shy of pushing the matter far on the Western Front.

(Repeated to Rome, Bucharest, Sofia, Belgrade and Athens.)

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[R 12139/7377/44] No. 148.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 872.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Angora, December 28, 1939.*

VERY severe earthquake has occurred principally in Erzincan District. No details at present, but probably over 1,000 dead.

2. No information as regards British subjects so far, but I consider casualties improbable.

3. I have expressed my own sympathy, but you may think fit to send some expression from His Majesty's Government as on previous occasion (see your telegram No. 62 of 1938).

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